Evaluation of the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF)

Final Report, January 7, 2002

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Office of the Inspector General

Evaluation Division

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Acronyms

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AP	Anti-personnel
BH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BHMAC	Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
CAW	Canadian Auto Workers
CCMAT	Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDC	Canadian International Demining Centre
CLF	Canadian Landmine Fund
CRC	Canadian Red Cross
CUSO	Canadian University Students Overseas
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRES	Defence Research Establishment Suffield
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Handicap International
IC	Industry Canada
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
ILX	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Mine Action Team
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IND	Mozambique National Demining Institute
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
ITEP	International Testing and Evaluation Program
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis

MAC	Mines Action Canada
MAPA	Mine Action Program in Afghanistan
MAU	Canadian International Development Agency Mine Action Unit
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NPA	Norwegian People=s Aid
OAS	Organization of American States
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
R&D	Research and Development
REACH	Radio Education for Afghan Children
SAC	Survey Action Centre
SFOR	NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
TPC	Technology Partnership Canada
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UXO	Unexploded Ordnances
WHO	World Health Organization
YMAAP	Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program

1.0 Executive Summary

The $100 million Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) was announced in December 1997 as a five year contribution to implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and toward mine action projects. Near the end of Fiscal 00/01, the four CLF partner departments (DFAIT, CIDA, DND and IC) launched a multi-phase evaluation process in support of discussions on the Government of Canada=s post-2003 approach to mine action support.

The scope of this first-phase evaluation included all CLF programming and activities and addressed in full or in part, three evaluation issues: the relevance of the CLF, the results achieved to date, and the effectiveness of selected CLF activities. The fieldwork for this study was conducted during the period from July 2001 to September 2001. Five data collection methodologies were used: document and literature review, project file review, interviews[1], e-mail survey questionnaires, and focus groups.

During the first three years of the fund, the CLF has been active in all five pillars of landmine programming including: advocacy, mine awareness, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and victim assistance.

Findings and Conclusions

General: Investments in key areas of land mine programming will be required well into the foreseeable future and beyond the current life of the CLF. It is important that host governments in affected countries recognize the need to make mine action programs more locally self-sustainable over time and the reality that external support must ultimately be of limited duration.

The CLF is clearly consistent with all of Canada=s foreign policy objectives, and its renewal at comparable levels is essential to maintain Canada=s credibility as a leader, both domestically and internationally, to encourage other donors= commitment, and to sustain the development of Canadian NGO mine action capacity.

The CLF was designed to meet ongoing treaty obligations, and to date, the CLF has not only enabled Canada to do so but has also responded to the need of mine affected communities..

[1]Five respondent groups were included: CLF departmental representatives; CLF funding recipients including Canadian and International NGOs, UN organisations, and private companies; other relevant international landmine-related organisations; other donor country representatives, and recipient country representatives.

Pillar #1, Advocacy: Through the CLF, Canada has made what is viewed as an effective and exemplary contribution towards universal acceptance and early ratification of the MBT. However, a key problem facing the ban landmine movement is the continued resistance of large, militarily significant countries to ratification and implementation of the MBT. Therefore, future efforts towards universalization can no longer rely upon the Ahumanitarian@ argument. Future efforts will require States Parties to utilize diplomatic and policy resources outside the scope of funded programs such as the CLF.

CLF efforts to improve the advocacy capacity of mine action groups in Canada and internationally have proven both useful and effective. While Canada has been successful in leveraging donor funding for ICBL, MAC remains very dependent on the Fund.

Pillar #2, Mine Awareness: Mine awareness programming did not receive as much attention as other CLF components. There is an urgent need, for a more structured assessment of how efforts in mine awareness have been linked first to a material change in the level of knowledge among target group members and secondly how this change in awareness may or may not result in changes in high-risk behavior.

Pillar #3, Stockpile Destruction: The CLF has contributed to efforts to reduce landmine stockpiles and these efforts have positioned Canada as a leader in the area of stockpile destruction programming.

Pillar #4, Mine Clearance: With respect to CLF mine clearance programming, it is difficult to conclude on the quality of the work being accomplished by each project. However, CLF funding has contributed to the development of effective national programs and to the development and completion of Level One Surveys, provided essential data on mines location and impact, and resulted in the clearance of high priority land.

There is a clearly apparent need for improvement in demining technologie**s**, given the magnitude of the problem of mined land and the slow pace of manual de-mining. The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) has become an internationally recognized centre of expertise for the testing and evaluation of demining and related technologies. As a result of the test and evaluation by CCMAT of several products developed largely by Canadian private companies, CCMAT has enabled at least three Canadian products to be Aproven@, and therefore successfully integrated within international demining operations.

In the area of R & D, CCMAT has been very active at the international level in sharing and distributing technical information and providing technical support. Progress continues on numerous R & D initiatives within CCMAT, however no products or equipment for use directly in demining operations have as yet been delivered. Although CCMAT undertook efforts to match R & D activities with user needs, the extent to which project selection decisions meet these needs remains unclear. The R & D community, including CCMAT,

has acknowledged the existence of a gap between researchers and users and is taking actions to resolve the issue.

The results achieved to date by Industry Canada in marketing and commercializing new or adapted demining technologies are limited to just one product. The lack of results appears to be due largely to the fact that the market for demining technology is not a normal commercial market and there appears to be very few Canadian companies with the capacity to develop potential demining technologies.

Development of mine action capacity in mine affected countries is a long-term investment that cannot reasonably be expected to have already yielded measurable results. Preliminary results nonetheless show that Canada is making a recognized contribution to increasing mine action capacity through its effective leveraging of other donor contributions and its support to national Mine Action Centres. Mine action capacity of Canadian NGOs is considered to be a secondary objective of the program. Canadian NGOS are deemed to be very effective in the area of advocacy but to need further development in the areas of demining and victim assistance.

Pillar #5, Victim Assistance: CLF victim assistance activities are impressive in volume and clearly essential in their positive impact on the lives of mine-affected people. However, given the wide range, complexity, length, and cost of victim assistance initiatives, it is difficult to draw general conclusions as to the program=s results in this area. Most stakeholders consulted consider that more needs to be done in this domain and that victim assistance activities should be better integrated with development programming.

Some Niche Areas for the CLF

Potential niche areas of Canadian excellence are beginning to emerge. These should be closely monitored and assessed as areas where Canada could concentrate its efforts over the long term. Some emerging niche areas are:

$ **Stockpile destruction**: The CLF could continue to demonstrate Canadian leadership in this important area of landmine programming.

$ **Testing and evaluation of demining technologies**: The CLF could continue to support Canada=s internationally recognized work in testing and evaluation of demining technologies.

$ **Level One Surveys**: The CLF could continue to invest in and refine the practice of Level One Surveys as a means of establishing a baseline for demining efforts in affected countries.

Recommendations

In order for key donor countries to meet their obligations for assistance to States Parties, they will need to base their strategy on recognition of the long term horizon beyond March

2003. Also, it is important to note that any long term strategy will have to be built around empowerment of assisted countries through capacity building.

1. **Funding Horizon:** It is recommended that Canada continue to fund MBT-related landmine programming well beyond March 31, 2003. Funding level decisions must consider: the need to fund Canada=s continuing administrative and reporting obligation as a State Party; Canada=s obligation as a State Party Ain position to do so@; and the fact that Canada=s current leadership position carries with it some level of political and moral obligation and responsibility to assist with any leadership transition.

2. **Universalization Efforts:** It is recommended that the CLF=s strategy to universalize the MBT continue to be refined and re-adjusted given that many of the remaining holdout countries are doing so on account of military and or security concerns. Canada and other donor countries must re-examine the extent to which programs such as the CLF can impact or influence the recalcitrant countries on this issue.

3. **Victim Assistance:** It is recommended that the CLF examine the practical and ethical implications of integrating victim assistance activities into national systems of support to the disabled and general health services interventions in mine affected countries.

4. **Mine Awareness:** It is recommended that the CLF re-examine the causal link between its mine awareness interventions and the reduction of risk behavior in mine affected countries.

5. **Capacity Building:** It is recommended that the CLF develop and implement a strategy that will take into account the potential of NGOs for self-sufficiency so that a more or less permanent state of financial dependency is avoided.

6. **Research and development of demining and related technologies:** It is recommended that the research and development activities of CCMAT that are funded by the CLF be restricted to short and medium term initiatives that are very clearly linked to identified and immediate needs of field practitioners. Funding sources outside the CLF should be used to resource longer term research and development initiatives.

7. **Role of Industry Canada:** It is recommended that the role of marketing and commercialization and by extension the role of Industry Canada within CCMAT and or the CLF be re-examined to determine the most appropriate role, if any.

8. **Performance Measurement:** It is recommended that the CLF immediately develop and implement a CLF-wide Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF).

2.0 Introduction

This section of the report explains the purpose and scope of the study, as well as the methodology and approach.

2.1 Purpose of the study

This study is a formative evaluation. A formative evaluation is usually conducted in the early stages of a program and typically addresses questions about the efficiency of its delivery and the quality of program implementation. The aim of this type of evaluation is to analyse strengths and weaknesses towards improving the program.

Summative evaluations, in contrast, are designed to gather conclusive data that indicates how effective the overall program is. They examine the effects or outcomes of a program, assess whether program activities can be said to have caused these outcomes, determine the overall impact of the program activities, and estimate the relative costs associated. A summative evaluation results in decisions about whether or not to continue a program.

The $100 million, 5 year, multi-departmental Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) was established in December 1997. During the first 3 years of operation, many activities and initiatives have been implemented. As at March 31, 2001, the majority of CLF funding has been expended or is already committed.

Near the end of Fiscal 00/01, discussions began amongst the partner departments on the Government of Canada=s post-2003 approach to mine action support. In the fall of 2001, the partner departments will be required to make recommendations to the CLF Management Board[2] on Canada=s post 2003 approach. Possible scenarios for the CLF range from immediate integration into ongoing programs to a multi-year extension with possible new funding. In preparation for these discussions, the four departments launched an evaluation process. The first step was development of the *Evaluation Assessment of the Canadian*

[2] The CLF Management Board is discussed later in the report. Members of the CLF Management Board include the Minister of Foreign Affairs (chair), Minister for International Cooperation, Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Industry, and any other Ministers deemed necessary by the Management Board.

Landmine Fund (June 2001), which identified evaluation issues and suggested evaluation approaches that would inform the decision making for Canada=s post-2003 approach. This evaluation represents the 2nd step in the process.

2.2 Scope of the Study

Based on the suggested issues and approaches of the *Evaluation Assessment*, the Advisory Committee recommended proceeding with a multi-phase approach to the evaluation of the CLF, starting with this evaluation. This multi-phase approach was identified as the most reasonable approach given the information requirements of senior managers, cost issues, and the need to complete the study by September 2001.

The scope of this study includes all CLF programming and activities. The evaluation issues addressed by this first phase study include, in full or in part, three of the five issues identified in the *Evaluation Assessment. Appendix A* provides a detailed list of the evaluation issues and sub-issues addressed by this study.

The issues addressed by this study include:

$ Relevance: *Relevance refers to the extent to which the stated objectives and expected results of the program are consistent with the actual needs of intended beneficiaries*;

$ Results achievement[3]: *Results achievement refers to the extent to which the program of intervention has had an effect, planned or unplanned, negative or positive, on the intended beneficiaries*; and

$ Effectiveness[4]: *Effectiveness refers to the extent to which the program achieved its expected outcomes, and thus its stated objectives.*

This study also identifies lessons learned, issues related to future direction of the CLF, and includes a preliminary review of how strategic the CLF has been in developing Canadian capacity in mine action and in carving out a specific niche for Canada.

The scope of this first phase study excludes issues related to:

$ efficiency and sustainability; and

$ intermediate outcome level results (with three exceptions) and long term outcomes.

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[3] There are four levels of results achievement identified in the *Evaluation Assessment*: outputs, short term outcomes, intermediate outcomes, and long-term outcomes. The scope of this study includes all outputs and short term outcomes, and selected intermediate outcomes.

[4] The scope of this study addresses effectiveness only as it relates to DFAIT=s advocacy role in promoting universalization and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

As well, the scope of this study did not include any field visits to provide the opportunity to meet directly with representatives of mine affected countries or communities.

2.3 Methodology and Approach of the Study

Our approach to this study involved three phases:

Phase One: The Planning Phase (Project initiation, preliminary telephone and in-person interviews, document review, development of study instruments and detailed workplan, Project Authority review and approval of study instruments and workplan);

$ *Phase Two: Data Collection and Analysis* (Document review; project file review; telephone interviews; one-on-one and small group interviews (Ottawa, Suffield, Washington and New York); E-mail questionnaire; documentation of information, and analysis and synthesis of information); and

$ *Phase Three: The Reporting Phase* (validation session with CLF Evaluation Advisory Committee, development of draft report, presentation of draft report, development of final report).

The study team used five data collection methodologies. Each of these methodologies are discussed below:

Document Review: The study team conducted a review of a wide range of documents, reports and studies obtained from the four partner departments and from key informants. These documents were reviewed in detail, and analyzed against the evaluation issues. Key documents reviewed are listed in Section 7.0, *Bibliography*.

Project File Review: The study team reviewed key documents within selected CLF project files. The objectives of the file review were to:

$ obtain an understanding of how funding decisions are made; and

$ to identify the specific results of the particular project. A sample of 30 project files (approximately 13**%** of the total number of identifiable CLF projects) was selected for review.

Interviews: The team conducted interviews with five informant groups: Departmental representatives, CLF funding recipients (including NGOs, UN organisations and private Canadian companies), other relevant Canadian and international organisations, other donor country representatives and mine-affected country representatives. ***Appendix B*** provides a summary of the total number of interviews completed, and ***Appendix C*** provides a complete list of all interviewees. Each interview was conducted using a structured interview guide. Detailed interview notes were recorded for each interview, and following each interview, the evaluation team summarized the interview findings in the AInterviewee Roll-up Summary@, which was organised by evaluation issue and sub-issue. The AInterviewee Roll-up

Summaries@ were used by the review team to identify trends and patterns or inconsistencies with respect to each evaluation issue and sub-issue.

E-mail Questionnaire: In an effort to receive additional input, but at the same time, to remain within the budget for the study, e-mail questionnaires were distributed to selected key informants. The results of the e-mail questionnaires were rolled up and analysed using the same approach as that for the key informant interviews. Although over twenty e-mail questionnaires were distributed, only 9 responses were received.

Focus Groups: The evaluation team conducted two focus groups (8 participants per group) with Carleton University Masters level students in Public Administration, International Development or Industrial Relations. One focus group consisted of Canadian students, and a second focus group included only international students. The objectives of the two focus group sessions were as follows:

$ *Canadian group*: to obtain views regarding the level of awareness of Canadians of the Government=s role with respect to global landmine activities; the level of support of Canadians for the Government=s role; and the favoured role for the Government of Canada.

$ *International Group:* to obtain views regarding their familiarity with Canadian landmine activities and contributions, their definition of the needs of mine affected countries, and their perception of the extent to which Canada has addressed the landmine issues and needs of their country.

The data collection techniques were of varying degrees of usefulness in assessing each evaluation issue. ***Appendix D*** illustrates, by evaluation issue, an overview of which data collection methodologies were used.

2.4 Study Limitations and Constraints

There were several constraints and limitations involved in this study. The constraints resulting from the scope of the study have already been discussed in Section 2.2. Other constraints and limitations of the study are related to the timing of the study, the nature of the landmine issue, and the life-cycle stage of the CLF.

Constraints related to the timing of the study

This study was conducted over the course of 10 weeks, from date of contract award on July 19, 2001 to delivery of the first draft report on September 27, 2001.

The constraint posed by the tight timeframe was addressed by the study team through careful planning of the logistics to access key documents, schedule interviews and focus groups, and distribute the e-mail questionnaire. Despite the problems presented by conducting the study during the vacation season, and having to deal with some

Arespondent fatigue@[5], the study team was able to obtain input from almost all targeted respondents (or similarly qualified delegates). Given the fact that the study methodology included document and project file review components, and that over 80 key informants were able to provide input, the overall findings and conclusions of this study are not likely impacted by the omission several interviewees.

Constraints related to the nature of the landmine issue

The constraints related to the nature of the landmine issue include:

$ The global movement to ban landmines involves a very **large and diverse group of stakeholders**, each with various degrees of knowledge and expertise, as well as their own set of objectives and priorities; and

$ The global movement to ban landmines is a **new issue**. As such, the theories and approaches to developing and delivering landmine programming and to evaluating the results of such programming continue to develop and evolve.

The fact that the objectives and priorities of each stakeholder group vary widely is obvious. The study team obtained the individual opinions of numerous representatives of each stakeholder group and analyzed the responses to identify trends, inconsistencies and patterns within each stakeholder group, as well as between different stakeholder groups. Responses by individuals who are generally recognized within the landmine community as being an expert or authority were given more weight than respondents with lesser experience and expertise. This constraint did not affect the results of the study.

[5] This study took place very soon after the conduct of the *Evaluation Assessment*, as well as several other studies and evaluations within the international landmine community. Consequently, several key respondents were approached within a very short time frame, with requests to participate in two or more studies. As a result, some individuals chose not to participate in this study.

The lack of well defined and accepted approaches to developing and delivering landmine programming and to evaluating the programming presented a considerable challenge. This issue was addressed by the team, to the extent possible, through: guidance included in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action[6]; the information included in the *Evaluation Assessment;* guidance provided by the CLF Evaluation Advisory Committee; interviews with Alandmine authorities@ as identified to the team by the Advisory Committee; and through a review of available and relevant documentation to identify the most widely accepted and current theories and approaches to developing, delivering and evaluating the results of landmine-related programming.

For example, in addition to the foundation already established in the *Evaluation Assessment,* the study team reviewed:

$ evaluations, studies, and reviews already completed on specific CLF projects and on the landmine programming of other donor countries; and

$ research and other reports published by landmine Aauthorities@ such as UNMAS, UNDP, and the intersessional working groups established by the States Parties (i.e. The Standing Committees of Experts).

The findings and conclusions of this study are based upon an analysis of the CLF program and results against the framework and issues established by the *Evaluation Assessment*. Where applicable, additional research questions regarding the relevance, results achievement, and effectiveness of CLF programming that were identified through the document and literature review, were also assessed.

Constraints related to the life-cycle stage of the CLF

The CLF is in the third year of a five year mandate. Although many projects have already been completed, others have not. Therefore, complete information on results was not available for those CLF projects still in progress. In these instances, the study team reviewed reports or sought opinions related to interim progress, where possible. The findings and conclusions of this study are limited to the CLF projects completed to date, and where possible, on in-progress projects.

[6] This system is an extensive research initiative led by DFAIT=s ILX team that attempts to establish a system to measure and better understand the extent to which the international mine action community, including the efforts of the CLF, is achieving desired results. This system is discussed in Section 5.3.1.

3.0 Background and Context of the Program

This section of the report provides an overview of the background and context in which the CLF was developed and operates. The following sections are included:

$ History of the Landmine Issue and the AOttawa Process@

$ The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)

3.1 History of the Landmine Issue and the AOttawa Process@

Up until the early nineties, Canadian foreign policy, like that of many other countries around the world, was essentially disinterested in the landmine issue. In fact, in the early nineties, the official Canadian position was opposed to the elimination of landmines. However, in the early to mid-1990's, international interest and concern surrounding the devastating effects of landmines began to increase. This growing interest and concern came from many perspectives, including governments from around the world, the general public and most vocally, from the international NGO community.

By the mid-1990's, humanitarian organizations and international advocacy groups had largely succeeded in stigmatizing landmines as inhumane weapons, and developing considerable public awareness of the problem and sympathy for the victims. During this time of heightened international interest and concern for the landmine crisis, there was also a growing frustration and cynicism with the normal diplomatic procedures and arms control bodies, especially at the United Nations. The feeling was that the normal diplomatic process was incapable of dealing with the landmine crisis quickly and effectively.

Meanwhile, public opinion polls in the mid-1990's showed that more than 70%[7] of Canadians favored a complete ban of landmines. In addition to the swell of Canadian public support for the issue, two Canadian Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Ouellet and Axworthy) had become personally committed to seeking a constructive way to end the landmine crisis.

Eventually, the search for a new strategy to deal effectively with the landmine crisis led to the October 1996 conference in Ottawa. The October 1996 conference involved representatives of like minded nations, invited by Canada, to meet and discuss the development of a global strategy and mechanism to solve the landmine crisis. Canada invited all nations to attend this conference. Although Canada expected only 15 nations to attend, 75 nations agreed to attend as participants, and another 25 attended as observers.

[7] Evaluation Assessment of the Canadian Landmine Fund, June 2001

At the end of the October 1996 conference, Minister Axworthy announced the goal of creating a landmine ban treaty by December 1997.

Thus began the unique and unprecedented AOttawa Process@. The Ottawa Process was a fast track diplomatic process aimed at negotiating and signing a binding international convention banning the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel (AP) mines. This process represented a new sort of diplomacy that included: open discussions and partnerships with civil society; the ban landmines movement; and a core group of ten countries, each having a specific role in the Afast track@ approach to creation of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

After a series of regional meetings in early 1997, the wording of the MBT was approved at a September Conference in Oslo, Norway. The Ottawa Process culminated at the Treaty Signing conference in December 1997. At the end of the Ottawa Conference in December 1997, the status of the MBT was 122 signatures, 3 ratifications and 68 non-signatories.

3.2 The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)

The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) is often referred to as the Ottawa Convention, however the formal name is the AConvention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction@. The MBT consists of over twenty articles. Exhibit 3.2 lists the titles of the key articles as they relate to the CLF. ***Appendix E*** provides a brief summary of these key articles.

Exhibit 3.2: Key Articles of the MBT

Article 1: General Obligations
Article 4: Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Article 5: Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
Article 6: International cooperation and assistance
Article 7: Transparency Measures
Article 8: Facilitation and clarification of compliance
Article 9: National implementation measures
Article 10: Settlement of disputes
Article 11: Meetings of the States Parties
Article 12: Review Conferences

Not only does the Treaty prohibit the use, production, trade, exchange, and development of landmines, it also obliges States to the following:

- destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines within **four** years after entry into force;
- destruction of AP mines in mined areas within **ten** years;

- S participation in, and funding for, the annual Meetings of the States Parties and the Review Conference(s); and
- S annual reporting to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of various information related to implementation of the treaty, including for example, a report on the total of all stockpiles owned, the location of all mined areas, and the status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities.

In addition to the obligations noted above, Article 6 (AInternational Cooperation and Assistance@), states that each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other State Parties, to the extent possible, in the following areas: care and rehabilitation, and social and economic rehabilitation of mine victims; mine awareness programs; mine clearance and related activities; and destruction of stockpiles.

The MBT includes a number of mechanisms to encourage compliance and resolve disputes between states that have ratified. Although State Parties are required to report annually to the UN on the status of their activities and compliance, the MBT does not define an independent monitoring regime.

The MBT entered into force and became legally binding on signatories on March 1, 1999 which was six months from the date on which the 40th nation ratified the Treaty. As at August 2001, the status of the MBT was 118 ratifications or accessions, 22 signatories not yet ratified, and 53 non-signatories.

The Meetings of the State Parties

Article 11(AMeeting of the States Parties@) of the MBT requires that State Parties meet annually after entry-into-force of the Convention until the first Review Conference in 2004. The purpose of the Meetings of the States Parties is to consider all matters with regard to the application or implementation of the Convention. To date there have been three Meetings of the State Parties: May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique, September 2000, in Geneva Switzerland, and September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.

Intersessional Committees

At the First and Second Meetings of the States Parties an intersessional work program was created to Aconsolidate global mine action efforts...and to highlight the role of the Convention as a comprehensive framework for action@. Currently, the intersessional program includes four Standing Committees, each meeting twice between the second and third Meetings. These four intersessional Committees address the status, issues, problems and strategies related to each of the following:

- $ Mine Clearance and Related Technology;
- $ Victim Assistance, Socio-economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness;

- $ Stockpile Destruction; and
- $ the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

Canada has played various roles within each of these Intersessional committees, including Co-chair, Co-Rapporteur, and member.

4.0 The Canadian Landmine Fund: Description of the Program

This section of the report provides an overview of the CLF program, including:

$	Section 4.1:	Mandate and Overview of the CLF;
$	Section 4.2:	CLF Management and Governance;
$	Section 4.3:	CLF Stakeholders;
$	Section 4.4:	Profile of CLF Programs
$	Section 4.5:	CLF Delivery Structure and Project Selection;
$	Section 4.6:	CLF Results-Based Logic Model.

4.1 Mandate and Overview of the CLF

The $100 million Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) was announced in December 1997 at the Treaty Signing Conference. The Prime Minister=s announcement of the fund described the CLF as a five year contribution to implementing the MBT and toward mine action projects. The CLF was designed not only to achieve humanitarian goals of solving the landmine crisis but it also had political goals of universalizing the MBT. One of the very early and significant mandates of the CLF was to ensure the MBT would become international law.

The mandate of the CLF is set out in the Memorandum to Cabinet, as follows:

> ATo ensure the Canadian contribution to implementation of the Convention.....through assistance for victims, mine awareness, destruction of stockpiles, demining and monitoring compliance-...is effective, co-ordinated and sustainable and meets the goals of universalization and early entry into force of the Convention@.

The CLF design includes delivery by four partner departments:

- $ the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade;
- $ the Canadian International Development Agency;

$ the Department of National Defence; and

$ Industry Canada.

The Memorandum to Cabinet set out lead department responsibility for five fund components and a policy unit. Exhibit 4.1 provides an overview of the five fund components and the DFAIT/ILX Policy Unit, including identification of the lead department, the name of programs established within each of the components, and the amount of CLF resources allocated.

Exhibit 4.1: Overview of the Canadian Landmine Fund

Activities	Lead Depart-ment	Programs	5 yr Budget (000's)	(% of fund)
1. Treaty Ratification and universalization	DFAIT	1-1 Mine Action Partnerships Program	$12,150	**12%**
		1-2 Mine Ban Initiatives Program	$8,600	
2. Intl co-ord, global priority setting and monitoring treaty implementation	DFAIT	2-1 Multilateral Coordination	$500	**8%**
		2-2 Convention Monitoring Program	$2.200	
		2-3 Research & Policy Development Program	$1,770	
		2-4 Outreach & Sustainability Program	$3,880	
3. Policy Support Unit-DFAIT/ILX	DFAIT		$5,000	**5%**
4. Stockpile destn	DFAIT	4-1 AP Mine Stockpile Destn Program-DFAIT	$7,000	**8%**
	DND	4-2 AP Mine Stockpile Destn Program-DND	$500	
5. R & D, mktg of technologies	DND	5-1 CCMAT-DND	$13,095	**17%**
	IC	5-2 CCMAT-IC	$3,905	
6. Demining & Victim Assistance	CIDA	6-1 Integrated Country Program-Mozambique	$10,460	**50%**
		6-2 Integrated Country Program-Bosnia & Herzegovina	$10,000	
		6-3 Tapping Canadian Creativity in Mine Action	$8,000	
		6-4 Country Initiatives - Asia	$5,200	
		6-5 Integrated Country Program-Americas	$4,500	
		6-6 Multilateral Institutions Program	$10,440	

		6-7 Operating Costs	$1,400	
Total			**$100,000**	**100%**

4.2 Management and Governance of the CLF

In addition to establishing lead department responsibility for each type of CLF programming, the Memorandum t o Cabinet also established the governance structure for the CLF, which includes the following:

Management Board (the four Ministers): Key responsibilities include the following: approve programs, project and disbursements submitted by ministers for activities for which they have lead responsibility; review reports on progress and offer corrective action as required.

Secretariat (Deputy Minister of DFAIT and President of CIDA): Key responsibilities include the following: provision of support to the Management Board with the mandate to ensure inter-departmental coordination of recommendations and proposals to Management Board; ensure programs follow the strategic directives; and timely distribution of quarterly financial reports for the Management Board, including status of disbursements and proposals for course correction.

The Ambassador for Mine action: Key responsibilities include the following: through the chairmanship of the interdepartmental committee of the CLF, provide strategic direction for the allocation of Canada=s $100 million fund; and provide a framework for proposals going forward to the Secretariat.

Interdepartmental Committee: Key responsibilities for this committee are not documented.

The Four partner departments: Key responsibilities include: develop programmes and projects within their respective CLF program lead areas; provide a support role to the lead departments of other CLF program areas; implement programmes and projects approved by the Management Board; report on results; and liaise with other department partners on policy development and program delivery.

Co-ordination Mechanisms

The design of the CLF=s governance structure relies upon the co-ordination provided through: meetings of the Management Board and the Secretariat; interdepartmental meetings between the four partner departments; and with respect to CCMAT[8], meetings of the CCMAT Executive and Management Committees.

[8] CCMAT refers to the organisation established by Industry Canada and DND to deliver on the research and development mandate of the

At the departmental level, two mine action teams or units were also established: one in DFAIT; and one in CIDA. Further information on the delivery structure of these two units is included in Section 4.5.

4.3 CLF Stakeholders

The Canadian Landmine Fund involves the following key stakeholders: program staff from the four partner departments; Canadian and international NGOs; UN organisations; other multilateral organisations; private companies involved in mine action activities; governments and organizations of mine affected countries, and other donor country governments.

Key Canadian NGOs involved in mine action include the Canadian Landmine Foundation, the Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC), the Canadian Red Cross (CRC), and Mines Action Canada (MAC). Exhibit 4.3 provides an overview of international NGOs and UN organisations who play a pivotal role in global mine action initiatives.

Exhibit 4.3: Key International NGOs and UN Organisations
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL): The ICBL brings together more than 1,100 organizations and acts as an international monitoring agency through the production of the Landmine Monitor. ICBL also coordinates the development of international mine action standards. The ICBL and Jody Williams were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for their very significant and crucial role in pushing forward the vision for a global landmine treaty and helping to make it a reality.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP): The UNDP=s Mine Action Response Team is responsible for supporting national/local capacity development to address the long-term socio-economic consequences of landmines. It coordinates initiatives to develop integrated and sustainable mine action programmes in affected countries.
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS): UNMAS is a sub-division of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It is the focal point responsible for the UN=s system-wide policy on mine action, including coordination, policy development, information management, quality control, standards setting, advocacy, and intervention in emergency situations.

CLF. This organisation is discussed further in the report.

Exhibit 4.3: Key International NGOs and UN Organisations
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD): The GICHD is a research centre dedicated to supporting the efforts of the international community in reducing the impact of mines and UXOs. In particular, it supports the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and assists UNMAS in developing and maintaining the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)

4.4 A Profile of CLF Programs

A profile of the eighteen CLF programs is included as ***Appendix F.*** For each program, the following information is provided:

- $ Purpose of program
- $ No. of projects funded
- $ Type of projects funded
- $ Five Year Budget Allocation
- X Expenditures as at March 31, 2001 (Yr 3)
- $ Type of Funding Mechanisms
- $ Recipient
- $ Countries where program is active

4.5 CLF Delivery Structure and Project Selection

As required by the Memorandum to Cabinet and as specified in the Treasury Board submission, CLF programs are managed and delivered through four federal government departments. Each department has established its own delivery structure and process for identifying and prioritizing potential CLF interventions or projects.

4.5.1 DFAIT and CIDA

With respect to DFAIT and CIDA programming, country priorities for CLF interventions were established at the start of the program, and are updated annually by CIDA and DFAIT/ILX, and presented to the CLF Management Board for review. The annual AMine Action Country Priorities List@ is a list of Astates in which Canada will consider new mine action interventions during the next fiscal period...not meant to include states in which Canada already has intervened.@ This document presents a summary list of countries organized into five categories:

$ Possible new major interventions;

$ Possible new limited interventions (high, medium, and low priority); and

$ Possible stockpile interventions.

The document also identifies the ADecision Making Criteria@ that were used to prioritize and rank the countries, as well as the rationale for each country=s ranking. The ADecision Making Criteria@ included four different categories of criteria related to:

$ the Ottawa Convention *(for example, is the country committed to the MBT, will an intervention help ensure commitment?);*

$ the gravity of the mine problem *(for example, what is the extent of humanitarian developmental impact due to landmine issues, what level of international assistance is already available?)*

$ the effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention *(for example, does the recipient country have the infrastructure and or capacity to ensure that the intervention can be efficiently and effectively implemented, does Canada have the capacity to monitor the delivery of the intervention, would the intervention serve as a preventative measure with respect to a future humanitarian crisis or would it help build capacity for mine action?)*

$ miscellaneous criteria related to the usefulness and practicality of the intervention given political, security, and stability issues within the affected country.

The updated versions of the AMine Action Priorities@ list served as guidance to DFAIT and CIDA for identifying and prioritizing interventions. However, each department used its own internal processes for identifying, prioritizing and selection of which interventions were funded.

4.5.1.2 DFAIT

The Mine Action Team (ILX)

In accordance with the terms set out in the Memorandum to Cabinet, DFAIT established the Mine Action Team (ILX). The objective of ILX, as described in the 2000-2001 Business Plan, is to@ensure the universalization and full implementation of the ....Ottawa treaty...in all of its aspects and the effective management of all policy operational and domestic advocacy and outreach matters related to landmine issues@. Headed by the Ambassador for Mine Action, ILX consists of 13 FTEs, organized into two areas: Program & Administration; and Policy. The responsible DFAIT Assistant Deputy Minister is the ADM, Global and Security Policy.

The **Program & Administration section** is headed by a lead Co-ordinator who reports directly to the Ambassador. Six positions report to the lead Co-ordinator: four Program Co-ordinators, a DND Liaison Officer, and the ILX financial officer. Each of the four Program Co-ordinators are responsible for two types of responsibilities:

$ Geographical responsibility: Responsible for keeping up to date on any and all issues related to the Treaty for a particular country or region, and for sharing that information

within ILX, as required. The regional responsibilities of the four officers are: Americas, Europe Asia, and Africa.

$ Program responsibility: Lead responsibility for a particular CLF programming area. The program responsibilities of the four program coordinators are: Victim Assistance, Technology, and Stockpile Destruction..

The **Policy section** is led by the Section Head for Research, Policy and Communications who reports directly to the Ambassador. Three Program Coordinators report to the Section Head. Two of these program co-ordinators are responsible for Outreach and Communications, and the third is responsible for Research and Policy Development.

Project Selection

The decision making process followed to prioritize and select project funding proposals or applications within ILX is not fully and consistently documented. Based on discussions with ILX personnel, the process followed is: review and recommendation by the ILX officer responsible for the particular region (and in some instances, the relevant CIDA counterpart); review and input from the relevant DFAIT mission; review and input by the ILX selection team (which includes the ILX Coordinator and four ILX Program Coordinators); recommendation to the Ambassador for Mine Action of projects to be funded; and finally, approval by the Ambassador for Mine Action.

Although not consistently documented , the basis for project selection within ILX appears to be a variation of the criteria used to develop the AMine Action Country Priorities List@, including criteria such as:

$ what are the needs of the country or region?;

$ what level of support is there within the particular country, and or neighboring countries, for the MBT and to what extent could an intervention increase such support?;

$ if already ratified or acceded, what assistance is required to help ensure successful MBT implementation?;

$ what other interventions are planned or in progress by the UN, other donor countries, or CIDA?; and

$ what other partners could help DFAIT fund or deliver on the requirement?

4.5.1.2 CIDA

CLF activities were implemented at CIDA by two separate Branches that have very distinct delivery structures and that are bound by different terms and conditions from Treasury Board: the Partnership Branch; and the Multilateral Branch.

Initial Funding Decisions

According to key CIDA personnel interviewed, initial funding decisions were taken based on a combination of brainstorming sessions among key country desk representatives and quick responses to pressures exercised by DFAIT for CIDA to quickly publicize the allocation of funds for specific projects. Upon official announcement of the CLF funds, a general meeting was called by Policy Branch of CIDA=s country desk strategic planners to identify which countries would best lend themselves to the most efficient landmine programming. Initial decisions were based on the UN=s list of most mine affected countries; countries already receiving development assistance from CIDA; and existing Country Program priorities.

Based on these criteria, programs in Mozambique, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Cambodia were readily identified as key choices. Choices to intervene in countries such as Afghanistan and Yemen were the result of political pressures. Not having country programs in these countries, and therefore no physical presence on site to monitor project implementation, CIDA was thus faced with particular management and accountability issues.

Delivery Structure and Project Selection

The **Partnership Branch** oversees all the Integrated Bilateral Country Programs approved to implement CLF activities: Mozambique, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Asia (Cambodia), with the exception of the Americas (Nicaragua, Peru and Ecuador, Canada-Mexico-PAHO). Bilateral projects are negotiated and implemented in partnership with the government of the mine affected country. The program is accountable for the project and hires Canadian NGOs or private contractors for specific mandates through contribution agreements and contracts. Bilateral programs are required, according to their Treasury Board terms and conditions, to hire a Canadian organisation unless the required capacity does not exist in Canada. Although this requirement is not part of Treasury Board terms and conditions for CLF, mine action projects implemented through the Bilateral programs are selected according to this criteria. The Bosnia & Herzegovina Bilateral Program is an exception to this rule because the area is not considered to be a developing country. Other criteria for project selection are left to the discretion of each Country Program according to its priorities and ongoing development activities. Projects are approved by the delegated decision-making authority for the Branch, usually the vice-president.

The other CLF projects are delivered through CIDA=s **Multilateral Branch** and managed by its Mine Action Unit (MAU). They include the Multilateral Institutions Program, the Afghanistan Country Program, the Americas Integrated Country Program, and the Tapping Canadian Creativity Program. These programs differ from the bilateral programs in that they do not involve direct negotiations with a mine affected country government but rather deal with a third party organisation.

From 1998 to the end of 1999, the Tapping Canadian Creativity Program was managed by the Canadian Partnerships Branch but its responsibility was subsequently transferred to the

Mine Action Unit due to the multilateral nature of its projects. The same decision was made about the Americas Program, given the complexity and multilateral nature of the PAHO project. For consistency, subsequent projects in the Americas were kept under MAU=s responsibility.

Multilateral Program funding is given through grants to multilateral organizations such as the UN, WHO and ICRC, in response to their appeals for funds. Funding to the Americas and the Afghanistan projects is mostly given through grants. Project selection for all projects under the Multilateral Branch=s responsibility is conducted in consultation with DFAT/ILX representatives and is based on the CLF country priorities identified and revised annually by the Management Board.

The selection process for the Tapping Canadian Creativity differs somewhat from the other programs. Proposals are reviewed by a selection committee composed of representatives from MAU, CIDA Partnership Branch, DFAIT, DND, and MAC. Consultations are also held with CIDA=s relevant geographical desks in the field and DFAIT=s CLF representative in New York. In addition, the Tapping Canadian Creativity Program was designed to provide funding for mine action projects carried out by Canadian NGOs and private companies. Priority is therefore given to proposals from Canadian organizations. During the first two years of the program, CIDA took a pro-active role in inviting key NGOs to submit proposals. This year a higher number of good proposals were submitted without invitation, reflecting an increase in capacities and knowledge of Canadian NGOs in the field of mine action. Funding is given through multilateral-type grants and contribution agreements to NGOs who respond to calls for proposals.

For all these programs, the final project selection is approved by the Multilateral Branch Vice-President.

4.5.2 DND and Industry Canada

DND has joint responsibility for delivery of two CLF components: stockpile destruction and the research, development and marketing of Canadian technologies. Responsibility for the stockpile destruction program is shared with DFAIT/ILX. Project selection is based on the DFAIT/ILX process described above. DND=s primary contribution to this program area is the funding of a full time DND officer to work within DFAIT/ILX, and provision of other military experts on an as required basis, for selected seminars, workshops or meetings.

Responsibility for the research, development and marketing of Canadian technologies is shared by DND and Industry Canada. DND fulfills this responsibility through the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT), which is co-located within the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES), in Alberta. The management structure of CCMAT includes the CLF Management Board, the DND/IC Executive Committee and the DND/IC Management Committee, a Director, and Manager. Industry Canada=s contribution to the CCMAT mandate includes participation on the Executive and Management Committees,

and provision of two part-time resources, one from Industry Canada=s Sector Branch to address marketing issues, and one from Technology Partnerships Canada to address commercialization issues.

Activities and funding decisions within CCMAT were based on the results of a study by CCMAT at the start of the program, the AScoping Study for Humanitarian Demining Technologies@, September 1999 which recommended a research and development program in humanitarian demining for the 5 year mandate of the Centre.

With respect to proposals submitted to CCMAT from private industry, funding decisions were based on the ACCMAT Proposal General Assessment Criteria@, February 1999. This document sets out criteria related to management capacity, as well as to technical feasibility and capacity. While IC was responsible for the management assessment, DND focused on the technical issues which included the following: test results to date (i. e., demonstrated test and evaluation); environmental impact; operational application to deminers; specifications and standards; understanding of humanitarian demining; human factors engineering; calibration; and survivability of proposed system

With respect to proposals submitted to CCMAT by DRES researchers and scientists, the basis for funding decisions is described by CCMAT management as being Aassessed on the basis of technical merit, ability to meet the fundamental criteria expressed in the Scoping Study, and withstand the scrutiny of the CCMAT Management Committee.@

4.6 CLF Results-Based Logic Model

The CLF Results-Based Logic Model was developed as part of the planning stage of the evaluation process, and was presented as in the June 29, 2001 document, *Evaluation Assessment of the Canadian Landmine Fund.* The CLF logic model includes six elements:

$ *Activities:* Any administration, management or implementation program, or operation or action taken to produce an output;

$ *Output:* The desired goods or services produced for the use of program delivery partners and or the intended beneficiaries;

$ *Reach* or *Intended beneficiaries*: The individuals or groups of individuals or organizations who are expected to use the outputs produced;

$ *Short-term Outcomes:* First level results that are the logical consequence of using the outputs.

$ *Intermediate Outcomes:* The second level of results that are the logical consequence of having achieved the short term outcomes.

$ *Long-term Outcomes:* The long-term consequences of having achieved the intermediate level outcomes.

The CLF Logic Model identifies five CLF program activities, and for each activity, the outputs and short term outcomes that are expected to be achieved as a result of undertaking these activities. As well, the Logic Model identifies the intermediate term and the long term outcomes that are expected as a result of having produced outputs and short term outcomes. The five activities identified are:

- Treaty ratification and universalization;
- International coordination, global priority setting and monitoring;
- Stockpile destruction;
- Research, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies;
- Demining and victim assistance.

The CLF Logic Model defines the types of outputs and outcomes that are intended to be produced as a result of these five activity areas. Exhibit 4.6, on the following page, illustrates the entire CLF Logic Model. For example, as illustrated in Exhibit 4.6, there are six types of outputs and two short term outcomes intended to be achieved as a result of activities related to the first activity area: treaty ratification and universalization. Similarly, the CLF Logic Model identifies the intermediate outcomes that are expected to be achieved as a result of conducting the five activities and achieving the intended outputs and short term outcomes.

5.0 Evaluation Issues: Findings and Conclusions

This section of the report presents findings and conclusions for the following:

$ Section 5.1: Relevance

$ Section 5.2: Use of Financial Resources

$ Section 5.3: Achievements

5.1 Relevance

Three evaluation issues were addressed by this study: relevance, results achievements (outputs, short term outcomes, and limited intermediate outcomes), and effectiveness. This section of the report addresses Arelevance@, which refers to the extent to which the stated objectives and expected results of the program are consistent with the actual needs of intended beneficiaries.

5.1.1 Consistency with Foreign Policy

EVALUATION ISSUE: *Is the CLF in its design and implementation, consistent with Canada=s foreign policy objectives? Specific sub-issues to be addressed:*

$ Does the CLF promote global peace?

$ Is the CLF in our national security interests?

$ Has the CLF contributed to Canada=s reputation as a world leader in global land mine action?

$ What would be the domestic and international repercussions of not renewing the CLF at a comparable level?

Does the CLF promote global peace?

Canada defines peace building as the Aeffort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict.@[9] This definition includes components of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and various types of post-conflict reconstruction, focusing on the political and socio-economic context of the conflict. Disarmament is also a key aspect of Canada=s contribution to international peacekeeping activities.

[9] http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peace building/menu-e.asp

The CLF contributes to promoting global peace by lobbying governments to cease all production, sale and use of landmines. By reducing the widespread use of such weapons, one small yet important step is taken towards the reduction of violent conflicts. The pressures exercised and the incentives offered by Canada to governments to sign the ban on landmines have also contributed to increased dialogue between certain rival countries. For instance, Turkey and Greece have announced in April 2001 that they would commence procedures to adhere to the Treaty (Greece has signed the Treaty but has yet to ratify it whereas Turkey is a non-signatory)[10]. Moreover, CLF=s support to developing mine action capacity in affected countries contributes to these countries= capacity to demine their mine infested lands and return them to productive use, thereby contributing to socio-economic recovery.

Stakeholders= testimonies support this analysis. They are unanimous that the CLF is consistent with all of Canada=s foreign policy objectives. In particular, the Fund is said by some to promote Canadian values and to be consistent with Canada=s role as peacekeeper.

The CLF is thus clearly consistent with Canada=s foreign policy objective to promote global peace.

Is the CLF in our national security interests?

Canada defines human security as Afreedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or their lives.@[11] The CLF directly contributes to two components of this key government commitment: diplomatic leadership and advocacy and strengthening multilateral mechanisms.

Diplomatic leadership and advocacy consists of Apromoting human security norms and objectives internationally through coalition-building and diplomatic outreach, developing and advocating adherence to international conventions, establishing and supporting expert groups, and financing key international meetings@[12]. The CLF, in particular through the work accomplished by DFAIT/ILX, has continued to lobby countries to adhere to the MBT, has created a unique team of recognized experts in the area of mine action whose advice and

[10] http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001/greece/

[11] http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/HS_program-e.asp

[12] Ibid.

guidance is regularly sought by international organisations and donor countries, and has continued to support, since the Ottawa Convention, various international meetings on landmines.

Strengthening multilateral mechanisms consists of Areinforcing the ability of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop, implement and monitor international commitments on human security issues, as well as supporting the deployment of Canadian experts to peace support operations and other multilateral field missions@.[13] Among others, the CLF has provided continued funding to Mines Action Canada, the ICBL and UN organizations, in support of their advocacy and/or leadership work in the area of mine action. In particular, the Landmine Monitor published by ICBL plays a monitoring role of various countries= adherence to their MBT commitments and documents the progress accomplished around the world in the implementation of the Treaty. The CLF has also provided technical expertise in various areas of mine action (demining technologies, database technologies, community based reintegration, etc) through its numerous CIDA projects.

All stakeholders consulted agree that the CLF is consistent with Canada=s foreign policy. In particular, DFAIT representatives and staff consider that the Fund supports our human security agenda.

Has the CLF contributed to Canada=s reputation as a world leader in global land mine action?

The funding provided by the CLF has enabled Canada to maintain an internationally recognized and respected leadership role in global landmine action. According to the great majority of stakeholders consulted, such an investment was necessary to lend credibility to Canada=s moral authority in this domain.

The fact that Canada is one of the top ten donors in global land mine action has helped to position Canada as a world leader. Exhibit 5.1.1 provides a brief overview of how Canada compares with other donor countries in terms of funding.

Exhibit 5.1.1: Estimated Annual Funding for Landmine Programming, Top Ten Donor Countries*

Country	Estimated Annual Funding (US $)		Country	Estimated Annual Funding (US $)
US	$65 million		European Commission	$25 million
Norway	$24 million		Germany	$10 million

[13] Ibid.

United Kingdom	$14 million		Australia	$ 7 million
Canada	$13 million		Japan	$5.6 million
Netherlands	$12-13 million		Switzerland	$4.7 million

***Source: Humanitarian Demining: Assessment of the International Market for humanitarian Demining Equipment and Technology**

Although the position as one of the top donor countries has contributed to Canada=s reputation as a leader in global land mine action, this position is not the sole reason why Canada is, in fact, viewed as a world leader. Recognition as a leader must be earned by exemplifying leadership attributes such as:

$ the provision of guidance, funding or other support to ensure others achieve a desired objective;

$ influencing and motivating others;

$ dedication and perseverance to an issue or activity;

$ exhibiting integrity, fairness and due diligence in all actions and activities; and

$ taking an active role in key activities and events designed to improve the efficiency and quality of results.

There are many examples of how the funding, design and resultant activities of the CLF have contributed to Canada=s reputation as a world leader in global land mine action, including:

$ the operation of an adequately resourced Athought leadership@ policy unit, dedicated solely to landmine and MBT issues;

$ development and delivery of a dedicated program (i.e. the Mine Ban Initiatives Program) focused solely on encouraging and influencing countries to move closer to signing, ratifying or acceding the MBT;

$ the provision of financial assistance so that State Parties in need have the opportunity to participate in landmine-related events aimed at sharing information and or building networks between donor countries, delivery organisations and State Parties in need;

$ the active participation by ILX/DFAIT personnel, the Ambassador for Mine Action, and CCMAT personnel as members, Co-chair, or Co-Rapporteur in each of the four Intersessional Committees of the State Parties;

$ the development of partnerships between Canada and other donor countries to co-fund landmine action requirements of State Parties in need;

- $ the assumption of the role as AInformal Secretariat@ for the MBT to address early implementation issues including for example, the provision of legal advice and actions to address instances of non-compliance;
- $ the development of formal and informal partnerships with international organizations involved in landmine action including for example, OAS, ICBL, MAC, UNMAS, UNDP, GICHD, CAW, NATO, HI, and NPA;
- $ the co-funding of initiatives and organizations that are key to ensuring successful implementation of the MBT including for example, funding for the development and publication of the LandMine Monitor, and core and special funding for key organizations such as ICBL, MAC, and UNMAS; and
- $ the development of websites, databases and other tools to support international landmine efforts such as a website for UNMAS on issues related to stockpile destruction, a database for UNMAS on donor funding, and a Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action.

What would be the domestic and international repercussions of not renewing the CLF at a comparable level?

According to stakeholders consulted, the repercussions of not renewing the fund at comparable levels would be important, both domestically and internationally. A great majority of respondents from all groups of stakeholders consider the fund to be essential to maintain Canada=s credibility as a leader in mine action. Moreover, they consider this leadership role as essential to the vitality of international efforts in mine action since no other country or organisation is positioned to exercise the same influence on participating countries and on other donors.

The stakeholders most affected by a decline in CLF funding would likely be the international and Canadian NGOs, which have come to depend on Canada=s contributions to landmine programming. This applies particularly to Canadian NGOs, which have only recently begun developing expertise in the area of mine action and are seen as needing to acquire more expertise to contend with more experienced international organisations.

However, the most important impact of a decrease in funding would be the influence this would have on other donor countries. A majority of respondents, particularly from international NGOs and multilateral organisation, are convinced that such a decision would be interpreted as a signal that the landmine issue is not worth investing in anymore or that the problem has been solved. It is feared that several donors would follow suit and decrease or interrupt their contributions to land mine action. Given Canada=s leadership and influence in mine action, this fear appears well-founded.

At the domestic level surveys show that the general Canadian population remains very proud of Canada=s prominent role and commitment to mine action. Likewise, several stakeholders consulted consider that a reduction of funding would constitute bad public relations and would expose Canada to speculation that its initial involvement in the land mine issue was only a photo opportunity.

However, some respondents consider unrealistic the prospect that Canada would maintain the same level of CLF funding indefinitely. They nonetheless consider that equivalent sums should be invested through existing humanitarian programming or that a well-planned strategy be implemented to gradually decrease the dependence of mine affected countries on Canadian funding and to ensure the sustainability of national mine action programs.

Overall, renewal of the CLF at comparable levels appears essential to maintain Canada=s credibility as a leader, to encourage other donors= commitment, and to sustain the development of Canadian NGO mine action capacity. Key consequences of not renewing the fund at comparable levels would likely include the wasting of Canadian NGO=s developing expertise in mine action and an important decrease in other country donor commitments.

Conclusion: The CLF is clearly consistent with all of Canada=s foreign policy objectives, and its renewal at comparable levels is essential to maintain Canada=s credibility as a leader, both domestically and internationally, to encourage other donors= commitment, and to sustain the development of Canadian NGO mine action capacity.

5.1.2 MBT Obligations

EVALUATION ISSUE: Relevance

Does the CLF in its design and implementation meet Canada=s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)? Specific sub-issues to be addressed by the evaluation:

- $ Did the design of the CLF address all of Canada=s obligations?
- $ Which of Canada=s obligations have been fulfilled?
- $ Which of Canada=s obligations remain unfulfilled?
- $ Are all of the CLF components necessary to fulfilling Canada=s remaining obligations?=
- $ What would be a reasonable time commitment needed to fulfill Canada=s remaining obligations?

The MBT[14] requires State Parties to meet several types of obligations. The key obligations are listed below:

[14] A summary of the key articles included in the MBT is included as ***Appendix E***.

$ Article 1, AGeneral Obligations@: general obligations related to banning the use, acquisition, transfer, and production of anti-personnel mines within the country;

$ Article 3, ADestruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines@: obligation to destroy all anti-personnel mine stockpiles held by the country within 4 years of entry into force;

$ Article 5, ADestruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas@: obligation to undertake to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after entry into force;

$ Article 6, AInternational Cooperation and Assistance@: obligation to share and exchange equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of the Convention, provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations, and for those State Parties Ain a position to do so@, an obligation to provide assistance to other State Parties for:

X the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs;

X mine clearance and related activities; and

X the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

$ Article 7, ATransparency Measures@: obligation to report to annually to the Secretary General of the United Nations on matters including the status of stockpile destruction and mine clearance, the location and status of mined areas and various other information related to compliance with treaty obligations;

$ Article 8, AFacilitation and clarification of compliance@: obligation to consult and cooperate with other State Parties on implementation of the provisions of the Treaty , and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by State Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

$ Article 9, ANational Implementation measures@: obligation that each State Party take all legal, administrative and other measures to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party;

$ Article 11, AMeetings of the States Parties@, obliges State Parties to attend annual meetings of the State Parties; and

$ Article 12, AReview Conferences@, obliges State Parties to participate in and attend Review Conferences, which will be held every five years after the entry into force; and

$ Article 15, ACosts@, obliges State Parties to help pay for the costs of meetings of the State Parties including Review Conferences, Amendment Conferences, Annual Meetings, and Special Meetings.

Which of Canada=s obligations have been fulfilled?

During the first three years of the CLF, the program has enabled Canada to make progress on meeting all of the obligations for which it was designed. Exhibit 5.1.2 provides a cross reference between the treaty obligation, and the CLF program or activity that enabled Canada to fulfil the obligation.

Exhibit 5.1.2: Treaty Obligations and CLF Activities

Treaty Obligation	CLF Program or Activity that works towards fulfilling obligation
Article 6, AInternational Cooperation and Assistance@	All CLF Programs and activities of DFAIT/ILX
Article 7, ATransparency Measures@	Activities of DFAIT/ILX
Article 8, AFacilitation and clarification of compliance@	Activities of DFAIT/ILX
Article 9, ANational Implementation measures@	Activities of DFAIT/ILX
Article 11, AMeetings of the States Parties@	DFAIT/ILX Personnel
Article 12, AReview Conferences@	TBD (scheduled for October 2004)
Article 15, ACosts@	DFAIT/ILX Policy Unit Budget

Based upon a review of how CLF funds were spent to date (Section 5.3) and a review of relevant program and third party documentation[15], it is evident that, to date, the CLF has enabled Canada to meet the MBT obligations for which the program was designed.

With respect to Article 6, which requires State Parties Ain a position to do so@ to provide financial and other assistance to help other State Parties comply with the terms of the Treaty, the Treaty does not state a minimum or maximum level of effort or financial support. Based upon information included in the LandMine Monitor, Canada has, since the inception

[15] Section 7.0, Bibliography lists all documents reviewed as part of this study. The most relevant documents in support of the progress and results of CLF activities were the project files, internal progress and other reports prepared by the departments, information packages provided to the CLF Management Board, and in several instances, reviews or evaluations conducted on CLF projects.

of the CLF, been one of the top 10 donor countries in terms of financial assistance. Interview respondents from the CLF partner departments, MAC, ICBL and UN organisations are in agreement that during the first three years of the CLF, the fund has enabled Canada to meet its obligations as a State Party. In fact, as discussed earlier in Section 5.1.1, these respondents noted that Canada has not only met its obligations as a State Party, but the activities and efforts of the CLF, the DFAIT/ILX Policy Unit, and the Ambassador for Mine Action have enabled Canada to emerge as a leader on many issues related to implementation and operation of the MBT.

Which of Canada=s obligations remain unfulfilled?

Canada=s obligations under the MBT can be grouped into three areas:

$ original treaty obligations;

$ ongoing treaty obligations; and

$ leadership obligations.

The Aoriginal treaty obligations@ refers to Canada=s obligations in Articles 1, 3 and 5. The CLF was not designed to meet these obligations. Although a review of the status of these obligations is beyond the scope of this study, a cursory review of the LandMine Monitor publications indicate that Canada had substantially met these obligations prior to the start of the fund, and continues to do so, as a matter of foreign policy.

The Aongoing treaty obligations@ refers to those obligations listed above in Exhibit 5.1.2. These legal treaty obligations must continue to be fulfilled by Canada and other State Parties, however, the term and cost of continuing to do so has not yet been quantified in terms of resources or years. Other than the costs related to helping to fund the cost of the States Parties Meetings[16], there is no legally binding minimum or maximum amount of funding that must be provided by Canada or any other State Party. In the years post-CLF, Canada must make available funding at a level to enable the obligations listed in Exhibit 5.1.2 to continue to be met. Given Canada=s role as one of the founders of the MBT, the amount of funding should at a minimum be comparable in per capita terms with other donor country contributions.

The third type of obligation arising from the MBT are Canada=s Aleadership obligations@. Although not a legal treaty obligation, it is widely recognized within the international landmine community that Canada has demonstrated remarkable leadership on this issue.

The Acost of leadership@ by Canada has not been formally quantified, but the cost would include part or all of the funding that has been provided to the DFAIT/ILX Policy Unit. As at

[16] To date, Canada=s annual share of the Meetings of the State Parties has been in the range of $60,000 to $70,000.

March 31, 2001, the DFAIT/ILX policy unit has spent $2.8 million, or approximately $1 million per year. Although not all activities within DFAIT/ILX have contributed directly to positioning Canada as a leader, the majority of activities have contributed. The many examples of how the DFAIT/ILX unit has demonstrated leadership on the MBT was previously discussed in Section 5.1.1. One of the most important issues on which Canada has demonstrated leadership is assumption of the role as unofficial ASecretariat@ for the MBT. Several key informant groups including UN organisations, senior landmine officials, and key NGOs noted that the Ambassador for Mine Action and the DFAIT/ILX Team have in many ways, filled the role of unofficial ASecretariat@ for the MBT. Examples of Secretariat-type duties carried out by the Ambassador and DFAIT/ILX include:

$ provision of advice on legal interpretations of the MBT to the Meetings of the State Parties and to the UN and other landmine organisations;

$ organizing and co-ordinating informal discussions and meetings to investigate allegations of treaty violations;

$ leadership roles in meetings and discussions with the GICHD, UN and other landmine organisations on strategies for creating a formal Ahome@ for the MBT to ensure its longevity; and

$ playing a key role in funding and guiding the ICBL=s development of an independent monitoring (i. e. , the LandMine Monitor) for the MBT.

At the September 2001 Third Meeting of the State Parties, we understand that discussions were held regarding the establishment of a formal Secretariat for the MBT in Geneva. The Annual Report of the Third Meeting was not available for review, therefore further details on the status or plans for this Secretariat, or of Canada=s role, if any, are unknown at this time.

If Canada decides to continue to position itself as a champion of universalizing the MBT and successful implementation of the MBT, a portion of Canada=s landmine funding would need to be allocated to these activities.

Are all of the CLF components necessary to fulfilling Canada=s remaining obligations?

In addition to the activities of the DFAIT/ILX Policy Unit, the CLF consists of five components: treaty ratification and universalization; international coordination, global priority setting and monitoring; stockpile destruction; research, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies, and demining and victim assistance. As illustrated earlier in Exhibit 5.1.2, the DFAIT/ILX policy unit and each of the CLF components contribute towards meeting Canada=s treaty obligations. Since no minimum levels of effort or of financial resources is dictated by the MBT, the extent of effort and resources required

to continue to fulfill these ongoing obligations is left to the discretion of each State Party, including Canada.

What would be a reasonable time commitment needed to fulfill Canada=s remaining obligations?

Article 20 of the MBT states that AThis Convention shall be of unlimited duration@. Two deadlines were included within the MBT, the first one requires that all State Parties destroy all landmine stockpiles within four years of entry into force, and the second requires that all State Parties clear all mined areas within ten years. Although under Article 6 of the MBT, Canada and other donor countries who are Ain a position to do so@, have been helping to fund the efforts of State Parties in need since the December 1997 signing of the MBT, much work remains.

Based on a review of LandMine Monitor publications, State Parties from around the world are in varying stages of working towards these two MBT objectives, ranging from:

$ identifying the scope of the problem;

$ planning an approach for the required project(s);

$ trying to obtain technical expertise or build internal technical capacity;

$ trying to obtain funding for the required work;

$ trying to obtain delivery organisation for the project;

$ project implementation ; to

$ project completion.

Many States Parties and non-signatories have yet to completely define the scope of the problem. For example, one of the first steps in mine clearance programs is the conduct of a Level One Survey (Level One Surveys identify and map all suspected mined areas and collect socio-economic data and information on mine victims). Less than 10 Level One Surveys have been started or completed. The scope of what work remains to be done world-wide is undefined, therefore the landmine community has been unable to set a firm timeline for how long it will take to meet the objectives set out in the MBT.

Interviews with key informant groups expressed the opinion that years and years of work remain. Some NGOs representatives expressed the view that the timeline extends well beyond the next five years since most countries are only now realizing what the MBT obligations mean in terms of level of effort and resources. Other NGO respondents suggested that efforts will need to continue for another 5-20 years. UN representatives acknowledge that the road ahead will extend beyond the ten years envisioned by the MBT, but note that the required timeline for donor support should be only as long as it takes to build local capacities within State Parties to carry out the work on their own. CLF

departmental representatives suggest that work must continue for between 5 and 20 years, but again, similar to the UN view, the level of support by donor countries should decline as capacities are built within State Parties to carry on with the work on their own. CLF department respondents also noted that many governments, including Canada, have always funded efforts consistent with the obligations under Article 6 in the normal course of developmental programming, and that such programming will no doubt continue as usual.

Conclusion: The CLF was designed to meet ongoing **treaty obligations**. To date, the CLF has enabled Canada to do so. Although not a legal obligation, Canada has established itself as a champion for universalizing and successfully implementing the treaty. Should Canada decide to continue to fulfill this role, funding would be required. The amount required to fund such a leadership position has not been determined.

The MBT does not stipulate the minimum or maximum **level of funding required** from each State Party. One yardstick to determine the amount of funding that Canada should continue to provide for these ongoing treaty obligations is the *per capita* amount contributed by other donor country State Parties.

The **length of time required to continue** to fulfil Canada=s ongoing treaty obligations is unknown since the extent of the landmine problem has not been completely scoped out, and State Parties are obliged to assist other State Parties in addressing the landmine problem. Estimates range from another five to fifteen years beyond the March 2003 sunset date of the CLF, but there is a widely held view within the landmine community that donor country contributions should slowly decline, as capacities within mine affected State Parties increase. Some aspects of routine Canadian government development programming can be considered as meeting in part or in full Canada=s obligations under Article 6.

5.1.3 Needs of Mine Affected Communities

EVALUATION ISSUE: Relevance #3

Does the CLF respond to the needs of mine affected people and communities? Specific sub issues:

- $ What proportion of the CLF programming is in direct response to a request for assistance?
- $ To what extent are needs assessments done to determine program/project priorities?
- $ To what extent does the CLF support the 5 pillars of mine action: Mine clearance; victim assistance; mine awareness; stockpile destruction and advocacy?
- $ Is the weighting of CLF=s resource allocation to the five pillars justifiable?
- $ To what extent is the CLF component for AResearch, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies based on field experience and driven by the need of communities and practitioners of mine clearance?

Mine affected people and communities have many different types of needs. The needs can be grouped as follows:

$ immediate needs related to victim assistance;

$ needs related to mine awareness so that future landmine victims can be minimized;

$ needs related to clearing mined lands that are precluding people from living normal and safe lives;

$ needs related to destroying stockpile so that the mines cannot ever be used again; and

$ needs related to convincing their government to accede to the MBT so that in the long term, the effects of landmines on their lives will be minimized.

What proportion of the CLF programming is in direct response to a request for assistance?

Since the start of the CLF, well over 200 projects have been funded by the CLF in initiatives related to each of the above noted needs. Neither of the four partner departments tracks projects based on whether the funding decision was made as a result of a direct request, therefore an exact number of such projects cannot be identified.

However, based upon the work carried out during this study, including discussions with officers of the 4 CLF departments, a review of selected project files, and a review of documentation related to the project selection process for each of the individual CLF programs, it is estimated that approximately 65-70% of CLF programming has been in direct response to a request for assistance. The sources for such requests vary. The sources include: requests from governments of mine affected countries communicated to the CLF either directly or via in-country DFAIT or CIDA personnel, direct requests from international NGOs working in mine affected countries, requests from UN organizations, and requests from NGOs active in advocacy activities.

To what extent are needs assessments done to determine program/project priorities?

Very few formal need assessments have been done within the CLF to determine program or project activities. However, in most instances, requests for assistance are submitted to one of the four partner departments in the form of a project proposal. Project proposals are reviewed, assessed and prioritized through the process designed by each of the 4 partner departments. Although each department carries out a slightly different project selection process, each process considers to some extent, whether the project is filling a real and identified need.

In the case of DFAIT/ILX, Industry Canada and CCMAT the project selection and prioritization process is either inconsistently documented or not documented at all, therefore it cannot be concluded whether the highest priority projects were funded. In the case of CIDA, normal bilateral CIDA programming requires completion of a needs

assessment prior to the start of each project. Although CIDA personnel and some internal department documentation suggests that a formal needs assessment was done at least for the Cambodia and Mozambique projects, no documentation was made available to the study team for review.

Several respondent groups including Canadian NGOs and CLF departmental representatives expressed some concerns that there were several instances where lower priority projects were funded in each of the four departments due to political pressures; hurried decision making, especially at the start of the fund; and or due to the pushing of Canadian product or service deliverers.

To what extent does the CLF support the 5 pillars of mine action: Mine clearance; victim assistance; mine awareness; stockpile destruction and advocacy?

The CLF was designed to support all 5 pillars of mine action. CIDA=s CLF programs were designed to address mine clearance, victim assistance and mine awareness. Industry Canada=s and DND=s activities within CCMAT were designed to support mine clearance activities by providing demining technology to mine clearance operations. DFAIT=s CLF programs were designed largely to address stockpile destruction and advocacy activities, but they also touch on the other three pillars.

The approach taken by Canada to address all five pillars differs from that of many of the other donor countries who have decided to limit their funding to specific pillars or to fund only certain recipients. For example: Norway and the US have historically focused landmine funding on demining operations, the UK focuses on demining and research and development; and the Netherlands focuses on mine clearance but only for State Parties.

Is the weighting of CLF=s resource allocation to the five pillars justifiable?

The allocation of funding between the five pillars was determined near the start of the program based upon discussions and negotiations between the four partner departments and the CLF Management Board.

Based on interviews conducted by the study team, there are some concerns regarding the weighting between the five pillars. Several respondent groups expressed concern over the fact that 20% of the fund was allocated to the research and development of demining technologies. This concern was expressed by almost all NGOs as well as by some departmental personnel. The preference of these groups is that the funding should be provided at the ground level either to demining operations, victim assistance and or landmine awareness.

To what extent is the CLF component for AResearch, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies@ based on field experience and driven by the need of communities and practitioners of mine clearance?

CCMAT activities in research and development include activities related to R & D, testing and evaluation of demining technologies, and provision of technical guidance and support. The testing and evaluation work done by CCMAT is discussed in Section 5.3.5. This work is well regarded by all respondent groups as meeting the needs of mine affected communities and field operators.

However, there is a mix of views regarding whether the research and development activities of CCMAT are driven by the need of communities and practitioners of mine clearance. CCMAT representatives express the view that the project selection process for CCMAT research and development projects was designed to ensure the needs of communities and field practitioners were met. CCMAT representatives note that the project selection process was based on and considered the following:

$ at the start of the fund, CCMAT personnel conducted an initial scoping study[17] to identify the highest priority research and development needs within the demining community;

$ CCMAT has worked very diligently to ensure their research and development activities complement, rather than duplicate, other research and development efforts around the world, including those of other donor countries, other militaries, UN organizations and NATO;

$ many CCMAT projects were designed around several Statements of Requirements provided to CCMAT near the start of the program, by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre;

$ CCMAT personnel routinely discuss and share technical information and field practitioner needs with demining field personnel in Thailand, Cambodia and Afghanistan;

$ CCMAT personnel include several individuals with humanitarian demining and or military demining experience; and

$ each potential research and development project has been reviewed and assessed by the CCMAT review team (which includes DND demining experts) with consideration of many factors including cost, development time, simplicity of use, operator safety, and the potential for productivity gains.

Based upon a review of relevant CCMAT documentation and discussions with CCMAT officials, it is evident that the needs of mine communities and field practitioners were considered in CCMAT programming, however the extent to which this factor influenced decisions is unclear.

[17] Additional details regarding the Scoping Study are provided in Section 5.3.5 of the report.

This lack of a very direct and clear connection between research and development activities and the needs of field practitioners is not unique to CCMAT. In fact, this issue is a matter of substantial debate within the landmine community. The reason for this apparent disconnect appears to be due to a combination of factors including isolation of the researchers, failure of field practitioners to clearly define requirements, lack of understanding of how to introduce and integrate new technologies into existing demining operations, the emphasis on military countermine applications rather than on humanitarian demining requirements, and to some degree, resistance to change on the part of demining operations.

CCMAT and other research organizations have acknowledged the fact that there is a gap, for whatever reason, between the researchers and developers and the field practitioners. The research community, including CCMAT, have in fact, started to work towards a solution so that new technology can be developed and delivered in support of faster, more efficient and safer demining operations.

For example, in June 2001, the recently created Demining Information Technology Forum (DTIF), of which CCMAT is a co-founder, arranged a conference to bring together researchers and developers and field practitioners. The DTIF website describes the purpose of the workshop as follows: AThe aim of the workshop was to establish a productive dialogue between the developers and the users of mine action technology. The purpose of this dialogue is to do a better job of incorporating the experience and insight of the user community into technology development.@ In his opening remarks to the conference, the Director of CCMAT noted the following: AThere is no doubt that there has been a tendency, over some period of time, for technology which is required in mine action to be developed in isolation, or at least to some degree, in isolation from the people that are required to apply that technology. This is a generalization and I=m absolutely convinced it=s not 100% true, but there is an element of truth to it.@

Several informant groups, including CLF partner departments, had no opinion or very little knowledge of the research and development activities of CCMAT. Several donor country representatives were of the opinion that CCMAT activities were well directed, considering the small amount of funding available to them. The NGOs and other CLF funding recipients are not convinced that CCMAT=s research and development programming meets the needs of affected communities and field practitioners. Several respondents suggested the research is far removed from the needs of the field practitioner (too sophisticated, too expensive, too long term), and that funding decisions are based more on the needs of the military than on the needs of humanitarian demining practitioners.

Conclusion: The CLF responds to the needs of mine affected communities. It is uncertain whether the highest priority needs have been addressed due to the lack of formal needs assessments and the lack of documentation to support the prioritization and selection of project funding decisions.

In allocating resources across the five pillars of mine action (mine clearance, victim assistance, mine awareness, stockpile destruction and advocacy) there is a continuous need to balance the views and interests of key stakeholder groups. CLF has managed this balance fairly well over its current phase. While the CLF supports all five pillars of mine action, some concerns have been expressed regarding the amount allocated to the funding of research and development activities.

With respect to CCMAT, the centre=s test and evaluation activities are widely praised for meeting the needs of communities and practitioners of mine clearance. As a result of the testing and evaluation of products developed largely by Canadian private companies, CCMAT has, to date, enabled three proven Canadian products to be distributed. CCMAT is now recognised as an international centre of test and evaluation expertise for certain demining technologies.[18]

Despite the fact that CCMAT undertook efforts to match research and development activities with the needs of communities and practitioners of mine clearance, the extent to which project selection decisions meet these needs remains unclear. The R & D community, including CCMAT, has acknowledged the existence of a gap between researchers and users and is taking actions to resolve the issue. Although progress continues on numerous research and development projects within CCMAT, no products have as yet been deployed to demining operations.

5.2 Financial Resources

Three evaluation issues were addressed by this study: relevance, results achievements (outputs, short term outcomes, and limited intermediate outcomes), and effectiveness. One of the sub-issues to be addressed as part results of achievement related to outputs, was whether the CLF financial resources were used for the purposes intended. This section of the report addresses this financial-related sub-issue. All other sub-issues related to outputs are addressed in the next section of the report, Section 5.3, Achievements.

EVALUATION ISSUE: Results Achievement
What progress has the CLF made toward the production of outputs? Specific sub-issue to be addressed:
$ *Have all available financial resources been used for the purposes intended?*

A total of $100 million was approved for the CLF. Approval for the allocation of funding, by department, by program was given by the Management Board, as evidenced by minutes of the CLF Management Board meetings. Exhibit 5.2 on the following page, provides a summary of total $ approved, by department, by program, and total $ spent to date. The totals for Industry Canada and DFAIT included as ATotal spent in first 3 years, as at March 31, 2001", include lapsed budget funds: $2,198,000 by Industry Canada, and $248,000 by DFAIT.

[18] Additional details regarding these successes are included in Section 5.3.5.

Exhibit 5.2: CLF Expenditures as at March 31, 2001[19]				
Programs	**5 yr Budget per Mgmt Bd (000's) $**	**Total $ spent in first 3 years, as at March 31, 2001 (including lapsed funds)**		
		O &M (000's) $	**Contracts and or G=s & C=s (000's) $**	**Total (000's) $**
1. Treaty Ratification and universalization (DFAIT lead)				
Mine Action Partnerships Program	3550	0	2288	2288
Mine Ban Initiatives Program	8600	1475	4814	6288
2. Intl co-ord, global priority setting and monitoring treaty implementation (DFAIT lead)				
Multilateral Coordination (UNMAS)	500	0	500	500
Convention Monitoring Program	2200	22	900	922
Research & Policy Development Program	1770	328	633	961
Outreach & Sustainability Program	3880	1668	1737	3405
3. Policy Support Unit (ILX) (DFAIT lead)	5000	2607	0	2855[20]
4. Stockpile destn (Jointly led by DFAIT and DND)				
AP Mine Stockpile Destn Program-DFAIT	7000	750	727	1477
AP Mine Stockpile Destn Program-DND	500	300	0	300

[19] The numbers presented in this table are a summary of detailed and final numbers provided by the four departments for results as at March 31, 2001. The total numbers provided by CCMAT (DND) and by DFAIT are substantially different from numbers presented in the *Evaluation Assessment.* A reconciliation of these differences is beyond the scope of this study.

[20] Although DFAIT/ILX has spent only $2,607,000 as at March 31, 2001, an additional $248,000 of budget funds were lapsed in fiscal years 99/00 and 00/01. These lapsed funds have not been identified by DFAIT/ILX as belonging to a particular DFAIT/ILX program. For the purposes of presentation in this chart, the lapsed funds have been arbitrarily allocated to the DFAIT/ILX Policy unit. Therefore as at March 31, 2001, the total amount spent or lapsed by DFAIT/ILX for the policy support unit is $2,855,000 (ie. $2,607,000 plus $248,000).

5. Research and development and marketing of technologies (Jointly led by DND and IC)				
5-1 CCMAT-DND	13095	3941	3954	7896
5-2 CCMAT-IC	3905	126	95	2419[21]
6. Demining and Victim Assistance (CIDA lead)				
Integrated Country Program-Mozambique	10460	0	4938	4938
Integrated Country Program-Bosnia & Herzegovina	10000	0	7372	7372
Tapping Canadian Creativity in Mine Action	8000	0	5461	5461
Country Initiatives - Asia	5200	0	2908	2908
Integrated Country Program-Americas	4500	0	4205	4205
Multilateral Institutions Program	10440	0	8025	8025
Operating Costs	1400	789	789	789
Total (all departments, all programs)	**100000**	***12006***	***49346***	***61352***

Conclusion: Although not audited as part of this study, it would appear that all CLF funds have been used for the purposes intended, with the exception of the funds that were lapsed by Industry Canada ($2.198 million) and DFAIT ($248,000).

5.3 Achievements and Effectiveness

Three evaluation issues were addressed by this study: relevance, results achievements (outputs, short term outcomes, and limited intermediate outcomes), and effectiveness. This part of the report addresses results achievement. Results achievement is defined in the *Evaluation Assessment* as Athe extent to which the program of intervention has had an effect, planned or unplanned, negative or positive, on the intended beneficiaries@.

This section of the report is organized as follows:

$ Section 5.3.1 identifies the criteria used to assess Aresults achievement@, the issues and challenges faced by the study team in assessing those criteria;

$ Sections 5.3.2. to 5.3.8 address Aresults achievement@ at the outputs and outcome level, for the five short-term outcomes identified in the CLF Logic Model (Exhibit 4.6 on page 27).

[21] Although IC has only spent $221,000 as at March 31, 2001, an additional $2,198,000 of budget funds were lapsed in fiscal years 99/00 and 00/01. Therefore as at March 31, 2001, the total amount spent or lapsed by IC is $2,419,000 (ie. $221,000 plus $2,198,000).

5.3.1 Results achievement: Research questions explored and challenges encountered

This section of the report discusses the research questions addressed in order to assess the extent of progress made towards achievement of outputs, and towards achievement of short term outcomes. This section also discusses the challenges encountered by the study team in addressing these research questions.

5.3.1.1 Output Level Results

Four research questions were used to assess the extent of progress made towards the production of outputs. These research questions are:

1. What **type of outputs** has the program produced? *(identified by CLF Logic Model)*
2. **How many** of each type of output has been produced? *(identified by CLF Logic Model)*
3. Are the outputs of a type and scale that are likely to **support achievement of the targeted outcomes**?
4. What is the **quality** of each type of output produced? *(identified by CLF Logic Model)*

As discussed in Section 2.3, Methodology and Approach, five data collection techniques were used by this study to assess the above noted research questions. The most useful methodologies for assessing outputs were interviews with key informant groups (departmental and CLF recipient representatives), project file review, and in some instances, document review (i.e. reports on progress).

The assessment of output level results presented a challenge to the study team. At the output level, none of the four partner departments track or report on output level results, therefore the outputs information was created by departmental personnel and the study team. As well, since the departments had not established targets for output level results, a comparison could not be made between targets and results. Thus, the study team relied upon the remaining research questions to assess results achievement related to outputs.

5.3.1.2 Short Term Outcome Results

Five research questions were used to assess the extent of progress made towards short and intermediate term outcomes:

5. What outcome level results have been **achieved**?
6. Are these the **results that the CLF expected (or targeted) to achieve?**
7. What types of projects and or activities have been funded by each relevant program and are these projects and activities **consistent with the types of activities**

generally accepted by the international landmine community as being appropriate[22]?

8. What **strategy** was taken to achieve the intended outcomes? To what extent does this strategy support achievement of the intended outcomes?

9. What **delivery approach** (organization of unit responsible for delivering the program, program selection criteria, selection process, etc.) was taken to achieve the objectives? To what extent does this strategy support achievement of the intended outcomes?

As discussed in Section 2.3, Methodology and Approach, five data collection techniques were used by this study to assess the above noted research questions.

The first and second questions, related to results achieved and results expected, presented a major challenge to the study team. None of the four partner departments have established and completely implemented a performance measurement system. Although general objectives are established for each program, very few programs have developed performance measurement tools or indicators of performance against which to measure their results. Attempts to collect results information on each of the CLF programs revealed inconsistencies in the level of reporting and record keeping for most of the CLF programs. This in turn appears to have affected the program=s capacity to effectively monitor the implementing organisation=s performance.

While administrative documents provided information on the key outputs produced by CIDA programs, the evaluation reports and the stakeholder testimonies constituted our main source of information regarding the success of departmental activities in achieving the expected outcomes. In some cases, the information gathered was inconclusive. Some recommendations regarding necessary data collection for the program=s summative evaluation are thus provided in the conclusion section of this report.

With respect to the third research question, related to the consistency of CLF activities with those generally accepted by the mine action community, the study team relied upon the indicators set out in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action. The Performance Measurement System is a research initiative of DFAIT/ILX. The objective of the study was multi-purpose, but one of the key objectives was to obtain a better understanding of the extent to which the mine action community is achieving the desired results in addressing the global landmine problem. The Performance Measurement

[22] See discussion on next page regarding the APerformance Measurement System for Global Mine Action@.

System, although still in draft form, received input from, and has been reviewed by, many experts in the landmine community, and therefore can be considered as a credible basis. The Performance Measurement System details the following: six types of outputs that should be produced as part of landmine programming; examples of the types of activities that would lead to the desired outputs, and ultimately to the desired outcomes; and a statement on the desired ultimate impact of landmine programming. With respect to this study, the information of interest in the Performance Measurement System are the detailed listings of the types of activities that would lead to the desired outputs, and ultimately to the desired outcomes of landmine programming. If CLF activities are consistent with the types of activities detailed in the Performance Measurement System, then a logical conclusion, is that CLF programming is headed in the right direction. Thus, one of the criteria used to assess the extent of progress made toward the achievement of short-term and intermediate outcomes is the extent to which CLF activities are consistent with those identified in the Performance Measurement System.

As an example of the activities detailed in the Performance Measurement System, Exhibit 5.3 on the following page, lists those related to Aimproving mine action information and co-ordination@. ***Appendix G*** provides a complete listing of all activities detailed in the Performance Measurement System.

Exhibit 5.3: Activities that support achievement of improved mine action information and coordination

- accumulation of information on the general nature and scope of the problem
- accumulation of national level socio-economic impact data
- collection of mine incident data
- implementation of information management system
- implementation of national mine action coordination system
- donor coordination mechanism in operation
- integration of mine action planning into broader development planning
- development and implementation of relevant international reporting instruments

5.3.2 Treaty ratification and universalization

The first component of the CLF involves activity related to Atreaty ratification and universalization@. Two DFAIT/ILX programs were designed to support this activity: the Mine Action Partnership Program and the Mine Ban Initiatives Program. This section of the report addresses Aresults achievement@ for the outputs and outcomes related to treaty ratification and universalization.

EVALUATION ISSUES: Results Achievement

Outputs: *With respect to the Mine Action Partnership Program and the Mine Ban Initiatives Program, what progress has been made towards the production of outputs?*

Short-term Outcomes: *What progress has the CLF made towards achievement of the following outcomes?*

$	*improved advocacy capacity of mine action groups (Section 5.3.2.1); and*
$	*increased public support to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines (Section 5.3.2.2).*

5.3.2.1 Improved advocacy capacity of mine action groups

Overview of Program Objectives and Approach

The DFAIT/ILX Mine Ban Partnerships Program was designed to focus on sustaining the ability of NGOs to carry on with the advocacy activities that were widely applauded as key to the Ottawa Process and the signing of the MBT in December 1997[23]. Specifically, the objective of this program is to build the capacities of domestic and selected international NGO=s to play an active and sustainable role in conjunction with international efforts to support the ratification, universalization and implementation of the MBT. Starting in the second year of the program the objective of this program was expanded to include efforts to encourage the diversification and growth of donor support.

One of the activities set out in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action as an integral part of landmine programming is Abanning the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of AP mines@. The Performance Measurement System lists Aformal acceptance of the MBT@ as being one way to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of AP mines. Very clearly, the objectives of the Mine Ban Partnership Program supports this activity.

The approach taken by DFAIT/ILX for the Mine Action Partnership program is reasonable and logical. The approach taken was to:

[23] This view is widely expressed in many landmine related reports, studies, and accounts published by the United Nations (including the Report on the First Meeting of the States Parties), the LandMine Monitor, and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs.

- $ use 70% ($2.5 million) of the total five year allocation of $3.5 million, to provide core funding to help put established organisations like Mines Action Canada (MAC)[24] and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines on a sustainable financial footing; and
- $ use the remaining 30% as responsive funding available to:
  - X support advocacy capacity activities in regions and countries considered to be high priority for ratification and universalization activities; and
  - X to support the development of new partnerships with domestic and international NGOs active within the movement to ban AP mines.

[24] Organised in 1994, MAC is a coalition of Canadian NGOs, dedicated to promoting the global ban on landmines. Coalition members include: World Vision Canada, The United Nations Association of Canada,, Canadian Auto Workers, CIET Canada, Oxfam Canada, Canadian Red Cross, UNICEF Canada, Physicians for Global Survival, Canadian International Demining Centre, and the Sierra Club of BC.

The identification and prioritization of Mine Ban Partnership projects was done by DFAIT/ILX, apparently on the basis of the CLF=s AMine Action Country Priorities List@[25]. There is very little DFAIT/ILX documentation to support the process of identifying and prioritizing projects related for this program, therefore it cannot be concluded that the highest priority projects were funded. However, the decision to select ICBL and MAC as recipients of core funding from the CLF was sound and reasonable, given the agencies available, their mandate and capacities. ICBL is unquestionably the key NGO involved in MBT advocacy activities at the international level, and MAC, the Canadian affiliate of the ICBL, is the key organisation at the domestic level.

Output Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, two output level indicators were identified for this program by the *Evaluation Assessment*: amount of core funding to MAC and ICBL, and # of advocacy projects funded. Although typically the amount of funding is not used as an indicator of outputs, this indicator does serve as a reflection of the efforts and activity required to plan, arrange and implement these agreements.

Specific objectives for the two output indicators were not established. However, DFAIT/ILX planning documents (for example, DFAIT/ILX business plans and the information packages submitted to the CLF Management Board) clearly identify MAC and ICBL as the key intended beneficiaries of this program.

Results for this output indicator have not been formally tracked nor monitored against targets. For the purpose of this study, the output level indicators identified by the *Evaluation Assessment* were populated by DFAIT/ILX personnel and the study team.

The five year allocation for the Mine Ban Partnerships Program is $3.5 million. As at March 31, 2001 (i.e. end of year three), $2.3 million, or 64%, has been spent. The $2.3 million has been used to fund twelve contribution agreements with 4 organisation: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Mines Action Canada (MAC), the Canadian Centre for Demining (CIDC) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). Exhibit 5.3.2.1 summarizes the amount provided to each organisation, and the nature of the agreements.

Exhibit 5.3.2.1: Funding of NGO=s through Partnerships Programs

Organisation	Amount of funding	# of agreements	Nature of agreements
ICBL	$946, 355	4	Core funding
MAC	$1,083,877	5	Core funding and special projects

[25] The Mine Action Country Priorities List was discussed in Section 4.5.

CIDC	$97,500	1	Special projects
IPPNW	$160,923	2	Special project

Although a comparison cannot be made between specific targets set for output indicators and results achieved to date, it is clear that the nature and scale of outputs from the Mine Ban Partnerships Program are consistent with the program=s key objective which, as noted, was to build the capacities of domestic and selected international NGO=s to play an active and sustainable role.

Outcome Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, the intended short term outcome of this program was: improved advocacy capacity of mine action groups.

Over $1 million has been provided to MAC in the first three years of the fund. In 2000, 100% of MAC=s core funding was financed by the CLF. Financial support to MAC for core operations and special projects has enabled the organisation to continue to play a role in international and domestic advocacy work.

As documented in MAC progress reports to DFAIT/ILX, the CLF funding to MAC has enabled the organisation to hire resources and undertake activities including:

- $ the provision of guidance and support to other Canadian NGOs (i. e., MAC coalition members) involved in ban landmine advocacy work;
- $ development and maintenance of a professional and up to date website that includes, on behalf of ICBL, a very detailed and up-to date database of the status of treaty signatures, ratifications, and accessions;
- $ outreach and education activities within Canada, including most notably, serving as Secretariat for the Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program (YMAAP);
- $ serve as a key member of ICBL=s @LandMine Monitor Core Group@;
- $ the provision of funding, guidance and support to the United States Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL)[26]; and
- $ the provision of guidance and support to help build the capacity of mine action groups in the Americas to monitor the treaty=s implementation.

Almost $950,000 in core funding has been provided to ICBL during the first three years of the CLF. The amount of core funding provided by CLF to ICBL ranges from 15-20% of total requirements. Core funding to ICBL has been used, as described in the objectives of the contribution agreement between ICBL and DFAIT/ILX, to help finance ICBL efforts to

[26] The USCBL is responsible for advocacy activities to encourage the US to become a State Party to the MBT. USCBL activities include activities aimed at increasing US public awareness of the landmine issue, and mobilizing political awareness and activity among American decision makers.

maintain the momentum of civil society participation in landmine ban advocacy efforts, to increase the number of ratifications, and to increase the capacities of the national campaign in the US.

Results achieved by the ICBL are detailed in year end reports to the donor country funders, including of course, Canada. Examples of the results achieved by ICBL, due in part to CLF funding, include attendance and participation in each of the four Intersessional Committee programs[27], development and presentation of regional conferences for Landmine Monitor researchers, development and implementation of the 2004 Action Plan (adopted at the Third Meeting of the States Parties); and development and presentation of a wide range of conferences, petitions, and workshops each aimed at increasing the number of ratifications of the treaty and working towards universalization. The geographic focus of ICBL activities has been the Middle East, South East Asia and the former Soviet Republics.

Since the signing of the treaty, the work of ICBL continues to be highly visible and widely praised, as evidenced from interviews with key informant groups, including representatives from CLF partner departments, UN organisation, and Canadian and international NGO=s. departmental representatives, as well as in the official reports of the First and Second Meetings of the States Parties.

Conclusion: CLF efforts to improve the advocacy capacity of mine action groups in Canada and internationally have proven both useful and effective. In the first three years of the CLF, Canada has contributed to the improved advocacy capacity of mine action groups, most notably the ICBL and MAC. The funding provided to ICBL and MAC has enabled these two key NGOs to continue to develop their expertise in advocacy activities.

While Canada has been successful in leveraging donor funding for ICBL, MAC remains very dependent on the Fund. Therefore, going forward, questions remain as to whether there is a need to continue to fund some key partners at or near the 100% level, and what Canada=s role should be in building or maintaining the financial sustainability of mine action groups.

5.3.2.1 Increased public support to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines

Overview of Program Objectives and Approach

At the end of the Ottawa Conference in December 1997, the status of the MBT was 122 signatures, 3 ratifications and 68 non-signatories. Although this far exceeded expectations, it was clear that additional efforts were required to increase public support for the MBT so that universalisation of the MBT could ultimately be achieved.

The DFAIT/ILX Mine Ban Initiatives Program was designed to support national, regional and global initiatives to mobilise political will and to ensure the technical capacities to promote the timely ratification, universalisation and effective implementation of the MBT. The goal of the program is to promote ratifications and implementation of the Convention.

[27] The Intersessional Committee Program is further described in Section 3.2 of this report.

One of the activities set out in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action as an integral part of landmine programming is Abanning the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of AP mines@. Very clearly, the objectives of the Mine Ban Initiatives Program supports this activity.

The approach taken by DFAIT/ILX for the Mine Ban Initiatives Program was reasonable and logical. As described in DFAIT/ILX planning documents and the information packages provided to the CLF Management Board, the approach was twofold:

$ deliver 40% of the program through a small projects fund which will, on a responsive basis, support initiatives undertaken by DFAIT posts; and

$ use the remaining 60%, on a responsive basis, for initiatives of the DFAIT/ILX policy unit.

The selection process for projects to be funded under this program is partially documented, but not in a consistent manner. The identification and prioritization of Mine Ban Initiatives projects was done by DFAIT/ILX, apparently on the basis of the CLF=s AMine Action Country Priorities List@ [28]. Based upon discussions with DFAIT (ILX) personnel, the selection process for Mine Ban Initiatives projects considered the following factors:

$ the needs of the country or region as understood by the DFAIT/ILX Program Co-ordinator for the particular region, DFAIT missions and or in-country representatives;

$ the level of support for the MBT within the particular country;

$ the extent to which a DFAIT/ILX intervention could increase support for the MBT in the particular country or a neighboring region;

$ if already ratified, the type and extent of assistance required by the country to implement the MBT;

$ the complementarity of a DFAIT/ILX intervention in a particular country, given other interventions planned or in progress by the UN, other donor countries, and or CIDA; and

$ whether other donor countries would be willing to help fund the intervention.

Since there is very little DFAIT/ILX documentation to support the overall process for identifying and prioritizing projects related to this program, it cannot be concluded that the highest priority projects were funded. However, as discussed in the following sections on output and outcome level results, the approach taken by DFAIT/ILX was reasonable, as were the projects selected.

Output Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, which was developed as part of the *Evaluation Assessment,* five output level indicators were identified for this program: # of advocacy projects funded, # of Mission-funded projects, # of special projects funded, # of mine clearance projects funded , and # of victim assistance and awareness projects funded. The apparent intent of using these numbers as indicators for output level results is the fact

[28] The CLF AMine Action Country Priorities List@ was discussed in Section 4.5.

that these #=s reflect the level of effort and resources that were required to plan and implement the activities.

Specific objectives for these output indicator were not formally established by DFAIT/ILX. However, DFAIT/ILX planning documents (for example, DFAIT/ILX business plans and the information packages submitted to the CLF Management Board) note that efforts will include:

$ regional conferences and seminars to promote dialogue in states that are emerging players in mine action and to promote the Convention in holdout regions;
$ limited interventions in priority countries;
$ expanded networks of donor cooperation and leveraged funds;
$ continued visibility for Canada in a wide range of states outside the major country programs; and
$ flexibility to react to emerging priorities or humanitarian crises.

Results for the five output indicators have not been formally tracked or monitored against targets. For the purpose of this study, results for the five output level indicators were populated by DFAIT/ILX personnel[29]. This information is summarised on the following page in Exhibit 5.3.2.

Exhibit 5.3.2: Outputs related to Mine Ban Initiatives Program

Description	***Amount ($) or #***
# of advocacy projects funded	18
# of Mission-funded projects	Not available[30]
# of special projects funded	17 (related to universalisation)
# of mine clearance projects	28
# of victim assistance and awareness projects funded	13

Although a comparison cannot be made between specific targets set for output indicators and results achieved to date, it is clear that given the funding available, the nature and scale of outputs from the Mine Ban Initiatives Program are consistent with the program=s

[29] Note: These output level results are draft only. Although prepared by DFAIT/ILX personnel, DFAIT/ILX management has not confirmed agreement with the results.

[30] Projects funded by DFAIT missions are not tracked by DFAIT/ILX. Input by DFAIT missions is provided to many of DFAIT/ILX=s CLF projects, however this information is not tracked.

objective. Following is a discussion of other activities and output level results of the Mine Ban Initiatives Program that demonstrate the consistency of the program=s output level results and objectives.

The five year allocation for the program was $8.6 million. As at March 31, 2001 (ie. end of year three), $6.3 million, or 73% has been spent. The $6.3 million consists of the following: $4.8 million to fund contribution agreements, and $1.5 million for DFAIT/ILX operating and maintenance (ie. O &M) costs.

Over 75 contribution agreements, totalling $4.8 million, have been funded under this program for activities identified above in Exhibit 5.3.2. As evidenced from a review of project files and DFAIT/ILX status reports, these agreements have funded activities in many countries and regions including, for example, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Burkina Faso, Chad, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Russia, Ukraine, Nicaragua, Georgia, Nepal, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Vietnam, and Honduras. The $1.5 million spent on O &M includes costs related to:

$ salary or contract costs for additional DFAIT/ILX personnel, several landmine specialist contractors and consultants, and a DFAIT person working out of DFAIT=s Geneva-based mission;

$ travel and hospitality costs of DFAIT/ILX personnel, consultants and contractors to attend meetings, seminars or conferences related to increasing public support for the MBT;

$ miscellaneous other expenses related to planning, developing or co-ordinating various regional seminars and conferences designed to increase public support for the MBT including for example, the First State Meeting in Maputo, the Rosario Landmines Conference, the Minwara Conference, the Bamako Seminar, and the Forum for Co-operation on Mine Action.

Outcome Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, one short-term outcome was expected as the result of having achieved output level results from activities funded by the Mine Ban Initiatives Program: increased public support to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines. The apparent intent of using these numbers as indicators for output level results is the fact that these #=s reflect the level of effort and resources that were required to plan and implement the activities.

As evidenced from a review of project files, DFAIT/ILX business plans, DFAIT/ILX reports to the CLF Management Board and various DFAIT/ILX progress reports, the program has funded a wide variety of projects, each apparently designed to increase international public support for the MBT. Examples of the projects funded and results achieved are listed in Exhibit 5.3.2.

Exhibit 5.3.2: Examples of Projects funded by the Mine Ban Initiatives program

- $ the provision of demining equipment and training to the Royal Jordanian corps of Engineers, the Bulgarian Army, and mine action centres in Ecuador and Peru;
- $ the partial funding of a Level One Survey being conducted in Thailand by the Norwegian People=s Aid;
- $ the funding of the Toronto-based Canadian Landmine Fund to investigate the feasibility of developing and implementing a unique, international fund-raising and awareness campaign called the Night of a Thousand Dinners[31];
- $ the funding of mine ban campaign offices in Croatia and India to promote awareness of the MBT, build a civil society, and to maintain political pressure;
- $ the funding of campaign offices in Georgia and Ukraine;
- $ the funding of mine action projects in Georgia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo;
- $ the training of Colombian civil servants on how to implement the treaty in their country;
- $ the partial funding of UN assessment missions in Thailand, Burma and Uganda; and
- $ the partial funding of national mine action centres in Croatia, Chad and Yemen to increase leadership, coordination and management capacity of the institutions and to fund specific mine action projects.

Six project files from the Mine Ban Initiatives Program were reviewed to obtain evidence of specific results achieved by this program, however, this approach provided limited information on results at the outcome level. Firstly, the quality and completeness of results reporting in the files was inconsistent, ranging from comprehensive reports on results against specific objectives, to brief reports on results that do not report against objectives established, to no reports on results.

Secondly, in many instances, the project objectives had been set only at the output level, and therefore, reports on achievements addressed only output level results. For example, several projects funded under this program were for the purchase of equipment for several mine action centres. The objectives of these projects were stated as Ato provide equipment and training on the equipment.@ Consequently, the reporting of results included in these project files was limited to a report on whether the equipment was delivered and whether training was delivered. No additional documentation was included in the project file regarding higher level results such as for example: was the equipment actually used by the mine action centre?; was the training delivered effectively?; how did the funding of the equipment and training increase public support for the MBT? The observation that some CLF projects were developed and designed based only on output level results, rather than on higher level results is supported by notes prepared for the DFAIT/ILX Planning

[31] Provide quick overview of the night of a 1000 dinners.

Workshop in June 1999, which stated: AIn short, priorities for each program were developed on an ad hoc basis without any substantive reference to overall performance targets that span the five years of the program.@

Nonetheless, the ultimate indicators of whether overall DFAIT/ILX efforts and the Mine Ban Initiatives Program has contributed to increased public support for the MBT is:

$ how many countries have signed, ratified or acceded the treaty since the inception of the CLF, and

$ to what extent the international landmine community acknowledges Canada=s contribution to these additional signatures or accessions?

At the end of the Ottawa Conference in December 1997, the status of the MBT was 3 ratifications, 122 signatures, and 68 non-signatories. As at August 2001, the status of the MBT was 118 ratifications or accessions, 22 signatories not yet ratified, and 53 non-signatories. Clearly progress has been made by the landmine community, including DFAIT/ILX and the activities of the CLF, to increase public support for the MBT.

All landmine literature reviewed by the study team, and all key informants interviewed were very supportive not only of Canada=s efforts to arrange the Ottawa Conference in 1997, but also of Canada=s continued leadership role in increasing support and facilitating and encouraging additional signatures, ratifications and accessions. UN organizations, major NGOs and senior US landmine officials were among the most notable informant groups who praised Canada=s efforts. When asked specifically about projects funded by DFAIT/ILX for the purpose of increasing support for the MBT, the majority of informants, including informants from other donor countries, the UN, and the NGO community, noted that DFAIT/ILX programming decisions within this program were for the most part, good to excellent choices.

However, almost every informant group including other donor countries, NGOs and UN organizations expressed concern with the lack of tangible results with respect to the remaining Abig player countries@ (for example, China, India, Russia and the US) who have yet to ratify or accede the Convention. All players in the ban landmine community are fully aware of this issue and Canada continues to play a leadership role in developing new strategies to address this problem.

Conclusion: Through the CLF, Canada has made a contribution towards universal acceptance and early ratification of the MBT. Canada is viewed as a leader in these efforts, and Canada=s contribution is regarded within the international landmine community as having been exemplary and effective.

The CLF=s efforts to increase public support for signing and ratification of the MBT and for the elimination of land mines have been judged as a reasoned response to the problem of encouraging smaller and medium sized nations to ratify or accede to the MBT. These

efforts have an important part to play in landmine programming over the long term and should not be seen as secondary to the more immediate and direct actions in support of victims.

Future efforts towards universalization can no longer rely upon the Ahumanitarian@ argument. Focus must now turn to address non-signatory concerns related to security and military issues. A key problem facing the international mine action community is the continued resistance of large, militarily significant countries to ratification and implementation of the MBT. This will require States Parties to utilize diplomatic and policy resources outside the scope of funded programs such as the CLF.

5.3.3 International coordination, global priority setting and monitoring

Another component of the CLF is activity related to international coordination, global priority setting and monitoring of treaty implementation. Four DFAIT/ILX programs were designed to support this component: Multilateral Co-ordination Program, Convention Monitoring Program, Research and Policy Development Program, and Outreach and Sustainability Program. This section of the report addresses Aresults achievement@ for the outputs and outcomes related to this component of the CLF.

EVALUATION ISSUES: Results Achievement

Outputs: *With respect to international coordination, global priority setting and monitoring of treaty implementation, what progress has been made towards the production of outputs?*

Short-term Outcome: *What progress has the CLF made towards achievement of the following outcomes?*

- $ *accessibility of mine action data and information improved (Section 5.3.3.1);*
- $ *co-ordination of UN supported mine action enhanced (Section 5.3.3.2); and*
- $ *Canadian public awareness of mine action program raised (Section 5.3.3.3).*

5.3.3.1 Accessibility of mine action data and information improved

Overview of Program Objectives and Approach

Two DFAIT/ILX programs were specifically designed to focus on improved mine action data and information: Convention Monitoring Program, and the Research and Policy Development Program. Although efforts of other DFAIT/ILX programs, and the CLF programs of the other three partner departments also contributed to improved mine action data and information, these two programs were the key contributors.

The objective of the Convention Monitoring Program was to support the production of an annual independent experts report on the status of the implementation of the MBT. Another objective was to assist the development of sustainable capacities of civil society organizations to monitor and report on the implementation of the MBT. The approach taken by this program was to provide funding to ICBL to support efforts to research and publish the annual LandMine Monitor. Given the calibre of ICBL and the amount of international support for this initiative, clearly the approach taken by DFAIT/ILX was reasonable.

The objective of the Research and Policy Development Program was maintenance of Canadian leadership in mine action by ensuring that Canadian officials have the best available mine action information to support policy development and the management of Canadian mine action programs. This program also supports Canada=s efforts to meet the MBT=s annual obligation to report to the UN on the status of operation of the MBT in Canada (i.e., Article 7). The approach taken by this program included research policy development undertaken by both DFAIT/ILX personnel, as well as by external consultants and organizations. The combination of using in-house expertise and supplementing that expertise with external sources is reasonable.

There is very little DFAIT/ILX documentation to support the process of identifying and prioritizing projects related to this program, and although the activities and projects selected seem reasonable, it cannot be concluded whether the highest priority activities have been funded.

Output Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, two output level results were identified in the *Evaluation Assessment* in support of increased accessability of mine action data and improved information: # of monitoring projects funded, # of research projects funded, and # of policy projects funded.

Specific objectives for the output indicators were not established, and therefore results for this output indicator have not been formally tracked and monitored within DFAIT/ILX. For the purpose of this study, these output level indicators were populated by DFAIT/ILX personnel. The outputs achieved are[32]*:*

$ # of monitoring projects funded: **3**

$ # of research projects funded: **9**

$ # of policy projects funded: **0**

These output indicators do not completely reflect the activities and effort of the Monitoring and Research programs. Following is a discussion of other activities and output level results that demonstrate the consistency of two program=s output level results and objectives.

A summary of the five year allocation and funds spent to date for the two programs is summarized below in Exhibit 5.3.3.1.

Exhibit 5.3.3.1: CLF Expenditures as at March 31, 2001

[32] The information for these output indicators were calculated by DFAIT/ILX personnel. As at the date of this report, DFAIT/ILX management has not verified the accuracy of these numbers.

Programs	5 yr Budget per Mgmt Bd ($ in 000's)	Total spent as at March 31, 2001		
		O &M ($ in 000's)	G=s & C=s ($ in 000's)	Total ($ in 000's)
Convention Monitoring Program	2200	22	900	922
Research & Policy Development Program	1770	328	633	961

Between the two programs, fifteen contribution agreements have been funded. For example, contribution agreements were entered into with: ICBL, IDRC, Handicap International, York University, Physicians for Human Rights, CIET, and the International Peace Institute of Oslo. The monies spent on O &M includes costs related to:

$ salary or contract costs for additional DFAIT/ILX personnel, and short term contracts for several landmine specialist contractors and consultants;

$ travel and hospitality costs of DFAIT/ILX personnel, consultants and contractors to attend meetings, seminars or conferences related to convention monitoring or research and policy development;

$ miscellaneous other expenses related to planning, developing or co-ordinating various meetings, conferences and seminars related to policy research or monitoring of the implementation of the MBT; and

$ miscellaneous other expenses related to printing and publishing Canada=s annual report under Article 7 of the MBT.

Outcome Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, the intended short term outcome of these two programs was: increased accessibility of mine action data and improved information.

DFAIT/ILX=s most noted contribution in support of encouraging effective monitoring of the MBT has been the funding and support for development and publication of the LandMine Monitor. The LandMine Monitor is an annual publication by the ICBL to monitor international implementation of, and compliance with, the MBT. The LandMine Monitor is viewed by all respondents as a very necessary and extremely well done initiative. Canada is credited as having been one of the co-founders of the LandMine Monitor concept, and is one of the major funders of ICBL=s efforts to develop and publish the report.

The LandMine Monitor has achieved many objectives related to improved mine action data and information, as well as to improved mine action, in general. For example, development and publication of the LandMine Monitor:

$ serves as an independent and validating resource of information that is complementary, not duplicative, of the Article 7 annual reports submitted to the UN by each State Party;

$ has served as a tool to maintain the engagement of civil society, and at the same time, it has served as a way of building the research and monitoring capacity of civil societies around the world; and

$ has, through the process of researching, writing, editing, validating and publishing the report, served to create and or consolidate networks, communications, and dialogue between NGOS, researchers, the governments of donor countries and the governments of affected countries.

In addition to DFAIT=s contribution to development of the LandMine Monitor, several other important contributions have been made to improved mine action data and information. The CLF has been a major proponent of the development and conduct of Level 1 Surveys which are a very important means of improving mine action data and information. Canada=s contributions to Level 1 Surveys is further discussed in Section 5.3.6 of the report. Based on a review of project files, progress reports, and Annual Reports of the Meetings of the State Parties, other contributions by DFAIT/ILX to improved mine action data and information include:

$ development of policy position papers on various MBT issues for consideration by the Meetings of the State Parties;

$ active participation in and provision of advice to each of the four Intersessional Committees and the UN Mine Action Support Group;

$ hosting of the Ottawa Mine Action Experts Meeting in Fiscal 98/99;

$ development of a database to support policy development and ongoing information needs;

$ development of a website on stockpile destruction and of the Mine Action Investments Database (a database of donor activity), both of which have been presented to UNMAS for incorporation within the UNMAS website;

$ development of the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action; and

$ support to several research centres towards development of socio-economic impact tools.

Conclusion: The CLF has contributed to improved mine action data and information. The most highly acclaimed contribution, in the opinion of most respondents, has been Canada=s financial and other support for the development and publication of the annual LandMine Monitor. The LandMine Monitor, published by the ICBL, is an internationally respected report that serves as an independent monitor of international implementation of, and compliance with, the MBT.

5.3.3.2 Enhanced Co-ordination of UN supported Mine Action

The extent of progress towards this short term result is discussed in Section 5.3.6.5 of the report, since the funding of UN organizations was part of DFAIT programming only in the

first year of the fund. In subsequent years, responsibility was transferred from DFAIT to CIDA.

5.3.3.3 Canadian Public Awareness Raised

Overview of Program Objectives and Approach

One DFAIT/ILX program was designed to raise Canadian public awareness: the Outreach and Sustainability Program. The objectives of this program are to contribute to the awareness of and support for the MBT and Canadian mine action through development of domestic and international outreach tools, and to support development of an annual report to Parliament on Canada=s mine action programs.

The approach taken by this program was, through the work of DFAIT/ILX personnel and external resources, to identify information needs and develop appropriate communication and other tools. There is very little DFAIT/ILX documentation to support the process of identifying and prioritizing activities related to this program, and although the activities and projects selected seem reasonable, it cannot be concluded whether the highest priority projects have been funded.

One of the activities set out in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action as an integral part of landmine programming is: sustaining mine action efforts, which includes maintaining public awareness of the landmine problem. Clearly the objectives of the Outreach and Sustainability Program support this activity.

Output Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, only one output level result was identified for raising Canadian public awareness: # of Annual Reports prepared for Parliament. To date 3 annual reports have ben prepared for Parliament.

This output indicator does not reflect the extent of activities and effort of the Outreach and Sustainability Program. Following is a discussion of other activities and output level results of the program that demonstrates the consistency of the program=s output level results and objectives.

The five year allocation for the Outreach and Sustainability program is $3.88 million. As at March 31, 2001, $3.405 million (or 88%) has been spent. The $3.405 million consists of the following: $1.668 million to fund contribution agreements, and $1.737 million for DFAIT/ILX operating and maintenance (i. e., O &M) costs.

Sixteen contribution agreements have been funded during the first three years of the program, totaling $1.668 million. Recipients of these agreements include CRC, MAC, and the Canadian Landmine Foundation. The $1.737 million spent on O &M costs include:

$ contract costs for DFAIT/ILX personnel and communication specialist consultants involved in writing, testing or evaluating communication materials;

$ development, production and delivery costs related to information videos, promotional goods, promotional displays;

$ funding of Youth Mine Ambassador activities;

$ creation of the SafeLane website; and

$ development and publication of the SafeLane newsletters, the Annual Report to Parliament, and Measured Steps.

Outcome Level Results

Assessing the actual impact of the Outreach and Sustainability Program or the effectiveness of tools developed on its Canadian audience was beyond the scope of this evaluation. However, it is clear that public support for the landmine issue remains quite high (1997: 87% - 1998: 57% - 1999: 41% - 2000: 67%[33]). No clear correlation between these figures and the program efforts can be established, however, based on a review of project filers, interviews with CLF department personnel, MAC, other Canadian NGOs, the program has made significant progress in raising the awareness of Canadians on the issue of landmines, particularly at the grassroots level.

The flagship of DFAIT/ILX=s awareness program is the Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program (YMAPP), a joint initiative by the CLF, CRC and MAC. The YMAPP is viewed by most respondent groups as having been an extremely successful, and innovative initiative by the CLF. Over three years, YMAAP has grown from five youth ambassadors to twelve in 2001. To date over twenty ambassadors have graduated from the program and several host organizations have benefitted from the presence of youth ambassador as mine action activists. Since 1998, the YMAAP has reached thousands of youth and other Canadians, made hundreds of presentations to groups and the media in nine provinces, and trained an estimated 200- 300 mine action volunteers across Canada. Many respondents credit YMAAP as an effective means to raise awareness among young Canadians and the general public. There is strong evidence that the coordinating organizations consult the youth ambassadors regularly, which leads to improvements and adjustments to communications outreach tools and activities. The YMAAP is also credited for its role in building the capacity of host organizations on mine action.

CLF funding within this component has also been used to:

$ produce a wide range of special events and exhibits in Canada and abroad. Major joint special events include the *Ban Landmine 99*, a Mine Action Exhibition in December 1999 at Lansdowne Park in Ottawa, the VVAF *Landmines Concert* in 2000

[33] DFAIT commissioned polls in 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000, conducted by Goldfarb Consultants and Environics.

and *Canadian Landmine Awareness Week* (CLAW), an annual event launched in 2000; and

$ develop and distribute various communication tools. For example, it funded the production and distribution of a CD ROM (*Ban Landmines!*), two documentary videos (*One Step at a Time* and *In Years, Not Decades*), a quarterly newsletter, two web-based educational tools (*Mine Action Workbook* and *The Virtual Classroom*), two Annual Reports on the activities of the Canadian Landmine Fund; and the updating and expansion of the DFAIT *Safe Lane* website.

A second area within the awareness component was development and implementation of a self-sustaining fund for Canadian mine action. Efforts towards this objective have consisted largely of funding (core funding and special project funding) for the Toronto-based Canadian Landmine Foundation. Canadian Landmine Foundation activities include a gala dinner in December 1999, co-sponsoring the VVAF Landmine Concert in 2000 and organizing the ANight of a 1000 Dinners@ initiative. The Canadian Landmine Foundation has also helped build Canadian awareness and support at the grassroots level. Domestically, the Foundation has focused efforts on the United Church and Rotary Club networks. Internationally, the Foundation is hoping to raise upwards of $1 million in 2001 through its 1000 Dinners fund-raising event. There are concerns that the Foundation will not become self-sustaining before the end of the present Fund. It is estimated that to be self-sustainable, the Foundation must raise approximately $4M a year. In its first three years of operations, it has raised a total of $800,000. However, the Canadian Landmine Foundation has had a unsteady start, with three executive directors in three years of operations and a fundamental shift in funding strategy.

Conclusion: The CLF has contributed towards an increase in Canadian public awareness of mine action programs. The flagship of the CLF=s awareness program is the YMAAP.

5.3.4 Stockpile Destruction

Another component of the CLF is activity related to stockpile destruction. DND and DFAIT/ILX co-lead this activity. This section of the report addresses Aresults achievement@ for the outputs and outcomes related to stockpile destruction.

EVALUATION ISSUES: Results Achievement

Outputs: *With respect to the DND-DFAIT/ILX led program, AStockpile Destruction@, what progress has been made towards the production of outputs?*

Short-term Outcome: *What progress has the CLF made towards achievement of the following outcome?*

$ *access to and use of landmine stockpiles reduced*

Overview of Program Objectives and Approach

Article 4 of the Ottawa Treaty, ADestruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines@ obliges each State Party to destroy all AP landmine stockpile it owns or possesses, as soon as possible, but not later than, four years after entry into force of the Convention for that State

Party. This obligation on State parties has created the need for donor countries to provide assistance for two reasons:

$ some State parties will be unable to comply with the Treaty=s four year deadline for stockpile destruction, unless financial resources and technical assistance is made available by other States parties (i. e., as required under Article 6, AInternational cooperation and assistance@);

$ some countries who have not yet ratified or acceded the Treaty are hesitant to do so, in part, because they do not have the required resources or expertise to destroy their stockpiles within the legal timeframe.

The primary objective of the CLF=s Stockpile Destruction Program is to: promote and facilitate universal adherence to the convention; and to assist State parties= compliance to the Convention by providing technical and financial aid to permit the destruction of existing stockpiles of AP mines in selected countries. In the third year of the program, the objective of this program expanded to include facilitation of coordination among donor countries and states in need of assistance, and enhancement of availability of accurate data on global stockpiles and on their destruction. In the fourth year, the objective was further expanded to include raising of the profile and importance of the issue of stockpile destruction within the area of mine action.

One of the activities set out in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action as an integral part of landmine programming is Abanning the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of AP mines@. Very clearly, the objectives of the Stockpile Destruction Program supports this activity.

For all intents and purposes, the DFAIT/ILX team leads this program. DND provides a support role through two means: provision of a DND officer within DFAIT/ILX to provide ongoing technical and other advice related to stockpile destruction issues, and provision of military experts, on an as required basis, to support DFAIT/ILX requests for military experts to lead and or participate in international meetings, conferences and seminars related to stockpile destruction.

The approach taken by DND and DFAIT/ILX for the Stockpile Destruction Program is reasonable and logical. The approach is based on partnership, communication and coordination with other key donor countries and organisations, and includes the provision of financial aid, as well as the provision of Canadian military expertise to enable military-to-military dialogue on stockpile destruction issues. Partners involved in CLF stockpile destruction projects include other donor countries such as the United States, and other key organisations such as OAS, NATO, and UNMAS.

The identification and prioritization of stockpile destruction projects was done by DFAIT/ILX, apparently on the basis of the CLF=s AMine Action Country Priorities List@[34]. There is very little DFAIT/ILX documentation to support the process of identifying and prioritizing projects related to stockpile destruction, therefore it cannot be concluded that the highest priority

[34] The CLF Mine Action Priorities and the CLF Decision Making Criteria were discussed in Section 4.5 of the Report.

projects were funded. However, the projects selected do seem reasonable, since none of the literature reviewed by the study team, nor any of the key informants interviewed, suggested that Canada=s approach was illogical or unreasonable. As discussed in the following section, landmine community publications and all key informant groups are very supportive of Canada=s efforts in the area of stockpile reduction.

Output Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, only one output level indicator was identified for this program: # of country-specific projects for the disposal of AP stockpiles funded. The apparent intent of using this numbers as an indicator for output level results is the fact it serves to reflect the level of effort and resources that were required to plan and implement the activities.

Specific objectives for this output indicator have not been formally established by DFAIT/ILX or DND. However, DFAIT/ILX planning documents (for example, DFAIT/ILX business plans and the information packages submitted to the CLF Management Board) do note the following geographic targets for stockpile destruction projects: Ukraine, Belarus, other parts of the world (Africa, Americas) and Aelsewhere@.

Results for this output indicator have not been formally tracked nor monitored against targets. However, a review of project files and various DFAIT/ILX reporting documents show that as at September 2001, eleven country-specific projects for the disposal of AP stockpiles have been funded. The countries that have received assistance include Ukraine, Belarus, Argentina, Hungary, Thailand, Guyana, 6 countries in the Americas (through funding provided to the OAS=s Managua Challenge Fund[35]), and Albania (through funding to the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, NAMSA).

Although a comparison cannot be made between specific targets set for output indicators and results achieved to date, it is clear that given the amount of resources available and the unanticipated complexities discovered by the international landmine community in the area of stockpile destruction programming, the nature and scale of outputs from the CLF=s Stockpile Destruction Program are consistent with the program=s key objectives. Following

[35] The Managua Challenge was a series of challenges issued to States Parties in the Americas in advance of the Third Meeting, which took place in September 2001. One of the challenges was Aensuring that all States Parties in the Americas have completed the destruction of stockpiled AP mines@.

is a discussion of other activities and output level results of the Stockpile Destruction Program that demonstrate the consistency of the program=s activities and objectives.

The five year allocation for the stockpile destruction program is $7.5 million. As at March 31, 2001 (i. e., end of Year 3), only $1.7 million (or 26%) has been spent. The $1.7 million consists of the following: $300,000 for salary related to the secondment of DND personnel to DFAIT/ILX, $727,000 to fund contribution agreements, and $750,000 for DFAIT/ILX operating and maintenance (i. e., O &M) costs.

The eleven contribution agreements during the first three years of the program, totaling $727,000, have funded projects in Ukraine, Belarus, Argentina, Hungary, Thailand, Guyana, 6 countries in the Americas, and Albania. The $750,000 spent on O &M costs include:

$ contract costs for military experts to assist DFAIT/ILX=s efforts in stockpile reduction, in addition to the DND secondment person***;***

$ travel and accommodation costs for DFAIT/ILX and DND personnel to participate in relevant meetings and conferences such as the Ukraine Stockpile Destruction Meeting, the Mongolia Landmines Seminar, the Buenos Aires Stockpile Destruction Seminar; and meetings of the Stockpile Destruction Standing Committee of Experts; and

$ contracts for environmental assessment reports, scoping and other planning studies related to the Ukraine stockpile destruction project, and development of a website on stockpile destruction issues.

Outcome Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, one short-term outcome was expected to be achieved as the result of the stockpile destruction work: access to and use of landmine stockpiles reduced.

Since its inception, CLF=s Stockpile Destruction Program has undertaken several country-specific and multilateral initiatives. The largest stockpile project undertaken by the CLF is the Ukraine project, a major joint undertaking with NATO. The project was slower to start than expected due to political and technical hurdles. However, it now appears back on track and we understand the destruction of AP mines in Ukraine is to begin shortly.

As evidenced from a review of project files, DFAIT/ILX business plans, and various DFAIT/ILX progress reports, the program has, in addition to the Ukraine project:

$ directly assisted, or is still in the progress of assisting, with the destruction of the stockpiles of Belarus, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Ecuador and Albania;

$ enabled the Canadian co-sponsorship of five regional seminars (Argentina, Hungary, Malaysia, Mongolia and Mali) that encourage stockpile destruction, universalization and ratifications;

$ through the efforts of DFAIT/ILX and DND personnel, spearheaded several other important stockpile-related multi-lateral initiatives, including:

- X the establishment of better monitoring and verification mechanisms in collaboration with the Geneva International Humanitarian Demining Centre;
- X the coordination of technical experts meetings on specific stockpile destruction technical themes;
- X the development of a website on various aspects of stockpile destruction, which was given to UNMAS for inclusion on their website;

- the establishment of a NATO Trust Fund for stockpile destruction, and the funding of activities related to the Managua Challenge.

Two project files were reviewed to obtain evidence of specific results achieved to date: the OAS-Managua Challenge project ($200,000 US) and the NAMSA Stockpile Destruction Program for Albania ($209,000 US). Although some documentation related to project objectives was on file, no interim or final progress reports were yet on file. Discussions with the DFAIT/ILX project officers indicate that DFAIT/ILX does maintain ongoing contact with the delivery agents for both of these projects, and although not documented in the files, progress continues.

Other sources of information confirm the fact that Canada is making a contribution to world wide efforts to reduce stockpiles. The LandMine Monitor 2000 noted that Canada was the first country to recognize the need for donor countries to provide both financial support and technical assistance in the area of stockpile destruction. Almost all key informants interviewed (including NGOs, CLF, UN representatives, and other donor country representatives) noted that CLF efforts and progress in the area of stockpile destruction assistance is widely respected within the international landmine community. This view is also supported in several landmine community publications. For example, the LandMine Monitor 2001 again highlighted the fact that Canada is one of the few donor countries active in the area of stockpile destruction. As well, the Report on the Second Meeting of the States Parties in September 2000, includes a note of appreciation for Canada=s efforts and contributions to the work of the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction. The Report also refers to Canada=s progress in developing a website related to stockpile destruction for UNMAS, and asks all other States to contribute to this important initiative being led by Canada.

In the course of providing assistance in the area of stockpile destruction, Canada and the rest of the international landmine community have learned that stockpile destruction is a much more complex issue than originally anticipated. Examples of the types of unanticipated issues that have had to be addressed include: identification of the location of stockpiles, miscellaneous military and security concerns, as well as safety and environmental considerations related to the transport and destruction of stockpiles. The LandMine Monitor and Reports of the Meetings of the States Parties note that Canada continues to provide solid leadership in trying to overcome and manage these unanticipated complexities.

Conclusion: One of the highest priority areas of land mine programming remains the destruction of stockpiles. Around the world there remain significant stockpiles of landmines. If not located and destroyed, these stockpiles could potentially be used to mine new or previously cleared lands. While the scope of existing stockpiles is not yet fully documented, the CLF has provided Canada with the means of establishing early leadership on a key issue.

In the first three years of the CLF, Canada has made a contribution to efforts to reduce landmine stockpiles around the world. In fact, by partnering with other major donor countries and organisations including OAS, NATO, UNMAS, and by providing technical and military expertise and financial aid, Canada has established a leadership position within the

international landmine community on how to approach the very complex issue of destroying landmine stockpiles.
State Parties have not yet been able to identify the scope of work remaining to destroy all stockpiles, therefore it remains unclear whether the efforts of donor countries, including Canada, will be sufficient to achieve the four year timeline established by the MBT.

5.3.5 Research, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies

The fourth component of the CLF is activity related to research, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies. This activity was set up to be co-led by Industry Canada and DND. This section of the report addresses Aresults achievement@ for the outputs and outcomes related to DND and IC activities.

EVALUATION ISSUES: Results Achievement

Outputs: *With respect to the DND-IC led program, AResearch, development and marketing of appropriate Canadian technologies@, what progress has been made towards the production of outputs?*

Short-term Outcome: *What progress has the CLF made towards achievement of the following outcomes?*

$ *new demining technologies produced/marketed to mine affected countries*

$ *adapted demining technologies produced/marketed to mine affected countries*

Overview of Program Objectives and Approach

When the MBT was signed in December 1997 there were a variety of estimates regarding the extent of mined land around the world. Although as reported in the LandMine Monitor progress has been made since December 1997, an enormous amount of work remains.

Although the amount of remaining work has not been quantified, the landmine community has expressed concerns that the current methods of demining, which is largely low-tech, manual and labour intensive, will not likely be capable of meeting the deadline imposed by Article 5, (ADestruction of anti-personnel mines@), of the MBT which requires State Parties to clear all mined land within 10 years of the entry into force of the Convention for each State Party. Article 6, AInternational cooperation and assistance@, envisioned the need for assistance in demining at the start by including the obligation that State Parties Aundertake to facilitate...the fullest exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information.@ The CLF component related to Aresearch and development of appropriate Canadian technologies@ was established, in part, to meet this particular requirement under Article 6.

The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) was established within the Defense Research Establishment in Suffield, Alberta (DRES). Although officially CCMAT is jointly managed by DND and IC, DND has, for all intents and purposes, led the research

and development activities of CCMAT, while IC has led the marketing and commercialization activities.

The objectives of CCMAT have been modified over the three years of the CLF. Although at the start, the primary objective appeared to be related to research and development of practical, low cost and sustainable solutions, the focus has expanded to include the sharing of technical information and advice within the landmine technical research community and establishment of CCMAT as a centre of expertise for test and evaluation of demining equipment. This evolution is described below:

$ The information package for the First CLF Management Board (May 1998) describes the objective of CCMAT as being Ato play a vital role in making available low -cost sustainable technologies to the developing world by adapting existing technologies and developing new low-technology solutions@.

$ The information for the next CLF Management Board meeting in January 1999 describes CCMAT objectives as being to Abuild on the technical expertise in DND and Canadian industry relating to mine and mine clearance technology in order to develop demining equipment and methods which are more effective, efficient and appropriate to end-user needs, and to commercialize and market these through Industry Canada and its agency Technology Partnership Canada (TPC).= The information from this second meeting further explains that CCMAT efforts by DND will pursue five areas:

    $ Information Acquisition and Dissemination;

    $ Test and Evaluation;

    $ Modification of Military Technologies for Demining;

    $ R & D for new demining technologies; and

    $ Study of the potential for Alternatives to AP Mines.

$ In March 2001, the information package prepared for the CLF Management Board explains that CCMAT was established Ato expand research and development of low cost, sustainable mine action technologies....(and that) CCMAT acts as the focal point for demining technologies, working on fundamental R & D, the development of a database on demining technology and the adaptation of applicable military technology for humanitarian use....(and)...serves as an assessment agency to ensure that only the most effective and appropriate technologies are deployed to the field.@ The objective of Industry Canada activities is described in this March 2001 information package as being to@encourage and fund industrial participation in the development and commercialization of promising new technologies@.

Based upon the literature review conducted by the study team (See Section 7.0, Bibliography), the expansion of CCMAT objectives to include information sharing and establishment of CCMAT as a test and evaluation facility is reasonable. The sharing of technical information is necessary to help minimize duplication of research and

development efforts around the world, and the need for scientifically valid test and evaluation protocols for demining equipment is required to help increase the safety of demining products and to facilitate the procurement process.

One of the activities set out in the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action as an integral part of landmine programming is Aclearing mined land@. The Performance Measurement Systems lists Amaking available mine clearance assets and capacities@ as being one way to assist the process of clearing mined land. Quite clearly the objectives of CCMAT supports this activity.

5.3.5.1 Industry Canada

This section of the report addresses Aresults achievement@ for the outputs and outcomes related to Industry Canada=s efforts to market and commercialize appropriate Canadian technologies.

Overview of Program Approach

Industry Canada=s approach to its role within CCMAT involved two areas of Industry Canada: the Sector Branch took lead responsibility for marketing activities and Technology Partnerships Canada took lead responsibility for commercialization activities.

Other than the information included in the information packages provided to the CLF Management Board, no documentation was made available to the study team that describes the planned strategy or approach that was to be taken by the Sector Branch with respect to marketing activities. Neither is there any documentation that describes the intended objectives of the program.

With respect to TPC, the approach taken to support the commercialization of appropriate Canadian technologies was to use the existing TPC structures. TPC literature describes their approach as encompassing several guiding principles including: fostering research and development; responding to needs; sharing risk and reward; requiring repayment; and limiting the amount of TPC investment (normally TPC shares are in the range of 25-30% of eligible costs).

Based upon information made available to the study team, it does not appear that specific objectives were set for TPC=s efforts to commercialize appropriate Canadian technologies.

Output Level ResultsBTPC

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, which was developed as part of the *Evaluation Assessment,* only one output level indicator was identified as relevant to TPC commercialization activities: # of private sector firms funded. The apparent intent of using this as an output level indicator is that the number of firms funded serves as a reflection of the level of effort and resources required to identify and qualify the project, develop the project concept, fund the project, and monitor implementation of the project.

As at September 2001, TPC has funded only 1 company, Promac, a Canadian private company located in British Columbia, for a total of $160,000 ($95,000 up to March 31, 2001, and an additional $65,000 since March 2001). TPC helped to fund Promac=s development costs for the BDM48, a type of brush cutter for use in demining operations. As at September 2001, Promac=s BDM48 is in use in demining operations in Thailand. Although TPC helped to fund the development of the BDM48, the reason why the product has been delivered and integrated within demining operations is due to the following:

$ CCMAT conducted extensive test and evaluation procedures to prove the safety and effectiveness of the product; and

$ DFAIT/ILX donated the equipment to Thailand.

This issue is discussed in further detail in the Section 5.3.5.2 with respect to DND activities.

The five year allocation for TPC is $3.605 million, consisting of $3.5 million for the funding of contribution agreements, and $105,000 for the funding of operating and maintenance costs. As at March 31, 2001, only $125,000[36] of the total budgeted funds of $3.605 million, or approximately 3%, were spent. Unfortunately, $2.198 million of the first three years= budgeted $2,472 million[37] funds have lapsed, and are therefore no longer available to the CLF or Industry Canada. A March 2001 TPC report to the CLF Management Board explains the reason for this lapse as being Adue to insufficient demand@.

Output Level ResultsBSector Branch (IC)

The CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, which was developed as part of the *Evaluation Assessment,* did not identify any output level indicators for the marketing activities for which industry Canada=s Sector Branch was responsible. Following is a discussion of the types of activities and outputs achieved by Sector Branch.

The five year allocation of the CLF for marketing efforts by Industry Canada=s Sector Branch is $300,000 for the funding of operating and maintenance costs. As at March 31, 2001, the Sector Branch had spent $96,000, or approximately 32% of total budgeted funds. Unfortunately, the remaining $84,000 of the budget for the first three years lapsed, therefore the funds are no longer available to the CLF or Industry Canada.

There were two types of activities carried out by Sector Branch in support of CLF marketing activities: firstly, the Director General of Sector Branch served as the Co-Chair of the CCMAT Management Committee, and secondly a Sector Branch resource was responsible for the conduct of the marketing activities. Based on discussions with CCMAT, Sector Branch and TPC representatives, we understand that Sector Branch served in the Co-Chair

[36] The $125,000 consists of: $95,000 for the funding of Promac and $30,000 for TPC O &M costs.

[37] A total of $233,000 was transferred to DND is fiscal 2000/2001 to help fund the testing of the BDM48, thus these funds did not lapse.

position from April 1998 until some time in the summer of 2000, when the Director General for TPC assumed the position. With respect to marketing, six activities were carried out by Sector Branch during the period from January 1999 to July 2000. Although the study team was not provided with any documentation to support these activities, we understand from discussions with Sector Branch representatives that these marketing activities included the following:

$ development and co-ordination of the *Canadian Demining Technology Showcase* in December 1999, where 35 companies presented Canadian demining technologies to world leaders (total cost $80,000);

$ development and distribution of the *Canadian Capability Demining Guide* in December 1999 which was developed to introduce Canadian demining technology. Three hundred guide books were given to potential clients (total cost $42,000);

$ development and presentation of a *Demining Seminar* in March 2000, organized to inform Canadian demining companies about CCMAT. Twenty companies participated in this seminar (total cost $3,500);

$ development of the *Ten Company Pavilion* in June 2000, apparently designed to showcase Canadian demining to world leaders and NGOs (total cost $2,000);

$ trip to a *UN Procurement Conference* in July 2000 to accompany 10 Canadian companies to help Canadian demining companies sell their products to UN buyers (total cost $15,000);

$ development and August 2000 launch of a *website* within Industry Canada=s Strategis site designed to inform foreign clients of where to buy Canadian demining products (total cost $6,000).

Outcome Level ResultsBIndustry Canada Sector Branch and TPC

The outcome level result intended to be achieved through the efforts of Industry Canada=s marketing and commercialization efforts was the introduction of new or adapted demining technologies (developed by Canadian companies) to mine affected countries.

The tangible result of Industry Canada=s efforts is the funding of Promac, a Canadian based company, for a new demining technology (the BDM48) that was developed, subsequently tested by CCMAT and eventually distributed to demining operations in Thailand.

The fact that as a result of Industry Canada efforts one product was funded for commercialization efforts is due to several factors:

$ The market for demining technology is not a normal commercial market, therefore there is limited interest from the private sector to pursue development of such products, especially if the company is expected to cost share development of such a product.

$ Although some CCMAT effort was spent on funding the development of demining products by Canadian companies, the main focus in the first three years of CCMAT has been on the sharing and dissemination of technical information within the international research and demining community and on the development of CCMAT as an international centre of expertise for test and evaluation services. Thus, there were very few Canadian companies working with CCMAT=s technical advisers who were in need of Industry Canada=s assistance in marketing and commercialization efforts.

$ The Promac product was the only proposal that was approved for development by DND, therefore this was the only company with which TPC could legitimately enter into an agreement.

$ There appears to be very few Canadian companies with the capacity to develop potential demining technologies.

These reasons are discussed below in further detail:

(1) *The market for demining technology is not a normal commercial market, therefore there is limited interest from the private sector to pursue development of such products, especially if the company is expected to cost share development of such a product.*

A March 2001 study, AHumanitarian Demining: Assessment of the International Market for Humanitarian Demining@, commissioned by DFAIT, concluded what many in the landmine community have come to recognize: A...those who demand equipment and technology generally are not able to purchase it (i. e., many third world countries who have substantial areas of mined lands), the suppliers (i. e., the donor countries) generally do not need or use the equipment themselves, but donate it to the demanders. This confused process creates a difficult market.@

The fact that the market for demining equipment is not a commercial market means that very few private sector companies were motivated to develop a product for which there is no, or an uncertain and dysfunctional, market. The fact that CLF=s chosen method for funding potentially interested companies was TPC=s cost-share, repayment mechanism, rather than a granting mechanism, served as yet another obstacle to encourage Canadian companies to focus on development of equipment suitable for demining operations.

Thus, even though TPC did approach several Canadian companies to explore funding opportunities, the companies were not interested in entering into an agreement with TPC in this manner.

(2) *There were very few Canadian companies working with CCMAT=s technical advisers who were in need of Industry Canada=s assistance in marketing and commercialization efforts.*

The extent and nature of CCMAT activities are discussed in Section 5.3.5.2 of this report.

(3) *The Promac product was the only proposal that was approved for development by DND, therefore this was the only company with which TPC could legitimately enter into an agreement*.

The call for proposals to Canadian industry by CCMAT resulted in just over 80 proposals being submitted in the first three years of the fund. The evaluation process for these proposals was a joint effort between TPC, Industry Canada=s Sector Branch, DND, and several other advisers including MAC. The role of Industry Canada in this process was to evaluate the management capacity of the company to develop, market and commercialize the proposed technology, while DND=s role was to evaluate the technical feasability of the product and the technical capacity of the company to deliver. The first step in this process was the technical assessment by DND. Of the over 80 proposals evaluated by DND, the only proposal that met the technical requirements set by DND was the Promac project. Consequently, the only potential company with which TPC had the opportunity to support, was Promac.

(4) *There appears to be very few Canadian companies with the capacity to develop potential demining technologies.*

At the start of the CLF, the Industry Canada=s premise was that there existed a sizeable capacity within Canadian industry to develop technologies for use in demining operations. Based upon the technical evaluations by DND on the some 80 proposals reviewed from Canadian industry, and the fact that only one proposal was deemed acceptable, the potential appears to be much smaller than originally anticipated by Industry Canada. Although there appears to be very few Canadian companies capable of meeting CCMAT=s technical standards, there is an opposing view held by Industry Canada, that there may exist a number of Canadian companies who are capable of adapting existing equipment and products now used for example, within the construction or agricultural sector, that could potentially be adapted for effective use in demining operations.

There is an ongoing discussion within the landmine community regarding what is needed in the field. While some in the R & D arena have focused on researching and developing new and vastly improved technologies, at the other end of the spectrum, is the view that what is needed in the field, and what is needed now, rather than later, is more of existing equipment and incremental improvements to existing equipment. This view is supported by personnel from Industry Canada=s Sector Branch, NGO representatives, as well as by the recent study conducted by DFAIT, AHumanitarian Demining, Assessment of the International Market Humanitarian Demining and Equipment@. This study concludes the following with respect to the demand for equipment and the needs of demining operations A....it is clear from the research that there is a significant demand for existing equipment, incremental improvements, and radical advancements in a few selected cases.@

The validity and usefulness of working towards incremental improvements rather than longer term research efforts towards new or vastly improved technologies is noted within UNMAS=s website in the section on ATechnology, Research & Development@. In a

discussion regarding the extent of to which new technologies have been deployed to demining operations, the UNMAS site notes@ ...perhaps the most impressive technological progress to date has been the innovation that has taken place in the field, by resourceful NGOs, mine action programmes, and commercial companies, using off-the-shelf technology and adapting equipment from other fields of endeavor, such as the construction and the forest industry, for demining operations.@

Even though there may be capacity within Canadian industry to adapt existing equipment to demining operations, the extent of potential has not been formally explored by Industry Canada.

With respect to marketing efforts, Industry Canada=s Sector Branch was also limited in terms of what could be accomplished due to reasons noted above. Since the summer of 2000, Industry Canada=s Sector Branch has ceased to take part in CCMAT operations or activities.

Conclusion: The results achieved to date by Industry Canada in terms of marketing and commercializing new or adapted demining technologies are limited to just one product, Promac=s BDM48 which is a type of brush cutter for use in demining operations. Although the Sector Branch spent limited funds for marketing activities (less than $100,000 over three years), the lack of results appears to be due largely to the following:

$ The market for demining technology is not a normal commercial market, therefore there is limited interest from the private sector to pursue development of such products, especially if the company is expected to cost share development of such a product;

$ There were very few Canadian companies working with CCMAT=s technical advisers who were in need of Industry Canada=s assistance in marketing and commercialization efforts; and

$ There appears to be very few Canadian companies with the capacity to develop potential demining technologies.

Similarly, Technology Partnership Canada=s (TPC) commercialization efforts and results were limited by these factors. As well, TPC was further limited to funding only those proposals that passed DND=s technical assessment process. The only proposal approved by DND and passed to TPC was the Promac proposal.

Looking ahead, the role for Industry Canada within the CCMAT mandate needs to be examined to determine the most appropriate role, if any.

5.3.5.2 DND

This section of the report addresses Aresults achievement@ for the outputs and outcomes related to DND=s efforts related research and development of appropriate Canadian technologies for mine affected countries.

Overview of Program Approach

DND=s approach to conducting research and development activities on behalf of the CLF was to establish the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies. CCMAT was co-located with the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) to take advantage of expertise and facilities developed at DRES where a military countermine R & D program was already in operation, and had been for many years.

The first activity undertaken by CCMAT was to conduct a scoping study, AScoping Study for Humanitarian Demining Technologies@. The aim of the study was to recommend a research and development program in humanitarian demining for the 5 year mandate of the Centre. An overview of the methodology and findings of the study is summarized below in Exhibit 5.3-1.

Exhibit 5.3-1: Overview of DRES Scoping Study

Methodology and Information Sources: The study was led and conducted by DRES personnel during the period from April 1998 to September 1999, and was based on the following sources of information: previous DRES experience, a 4 day technical seminar presented to DRES by an expert in demining operations, several briefings of DRES personnel by exerts with field experience in demining, attendance by DRES personnel at several technical conference, several Statements of Requirements (SORs) prepared by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, and a literature review including many specialist technical studies.

Findings: The study identified a plethora of potential demining equipment and ranked those potential products in order of priority for research and development focus by CCMAT, as high priority, lower priority, and discarded.

The technologies were categorized in 5 fields: Detection; Neutralization; Protection; Medical/Victim Assistance; Enabling Technologies; and Test and Evaluation.

Output Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, the *Evaluation Assessment* identified five output level indicators for DND=s efforts related to research and development of appropriate Canadian technologies: # of equipment standards, databases, and testing methodologies developed by CCMAT, # of private sector firms funded, # of new technologies developed, # of existing technologies adapted, and # of demining technologies tested. The apparent intent of using these numbers as indicators for output level results is the fact that these #=s reflect the level of effort and resources that were required to plan and implement the activities.

Based upon discussions with CCMAT personnel, it became evident that this list of indicators did not present a complete picture of CCMAT activities, consequently, 5 additional

indicators were developed by CCMAT and the study team. Following is a summary of total outputs produced by CCMAT in the first three years of operation:

$ # of equipment standards, databases, and testing methodologies developed by CCMAT: **6**

$ # of private sector firms funded: **19**

$ # of new technologies developed: **0**

$ # of existing technologies adapted: **0**

$ # of demining technologies tested, proven and now in use in demining operations: **9**

$ # of demining test technologies developed, proven and now in use: **6**

$ # of technologies being researched and developed: **16**

$ # of research publications produced by CCMAT: 46 reports and **15** papers

$ # of international collaborations in the area of test and evaluation: **7**

$ # of studies related to searching for alternatives to anti-personnel landmines: **1**

Specific objectives for these indicators were not established, and consequently, indicator results have not been tracked or monitored. The output level results were developed by CCMAT and the study team for the purposes of this study. Given the absence of targets, a comparison cannot be made between targets and results achieved.

The CLF five year allocation for CCMAT=s research and development activities is $17 million. As at March 31, 2001, $7.896 million has been spent, $3.94 million for contracts with private industry to fund research and development projects or to provide technical or other services to CCMAT, and $3.95 million for operating and maintenance costs (including salary and benefits for DRES personnel, CCMAT related travel by DRES personnel, and miscellaneous purchases.

Exhibit 5.3-2 provides an overview of how CCMAT funding was allocated within the various technology fields.

Exhibit 5.3-2: Overview of CCMAT spending

Field	Total expenditures fir the first three years, ended March 31, 2001		
	Contracts for R & D and for Services (000's)	Misc. Purchases, Wages and Travel (000's)	Total (000's)
Test & Evaluation	879.7	275.7	1155.4

Exhibit 5.3-2: Overview of CCMAT spending			
Field	**Total expenditures fir the first three years, ended March 31, 2001**		
	Contracts for R & D and for Services (000's)	**Misc. Purchases, Wages and Travel (000's)**	**Total (000's)**
Detection	1501.4	952	2453.4
Protection	657.6	331.6	989.2
Neutralization	576	249.8	825.8
Enabling Technologies	170	127.5	297.5
Medical/Victim Assistance	53	0	53
Information	103.7	69.7	173.4
Alternatives to Landmines	0	14	14
Staff Operations	0	1934.6	1934.6
TOTAL ($)	3941.4	3954.9	7896.3
TOTAL (%)	50%	50%	100%

Outcome Level Results

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, two short term outcomes were expected as a result of having achieved output level results funded by CCMAT: new demining technologies produced/marketed to mine affected countries; and adapted demining technologies produced/marketed to mine affected countries.

CCMAT=s efforts to produce new or adapted technologies to mine affected countries have been focused in four areas. Rather than focus solely on research and development activities, CCMAT has focused on various other factors involved in the process of developing and delivering new demining technology. For example, CCMAT is only one of several research and development organizations around the world who are working in the area of humanitarian demining issues. In the interest of minimizing duplication of effort by CCMAT and the other similar research organizations in Italy, the US, and the European Commission, CCMAT identified the need to share and disseminate information amongst these organizations to avoid duplication of effort. As well, one of the concerns in the landmine community is the fact that there have been instances where products have ben provided to demining operations that are unproven, ineffective and unsafe. To avoid this

risk, CCMAT and many others within the demining and R & D community recognized the need for products to undergo rigorous testing and evaluation prior to deployment to the field. Consequently, CCMAT=s efforts have not been limited solely to research and development, efforts have focused in the following four areas[38]:

$ Information Acquisition and Dissemination;

$ Test and Evaluation;

$ R & D for new demining technologies; and

$ Study of the potential for Alternatives to AP Mines.

(A) Information Acquisition and Dissemination

CCMAT has made progress in this area. All reports and studies (46 reports and 15 papers) produced by the centre are public documents and are made available for distribution through the CCMAT web-site. Examples of CCMAT publications include: A Research and Development Plan for Land Mine Detection Technologies for CCMAT, Preliminary Assessment of Electrical Impedance Tomography, Detection of Surface Laid Minefields in VNIR Hyperspectral High Spatial Resolution Data, Automation Applications in Humanitarian Demining, Instrumented Prodder-Final Report 1998; and Flail Fundamentals and their role in Mine Neutralization.

In addition to sharing CCMAT produced technical and other information through the publication of papers and reports, CCMAT routinely contributes to various existing mine action databases around the world. Although one of the original objectives of CCMAT was to develop a database related to demining procedures, CCMAT determined there was no need, since there are already several such databases already in existence around the world.

CCMAT also routinely provides technical advice and information. CCMAT summarizes the nature of this type of service in the following categories: product advisory services, advice on new and or unusual requirements, and advice to equipment developers and inventors.

Another initiative being carried out by CCMAT in the areas of information acquisition and dissemination is CCMAT=s role as one of the founding members of the Demining Information Technology Forum (DTIF), along with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and other donor country research and development organizations including the European Commission and the US. The primary aim of the DTIF is to create

[38] One other area of focus was included in these objectives, however according to CCMAT personnel, little to no efforts have been expended in this area: Modification of Military Technologies for Demining.

an opportunity for the R & D community to exchange information and ideas on technology for humanitarian demining. As well, the DTIF will also give the user community a chance to have its voices heard by the developers of demining technology[39].

[39] Source: DTIF website, James Madison University.

One of the first events organized by DTIF was a June 2000 workshop that brought together representatives of the R & D community and the user community. The objective of the workshop was to work towards bridging the Agulf between people using equipment in the field and those involved in developing the equipment@[40].

(B) Test and Evaluation

In the area of test and evaluation, CCMAT has made good progress. CCMAT was one of the founding members of the International Test and Evaluation Program. A brief explanation of ITEP is included below in Exhibit 5.3-3.

Exhibit 5.3-3 Overview of ITEP

Objective of ITEP: The purpose is to develop standards, coordinate and perform tests of materials and methods, and disseminate information about test results. Co-utilization of resources and expertise from participating ITEP countries will allow allocated resources to be used more efficiently, thus contributing to improvement of global humanitarian demining programs.

History: On July 17th 2000, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States, and the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP).

CCMAT has focused considerable effort and resources on development of test facilities and equipment. Starting with the pre-existing test facilities within DRES, CCMAT has enhanced and tailored these facilities to support the testing of humanitarian demining equipment and protective clothing. Particular success has resulted from the testing by CCMAT of three products that were largely developed by Canadian industry. These three products are: the Fixor explosive by MREL, a Kingston, Ontario based company; the BDM-48 brush cutter by Promac, a BC based company; and the Spider Boot by MedEng, an Ottawa-based company. As at September 2001, each of these products is being used in various demining operations around the world. These products would not have been made available to the demining community had they not successfully passed through the rigorous and scientifically-valid CCMAT test protocols. In the case of Fixor and the Spider Boot, CCMAT testing was done in partnership and collaboration with the US.

[40] Opening Remarks to the June 4 DTIF Workshop in British Columbia, by Dr. Bob Suart, Director, CCMAT.

Another area of CCMAT results in the area of test and evaluation is development of several types of equipment and tools for use in the test and evaluation process. One of the most important highly praised test and evaluation success by CCMAT was the research and development of a testing tool, the Asurrogate mine[41]@, which can be used in the test and evaluation of machinery for preconditioning ground and destroying mines in minefields. The surrogate mines were proven to be an effective test tool during the BDM-48 testing, and it now hoped by CCMAT that the surrogates mines will be adopted as part of standard international test methodology. As well, CCMAT participated in ITEP=s pilot project, AInternational Pilot Project for Technology Cooperation@ which was a multi-national technical evaluation of performance of commercial off the shelf metal detectors in the context of humanitarian demining. Another example of CCMAT=s contribution to the testing and evaluation of demining equipment are the conduct, by CCMAT experts (primarily DRES scientists on loan to CCMAT) of several in-theatre trials in mine affected countries, such as the March 2000 trial of metal detectors in Afghanistan in support of the Mine Action Program in Afghanistan (MAPA)=s search for a metal

(C) R & D for new demining technologies

In the area of research and development for new demining technologies, CCMAT is currently working on numerous projects including for example:

$ trials of nuclear quadrolpole resonance (NQR) Landmine Detection equipment *;*

$ research on the Auto Robotic Scanner (ARS II);

$ development of Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) for Mine Detection;

$ research on the feasibility of Neutron Imaging; and

$ research into hyperspectral imaging for the detection of landmines.

As at September 2001, none of these CCMAT research and development initiatives has yet resulted in deployment of equipment to demining operations. The stage of research of these various technologies and projects, in terms of the typical research and development life cycle, range from the proof of concept stage through to the prototype stage. CCMAT provided a summary list of CCMAT Projects, including identification of the current stage of the project and estimated completion date of that particular stage. Exhibit 5.3-4 provides a summary of this information for research and development projects, and ***Appendix H*** contains the complete list for all CCMAT projects.

Exhibit 5.3-4: CCMAT Research and Development projects

[41] The surrogate mines, or reproduction mines, have been developed to replicate several different anti-personnel mines in terms of shape, size, weight, fuse principle, and trigger force characteristics.

Stage of protect per CCMAT	Anticipated date of complection of current stage					
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	Total
Research	1		1	2		4
Development			1	4		5
Research and Development				4	2	6

Although no products have as yet been deployed to the field, CCMAT (DND) personnel are confident that the research and development projects approved for funding represent the highest or higher priority needs of affected communities and field practitioners, and that the funding of these projects has been the most effective and efficient use of CCMAT funding.

As previously discussed in Section 5.1.3, there is a mix of views as to whether the research and development activities are linked to the needs of field practitioners.

(D) Study of the potential for Alternatives to AP Mines

One of the sub-objectives of CCMAT was research into alternatives to the use of AP landmines. To date, very limited CCMAT resources ($14,000) have been put towards this issue. CCMAT was asked to investigate this issue to support for DFAIT/ILX efforts in convincing MBT non-signatories who insist AP landmines remain a crucial part of their military and security activities.

As at March 2001, the conclusion by CCMAT is that the only alterative to the AP landmine is most likely another weapon system. Since research into development of a weapon system is philosophically inconsistent with the mandate of CCMAT, and since much larger amounts are already being invested into the research of alternatives by other militaries around the world, CCMAT is currently awaiting ministerial direction on whether additional efforts will be made.

Conclusion: As the result of the testing and evaluation of products developed largely by Canadian private companies, CCMAT (DND) has to date, enabled three proven Canadian products to be distributed.

Also in the area of test and evaluation, other CCMAT achievements include: recognition as an international centre of test and evaluation expertise for certain demining technologies; co-founder of two important international organisation, ITEP and DTIF; development and delivery of several products for use in test and evaluation procedures; and development of several test protocols that are being reviewed for their potential as international standards.

In the area of research and development, CCMAT has at the international level, shared and distributed technical information, and has provided technical support to potential developers of demining technologies including Canadian private sector companies, other R & D organisation, and demining operations. Although progress continues on numerous research and development projects within CCMAT, no products have as yet been deployed to demining operations.

If success is to be achieved in addressing the problem of holdout large countries, the international mine action community must find the means to address the problem of effective military alternatives to the use of land mines. The CLF, in keeping with other mine action programs, has had difficulty in addressing the issue of effective military alternatives to land mines. This, in part, results from philosophical problems with the use of funds intended for essentially humanitarian and human security purposes in the development of alternative weapons systems.

5.3.6 Demining and Victim Assistance

The fifth and final component of the CLF is activity related to Ademining and victim assistance@. CLF support to demining and landmine victim assistance falls under the primary responsibility of CIDA, with support from DFAIT. In addition to the funds used for its own operating costs, CIDA designed and funded the following CLF programs[42] to support this component of the CLF: Integrated Country Program - Mozambique; Integrated Country Program - Bosnia & Herzegovina; Tapping Canadian Creativity in Mine Action; Country Initiatives - Asia; Integrated Country Program - Americas; and Multilateral Institutions Program.

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, CIDA=s landmine action programs were expected to produce five key short-term outcomes:

- implementation of national mine clearance programs (Section 5.3.6.1);
- raising landmine awareness (Section 5.3.6.2);
- reducing the number of new landmine accidents (Section 5.3.6.3);
- establishing landmine victim support assistance programs (Section 5.3.6.4); and
- enhancing UN supported mine action coordination (Section 5.3.6.5).

This section presents the outputs produced by CIDA=s programs in these areas of mine action, followed by an analysis of the extent to which these outputs have led to the achievement of each of the intended short-term outcomes.

The key documents available for review by the study team included the following: CIDA=s database of input, output and results achievement information entered for each project initiated since end of 1999; the 2000-2001 Cumulative Program Performance Reports for the Mozambique and Bosnia & Herzegovina programs; evaluation reports for the Mine Awareness project in Angola and the Canada-Mexico-PAHO tripartite victim assistance project, the evaluation of the non-CLF UNOCHA=s mine action program for Afghanistan; the

[42] Profiles for each of these programs are included in ***Appendix F.***

latest report on Canada=s progress in the Landmine Monitor 2001; and minutes from the CLF=s Management Board meetings from 1998 to 2001.

EVALUATION ISSUE: Results Achievement

Outputs: *With respect to demining and victim assistance, what progress has been made towards the production of outputs?*

Short-Term Outcomes: *What progress has the CLF made towards:*

$ *the implementation of national mine clearance programs (Section 5.3.6.1);*

$ *the raising of landmine awareness (Section 5.3.6.2);*

$ *the reduction of new landmine accidents (Section 5.3.6.3);*

$ *the establishment of landmine victim support and assistance programs (Section 5.3.6.14); and*

$ *the enhancement of UN supported mine action coordination (Section 5.3.6.5);*

5.3.6.1 Implementation of national mine clearance programs in other nations

According to the 1999-2000 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund, Amine clearance refers to investments in the full spectrum of activities related to clearing mined land, including mapping and marking minefields, training, supporting mine dog detection teams, providing equipment and protective clothing, demining and quality assurance@ [43]**.**

Output Level Results

From 1999 to 2001, CIDA-CLF invested $20,601,000 in 23 projects involving mine clearance activities, which represents 61% of its entire budget for these three years. CIDA=s programming in mine clearance focussed on the following mine affected countries or areas: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Mozambique, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Yemen, Laos, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Major players involved in these projects include UNMAS, UNDP, OAS, CAW, HI, CUSO, COCAMO, CIDC, Geospatial, NPA, UXO Lao, Handicap International, and the Canadian Engineering Corps of NATO.

As a result of the CLF funds (inputs) invested by CIDA in mine clearance activities, the following outputs were produced[44]:

$ 2 Level One Surveys completed and certified (Mozambique and Yemen), 1 in progress (Cambodia);

$ 88,691 mines or UXO cleared; and

$ 237,000 sq metres of land cleared.

As noted below, CIDA has focussed on outputs and outcomes results measured in terms of the population affected rather than ordnance removal or hectares cleared. These are discussed below.

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[43] ***DFAIT,* Measured Steps: 1999-2000 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund*, 45.***

[44] Inconsistent reporting formats were adopted by the various CLF projects funded by CIDA. As a result, available output data could not all be aggregated. The numbers presented here constitute an approximation based on the figures entered in CIDA=s SAP database and are subject to verification by CIDA.

Outcome Level Results

CIDA administers CLF funding through nine distinct programs located within two separate Branches. At the initial program planning stage, the decision was made to use some of CIDA=s existing delivery mechanisms (Integrated Bilateral Programs) to implement some of the CLF activities[45]. This approach has costs and benefits. On the one hand, administering CLF activities through geographic programs provides the potential to better link demining and other development activities. It also allows CIDA units to address mine action strategically, taking advantage of their developmental experience, established networks of in-country representatives, and relations with mine affected countries. This approach also provides latitude to individual country programs in setting their own objectives, priorities, selection criteria and monitoring mechanisms.

However, this implies that mine action strategies and objectives are set at the program or project level, not at the issue level, which makes it more difficult to measure achievement of outcomes such as implementation of mine clearance programs, raising landmine awareness, reducing the number of landmine accidents, victim support assistance programs, and enhancing UN supported mine action coordination.

This also has implications for the selection of projects funded under a given country program. Bilateral programs= terms and conditions require that contribution agreements or contracts be awarded to a Canadian organisation, unless the required skills and experience cannot be found in Canada. This limits the pool of available organisations that can participate in bilateral CIDA-CLF projects.

[45] Key CIDA informant interviews.

That said, mine clearance activities appear to be an exception to this rule in that a global approach was explicitly formulated by the program[46]. Project selection decisions are based on the premise that progress in mine action is better measured in terms of the number of people returned to their community, or the land returned to productive use, rather than in terms of the number of mines removed from the ground. This approach is considered within the landmine community as being most appropriate[47]. CIDA>s project selection process has given priority to areas where there was a high concentration of people affected by landmines, and where the presence of mines had the most impact on communities, such as schools, farm land, roads used to transport goods, and paths leading to sources of drinking water.

The evaluation team assessed program success in terms of its compatibility with the indicators of performance developed for each area of mine action in the Draft Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action. Based on the project information provided by CIDA=s SAP database, we can conclude that CIDA=s contribution to mine clearance has taken forms that are consistent with the following generally accepted indicators of performance for clearing mined land[48]:

(38) National mine clearance programs developed;
(39) Mined areas identified and marked;
(40) Development of Mine Clearance Capacities: Technical Expertise and Training; and
(41) High priority land cleared, certified and returned to productive use.

(A) National mine clearance programs developed

Through its support to the development of national Mine Action Centres (MAC), CIDA has contributed to the creation and development of national mine clearance programs in affected countries. Through its investment and promotion of Level One Surveys, it has contributed to the identification and marking of mined areas and to the establishment of priorities for demining. CIDA has also contributed technical assistance through its expert deminers, experts in database development, and its dog training projects. Combined, these activities have contributed to clearing high priority land and returning it to use.

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[46] DFAIT, *Measured Steps*, 20.

[47] See also UNDP/GICHD, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, 3; DFAIT, *Measured Steps* , 20.

[48] *Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action - Working Draft*.

CIDA=s contribution to the development of national mine clearance programs has been in large part focussed on the establishment of national Mine Action Centres in mine affected countries. For instance, one of the outcomes achieved by the Mozambique Country program ($7.4M 1999-2003) was to promote the country=s National Institute for Demining (IND).

> AThe role of IND as a national institution responsible for coordinating mine action is now recognized by the international community due to Canada=s leadership role as a keen supporter of IND - assisting in the development of IND=s vision statement, strategic plan, the LOIS, and development of the UNDP prodoc to strengthen the capacities of IND.@ [49]

As well, CIDA=s $1,7 million contribution (1999-2001) to UNDP projects supporting the Bosnia & Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) is considered to have improved the Centre=s capacity in executing quality control, certification of cleared sites, approval of standard operation procedures, and accreditation of demining organizations. It has also improved BHMAC=s capacity to focus mine clearance activities on priority areas for return of refugees and enhanced donor coordination and reduced duplication of efforts in demining.[50] This project was well received by the mine action community and is considered an outstanding achievement of the Bosnia & Herzegovina Country Program[51].

Other examples of CIDA support to mine coordination centres are: funding to UNDP for centres in Eritrea and Ethiopia; funding for the centre in Laos, aimed at development of national capacity by training staff in managing and implementing a national UXO program; and funding for technical assistance to Yemen=s national demining centre to build the capacity required to develop a National Mine Action Plan based upon the results of the recently completed Level One Survey.

Conclusion: CIDA=s support has been effective in capacity development and technical assistance for the establishment of national mine action programs.

***(*B) Mined areas identified and marked**

[49] *Mine Action Summary 2001.*

[50] *Mine Action Summary 2001.*

[51] B&H Program administrative documents.

CIDA has mainly contributed to the identification and marking of mined areas through its support to Level One Surveys. Level One Surveys (National Surveys, Landmine Impact Surveys)[52] identify and map all suspected mined areas and collect socio-economic data and information on mine victims. They are part of a global initiative aiming at standardizing information across countries on the impact that landmines and UXOs have on their populations. As defined by the Survey Working Group[53], surveys:

$ allow donors to rationally apportion funds to places of greatest human need as defined by impact on communities;

$ permit national authorities to develop national plans for focussing on regions and areas of greatest impact; and

$ give implementers baseline impact data that will provide success indicators for mine action programs[54].

Although considered by some key informants as expensive and lengthy, Level One Surveys are considered by many stakeholders as important tools to identify the location of mines, to mark them, and to develop a national demining plan.

> ASurveys are expensive, yet it is still rare that questions are asked about the value of the returned information, or about how design interventions might affect validity and reliability of surveys, and thereby their value.@[55]

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[52] According to the UNDP/GICHD Study (p.24), UNMAS has recently dropped the use of the term Level One Survey and replaced it with National Survey. However, in this report will we will continue to refer to Level ONE Surveys because it is the term most commonly used by stakeholders interviewed.

[53] The Survey Working Group was created by NGOs, UNMAS and GICHD to monitor standards and facilitate the international coordination of resources and expert personnel for the completion of Global Landmine Surveys.

[54] SAC (Survey Action Centre), *Landmine Impact Survey - Republic of Yemen*, SAC and Mine Clearance Planning Agency.

[55] UNDP/GICHD, 25.

In its project approval document, the Mozambique Program also outlined the importance of Level One Surveys for mine clearance interventions.

> AA wealth of international experience has clearly shown that the first priority in the process of delivering an effective mine action program is to obtain and verify reliable information on the extent of the mine problem through the conduct of general surveys, and the production of maps at a scale of 1:50 000 for minefield recording and planning of mine action operations. Without these essential tools, mine action efforts remain unfocused, subject to duplication, and do not efficiently promote the economic and social recovery of landmine-affected countries.@[56]

A large portion of CIDA=s CLF funds (approximately $7.2 million) were so far invested by CIDA in conducting Level One Surveys, making Canada one of the lead donors in that area. To date, CIDA has funded the completion of Level One surveys in Yemen (60% of the cost) and Mozambique (92% of the cost) and continues to fund the Level One Survey currently in progress in Cambodia (100% of the cost). Other CLF contributions to the completion of Level One Surveys are: a memorandum of understanding signed with the Ethiopian government that wishes to conduct its own survey (still at the planning phase); and funding provided by DFAIT in support of the Level One Survey in Thailand.

[56] CIDA, *Mozambique Program - Project Approval Document - ANNEX A*, 1998.

The Mozambique Level One Survey was initiated in 1999 and conducted by a Canadian NGO: the Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC). This project encountered delays in its first two years. According to CIDA representatives and performance report documentation, these delays were due both to conditions encountered in Mozambique and to internal CIDA administrative changes. Firstly, the conduct of the project was faced with the severe Mozambique flood conditions and the highly dispersed pattern of mines across the country. Secondly, high staff turnover and the introduction of CIDA=s new SAP system are said to have affected CIDA=s ability to manage implementation difficulties. Delays encountered are also attributed to an overly optimistic estimation by CIDA of the time frame and costs associated with conducting a national survey in a difficult environment such as rural Mozambique[57]. Despite the initial difficulties and slow start, CIDA personnel have since rectified the situation with the provision of additional time and money and by revising the contract with the NGO delivery agent to an outputs-based contract, which placed the risk on the NGO and encouraged it to use creative means to achieve results within time and budget. The Mozambique Country Program reports that outputs achieved since have exceeded expectations.

Despite the fact that the Mozambique Level One Survey has now received certification from the UN, a significant number of international NGOs, multilateral organizations, and DFAIT representatives have expressed reservations regarding the use of an (at that time) inexperienced NGO to conduct a Level One Survey. These stakeholders contend that Canadian NGOs lack the required expertise in demining and would benefit from partnering with other international organizations. Doubts were also expressed by a respected researcher from the international mine action community as to the quality of the research being conducted by CIDC:

> AAlthough there are obviously constraints on the time and personnel that CIDC is able to devote to each task, the data, as currently being collected, may not be of acceptable quality.@[58]

On the other hand, the Level One survey conducted in Cambodia by Geospatial, a Canadian private firm, is progressing in accordance with expectations of CIDA program personnel. Testimonies from UNMAS also indicate that the work conducted by Geospatial is satisfactory and of high quality. As at March 31 2001, 27.4% of all villages in Cambodia had been surveyed, the results had been quality assured, the information had been entered in the database, and the entries had been quality assured. So far, data on all major mine

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[57] CIDA, *Mozambique Project/Program Performance Report , 2000-2001.*

[58] UNDP/GICHD, 165.

affected provinces (8) has been compiled and 20,600 mine/UXO areas have been mapped[59].

Finally, the Yemen Level One Survey, which was funded in part by CIDA and conducted by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency is considered by UNMAS as a very successful project, which led to inputting of survey data into a planning and modelling software that enabled to identify which type of technical intervention could be implemented within specific time lines, and to develop a 25 year strategic plan for mine intervention.

Conclusion: Despite early difficulties experienced by CIDC in Mozambique and despite the cost of these activities, CIDA-CLF-funded survey activities have provided essential data for mine action.

(C) Development of Mine Clearance Capacities: Technical Expertise and Training

[59] *Mine Action Summary 2001.*

CIDA=s Bosnia & Herzegovina Integrated Country Program has supported a number of successful projects that funded technical expertise and training aimed at the development of mine clearance capacity. For instance, this program funded ($1.14 million 1999-2001) the training of 12 teams of mine detection dogs and their handlers. The use of dogs as a means of detecting mines is now practised by several demining operations around the world. Although there is some controversy related to the use of demining dog teams, it is generally accepted that using dogs to detect mines can result in a much faster demining process. This project=s success resulted in another contract for CIDC to train 6 dog mine clearance teams for the SFOR=s Entity Army Units, while attracting additional funding from European donors[60]. Several other CIDA CLF projects have contributed to the development of mine clearance capacities. These projects include:

$ the SFOR Entity Army Demining Project ($1.88 million 1999-2001) which funded the training and deployment of 550 Entity Army deminers;

$ the Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance Program ($1.11 million 1999-2001)which funded the training and deployment of 26 Bosnian deminers;

$ the Akcija Protiv Mina ($1,24M 1999-2001) project which funded the deployment of deminers as well as capacity development for the first Bosnian mine action NGO created; and

$ as part of the Mozambique Country Program, funding was provided to the UN Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) for three DND experts to provide technical assistance in the area of demining and database development over a period of one year and for equipment support. Reports from ADP to the program authority at CIDA note that the contribution of technical assistance by the DND experts has been invaluable. As a result, a request was presented to renew the agreement for an additional year.

Conclusion: CIDA-CLF funded several mine action projects that provided technical expertise and training to mine affected countries, in addition to the technical assistance it provided for the establishment of national mine action programs (see section A above). However at this time, we do not have access to information verifying that these various activities have actually resulted in developing mine clearance capacity.

(D) High priority land cleared, certified and returned to productive use

[60] CIDA, *Bosnia & Herzegovina Project/Program Performance Report.*

A key example of successful intervention funded by the CLF (CIDA) in clearing high priority land and returning it to use, is the Canadian Auto Workers project in Mozambique ($958,000, 1999-2001). The area of Pande was demined at the request of the government and has since been used to relocate people displaced by the floods. According to conclusions entered in the program=s SAP database, Ait is a good indicator of adapting demining priorities to real needs and shows a relatively high level of coordination@.[61] Of particular interest, this project enabled its implementors to identify the following success factors:

$ using local NGOs and local government partners;

$ conducting a scoping study before starting the project;

$ benefiting from the support of CIDA/DFAIT in-country representatives[62].

Another key example is CIDA=s contribution to the UNDP Trust Fund($505,000, 1999-2001) which was used, among other things, to clear 30 hectares of land in the village of Soubnam in Laos, following which water pumps were installed and irrigation canals were dug, thereby making the land ready for cultivation.[63]

Conclusion: CIDA-CLF has contributed to high priority land being cleared, certified and returned to use as illustrated by the above examples of successful projects.

Overall Conclusion (Mine clearance programs): With respect to work in the area of mine clearance, without collection of data on the ground, it is difficult to conclude on the quality of the work being accomplished by each project or on their short-term outcomes. However, CIDA-channelled CLF funding has contributed to the development of effective national programs, provided essential data on mines location and impact, and resulted in the clearance of high priority land.

5.3.6.2 Raised landmine awareness

According to the 1999-2000 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund, Amine awareness refers to investments in education and training programs that will reduce high risk, mine-

[61] *Mine Action Summary 2001.*

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

related activities and therefore prevent casualties.@[64] By educating children and adults about the dangers of landmines, it is hoped that projects will reduce behaviour that is considered high risk in mine affected areas[65].

Output Level Results

From 1999 to 2001, CIDA invested $4,775,000 to fund 16 projects that had a mine awareness component. This funding represents 14% of CIDA=s CLF budget for 1999-2001, however, most of these activities are a small component of larger victim assistance or mine clearance initiatives. Only five projects are specifically dedicated to mine awareness education:

$ UNICEF Canada Mine Awareness in Angola, 1999-2001 ($750,000)
$ UNICEF Canada Mine Awareness in Laos, 1999 ($250,000)
$ UNMAS/UNICEF Mine Awareness in Sudan, 1999 ($300,000)
$ OAS Mine Awareness Signs in Nicaragua, 2000 ($5,000)
$ Radio Education for Afghan Children (REACH), 1999 ($300,000)

The other eleven mine awareness projects were implemented in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Uganda. CIDA undertook these projects in partnership with organisations including: UNMAS, UNICEF, UNDP, ICRC, OAS, UNICEF Canada, Queen=s University, Falls Brook Centre, Sierra Club of BC, Canadian Network for International Surgery, and REACH.

In addition to projects funded by CIDA in the area of mine awareness, DFAIT has also funded several projects including $100,000 to UNICEF Colombia to deliver mine awareness messages through role playing games with children.

As a result of CIDA=s projects in the area of mine awareness the following outputs were produced:

$ 65,4000 newsletters/brochures/leaflets were distributed, and
$ 352,546 persons were reached by a mine awareness activity.

Other types of mine awareness activities implemented within these projects include: recruitment of staff for awareness education, development of awareness education course syllabus, development of community based networks to deliver mine awareness education, strengthening of existing awareness programs, visits to villages to deliver group presentations or theatre plays, and visits to schools using discussions, games, drawings, and songs to deliver mine awareness messages to children.

Outcome Level Results

[64] DFAIT, *Measured Steps*, 45.

[65] Ibid, 16.

Several sources in the international mine action community point out to the difficulties inherent to assessing and measuring the extent of progress with mine awareness activities. These difficulties include:

$ The difficult attribution of results to one particular set of mine actions: AAs yet, no evaluation of a mine awareness program has overcome the attribution problem@[66] ; and

[66] UNDP/GICHD, 82.

$ the difficult establishment of a causal link between mine awareness education and its effects on casualty rates: A While it is clear that the numbers of landmine and UXO accidents have fallen in many countries having mine action programmes, it remains unclear how much of the decline is the result of mine action.@[67]

In light of these difficulties, results in this area were assessed in terms of the compatibility of the projects funded by CLF with generally accepted indicators of performance for delivering mine awareness education:

$ mine awareness program is present,
$ mine awareness program is monitored and evaluated,
$ landmine casualties are decreasing,
$ mine awareness is integrated into existing community/state structures,
$ mine awareness is integrated into other aspects of mine action[68].

After reviewing the information available on the CIDA-CLF program, we chose to examine the extent to which it met two of the above indicators: the creation of mine awareness programs and the integration of these programs into other aspects of mine action. This decision was prompted by the fact that there is no global monitoring and evaluation of activities pertaining to mine awareness. Some monitoring and evaluation may have been conducted at the individual project level but falls beyond the scope of this evaluation. Also, limited information was available on the integration of mine awareness into existing community/state structures. Finally, decrease in landmine casualties is already being discussed as a separate outcome in the section that follows.

UNICEF is generally recognized as the lead organization in the area of mine awareness activities and has developed international guidelines for mine awareness education that are being actively promoted by the States Parties Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness[69]. Canada provided substantial support to UNICEF for its mine awareness activities in Angola. CIDA-CLF disbursed $750,000 from 1999 to 2002 to this project, which is intended to develop capacity in disseminating appropriate information on dangers of landmines through the use of mine awareness material in school curricula and the delivery of training in communities. In 2000-2001, 754

[67] UNDP/GICHD, 9.

[68] *Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action - Working Draft.*

[69] DFAIT, *Measured Steps*, 16.

teachers were trained in mine awareness training and they subsequently reached 33,390 primary school students with mine awareness content[70].

[70] *Mine Action Summary 2001.*

This project was evaluated in 2000 by CIET Canada[71], thereby providing information on the actual impact of this project on mine affected communities. This study is the only source of information on outcome level results of CIDA=s mine awareness programs available to the evaluation team. The evaluation showed that mine awareness messages were indeed delivered - 65% of children in schools targeted by the program received at least one mine awareness session - and observed measurable improvements in mine awareness as a result of the project. For example, children who received such training were more likely to communicate to family members information about mine awareness.

However, the evaluators did not identify a reduction in mine accidents, hence their recommendation to increase the focus of mine awareness messages on risk taking behaviour and on ways to avoid the worst consequences of encountering a device. The evaluation also identified areas needing improvement such as: more even implementation of the program across schools and provinces, further training of teachers, more follow-up support to teachers, increased monitoring of teaching activities, more accessible teaching materials for young children, more community campaigns, and more effective message delivery techniques (i.e. theatre/social mobilisation techniques, radio broadcasts).

On the other hand, CIDA-CLF has contributed to the integration of mine awareness activities into other aspects of mine action, as illustrated by the number (10) of projects funded that also involved mine clearance or victim assistance activities. Sierra Club of BC=s project in El Salvador ($400,000, 1999-2001) is a good example of such integration. It helps the reintegration of mine victims by training them for professions that promote the respect of the environment (i.e. bicycle repair) while recruiting mine victims to drive an adapted bus that tours around the country to sensitize and educate people about the dangers and ecological impact of landmines.

Most CIDA staff members interviewed consider this aspect to be the component of CIDA-CLF programming where the least resources were invested and results obtained, whereas other stakeholders at DFAIT and from Canadian and International NGOs consider that the CLF has supported excellent progress in raising landmine awareness. However, there is a likely possibility that these other stakeholders may have misinterpreted the question to mean Aawareness of the landmine issue by members of the international development and/or political communities@ as opposed to Aindividuals= awareness of the dangers posed by landmines@. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the majority of respondents revealed limited detailed knowledge of the various CLF projects funded by CIDA, their replies to questions about CLF=s impact on various aspects of mine action being generally vague.

Conclusion: Conceptually, CLF investments in mine awareness have been an essential component in mine action programming. There is an urgent need, however, for a more structured assessment of how efforts in mine awareness have been linked first to a material change in the level of knowledge among target group members and secondly how this

[71] Swaminathan, Aparna *et al, Angola Mine Awareness Evaluation - Draft Report*, UNICEF, DFAIT, CIET, April 7, 2000.

change in awareness may or may not result in changes in high-risk behaviour. Experience with awareness raising programs in HIV/AIDS prevention and in reproductive health demonstrates that awareness programs must be linked to projects demonstrating effective alternative behaviour and providing easy access to both services and incentives in order to be effective.

CIDA mine awareness programming did not receive as much attention as other CIDA CLF components, which indicates that mine awareness has not been a priority area of intervention for CIDA CLF programming. With the exception of UNICEF=s Angola project, no information was available on the results of mine awareness activities supported by the CLF. In Angola, the evaluation indicated that CLF-funded mine awareness activities had achieved a positive change in awareness but without a subsequent change in behaviour.

5.3.6.3 Reduction of Landmine Accidents

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model, the third outcome level result that was intended to be achieved by CIDA programming was: reduction in the number of landmine accidents.

Output Level Results

Output data on reduction of mine victims was reported for only one project: a project funded by CIDA=s Multilateral Program and delivered by ICRC ($600,000, 2000-2001). For this project, CIDA=s program database reports a decline in mine/UXO casualties from 72 in January-June 2000 to 20 in July-December 2000. This decline coincides with mine awareness activities carried out in 2000 by ICRC.

Outcome Level Results

Reduction of landmine casualties can be considered both as an objective of mine action and as an indicator of impact of mine clearance and mine awareness activities. None of CIDA=s programs for mine action present the reduction of landmine accidents as a specific objective. On the other hand, the use of reduced landmine casualties as an indicator of impact of mine clearance or mine awareness activities is being contested in the mine action community. Although they recognize a correlation between reduction of landmine accidents and the presence of mine action programs, the authors of *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action* are reluctant to attribute these reductions to demining activities, having not seen a single report that adequately documented the relationship between mine action and reduced accident rates.

> AWhile it is clear that the numbers of landmine and UXO accidents have fallen in many countries having mine action programs, it remains unclear how much the decline is the result of mine action. Declines also result from people learning to avoid contaminated areas or from Aspontaneous@ declines in risky behaviour. As well, a significant proportion of the decline may simply reflect the end of large population movements caused by conflict and re-migration.@[72]

The same study pursues to argue that the absence of comparative accident data over time precludes any assessment of the impact of mine action on reduced casualties.

[72] UNDP/GICHD, 9.

AWe remain unable to determine the impact of mine action in total, let alone estimate the decline in accidents due to the various components of mine action such as mine awareness or clearance.@[73]

These conclusions are also supported by the authors of the evaluation of UNOCHA=s MAPA program.

[73] Ibid.

> ABecause we do not have adequate data to determine the pattern of accidents, deaths, and injuries in the past, and compare this to changes in the level of risk exposure, we do not know firmly how much these have declined over time and whether any decline is continuing or accelerating. As well, we simply do not know what proportion of any estimated decline in harm should be attributed to mine action and its various components. A[74]

Finally, the same conclusion is drawn by the CLF program itself in its 1999-2000 Annual Report with regards to the impact of mine awareness interventions on casualty rates.

> AIt is also difficult to draw a causal link between mine awareness education and its effects on casualty rates. However, we do know that in every case where mine awareness education is delivered in a comprehensive manner, casualty rates are declining.@[75]

Conclusion: Problems in attributing changes in casualty rates make it difficult to conclude on the role of mine action programs in such an outcome. However, it is at least clear that there is a correlation between mine action programs (including specific programs supported by CLF) and reductions in casualties.

5.3.6.4 Implementation of victim support and assistance programs

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model, the fourth outcome level result that was intended to be achieved by CIDA-CLF programming was: implementation of victim support and assistance programs.

The 1999-2000 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund refers to victim assistance as Ainvestments in providing services to victims of mine incidents, including medical services; prosthetics, orthotics and other aids; and physical, vocational, social and psychological rehabilitation@.

Output Level Results

From 1999 to 2001, CIDA dedicated 27% ($9.08 million) of its CLF budget to 25 projects involving victim assistance activities. Such projects were implemented in various countries including Afghanistan, Chad, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Mozambique, Uganda, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Major partners working with CIDA in delivering these projects include:

- $ WHO
- $ UNDP
- $ ICRC
- $ PAHO
- $ World Vision
- $ Sierra Club of BC

[74] Mohammad, Khan et al, *Report on the Review of UNOCHA=s Mine Action Program in Afghanistan,* CIDA, British Department for International Development, Government of Japan, March 2001, 9.

[75] DFAIT, *Measured Steps*, 16.

- $ Queen=s University
- $ Garneau International
- $ Council of Canadians with Disabilities
- $ Disabled People International Conference
- $ CAW
- $ CUSO
- $ COCAMO
- $ Oxfam Québec
- $ Guardians Institute of Orthopaedics
- $ Handicap International
- $ Falls Brook Centre
- $ Canadian Network for International Surgery
- $ Alternatives Victim Assistance
- $ ADRA Canada.

Sixteen of these projects were dedicated exclusively to victim assistance interventions. These interventions addressed victims needs in various ways: vocational training, business loans, prostheses, physiotherapy, psycho-social support, etc.

As a result of these interventions:

- $ 884 handicapped children were integrated in schools,
- $ 400 staff were trained in rehabilitation/integration/community development,
- $ 41,130 disabled persons received victim assistance services (rehabilitation, integration, physiotherapy, special education),
- $ 2,539 mine affected persons (including family members) received vocational or community based agriculture training, and
- $ 51,280 orthopaedic appliances were provided and/or fitted (prostheses, orthoses, technical aids, wheelchairs, crutches).

It is difficult to generalize as to the ratio of the outputs achieved and the resources provided under this component of the program. Nonetheless, these represent critically important outputs for end-users of the program - those directly effected by land mines.

Outcome Level Results

The results obtained by CLF-funded interventions in the area of victim assistance were assessed with respect to the indicators for meeting the needs of landmine victims developed by the Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action[76]:

- $ information on mine victim=s demographics and needs is available,
- $ national disability coordination mechanisms exists,
- $ medical and rehabilitation programs are available,
- $ social and economic reintegration programs are available,
- $ mine victims are protected by effective laws and policies,
- $ disability community advocacy network exists.

Based on the available information provided by CIDA=s SAP database, the study team observed that CIDA has mostly funded projects that provide or support the provision of medical care and rehabilitation programs, combined with activities that promote the social

[76] Performance Measurement System for Global Mine Action - Working Draft.

and economic reintegration of mine victims and their families such as skills training, entrepreneurship training, and business loans.

The tripartite project Canada-Mexico-PAHO is the most often cited example of CIDA=s support to victim assistance projects. CIDA committed $3.5M of CLF funds for the period from 1999 to 2003 to assist landmine survivors in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. Queen=s University International Centre for Community based Rehabilitation was contracted by PAHO for its technical expertise. The project is designed to support the economic reintegration of disabled persons through vocational training and placement programs, integration of community based rehabilitation into the networks of primary health care services, strengthening of prosthetic and orthotic services, and development of health and disability information systems.

A mid-term evaluation of the program was conducted in 2001 by Judith Moe and Dr. James Farrow, thereby providing information on its impact on the targeted mine affected communities. The evaluation concluded that the community based rehabilitation approach adopted was appropriate to victim assistance but that the project was an Aexceedingly complex and difficult project to manage, coordinate and implement@[77]. It was deemed to suffer from critical managerial and technical shortcomings, including inappropriate scope, unclear definitions of roles and responsibilities, and inadequate monitoring and reporting mechanisms. These shortcomings were attributed in part by the evaluators to the pressures exerted by DFAIT for a rapid approval of the project.

> AMany, if not the majority, of these problems have their origins in the project=s rapid approval. CIDA, under considerable pressure from DFAIT to ensure the project=s access to conditional funding from the Canadian landmine Fund and the announcement of the project=s start-up at a high profile regional conference, failed to take adequate steps to ensure the project=s accountability...@[78]

These limitations have in turn affected the rapidity at which the project was able to produce tangible results in the area of victim assistance. PAHO efforts until now have been dedicated to local and national governmental capacity building and within PAHO itself, to bringing partners together, promoting the setting up of local civil society NGOs, and providing some training to local health professionals.

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[77] Moe, Judith and Dr. James Farrow, *Supporting Landmine Survivors in Central America: A Tripartite Project Canada - Mexico - Pan American Health Organization, Mid-Term Evaluation - Draft*, Mine Action Unit (MAU), CIDA, June 2001.

[78] Ibid.

On a positive note, evaluators observed that the project provided Asome level of support and a higher profile to weak institutions and groups across three countries who are working on issues which have not been highly prioritized by their governments or by the donor community@[79].

In contrast to the apparent difficulties experienced in the Canada-Mexico-PAHO project, a well recognized intervention in victim assistance was accomplished by the Royal Ottawa Hospital Rehabilitation Centre in Afghanistan. CIDA funded this project with $378,000 in CLF funds from 1999 to 2001 to support an Afghan NGO (Guardians) in providing victims of landmines with comprehensive rehabilitation services, particularly orthopaedics and physiotherapy, and to support the Rehabilitation Centre=s training of local staff. As a result of this project, 7,343 patients have been provided with rehabilitation treatment/services, 8,932 physiotherapy interventions were received by disabled victims, and 3,597 orthotic and prosthetic devices have been produced and distributed. This project was cited by a CIDA staff member as being an example of good work conducted by a Canadian organization in victim assistance. The project was also highly praised by several NGO representatives.

Similarly, World Vision=s victim assistance project in Cambodia ($750,000, 1999-2001) is also viewed as having been very successful, is well regarded in the landmine community, and is often quoted in CLF publications as a flagship project. CIDA=s contribution supported the creation of a vocational rehabilitation training centre, an extension unit, and an agriculture unit. So far, 285 mine victims graduated from training, and 320 more are starting courses.

Another example of Canada=s contribution to the area of victim assistance is the fact that DFAIT/ILX personnel have taken on the role as co-rapporteur for the Intersessional Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness[80]. Among other priorities, the committee will set standards and guidelines for a real positive impact on the ground.

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Section 3.2 of this report, which discusses the role and objectives of the Intersessional Committees, including the Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness.

Evaluating victim assistance is said to be complicated Abecause the term embraces so many objectives and activities@[81]. Because of the wide continuum of possible interventions, the multiple partners involved, and the cost of such assistance if there is an insufficient local public health system, victim assistance can be a complicated and costly intervention. In the case of the CLF, these difficulties are compounded with the fact that projects are still very recent and likely to have shown limited results. In addition, results from victim assistance activities can be very difficult to quantify.

Moreover, several stakeholders interviewed consider victim assistance to be conceptually problematic because it steps over the boundaries of mine action into humanitarian and development interventions. Because mine victims are the intended beneficiaries of victim assistance interventions, the question arises as to whether the program should extend its services to other disabled members of the community. Ethical considerations dictate that no such discrimination should be exercised between equally needy community members. It was also suggested that such discrimination may create friction within the community and therefore hinder the reintegration efforts. Indeed, the great majority of stakeholders interviewed consider that landmine victim assistance activities should be better integrated within other development programming. This observation is echoed by the evaluators of UNOCHA=s MAPA program:

[81] UNDP/GICHD, 9.

AAs is the case in most mine-affected countries, the organizations involved in victim assistance within Afghanistan are moving to an integrated approach. This aims to build sustainable public health capacity to address the needs of all disabled, rather than just mine or other war victims@.[82]

On the other hand, a few stakeholders point out to the risk that mine action activities might get sidelined if integrated as part of mainstream development activities, with a possible loss of direct benefits to individual landmine victims.

Overall, the majority of stakeholders believe that more remains to be done in the area of victim assistance but that such initiatives necessarily involve multiple partners.

Conclusion: Of all forms of mine action programming, victim assistance activities seem to be most directly linked to improving the physical and social well being of mine affected peoples. Reported and observed outputs and outcomes of CLF victim assistance activities are impressive in volume and clearly essential in their positive impact on the lives of mine-affected people. However, given the wide range, complexity, length, and cost of victim assistance initiatives, it is difficult to draw general conclusions as to the program=s results in this area. Most stakeholders consulted consider that more needs to be done in this domain and that victim assistance activities should be better integrated with development programming.

CLF funded victim assistance programming presents an important and, to some extent, cruel dilemma for the program. The type of rehabilitative services provided under victim assistance programs are not readily available for the vast majority of disabled persons in the countries involved, which raises critical issues of equity and sustainability. The main conceptual issue facing victim assistance activities in landmines programming is to what extent can and should this be integrated into services for disabled people and general health services interventions in mine affected countries

5.3.6.4 Enhanced coordination of UN supported mine action

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model, the fifth and final outcome level result that was intended to be achieved by CIDA programming was: enhanced coordination of UN supported mine action.

[82] Mohammad, Khan *et al*, *Report on the Review of UNOCHA=s Mine Action Program in Afghanistan*, CIDA, British Department for International Development, Government of Japan, March 2001.

The 1999-2000 Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund defines Mine Action Coordination as Ainvestments in structures and organizations that will support greater coherence in, and progress towards, addressing the landmine problem.@ [83]

Output Level Results

From 1999 to 2001, more than $9M of the CIDA=s CLF funds were provided to UN agencies to be used in their efforts in mine action. Core funding was given to UNMAS in 2000 and 2001 ($1.85 million) in recognition and support for its leadership role in mine action. UNDP received a total of $5.7 million from 1999 to 2001 for various projects focussed on developing national mine action capacity and carrying assessment missions in mine affected countries to establish mine action priorities. Such projects are being implemented in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Chad, Laos, Angola, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique and Bosnia & Herzegovina. UNMAS delivered a CLF-funded mine awareness project in Sudan with the assistance of UNICEF ($300,000, 1999). It also received CLF funding for the Yemen Level One Survey ($1.5 million), for the establishment of a mine coordination centre in Ethiopia/Eritrea ($200,000), and for quality assurance monitoring for the Cambodia Level One Survey ($90,000).

Outcome Level Results

Canada=s direct funding to UNMAS and UNDP is unique from that of other donor countries in that it provides multi year funding and considerable latitude as to the way the organizations can choose to spend it. This flexibility is a rare occurrence on the part of donors. The CLF has also contributed to the development of UN standards for demining equipment and holds frequent communications with both UNMAS and UNDP to share best practices and ensure coordination of mine action. In addition, DFAIT/ILX provided assistance to develop UNMAS website on stockpile destruction. Moreover, Canada participates in various multilateral coordination initiatives such as the annual Intersessional Meetings of the States Parties and the Mine Action Support Group, which holds informal monthly meetings in New York and is attended by all the permanent donor missions.

Most respondents believe that Canada=s financial contributions have played a large part in strengthening UN effectiveness in mine action. However, the only multilateral project for which evaluation data is available is a non-CLF mine action project funded by CIDA: the UNOCHA MAPA Program. This program was assessed to be the most successful UN coordinated mine action project in the world: Aa benchmark for international best practice in capacity development and service delivery in mine action.@ [84]

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[83] DFAIT, *Measured Steps*, 45.

[84] Mohammad, Khan *et al*, *Report on the Review of UNOCHA=s Mine Action Program in Afghanistan*, CIDA, British Department for International Development, Government of Japan, March 2001.

Two main exceptions were reported to Canada=s otherwise constant support to UN coordination initiatives. The Mozambique and Cambodia Level One Surveys were entirely funded by Canada and conducted by a Canadian NGO and a Canadian contractor, rather than by the Survey Action Centre.

The Survey Action Centre (SAC) was created in 1998 to coordinate the implementation by recognized international NGOs of Level One Surveys according to specific UN standards. Compliance with these standards is necessary for these surveys to obtain UN certification and for their results to be uploaded in the UN=s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The information contained in the IMSMA is then used to set mine action priorities. The SAC has coordinated Level One Surveys in Yemen, Kosovo, and Thailand, is currently coordinating a survey in Chad, and has started advance-survey missions and planning discussions with a dozen additional countries.

CIDA=s decision to support alternative mechanisms to deliver Level One Surveys has provoked both criticism, curiosity, and praise from members of the international mine action community. At first critical of this decision, members of UN organizations now acknowledge the quality of the results obtained with the Mozambique Survey and the quality work being done by Geospatial in Cambodia. They also recognize as legitimate Canada=s desire to promote and develop Canadian experience in mine clearance, as long as it does not preclude the sharing of lessons learned and expertise with existing international players. Indeed, the Mozambique and Cambodia surveys being implemented through bilateral channels, CIDA was required to award the project to a Canadian organisation. Nonetheless, as reported by CIDA representatives, sharing of information on the progress of the surveys was maintained with the SAC throughout the Mozambique and Cambodia projects. Praise was also expressed by two important NGOs for Canada pushing the concept of Level One Survey, which they see as important for effective mine clearance. As it turns out, the UN is now itself envisaging an alternative role for the SAC, and the Centre=s mandate is currently being redefined.

Conclusion: Since its inception in 1998, the CLF has provided constant support to UN-coordinated actions, both in terms of funding, expert guidance, participation in working committees, and coordination activities.

5.3.7 Increased Mine Action Capacity

As illustrated in the Logic Model presented in Exhibit 4.6 the CLF program is expected to have produced a number of intermediate outcomes by the end of its five year funding period. This evaluation is required to report on the program=s progress in increasing mine action capacity.

EVALUATION ISSUE: Results Achievement
What progress has the CLF made toward the achievement of increased mine action capacity?

This issue is generally considered to require a long term investment, the results of which cannot yet be fully measured. No indicators nor targets were developed by the CLF program

for this intermediate outcome. However, the objective was referred to in the Program=s first Management Board Meeting as Adeveloping capacity of local organisations in affected countries@[85].

Canada=s contribution to increased mine action capacity has been directed mostly through its partnerships with local government bodies and its support to local NGOs. For instance, CIDA supported the development of Akcija Protiv Mina, the first Bosnian demining NGO, as well as the training and deployment of Bosnian deminers with the Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance Program. Several project members involved in the Level 1 Survey in Mozambique were hired locally. The program also supported the creation and/or development of mine action centres in Afghanistan, Chad, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. It has also committed funds to support the government of Eritrea=s project to coordinate a Level 1 Survey. The impact of these initiatives on the mine affected countries= capacity to implement their own mine action activities cannot be reasonably measured at this time. Key informants are however numerous in saying that the CLF must consider a strategy to reduce these countries= dependence on external donor funding.

[85] CLF (Canadian Landmine Fund), *Canadian Landmines Fund 1st Management Board Meeting Package*, May 28, 1998.

But perhaps CLF=s most remarked contribution to increasing mine action capacity is through its effective leveraging of funds from other donor countries. Through its successful projects, the program shows leadership and encourages other countries to make similar contributions. For instance, the success enjoyed by the Mine Detection Dogs project in Bosnia & Herzegovina attracted additional funds from a European donor to train new teams of Bosnian Deminers. Similarly, the majority of DFAIT/ILX=s CLF projects have been projects co-funded by Canada and several other donor countries as the result of DFAIT/ILX efforts to bring donor countries together. Also, the PAHO project was successful in obtaining additional US AID assistance to its tripartite initiative[86]. Other donors contributions are likely to impact on the development of mine action capacity, especially in the case of UNDP projects, which are mostly focussed on supporting the development of national mine clearance programs.

It is also worth noting that a majority of respondents, when asked to comment on the program=s contribution to increased mine action capacity, also commented on its contribution to domestic capacity building. Indeed, although it is not an explicit objective of the program, funding decisions reveal some level of importance given to developing Canadian NGO capacity in mine action, in particular through its Tapping Canadian Creativity Program, where 75% of funding recipients are Canadian organisations. Key informants from Canadian and international organisations are consistent in their belief that Canadian NGOs have generally developed strong capacities in the area of advocacy (i.e. Mines Action Canada) but still require additional experience in the area of demining and victim assistance.

Conclusion: Development of mine action capacity in mine affected countries is a long-term investment that cannot reasonably be expected to have already yielded measurable results, although most respondents already recommend the development of an exit strategy. Preliminary results nonetheless show that Canada is making a recognized contribution to increasing mine action capacity through its effective leveraging of other donor contributions and its support to national Mine Action Centres. Mine action capacity of Canadian NGOs is considered to be a secondary objective of the program. Canadian NGOS are deemed to be very effective in the area of advocacy but to need further development in the areas of demining and victim assistance.

The CLF requires more definitive information on the effects of capacity development activities in mine-affected countries. While inputs seem to be soundly planned and implemented, it will take further investments in monitoring and evaluation to determine if the outcomes in terms of more effective mine action agencies in the host countries are commensurate with the investments made. This issue should be further explored by the summative evaluation of the CLF.

5.3.8 Treaty Ratification and Universalization

[86] Moe, Judith and Dr. James Farrow, 2001.

As illustrated in the CLF Logic Model in Exhibit 4.6, two of the intermediate term outcomes expected by the end of the funding period, as a result of having achieved CLF short term outcomes, is universal acceptance and early ratification of the MBT.

EVALUATION ISSUES:

Results Achievement: *What progress has the CLF made toward the achievement ratification and universalization of the MBT?*

Effectiveness: *Based on the achievement of results at this point in its life cycle, has the CLF made reasonable progress toward meeting its stated objectives? Specific sub-issues:*

$ *What has been the CLF=s contribution to the universal acceptance of the MBT?*

$ *What has been the CLF=s contribution to the early ratification and entry into force of the MBT?*

The MBT was opened for signature in December 1997. In December 1997, The treaty was signed by 122 countries and ratified by 3. As at December 1997, there were 68 non-signatory countries. By March 1, 1999, the number of countries that had ratified the MBT had grown to forty. Achievement of forty ratifications was significant, because that was the trigger, as set out in the MBT, for the treaty to be entered into force. As noted in the Landmine Monitor, this is believed to be the fastest entry into force of any major multilateral treaty ever.

As at August 2001, the status of the MBT was 118 ratifications or accessions, 22 signatories not yet ratified, and 53 non-signatories. The status of the MBT, by region, as reported in the LandMine Monitor 2001, is illustrated below in Exhibit 5.3.8.

Exhibit 5.3.8: MBT Status, by region as at August 2001

Region	Status as at August 2001
The Americas	Signatories: 4 Ratifications or Accessions: 29 Non-signatories: 2 Total: 35
Europe, the Caucasus & Centra	Signatories: 5 Ratifications or Accessions: 35 Non-signatories: 13 Total: 53
Sub-Sarahan Africa	Signatories: 7 Ratifications or Accessions: 35 Non-signatories: 6 Total: 48
East & South Asia & Pacific	Signatories: 5

	Ratifications or Accessions: 15 Non-signatories: 19 Total: 39
Middle East & North Africa	Signatories: 1 Ratifications or Accessions: 4 Non-signatories: 13 Total: 18

All CLF funding[87] has been used to help governments around the world address the needs of landmine victims and peoples living in mined areas, help State Parties implement the MBT, or encourage non-State Parties to sign, ratify or accede the treaty. The most significant efforts by the CLF, that were designed specifically for encouraging and promoting early ratification and universal acceptance of the MBT, have been those of the DFAIT/ILX team and the Ambassador for Mine Action.

There are many examples of DFAIT/ILX activities that have contributed towards early ratification and universal acceptance of the MBT that have been discussed throughout this report. The most significant efforts of DFAIT/ILX personnel and the Ambassador for Mine Action include the following:

$ ongoing involvement as member, Co-Chair or co-rapporteur in each of the four Intersessional Committees[88];

$ through both formal and informal channels, ongoing provision of policy and other advice related to MBT legal issues, implementation issues, and compliance issues to other donor countries, NGOs including MAC and ICBL, the governments of mine affected State Parties, the UN, other donor countries, and the Meetings of the State Parties;

$ continued partnership and consultation with NGOs in the ban landmine movement as evidenced by the provision of core funding to ICBL and MAC, and the inclusion of NG O representatives in many DFAIT/ILX activities;

[87] With the exception of approximately $2 million that has lapsed.

[88] Canada currently serves as the co-rapporteur of the Committee for Victim Assistance. Canada has also served terms as the Co-Chair of the Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

- $ co-ordination of numerous regional and other conferences aimed at building awareness of the MBT, understanding how to implement the MBT, and or understanding the benefits of becoming a State Party;
- $ co-ordination of, or participation in, numerous landmine conferences, seminars and workshops to discuss MBT issues related to specific countries, specific projects, or specific types of landmine programming; and
- $ co-ordination of formal and informal meetings between DFAIT/ILX, other donor country representatives, key NGOs like ICBL, representatives of governments of mine affected countries and UN representatives to:
  - S identify and discuss landmine and MBT problems, issues, and priorities;
  - S develop strategies for addressing the issues identified; and
  - S creating partnerships with other donor countries to fund the requirements.

One of the key strengths of DFAIT/ILX=s approach to the funding of CLF projects aimed at universalization and early ratification has been the leveraging of DFAIT/ILX funding with other donor countries. This approach has enabled DFAIT/ILX to build relationships and networks with other donor countries and UN personnel that facilitated further information sharing. Most importantly, this approach has enabled DFAIT/ILX to fund and Akick-start@ more projects than would otherwise have been possible, given the funding available.

Although certainly not alone in efforts to promote the early ratification and universalization of the MBT, all respondents from Canadian and International NGOs, other donor countries and UN organisation readily acknowledge the strategic and effective approach taken by DFAIT/ILX to achieve early ratification and work towards universalization of the treaty. Respondents consider that Canada has made a significant contribution to the success achieved to date. The LandMine Monitor concurs with this view. The LandMine Monitor has noted in each of its first three publications, that Canada has continued to take on a leadership role in international efforts to encourage countries to sign, ratify, accede and implement the MBT. Other key players noted by the LandMine Monitor as having played significant roles in promoting ratification and universalization of the MBT include ICBL, ICRC, and other donor countries including France, Norway, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and Austria.

The MBT has not yet achieved universalization, and of course, it was never anticipated that this would be achieved by now. The reasons for not signing or acceding the treaty are varied, but as reported in MAC=s database of the MBT=s status, the most common reasons include the following:

- $ some governments feel they do not have the resources or technical capacity required to meet the treaty obligations, particularly those related to destruction of stockpiles within 4 years, and clearance of all mined areas within 10 years;
- $ some governments view landmines as a necessary evil to maintain security over their country=s borders, and until all threats to security cease and or until a viable

alternative to landmines is created, landmines must continue to be used for border security;

$ some governments feel the MBT is an overly zealous approach to the landmine issue, and are unwilling to agree to the terms;

$ some governments believe that, in addition to the border security issue, there continues to be other important military requirements for landmine use, and until such time that a viable alternative is created, landmines must continue to be used.

Although rapid progress has been achieved towards universalization, there is concern that the countries that have yet to ratify will require new and even more strategic approaches. Several respondents have suggested that the Ahumanitarian@ argument has been played out, and now the argument must turn, in many instances to roadblocks related to security and military concerns. DFAIT/ILX officials agree that the Aeasier@ countries have been targeted, and success has been achieved, and now is the time for much more systematic, strategic and creative ways to achieve universalization.

Conclusion: Through the CLF, Canada has made a contribution towards universal acceptance and early ratification of the MBT. Canada is viewed as a leader in these efforts, and Canada=s contribution is regarded within the international landmine community as having been exemplary and effective.

Future efforts towards universalization can no longer rely upon the Ahumanitarian@ argument. Focus must now turn to address non-signatory concerns related to security and military issues.

6.0 Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

This section summarizes the conclusions of the study, including general conclusions and specific conclusions, organised within the five pillars of landmine programming.

6.1.1 General Conclusions

$ Experience to date with the **pace of land mine programming** in State Parties suggests that investments in key areas of land mine programming will be required well into the foreseeable future and beyond the current life of the CLF.

$ Key donor countries will need to recognize the **requirement for assistance to States Parties in meeting their obligations** for some time to come (perhaps 10 to 15 years). At the same time, it is important that host governments in affected countries recognize the need to make mine action programs more locally self-sustainable over time and the reality that external support must ultimately be of limited duration.

$ The CLF is clearly consistent with all of Canada=s **foreign policy** objectives, and its renewal at comparable levels is essential to maintain Canada=s credibility as a leader, both domestically and internationally, to encourage other donors= commitment, and to sustain the development of Canadian NGO mine action capacity.

$ The CLF responds to the **needs of mine affected communities**. It is uncertain whether the highest priority needs have been addressed due to the lack of formal needs assessments and the lack of documentation to support the prioritization and selection of project funding decisions.

$ Although not audited as part of this study, it would appear that all **CLF funds** have been used for the purposes intended, with the exception of the funds that were lapsed by Industry Canada ($2.198 million) and DFAIT ($248,000).

$ While some progress has been made on identifying the types of results expected of the CLF program, there is currently a **lack of consistently reported results information** which can be compared to targets established by each department or for the program as a whole. It will be essential in moving forward with the program to link higher level statements of objectives to more specific and quantifiable statements of expected results and to gather and report on results achievement in a systematic way.

$ In **allocating resources across the five pillars** of mine action (mine clearance, victim assistance, mine awareness, stockpile destruction and advocacy) there is a continuous need to balance the views and interests of key stakeholder groups. CLF has managed this balance fairly well over its current phase. While the CLF supports all five pillars of mine action, some concerns have been expressed regarding the amount allocated to the funding of research and development activities.

6.1.2 Specific Conclusions

Treaty Ratification and Universalization: *including treaty obligations, universal acceptance and early ratification, and advocacy capacity of mine action groups.*

Treaty Obligations

$ The CLF was designed to meet ongoing **treaty obligations**. To date, the CLF has enabled Canada to meet these ongoing obligations. Although not a legal obligation, Canada has established itself as a champion for universalizing and successfully implementing the treaty. Should Canada decide to continue to fulfill this role, funding would be required. The amount required to fund such a leadership position has not been determined.

$ The MBT does not stipulate the minimum or maximum **level of funding required** from each State Party. One yardstick to determine the amount of funding that Canada should continue to provide for these ongoing treaty obligations is the *per capita* amount contributed by other donor country State Parties.

$ The **length of time required to continue** to fulfil Canada=s ongoing treaty obligations is unknown since the extent of the landmine problem has not been completely scoped out, and State Parties are obliged to assist other State Parties in addressing the landmine problem. Estimates range from another five to fifteen years beyond the March 2003 sunset date of the CLF, but there is a widely held view within the landmine community that donor country contributions should slowly decline, as capacities within mine affected State Parties increase. Some aspects of routine Canadian government development programming can be considered as meeting in part or in full Canada=s obligations under Article 6.

Universal acceptance and early ratification

$ Through the CLF, Canada has made a contribution towards **universal acceptance and early ratification** of the MBT. Canada is viewed as a leader in these efforts, and Canada=s contribution is regarded within the international landmine community as having been exemplary and effective.

$ The CLF=s efforts to **increase public support** for signing and ratification of the MBT and for the elimination of land mines have been judged as a reasoned

response to the problem of encouraging smaller and medium sized nations to ratify or accede to the MBT. These efforts have an important part to play in landmine programming over the long term and should not be seen as secondary to the more immediate and direct actions in support of victims.

$ Future efforts towards universalization can no longer rely upon the Ahumanitarian@ argument. Focus must now turn to address non-signatory concerns related to security and military issues. A key problem facing the international mine action community is the **continued resistance of large, militarily significant countries** to ratification and implementation of the MBT. This will require States Parties to utilize diplomatic and policy resources outside the scope of funded programs such as the CLF.

Advocacy capacity of mine action groups

$ CLF efforts to improve the **advocacy capacity of mine action groups** in Canada and internationally have proven both useful and effective. In the first three years of the CLF, Canada has contributed to the improved advocacy capacity of mine action groups, most notably the ICBL and MAC. The funding provided to ICBL and MAC has enabled these two key NGOs to continue to develop their expertise in advocacy activities.

$ While Canada has been successful in leveraging donor funding for ICBL, MAC remains very dependent on the Fund. Therefore, going forward, questions remain as to whether there is a need to continue to fund some key partners at or near the 100% level, and what Canada=s role should be in building or maintaining the **financial sustainability of mine action groups**.

International coordination*: including improved mine action data information, support to UN-coordinated actions, and raised Canadian public awareness*.

Improved mine action data information

$ The CLF has contributed to **improved mine action data and information**. The most highly acclaimed contribution, in the opinion of most respondents, has been Canada=s financial and other support for the development and publication of the annual LandMine Monitor. The LandMine Monitor, published by the ICBL, is an internationally respected report that serves as an independent monitor of international implementation of, and compliance with, the MBT.

Support to UN-coordinated actions

$ Since its inception in 1998, the CLF has provided constant support to **UN-coordinated actions**, both in terms of funding, expert guidance, participation in working committees, and coordination activities.

Canadian public awareness

$ The CLF has contributed towards an increase in **Canadian public awareness** of mine action programs. The flagship of the CLF=s awareness program is the YMAAP.

Mine Awareness*: including mine awareness and reduced landmine accidents.*

Mine awareness

$ Conceptually, CLF **investments in mine awareness** have been an essential component in mine action programming. There is an urgent need, however, for a more structured assessment of how efforts in mine awareness have been linked first to a material change in the level of knowledge among target group members and secondly how this change in awareness may or may not result in changes in high-risk behaviour. Experience with awareness raising programs in HIV/AIDS prevention and in reproductive health demonstrates that awareness programs must be linked to projects demonstrating effective alternative behaviour and providing easy access to both services and incentives in order to be effective.

$ CIDA **mine awareness** programming did not receive as much attention as other CIDA CLF components, which indicates that mine awareness has not been a priority area of intervention for CIDA CLF programming. With the exception of UNICEF=s Angola project, no information was available on the results of mine awareness activities supported by the CLF. In Angola, the evaluation indicated that CLF-funded mine awareness activities had achieved a positive change in awareness but without a subsequent change in behaviour.

Reduced landmine accidents

$ With respect to **reduced landmine accidents**, problems in attributing changes in casualty rates make it difficult to conclude on the role of mine action programs in such an outcome. However, it is at least clear that there is a correlation between mine action programs (including specific programs supported by CLF) and reductions in casualties.

Stockpile Destruction

$ One of the highest priority areas of land mine programming remains the **destruction of stockpiles.** Around the world there remain significant stockpiles of landmines. If not located and destroyed, these stockpiles could potentially be used to mine new or previously cleared lands. While the scope of existing stockpiles is not yet fully documented, the CLF has provided Canada with the means of establishing early leadership on a key issue.

$ In the first three years of the CLF, Canada has made a contribution to efforts to reduce **landmine stockpiles** around the world. In fact, by partnering with other major donor countries and organisations including OAS, NATO, UNMAS, and by providing technical and military expertise and financial aid, Canada has established a leadership position within the international landmine community on how to approach the very complex issue of destroying landmine stockpiles.

$ State Parties have not yet been able to identify the scope of work remaining to destroy all stockpiles, therefore it remains unclear whether the efforts of donor countries, including Canada, will be sufficient to achieve the four year timeline established by the MBT.

Mine Clearance*: including R&D, military alternatives, marketing & commercialisation, and mine clearance activities*

Research and development

$ There is a clearly apparent need for **improvement in technologies and methods for mine clearance,** given the magnitude of the problem of mined land in many States Parties territories and the slow pace of manual de-mining. CLF funded efforts to address this problem have been somewhat hampered by the difficulty of linking newly developed technologies to a recognizable market (and there-by recapturing public and private R&D costs).

$ With respect to CCMAT, the centre=s test and evaluation activities are widely praised for meeting the needs of communities and practitioners of mine clearance. As a result of the testing and evaluation of products developed largely by Canadian private companies, CCMAT has, to date, enabled three proven Canadian products to be distributed. CCMAT is now recognised as an international centre of test and evaluation expertise for certain demining technologies.

$ In the area of research and development, CCMAT has shared and distributed technical information at the international level, and has provided technical support to potential developers of demining technologies including Canadian private sector companies, other R & D organisations, and demining operations.

$ Despite the fact that CCMAT undertook efforts to match research and development activities with the needs of communities and practitioners of mine clearance, the extent to which project selection decisions meet these needs remains unclear. The R & D community, including CCMAT, has acknowledged the existence of a gap between researchers and users and is taking actions to resolve the issue. Although progress continues on numerous research and development projects within CCMAT, no products have as yet been deployed to demining operations.

$ The international mine action community will need to recognize the somewhat **artificial nature of the market in demining technologies, equipment and capacities.** The fact that effective demand is tied to donor funding threatens to balkanize the market for de-mining techniques and equipment and to result in inefficiencies and duplication as each donor country pursues its Ashare@ of a small market. Donor countries should intensify efforts to collaborate on technology development and investigate possibilities for combining to procure a smaller number of recognized equipment types for mine affected countries.

Military alternatives

$ The CLF, in keeping with other mine action programs, has had difficulty in addressing the issue of **effective military alternatives to land mines**. This, in part, results from philosophical problems with the use of funds intended for essentially humanitarian and human security purposes in the development of alternative weapons systems.

$ If success is to be achieved in addressing the problem of holdout large countries, the international mine action community must find the means to address the problem of **effective military alternatives** to the use of land mines.

Marketing & Commercialisation

$ The results achieved to date by Industry Canada in terms of **marketing and commercializing new or adapted demining technologies** are limited to just one product, Promac=s BDM48 which is a type of brush cutter for use in demining operations. Although the Sector Branch spent limited funds for marketing activities (less than $100,000 over three years), the lack of results appears to be due largely to the following:

  X The **market for demining technology** is not a normal commercial market, therefore there is limited interest from the private sector to pursue development of such products, especially if the company is expected to cost share development of such a product;

  $ There were very few Canadian companies working with CCMAT=s technical advisers who were in need of Industry Canada=s assistance in marketing and commercialization efforts; and

  $ There appears to be very few Canadian companies with the capacity to develop potential demining technologies.

$ Similarly, Technology Partnership Canada=s (TPC) **commercialization efforts and results** were limited by these factors. As well, TPC was further limited to funding

only those proposals that passed DND=s technical assessment process. The only proposal approved by DND and passed to TPC was the Promac proposal.

$ Looking ahead, the **role for Industry Canada** within the CCMAT mandate needs to be examined to determine the most appropriate role, if any.

Mine clearance activities

$ With respect to work in the area of **mine clearance**, it is difficult to conclude on the quality of the work being accomplished by each project or on their short-term outcomes. However, CIDA-channelled CLF funding has contributed to the development of effective national programs, provided essential data on mines location and impact, and resulted in the clearance of high priority land.

Victim Assistance

$ Of all forms of mine action programming, **victim assistance activities** seem to be most directly linked to improving the physical and social well being of mine affected peoples. Reported and observed outputs and outcomes of CLF victim assistance activities are impressive in volume and clearly essential in their positive impact on the lives of mine-affected people. However, given the wide range, complexity, length, and cost of victim assistance initiatives, it is difficult to draw general conclusions as to the program=s results in this area. Most stakeholders consulted consider that more needs to be done in this domain and that victim assistance activities should be better integrated with development programming.

$ CLF funded victim assistance programming presents an important and, to some extent, cruel dilemma for the program. The type of rehabilitative services provided under victim assistance programs are not readily available for the vast majority of disabled persons in the countries involved, which raises critical issues of **equity and sustainability**. The main conceptual issue facing victim assistance activities in landmines programming is to what extent can and should this be **integrated** into services for disabled people and general health services interventions in mine affected countries.

Mine action capacity building

$ Development of **mine action capacity** in mine affected countries is a long-term investment that cannot reasonably be expected to have already yielded measurable results, although most respondents already recommend the development of an exit strategy. Preliminary results nonetheless show that Canada is making a recognized contribution to increasing mine action capacity through its effective leveraging of other donor contributions and its support to national Mine Action Centres. Mine action capacity of Canadian NGOs is considered to be a secondary

objective of the program. Canadian NGOS are deemed to be very effective in the area of advocacy but to need further development in the areas of demining and victim assistance.

$ The CLF requires more definitive **information on the effects of capacity development activities in mine-affected countries**. While inputs seem to be soundly planned and implemented, it will take further investments in monitoring and evaluation to determine if the outcomes in terms of more effective mine action agencies in the host countries are commensurate with the investments made. This issue should be further explored by the summative evaluation of the CLF.

6.2 Lessons Learned and Some Niche Areas for the CLF

This section draws on the findings reported throughout the evaluation to identify lessons learned that can be used in guiding the CLF in the future.

6.2.1 Lessons Learned

$ The government can effectively mobilize support and attain a position of leadership nationally or internationally if it makes a comprehensive initial commitment through strong political leadership (ministerial champion), effective coordination of concerned departments (ministerial committees and landmines Ambassador) and widespread coalition building with national and international stakeholders.

$ The relatively high level of financial resources committed by Canada and their high visibility helped to encourage other donor countries to maintain a presence in the area of land mine actions. The lesson learned is that an early high visibility program commitment may be effective in leveraging other donor country resources.

$ Comprehensive needs assessments and consultations with user populations are essential to appropriate and sustainable design.

$ The inter-departmental aspect of the CLF design can serve as a model for the timely application of funded program support to non-conventional international conventions and treaty initiatives related to human security.

6.2.2 Some Niche Areas for the CLF

Potential niche areas of Canadian excellence are beginning to emerge. These should be closely monitored and assessed as areas where Canada could concentrate its efforts over the long term. Some emerging niche areas are:

$ **Stockpile destruction**: The CLF could continue to demonstrate Canadian leadership in this important area of landmine programming.

$ **Testing and evaluation of demining technologies**: The CLF could continue to support Canada=s internationally recognized work in testing and evaluation of demining technologies.

$ **Level One Surveys**: The CLF could continue to invest in and refine the practice of Level One Surveys as a means of establishing a baseline for demining efforts in affected countries.

6.3 Recommendations

In order for key donor countries to meet their obligations for assistance to States Parties, they will need to base their strategy on recognition of the long term horizon beyond March 2003. Also, it is important to note that any long term strategy will have to be built around empowerment of assisted countries through capacity building.

1. **Funding Horizon:** It is recommended that Canada continue to fund MBT-related landmine programming well beyond March 31, 2003. At a minimum, there is a need to fund Canada=s continuing administrative and reporting obligation as a State Party. More importantly, as a State Party Ain a position to do so@, Canada is obliged under Article 6 of the MBT to assist other State Parties in addressing landmine problems. Although it is anticipated that capacities within mine affected countries will continue to increase and the need for donor assistance should decline, estimates of the length of time other State Parties will be required to provide continued assistance ranges from five to fifteen years beyond March 2003.

2. **CLF Resourcing:** It is recommended that future decisions related to Canada=s post-2003 approach should take into account the current **leadership position** of Canada within the international landmine community, and the fact such leadership carries with it some level of political and moral obligation and responsibility to assist with any leadership transition.

3. **Universalization Efforts:** It is recommended that the CLF=s strategy to universalize the MBT continue to be refined and re-adjusted given that many of the remaining holdout countries (eg. Russia, US, China and India) are doing so on account of military and or security concerns. Canada and other donor countries must re-examine the extent to which programs such as the CLF can impact or influence the recalcitrant countries on this issue.

4. **Victim Assistance:** It is recommended that the CLF examine the practical and ethical implications of integrating victim assistance activities into national systems of support to the disabled and general health services interventions in mine affected countries.

5. **Mine Awareness**: It is recommended that the CLF re-examine the causal link between its mine awareness interventions and the reduction of risk behaviour in mine affected countries.

6. **Capacity Building:** It is recommended that the CLF develop and implement a strategy that will take into account the potential of NGOs for self-sufficiency so that a more or less permanent state of financial dependency is avoided. This should not be done abruptly but in accordance with an agreed upon timetable and a strategy that serves Canada=s interests and identified niches, if any.

7. **Research and development of demining and related technologies:** It is recommended that the research and development activities of CCMAT that are funded by the CLF be restricted to short and medium term initiatives that are very clearly linked to identified and immediate needs of field practitioners. To avoid duplication of effort, CCMAT activities should continue to be co-ordinated and integrated with the research and development activities of other donor countries. Funding sources outside the CLF should be used to resource longer term research and development initiatives that may or may not, over the course of time, result in field deployment of more efficient and effective demining and related technologies.

8. **Role of Industry Canada:** It is recommended that the role of marketing and commercialisation and by extension the role of Industry Canada within CCMAT and or the CLF be re-examined to determine the most appropriate role, if any.

9. **Performance Measurement**: It is recommended that the CLF immediately develop and implement a CLF-wide Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF). Four issues that must be addressed as part of the RMAF are:
   - $ Governance, roles and responsibilities and joint monitoring and coordination mechanisms;
   - $ Expected results for the CLF and for its components;
   - $ Performance measurement strategy; and
   - $ Performance reporting strategy.

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