

## EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA

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Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in Africa, GICHD, Geneva, February 2008

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In November 2008, after this report was written, the EC published a set of guidelines on how to more effectively link mine action with development for future programming of EC mine action over the 2008-2013 period<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> This Commission Staff working document, “Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013” can be downloaded from the website [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/anti\\_landmines/docs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/anti_landmines/docs/index_en.htm)

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## ACRONYMS

AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office	JIDU	Joint Integrated Demining Unit
AIDS	Auto Immune-Deficiency Syndrome	JMC	Joint Military Commission
ANC	African National Congress	JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines	LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
APM	Anti-Personnel Landmines	LMA	Landmine Action
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture	LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
AU	African Union	M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
BAC	Battle Area Clearance	MA	Mine Action
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation	MAG	Mines Advisory Group
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of War	MAO	Mine Action Office
CED	Executive Commission for Demining	MDD	Mine Detecting Dog
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
CNIDAH	National Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance	MEDDS	Mechem Explosives and Drugs Detection System
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	MgM	People Against Mines, Germany
CRMAO	Central Region Mine Action Office	MINARS	Ministry for Assistance and Social Reintegration
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	MONUA	United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola
DA	Dangerous Areas	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
DCA	DanChurch Aid	MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
DDG	Danish Demining Group	MRE	Mine Risk Education
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	MRR&R	Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
DFID	Department for International Development	MSF	Doctors without Borders
DG DEV	European Commission Directorate General for Development	MVMMDS	Mechem Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection System
DG RELEX	European Commission Directorate General for External Relations	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
EC	European Commission	NMAO	National Mine Action Office
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office	NPA	Norwegian Peoples Aid
EDF	European Development Fund	NSAL	New Sudan Authority on Landmines
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	NSMAD	New Sudan Mine Action Directorate
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
EU	European Union	OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces	OSIL	Operation Save Innocent Lives
FAPLA	Angolan People's Armed Liberation Forces	PAM	World Food Programme
FNLA	Angolan National Liberation Front	PDA	Personnel Digital Assistant
FPDO	Friends of Peace and Development Organisation	PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
FSD	Fondation Suisse de Deminage (same as SFD)	PMAC	Puntland Mine Action Centre
GAC	Child Support Group	PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	QA	Quality Assurance
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	QC	Quality Control
GOA	Government of Angola	RAP	Rapid Assistance Programme
GoNU	Government of National Unity	RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
GoS	Government of Sudan	RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
GoSS	Government of South Sudan	ROLS	Rule of Law and Security
GRN	National Reconstruction Office	RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung	RRP	Relief and Rehabilitation Programme
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission	SAC	Survey Action Center
HI	Handicap International	SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
HPP	Humanitarian Plus Programme	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
ICMA	Inter-ministerial Committee on Mine Action (Somaliland)	SCBL	Sudan Campaign to ban Landmines
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	SCPP	Somali Civil Protection Programme
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	SFD	Swiss Federation for Demining (same as FSD)
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards	SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
IMATC	International Mine Action Training Centre	SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action	SIMAS	Sudan Integrated Mine Action Services
INAD	National Demining Institute (in Angola)	SLIRI	Sudan Landmine Information and Response Services
INAROE	National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles and Devices	SLR	Sudan Landmine Response
IND	National Demining Institute (in Mozambique)	SMAC	Somaliland Mine Action Centre
INEA	Instituto Nacional de Estradas de Angola	SNRC	Somali National Reconciliation Conference (adopted a Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic)
JASMAR	Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines	Soba	Traditional chief in Angola

SOP	Standard Operating Procedure	UNDP/BCPR	UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement	UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Spot UXO	Isolated UXO which does not impact a community even though it poses a possible threat	UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistic Command
SRCS	Somali Red Crescent Society	UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office
SRRC	Sudan Relief and Reconciliation Council	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)	UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
SSDC	Southern Sudan Demining Commission	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
SSRMAO	Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Office	USD	United States Dollar
STABEX	Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation	UTA	Technical and Administrative Unit
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
TA	Technical Advisor	VA	Victim Assistance
TFG	Transitional Federal Government	VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund (of the UN)
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission	VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
UNCCAS	UN Common Country Assessment	WFP	World Food Programme
UNDG	United Nations Development Group	Xeer	Somali customary law
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Center

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


The Evaluation of EC support for mine action in Africa is the first of six regional mine action evaluations that the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) will conduct or commission for the European Commission (EC).<sup>2</sup> These regional evaluations follow on from a Global Assessment of EC support for mine action completed in 2005.<sup>3</sup> Given the broad scope of a regional evaluation, no attempt was made to assess the performance of individual projects; rather, the focus was on EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country and regional levels.

In addition to a document review, the evaluation team sent questionnaires to the EC Delegations in those sub-Saharan African countries in which the EC has provided funding for mine action since 2002, and conducted country missions to Angola, North and South Sudan, and Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland).<sup>4</sup> Findings from these missions are reported in a separate volume.

### THE QUANTITY AND FOCUS OF EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION IN AFRICA

Although it has proved impossible to compile a complete and accurate list of EC-financed mine action projects,<sup>5</sup> from the data compiled by the evaluation team it is clear that the EC has provided over €90 million to mine action in Africa since 2002, with about two-thirds of this committed from 2005-07 – the period covered by the Second EC Mine Action Strategy. The €90 million in funding exceeds the combined targets set in the two Mine Action Strategies.

**Figure 1 – Financial targets & estimated commitments for 2002-04 and 2005-07**



Just over half of all EC<sup>6</sup> funding for mine action in Africa has gone to Angola, but significant support has also gone to Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, Senegal, and Somalia. Total funding peaked in 2004 (largely because of new projects in Angola) and has been tapering-off since.

<sup>2</sup> The Africa Evaluation was conducted by the GICHD. In Africa, the EC is


<sup>3</sup> Gasser, R. and R. Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.

<sup>4</sup> In addition, the Evaluation Team Leader attended the joint EU-AU Security Dialogue Workshop, 18-20 April 2007 in Addis Ababa.

<sup>5</sup> This was a finding from the Global Assessment as well.

<sup>6</sup> African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries receive assistance from the European Development Fund (EDF), which itself is funded by contributions from members of the European Union (EU). In relation to EDF funding, EC refers to the European Community rather than European Commission. African countries also have received mine action



**Figure 2 – Funding by year and by country**

The bulk of the funding has been for demining, mostly channelled through European NGOs. However, the UNDP has been the single biggest recipient of EC funding for mine action in Africa, receiving at least €27.4 million since 2002, often to support capacity development in the national mine action authorities and centres.

#### RELEVANCE OF EC MINE ACTION SUPPORT IN AFRICA

Clearly, EC support for mine action in Africa has been relevant to the objectives and priorities set-out in the mine action Regulations and Strategies. Financing has been provided to all pillars of mine action, with the bulk going toward demining (as is appropriate).

Assistance to mine action is also relevant to both the EU Strategy for Africa<sup>7</sup> and to the needs of many African countries.<sup>8</sup> On some measures, Africa is considered the continent most affected by landmines, and the EC has allocated a significant proportion of its total mine action support to it, with funds provided to 12 African countries. Since 2002, landmine contamination has been a major humanitarian concern in certain countries in Africa; particularly in Angola and Sudan following the peace agreements in those countries, when landmines threatened the return of millions of refugees and IDPs and constrained the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this context, it is appropriate that more than half of all EC assistance to mine action was spent in Angola and Sudan in the initial post-conflict years.

In addition, mine action has contributed significantly to peace building and the enhancement of security at various places and times in Africa, and the EC has supported such initiatives. For example, mine action was the first concrete programme of cooperation between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), serving as confidence building measure leading to the cease fire and eventual Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The pattern of assistance provided to mine action in Africa is also appropriate in terms of the EC policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Since 2005, the Delegation in Angola has been encouraging demining NGOs to incorporate developmental objectives in their proposals, and has provided funding for demining support to infrastructure reconstruction

assistance from the assessed aid budget European Commission. To avoid confusing the reader, we will ignore this subtle distinction.

<sup>7</sup> Particularly for the (i) Peace and Security, and (ii) trade and regional integration components of this strategy.

<sup>8</sup> Mine action is also relevant to a number of EC Strategies in place for major sub-regions in Africa, most of which have some provision for peace and security. However, no mine action projects have been funded by the regional instruments in the period covered by this evaluation.

projects.<sup>9</sup> Recent EC-financed projects in Sudan have incorporated mine action support into community development projects implemented by consortia of international and local NGOs.


Note that, although mine action appears relevant to the EU Strategy for Africa and at least some of the (sub-) Regional Strategies and Indicative Programmes, there is no regional or sub-regional EC mine action programme at the current time. All programming is done on a country-basis, even though some contamination problems clearly involve multiple countries or have sub-regional security implications.<sup>10</sup>

**EFFECTIVENESS**

This evaluation did not assess the performance of individual projects and we cannot, therefore, comment in the operational effectiveness of the EC mine action portfolios in terms of results on the ground. At a higher level, the programming decisions made by EC Delegations appear to have been effective in terms of aligning mine action with the needs of the country (which, in failed states and post-conflict situations, evolve rapidly). In Sudan, the EC supported early mine action initiatives that contributed to the broader peace-building process. In Angola and Sudan, the amount of funding for mine action rose dramatically in the immediate post-conflict period, when landmine contamination can lead to a humanitarian crisis. In recent years, the Delegation in Angola has sought to steer its implementing partners to focus increasingly on support to reconstruction and development. In Angola as well, EC assistance has supported the development of capacities in the provinces, where many Vice Governors appear to be committed to the mine action programme even if some officials in Luanda are not.

At the same time, the case of Somalia relative to other African countries suggests that donor programming mechanisms for mine action – including those of the EC – are not effective in allocating aid across countries in accordance to need.<sup>11</sup>

**Figure 3 – International funding per landmine victim<sup>12</sup>**



<sup>9</sup> At the same time, a number of these NGOs appear not to have fully adjusted their approaches to focus on development outcomes.

<sup>10</sup> In 2002, €20 million was approved in Brussels for post-conflict recovery in Eritrea and Ethiopia (€10 million for each country). As events turned out, only one project has been approved (€8 million for mine action in Ethiopia), and this involved only Ethiopia.

<sup>11</sup> The authors of the Global Assessment made a similar observation and recommended the EC employ multi-criteria analysis to determine its allocations across countries in a transparent fashion. This approach could only be useful for allocating the APL thematic budget, which no longer exists.

<sup>12</sup> Annual averages for the two most recent years. See the report on the Somalia mission for details on data sources.

EC assistance has been less effective in supporting the development of national capacities, fostering national ownership, and coordinating with other agencies supporting mine action. This, however, is not because the EC has ignored these issues; rather, it reflects a more systemic problem in the mine action field, at least within Africa. The evaluation team has not come across any fully adequate medium-term plans for capacity development or strategic plans for a national mine action programme.<sup>13</sup> In the absence of such plans, a single donor has no adequate framework for its programming decisions, and coordination among donors is greatly hindered.

#### **THE IMPACT OF DECONCENTRATION<sup>14</sup>**

There is no clear indication that deconcentration has yet had an effect on either the quantity or quality of EC assistance to mine action in Africa. Over time, however, we would expect both benefits and adverse effects. On the positive side, the EC Delegations are in a better position to devise a programme appropriate to the evolving political and economic realities of a country, and to adapt the future programme in light of the successes and failures of the current portfolio of mine action projects.

However, there invariably are challenges common to all efforts at deconcentrating aid programmes, including:

- country offices are generally too small to have specialists available for each sector or field
- officials responsible for mine action are typically covering one or more other sectors as well
- staff rotation policies mean that it is extremely difficult for country-level offices to maintain institutional memory and, therefore, programming continuity
- personnel in country-level offices have limited access to global policy debates and to lessons learned and innovations emerging from other countries.

#### **THE IMPACT OF THE END OF DEDICATED FUNDING AND THE REDUCTION IN THE STAFF COMPLEMENT AT HEADQUARTERS WORKING ON MINE ACTION**

Support from a headquarters-level unit or focal point could help overcome some of the challenges inherent in the deconcentration effort by, for example, providing policy and technical advice, backstopping Delegations when there is a rotation of the officer responsible for mine action, and identifying appropriately qualified experts to assist the EC Delegations with their mine action projects. Unfortunately the parallel effort to simplify EC aid delivery mechanisms has also led to the elimination of the APL thematic budget line and a reduction in the number of staff in Brussels working on mine action.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Such plans to institute a ‘programme-based approach’ should be formulated by the recipient government in consultation with donors and other mine action stakeholders. In failed states or the immediate post-conflict period, the lead UN agency for mine action in a country may need to prepare the strategic plan for the programme, or support the government’s capacity to prepare such a plan.

<sup>14</sup> Within the EC, ‘deconcentration’ is the specific term used by the EC to refer to the delegation of more authority to its Delegations, and ‘decentralisation’ signifies the delegation of responsibilities to authorities in the beneficiary countries. In the aid effectiveness literature, decentralisation is the general term used in reference to efforts at having key decisions made within the recipient country, embracing both EC the concepts – ‘deconcentration’ and ‘decentralisation’.

<sup>15</sup> There was a sector within the RELEX A4 unit responsible for the APL budget line and, more generally, the EC Mine Action Strategy. There remains a small staff complement, but its mandate covers conventional disarmament rather than simply mine action. There was also one position in the European Aid Cooperation Office responsible for mine action projects. This position now covers the Stability Instrument.

The loss of dedicated funding for mine action is likely to have an impact on future EC funding. In broad terms, the EC Mine Action Regulations and subsequent Strategies sought to advance humanitarian, developmental, and Treaty objectives.<sup>16</sup> While the responsibilities for EC Delegations extend beyond humanitarian and development assistance, the development programme typically dominates relations with poor countries, including much of Africa. As well, the bulk of the financial resources available for programming to EC Delegations in Africa comes from the European Development Fund (EDF). Accordingly, the Delegations are likely to view mine action through a development lens. They are unlikely to be enthusiastic about supporting mine action in countries where landmines are neither a humanitarian nor a development priority.

How then will the EC be able to support countries that:

- have some explosives contamination which is...
- not a development priority identified by the government, when the country...
- is addressing its mine contamination responsibly, but...
- is too poor to meet its Treaty obligations?<sup>17</sup>

The reduction in the mine action staff complement at headquarters will also diminish the EC's ability to play a significant role in international mine action forums, and in terms of coordination at the level of donor capitals, particularly with the EU member states.<sup>18</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1 – Re-establish a strong focal point for mine action in Brussels to:

- represent the EC in international forums
- coordinate with EU member states on mine action issues
- advise Delegations concerning mine action experts who could assist Delegations (see recommendation 4)
- assume responsibility for programming of mine action thematic funding (i.e., either a budget line or, more likely, a 'window' within an established financing instrument), should this be re-established (see recommendation 2)
- assist in establishing mine action programmes financed by regional programmes (see recommendation 3)
- implement recommendations from the Global Assessment
- provide policy and programming advice to the Delegations
- assist delegates who are new to mine action.

Recommendation 2 – Assess whether a thematic funding 'window' within existing budget instruments can be created at headquarters level to support Treaty implementation and global issues.

Recommendation 3 – Review the options for modest mine action programmes at the regional or (sub-)regional level in Africa,<sup>19</sup> designed to:

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<sup>16</sup> The anti-personnel landmine regulations were adopted in 2001 as a direct response to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001, par. 6).

<sup>17</sup> Zambia is an example from Africa.

<sup>18</sup> The Delegations in Geneva and New York attend the meetings on anti-personnel landmines and conventional disarmament. But these officials are not as well placed to address issues relating to EC and other donor support to, for example, mine-affected countries.

<sup>19</sup> In at least some regions, it probably would be more appropriate to have a focal unit and fund covering security system reform issues, including landmines/ERW.

- provide an expert focal point to provide strategic advice to EC Delegations, regional institutions, and national authorities on mine action issues
- fund modest initiatives to address contamination that is clearly of a multi-country or regional nature (e.g. landmines laid by Rhodesian and South African forces in the former front line states; border minefields between Ethiopia and Somalia; cross-border contamination in the Great Lakes States)
- provide modest funding to countries in which the EC Delegation has completed its exit strategy for mine action (see recommendation 6)

Recommendation 4 – Identify and perhaps pre-qualify mine action experts who could advise Delegations on mine action issues.

Recommendation 5 – Delegations should request proper strategic plans from national mine action authorities and/or the lead UN agency for mine action in each country.

A common problem with the national mine action programmes in Africa is the lack of an adequate strategic plan that would provide a framework for EC programming decisions and would facilitate donor coordination (both among themselves and with the government). The lack of such plans also greatly complicates the programming and coordination tasks of the EC Delegations.

Recommendation 6 – EC Delegations should formulate exit strategies for their support to mine action.

Exit strategies are particularly important for mine action as demining involves the use of expensive, often specialised equipment, and demining operators often have large numbers of local personnel who should be given fair notice well prior to the termination or downsizing of the programme. In addition, many local staff are former military personnel or otherwise trained in the use of explosives, and could represent a real threat if unfairly or summarily dismissed.<sup>20</sup>

Recommendation 7 – For countries where the EC has large mine action portfolios, commission country-level reviews of EC-funded mine action.

Our impression is that reviews of country mine action programmes will be more valuable to EC Delegations than a regional evaluation. Some Delegations have commissioned evaluations of individual projects, which can assess operational and technical issues and the performance of implementing partners, but which provide less guidance to the Delegations on their essential task – that of programming EC assistance for mine action in a particular country over a specific time.

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<sup>20</sup> Such problems have already occurred in Mozambique in 2005 (the sudden collapse of the UNDP Accelerated Demining Program) and Somaliland in the early 1990s (forcing the emergency evacuation of the international personnel of the firm Rimfire).

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL).<sup>21</sup> These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: *The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.* The APL Regulation goes on to state: *Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions...* (Article 14)

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007<sup>22</sup> further specifies that *more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact* will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

- Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
- Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:<sup>23</sup>

Africa	Caucasus-Central Asia	Latin America
Asia-Pacific	Europe	Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,<sup>24</sup> while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

The objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the

<sup>21</sup> Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

<sup>22</sup> This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

<sup>23</sup> Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:  
provide a repository service for reports from evaluations and similar studies;  
train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;  
support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).

<sup>24</sup> Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.

Global Assessment and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country and regional levels. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION:**

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Africa to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

**SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

1. To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
  - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
  - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
  - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in Africa;
  - EC strategy documents for Africa or major sub-regions in Africa;
2. To analyse the allocation of funds among mine-affected states in Africa, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
3. To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
  - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
  - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
  - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries;
4. To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
5. To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in Africa;
6. To assess the potential impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines on future mine action support from the EC to Africa;
7. To make recommendations to improve the identification, the definition, the implementation and the impact of EC-funded mine projects;
8. To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine action programmes in Africa and globally.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

The full Terms of Reference (TORs) are attached as Annex 1.

**STUDY METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation entailed: (i) preliminary planning and data collection; (ii) selection of ‘focus countries’ to which missions would be undertaken; (iii) desk research, including the review of recent evaluations of mine action programmes in Africa; (iv) missions to the focus countries (Angola, Somalia, and Sudan); and (v) analysis and reporting. During the initial phase, two rounds of questionnaires were submitted to the EC-Brussels mine action team and to EU delegations in African countries that had received EC funding for mine action. The responses allowed the identification of the key evaluation issues<sup>25</sup> and the selection of focus countries.

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<sup>25</sup> The Africa evaluation is the first of the six regional evaluations, so extended consultations took place to prepare the Terms of Reference, which will serve as the model for the other regions.

Country mission reports were drafted for each of the focus countries and distributed widely for comments before the overall report was written.

The Evaluation Team comprised Ted Paterson, GICHD Head of Evaluation (Team Leader); Vera Bohle, GICHD Evaluation Officer; Léonie Barnes, GICHD National Mine Action Standards Officer; Mohamed Ahmed, GICHD Regional Coordinator for MENA and East Africa; and Pamela Rebelo, a consultant based in Mozambique who has conducted a number of mine action evaluations. The country missions were organised as follows:

Country	Timing	Team Members
Angola	28 March-4 April	Vera Bohle & Pamela Rebelo
Somalia	24 March-6 April	Ted Paterson & Mohamed Ahmed
Sudan	21-27 March	Vera Bohle (to Khartoum)
	10-20 April	Léonie Barnes (to Juba & Yei)

In addition, Ted Paterson attended the joint EU-AU Security Dialogue Workshop, 18-20 April 2007 in Addis Ababa, where a range of concerns including landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) were discussed.

Reporting was done in two stages. Separate reports were first prepared for the three focus countries, with drafts submitted to EC headquarters and the EC Delegations and, subsequently, to other stakeholders (national mine action centres, UN agencies, demining NGOs, etc.) for their review and comments. The individual country reports were then finalised and the main report for the regional evaluation prepared.




## 2. GENERAL FINDINGS

### OVERVIEW OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

#### AMOUNT OF SUPPORT

It has proven to be extraordinarily difficult to compile a complete and accurate listing of EC funded mine action projects.<sup>26</sup> Our best estimate is that the EC has committed at least €91.8 million for mine action in 12 countries of Africa since 2002.<sup>27</sup> Of this, approximately €51 million was committed in 2005-07 – the period covered by the second EC Mine Action Strategy.

Figure 4 – EC Funding commitments for Mine Action



Funds came from the EDF,<sup>28</sup> ECHO, the dedicated APL budget line, and at least one other special budget line (Rapid Response Mechanism – RRM<sup>29</sup>). As well, in Sudan the Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), with €50 million in STABEX funding<sup>30</sup> at its disposal, has granted €10.7 million to two NGO consortia for projects that incorporate mine action.<sup>31</sup> Clearly, some of the officers responsible for mine action in the EC Delegations have shown great initiative in obtaining funds from sources outside the thematic budget line and the current EDF.

The €50.9 million committed in 2005-07 is almost precisely in line with the financial target set in

<sup>26</sup> This difficulty was also highlighted in the report on the Global Assessment of EC support to mine action. Difficulties include confusion between planned and committed figures, the inclusion of demining sub-components of development projects, the transfer of project files from Brussels to the relevant EC Delegations, the fact that funds came through a variety of EC funding mechanisms, and the fact that different officers compiled different lists over the years.

<sup>27</sup> In order of the amount of funds committed: Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, Senegal, Mozambique, Somalia, Burundi, Eritrea, Uganda, Guinea Bissau, Tunisia.

<sup>28</sup> Including, for Sudan, the EDF Humanitarian Plus Programmes (HPP 1 & 2).


<sup>29</sup> The Rapid Reaction Mechanism was created by EC Council Regulation No 381/2001 "...to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis." This was administered via a separate budget line, managed by Brussels (similar to the APL budget line).

<sup>30</sup> STABEX (*Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation*) was an EC compensatory financing scheme to smooth export earnings from agricultural commodities for ACP countries. It was part of the Lomé Convention, and abolished by the Cotonou Agreement in 2002.

<sup>31</sup> MAG is providing mine action services for one consortium, which DanChurchAid (DCA) covers the second. The Evaluation Team has been unable to determine how much of this funding has been reserved for mine action, so this is not included in our figures.

the second EC Mine Action Strategy (€51 million, including €13 million from the AP line). The financial targets for mine action funding to Africa for the entire period since 2002 have been exceeded.

**Figure 5 – Financial targets & estimated commitments for 2002-04 and 2005-07**



A significant proportion of total EC funding for mine action goes to Africa. While it is difficult to reconcile funding data from different sources, the records we have compiled for Africa amount to over one-third of all EC funding for mine action reported by Landmine Monitor for the period 2002-06. As well, the proportion going to Africa appears to have increased.

	Total EC funding to mine action	EC funding to mine action in Africa	% to Africa
<b>2002-04</b>	€145.2 million	€40.9 million	28.1%
<b>2005-06</b>	€107.8 million	€50.9 million	47.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>€253.0 million</b>	<b>€91.8 million</b>	<b>36.3%</b>

Sources: Total EC funding – Landmine Monitor; Funding for Africa – our figures

## COUNTRIES SUPPORTED

The data we have compiled indicate that just over half of all EC funding for mine action in Africa has gone to Angola. Sudan has been the next biggest recipient country in Africa (14% of total EC funding for mine action since 2002), followed by Ethiopia (10%), DRC (5%), Senegal (5%), and Somalia (4%). Funding to most countries was reasonably steady or increased in the second period, but funding to both Eritrea and Mozambique fell significantly in 2005-07 compared to the previous period.

**Table 1 – Estimated commitments by country (€ millions)**

	2002-04	2005-07	Total	%
Angola	10.4	37.3	<b>47.7</b>	52%
Burundi	0.0	2.4	<b>2.4</b>	3%
DR Congo	2.4	1.9	<b>4.3</b>	5%
Eritrea	1.6	0.0	<b>1.6</b>	2%
Eritrea / Ethiopia	1.0	0.0	<b>1.0</b>	1%
Ethiopia	1.0	8.0	<b>9.0</b>	10%
Guinea Bissau	0.6	0.0	<b>0.6</b>	1%

	2002-04	2005-07	Total	%
Mozambique	2.9	0.5	3.4	4%
Senegal	0.0	4.2	4.2	5%
Somalia	1.5	1.8	3.3	4%
Sudan	7.2	5.4	12.6	14%
Tunisia	0.0	0.5	0.5	1%
Uganda	0.1	1.0	1.1	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>91.8</b>	<b>100%</b>

Financing targets for individual countries for the 2005-07 period were, for the most part, met or exceeded. The exceptions were:


	Target	Our estimate	Apparent Reason
Eritrea	€2.0	€0.0	The Eritrean government expelled demining NGOs and repeatedly disrupted the work of the UNMEE mission
Mozambique	€2.0	€0.5	Poor performance by UNDP and IND on an earlier grant
Senegal	€10.0	€4.2	The €10 million in planned EDF funding could not have been fully used given large grants from France?
Somalia	€3.5	€1.8	The EC Delegation for Somalia do not view mine action as a priority and did not provide the EDF funding shown in the indicated plan.

In each case, the reason for not providing the targeted amount of funding appears reasonable.

## TYPE OF ORGANISATIONS SUPPORTED

The bulk of EC funding for mine action in Africa has been channelled via NGOs, with most of the rest going to UN agencies (particularly the UNDP).

The UNDP has been the single biggest recipient of EC funding for mine action in Africa, receiving at least €27.4 million since 2002. Among the international NGOs, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has received over €9.7 million in EC grants since 2002, while HALO Trust (€5.3 million), MgM (€4.5 million), Landmine Action (LMA – €4.3 million), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA – €3.7 million), Intersos (€3.0 million), Survey Action Center (SAC – €2.5 million), Handicap International (HI – €2.1 million), and Danish Church Aid (DCA – €1.9 million) have also received significant sums for their mine action work.

**Figure 6 – Funding to NGOs & UN agencies**

### MINE ACTION COMPONENTS SUPPORTED

It proved impossible to obtain complete and accurate data on the breakdown of financial commitments by mine action component, in part because many projects are for ‘integrated mine action’ (i.e. covering more than one mine action ‘pillar’ – demining; MRE; stockpile destruction; victim assistance; and advocacy).

Incomplete figures show that at least €5.7 million was allocated specifically to capacity building<sup>32</sup> since 2002, with smaller sums going for Landmine Impact Surveys (at least €2.8 million), stockpile destruction (at least €1.5 million), victim assistance (at least €1.4 million), and MRE (at least €0.8 million). In total, these allocations to non-demining components amounted to 13.3% of all funding for mine action, although a number of the other projects would have incorporated some capacity building, MRE, and victim assistance activities. Clearly however, the bulk of funding went for demining, as is appropriate.<sup>33</sup>


### EC-FUNDING RELATIVE TO TOTAL MINE ACTION FUNDING IN AFRICA

The EC has been a major contributor to mine action in Africa, and perhaps the largest single donor agency. While data problems mean the figures are only indicative, the following graph suggests that EC contributions ranged from 39% of total international funding for the period 2002-06 for Ethiopia, to 5% in Mozambique.

<sup>32</sup> Projects focusing on capacity building, victim assistance, and MRE typically would have included support for activities that some in the mine action community refer to as ‘advocacy.’ In addition, since 2006 the EC has provided financial contributions to the Sponsorship Programme, which finances the attendance of delegates from poor mine-affected states (including many from Africa) at meetings of States Parties. As such, EC mine action support to Africa has embraced all ‘pillars’ of mine action.

<sup>33</sup> Demining = survey, marking, and clearance.

Figure 7 – EC mine action funding relative to total from international sources 2002-06



## MINE ACTION IN EC STRATEGIES

The basic programming framework for EC support to mine action in any country is made-up most directly by (i) the EC Country Strategy Paper, (ii) the national mine action strategy and programme, and until recently, (iii) the EC Mine Action Strategy. However, Country Strategy Papers and national mine action strategies are in turn influenced by a number of other policies and strategies issued by European, African, and national authorities.

On the European side, the EC aid delivery system is quite complex, with DG External Relations (RELEX) and DG Development (DEV) responsible for aid policy (the latter agency also manages programming for ACP countries) plus a separate Directorate (EuropeAid Cooperation Office or AIDCO) for the implementation of the EC assessed budget for aid and for the European Development Fund (EDF) covering the ACP countries. In addition, humanitarian aid is managed by the European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO).

## THE GLOBAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY AND RECENT REFORMS TO AID POLICY

Until 2006, there were hundreds of specific EU regulations empowering EC assistance for specific aid purposes, including the two Regulations for Mine Action. These established both policy guidance and the APL thematic budget line. RELEX then formulated the two EC Strategies for Mine Action, covering 2002-04 and 2005-07 respectively. These documents outlined how the Commission would implement the EU mine action policy and provided an overall strategic focus for EC mine action programming.

### Textbox 1 – The objectives of the Mine Action Regulation and Strategy

The twin Regulations adopted in 2001 were adopted as *a direct response to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)*. Thus, the Regulations were explicitly aimed at Treaty implementation as well as humanitarian and development objectives.

Similarly, the EC Mine Action strategies specify commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty as a criterion for assistance, along with humanitarian and development needs, strategic important to the EU,

effectiveness of the national mine action programme, and coherence with the wider assistance programme.

It is clear therefore, that both the Regulations and the Strategies specified disarmament (i.e. Treaty implementation), humanitarian, and developmental objectives.

The 2005 Global Assessment of the EC Policy and Actions for mine action found that *EC staff have consistently sought to achieve high standards and the EC manages its mine action programme at least as well as other similar international donors* (p. v), and provided a number of recommendations for further enhancing the policy and its implementation. However, broader reforms to EU aid policies and institutions meant the recommendations for mine action could not, for the most part, be implemented. Most fundamentally, the broader reforms led to the replacement of the hundreds of aid policy regulations – including those specific to mine action – with a handful of broader regulations establishing a limited number of geographic and thematic instruments. As a result, the thematic budget line for anti-personnel landmines disappeared and the headquarters staff complement dedicated to mine action was reduced in number.

A complimentary element of EU aid system reform was a programme of deconcentration, in which the Delegations in developing countries were given greater responsibility and authority for the formulation and implementation of EC aid programmes. As correctly noted in the Global Assessment, there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with deconcentration vis-à-vis EC support for mine action. The fundamental advantage is that the EU Delegations are better positioned to monitor the political and economic developments in each recipient country, and to align EC development assistance with the recipient country's development priorities.<sup>34</sup> However, the EC Delegations do not have personnel with specialist knowledge on mine action, with the expertise to fully assess the quality of mine action programmes and projects, including the technical aspects, or to properly monitor the performance of the EC's partners responsible for implementing the projects (typically, international NGOs and UN agencies).<sup>35</sup>


Thus, programming decisions for EC support for mine action are the result of a wide range of influences, many of which are depicted on the following page. From the EC itself, there is the overarching strategy – the European Consensus on Development – which identifies nine primary areas of activity:

- trade and regional integration;
- the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources;
- infrastructure, communications and transport;
- water and energy;
- rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security;
- governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms;
- conflict prevention and fragile states;
- human development; and
- social cohesion and employment. (p. 3)

<sup>34</sup> This is in line with the international efforts to enhance aid effectiveness, encapsulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, espousing the principles of (recipient) ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results, and mutual accountability.

<sup>35</sup> Even when there were small units in Brussels focusing on mine action, the Global Assessment found that “Proposal and project assessment has not included a rigorous technical component, and this has led to some inefficiency.” (p. vi)

Figure 8 – Programming influences for EC-funded Mine Action



The overall strategy provides the framework for individual country strategies and influences ECHO programming and the actions supported by special instruments such as the APL budget line and (more recently) the Stability Instrument (see Textbox) which, together, make-up the EC aid programmes in specific countries. In line with aid effectiveness principles, the EC country strategies are also influenced by the recipient country's own development priorities, normally outlined in a national development plan/PRSP which in turn should be based on sector strategies and the availability of financial resources. For EC support to mine action, programming decisions should also be in-line with the national mine action strategy (where this exists).

### **Textbox 2 – The Stability Instrument and Support for Mine Action**

The Stability Instrument\* empowers Community short-term (up to 18 months) technical and financial assistance in response to a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, including assistance for mine action, specified as follows: *support for measures to address, within the framework of Community cooperation policies and their objectives, the socio-economic impact on the civilian population of antipersonnel landmines, unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war; activities financed under this Regulation shall cover risk education, victim assistance, mine detection and clearance and, in conjunction therewith, stockpile destruction;* (Article 3, par. h)

In addition, the Instrument makes provision for assistance to support for the *rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims of armed conflict, including measures to address the specific needs of women and children;* (Article 3, par. k). This would include landmine survivors.

In comparison, the former Mine Action Regulations and Strategies had a broader range of objectives – disarmament (Treaty implementation), humanitarian, and development. However, the Stability Instrument can provide only relatively short-term support for mine action in crisis situations to strengthen linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development and restore the conditions necessary for long-term development assistance. Thus, there is now no specialised instrument to support mine action with either long-term development or disarmament in mind.\*\*

\* REGULATION (EC) No 1717/2006 establishing the Instrument for Stability, 15 Nov. 2006. This also makes for provision for assistance to various aspects of Security System Reform, including demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces, and elements of small arms, light weapons (SALW) programming.

\*\* Article 4(1) of the Stability Instrument does provide for longer-term assistance for *...strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including illicit trafficking of... firearms and explosive materials.*

## **EC STRATEGIES FOR AFRICA**

In the case of African countries, EC programming decisions will also be influenced by the EU Strategy for Africa (adopted in late 2005), and by the continuing EU-AU dialogue aimed at forging a Strategic Partnership. This will focus on four 'clusters' of issues, including Peace and Security. Even before the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa, in 2004 the EU established the African Peace Facility to support African peace support operations and capacity building in the areas of peace and security.<sup>36</sup> This instrument was started with €250 million, but more funds have since been added.

The evolving EU-AU partnership – and particularly its Peace and Security elements – could have a growing influence on the scope and nature of EC support for mine action. For example, in some

<sup>36</sup> A central goal of the capacity building is to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council at the centre.



countries mine action support may be viewed through a ‘security lens’. In other cases, landmine contamination affects key regional transport arteries,<sup>37</sup> which constrains trade and regional integration. As well, the EU-AU partnership envisages a growing role for the AU and the key African Regional Organisations, which conceivable could play a role in mine action.<sup>38</sup>

## EC STRATEGIES FOR SUB-REGIONS IN AFRICA

In addition to Country Strategies and the new EU Strategy for Africa, the EC issued regional strategies/indicative programmes for 2002-2007 covering:

- Eastern and Southern Africa, with an indicative programme of €223 million, 5-10% of which could be for “Conflict prevention, resolution and management;”
- Central Africa, with an indicative programme of €55 million, of which 5-10% could be for conflict prevention and political dialogue;
- West Africa, with an indicative programme of €235 million, with €35 million reserved for conflict prevention and good governance;
- Southern African Development Community, with an indicative programme of €101 million, of which 20% is reserved for other (i.e. non-focal) programmes.

In addition, the EU has adopted a specific strategy for the Horn of Africa,<sup>39</sup> covering the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) members – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. This focuses on regional security concerns including the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict, Somalia, and Sudan.

Mine action is not addressed explicitly in any of these regional strategies. However, all the strategies envisage support for conflict prevention and other peace and security issues, which could include programmes to deal with the legacies of war, including landmines and ERW. As well, the Regional Strategy for Southern Africa mentions possibility of additional support to the SADC Landmine Programme.<sup>40</sup>

## EC COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS AND INDICATIVE PROGRAMMES

Landmine contamination and mine action are mentioned in some, but not all of the CSPs for African countries that have received EC funding for mine action from 2002-07. In some cases, landmine contamination is mentioned as a problem, but there is no mention of EC support to address the problem.

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<sup>37</sup> For example, Angolan railways used to be important for transporting minerals from Zambia and the DR Congo to international markets, and these railways are only now being reconstructed.

<sup>38</sup> Recently, Africa’s landmine and other ERW problems have now been mentioned in the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, and the Action Plan for 2008-2010 mentions activities to *enhance capacity building, networking, cooperation and exchange of information Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APM), as well as fight against illicit trafficking.* (p. 6)

<sup>39</sup> Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa, 20 Oct. 2006.

<sup>40</sup> This SADC programme received significant funding (€5 million?) prior to the adoption of the Strategy for 2002-2007. Apparently, the bulk of the funding was never spent.

**Table 2 – Mine Action in EC Country Strategy Papers**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contamination mentioned</b>	<b>EC support for mine action mentioned</b>
Angola	Yes	Yes – as part of rural development/food security
DRC	No	No
Ethiopia	Yes	Only past support for mine risk education
Eritrea	Yes	Yes – as part of the post-conflict rehabilitation programme
Guinea Bissau	Yes	Yes – support from the APL thematic budget line
Mozambique	Yes	No
Senegal	Yes	No
Somalia	Yes	Yes – support from the APL thematic budget line
Sudan	Yes	Yes – as part of sustainable livelihoods and DDR
Uganda	No	No

### 3. COUNTRY FINDINGS

#### ANGOLA

##### CONTEXT

Angola is a huge, sparsely populated country – bigger than France, Spain and Portugal combined, but with an estimated population of only 16 million. Following a long struggle, it achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, but then suffered from continuing, often intense conflict for most of the period until the 2002 death of Joseph Savimbi, the leader of the main rebel faction (UNITA).

The conflicts led to extensive contamination. Until recently, some reports stated that vast areas – up to 400,000 km<sup>2</sup> (35% of the country!) – was suspected of contamination, but the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) has now reduced this estimate by over 99% to between 1,239 km<sup>2</sup> and 207 km<sup>2</sup> (upper and lower bounds, respectively). Still, almost 2,000 communities, home to an estimated 2.4 million people (15% of the population), remain impacted to some degree. Thousands of Angolans have been killed or injured by landmines and other ERW, but the number of victims appears to be falling quickly,<sup>41</sup> due both to mine action and the fact that most refugees and IDPs have returned or re-settled permanently.

Rich in oil, diamonds, and other natural resources, Angola has experienced rapid economic growth since the conflict ended, and the government has now shifted from emergency post-conflict measures to large reconstruction and development investments. However, most Angolans remain extremely poor and still lack access to basic public services. Average life expectancy at birth is only 41 years (lower than the overall average for Sub-Saharan Africa); under-five child mortality is 260 per 1,000 live births (the second highest rate in the world); almost half of Angola's children suffer from malnutrition; and less than 20% of the population has access to electricity. Income distribution – already among the most unequal in the world – appears to be increasing.<sup>42</sup> While these problems are legacies of conflict to some degree, corruption also hampers progress – Angola is viewed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 147 out of 179 countries in the Transparency International index for 2007.

Rapidly increasing government revenues, coupled with large loans from China and the fact that oil is of such geopolitical importance, mean that Angola is not dependant on foreign donors and international financial institutions. Donors do provide significant funding, motivated in part at least by the continued poverty, but they appear to have limited policy leverage over the Government.

Since the end of the war, the Government has done a good job on most macro-economic measures, and is correctly embarking on a huge infrastructure reconstruction programme that will reconnect Angola's vast interior to urban and international markets, another problem looms on the horizon that promises to be even more challenging to the country's economic managers, and which could prove devastating to the rural population.

<sup>41</sup> Victims recorded by the LIS fell from 195 in 2004 to 133 in 2005

<sup>42</sup> During the 1990s, Angola's Gini coefficient rose from 0.54 to 0.62 (a higher number means greater inequality) – significantly higher even than other African oil producers with acknowledged inequality problems: Nigeria (0.51) and Cameroon (0.44).

**Textbox 3 – Roads, Rural Development, and the ‘Dutch disease’ in Angola**

The World Bank’s recent Country Economic Memorandum highlights the dangers to agriculture and rural livelihoods in a major oil-producing country such as Angola. While improved transportation links often benefit farmers by reducing their input costs and enhancing their access to urban markets, in Angola’s case these benefits will be more-than-offset by the competition from cheap imports. Oil revenues have boosted Angola’s exchange rate, making imports cheaper in local-currency terms and making many Angolan products uncompetitive in export markets (this is termed the ‘Dutch disease’).

*The typical overvaluation of the currency in real terms observed in oil-rich countries can be a major disaster for the agricultural sector. In Angola, for example, every farmer wishing to produce maize for the coastal urban market has been effectively taxed by the real appreciation of the Kwanza, especially over the past 2 years. Casual evidence indicates that they may not be competitive with imports at current exchange rates, but that they enjoy some de facto protection in the interior due to the extremely poor roads. It is thus clear that once the logistical infrastructure is rehabilitated, the rural farm production will have to compete with cheap imported goods and tradable commodities, such as cereals. In this case, a possible way to prevent widespread depression in the agricultural sector is by rapidly increasing its competitiveness... The key question, however, is whether productivity gains can be large enough to offset the disadvantages posed by the strong currency... (p. 97)*

The Bank points out that there is significant potential for increasing agricultural productivity as Angola has large areas of fertile land with adequate rainfall.\* But significant investment is needed now before farming households are driven into destitution and retreat into subsistence agriculture. Unfortunately, the GOA has budgeted little for agriculture\*\* and, even worse, the Ministry of Finance has not released all the budgeted amounts to the Ministry of Agriculture, so salaries consume almost all the funds that are made available.

\* At independence, Angola was self-sufficient in food production, the largest staple food exporter in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the world’s biggest coffee exporters. (AfDB/OECD, 2007, p. 5)

\*\* In 2004, just 0.64% of the national budget and less than 2% of the Public Investment Programme. (p. 98)

**THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME**

Angola has one of the largest mine action programmes in Africa, which started during the quasi-peace following the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords. As in most other mine-affected countries, the bulk of funding has gone to demining, mostly conducted by international NGOs.<sup>43</sup> In 1995, the Government, assisted by the UNDP, made an initial attempt to establish an integrated Mine Action Centre and operator (the Instituto Angolano de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos – INAROOE), but this was never effective. Accordingly, the Government created the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) in 2001 to serve as the National Mine Action Authority and Mine Action Centre. CNIDAH has developed some capacities (including the establishment of provincial sub-offices), it remains weak in the important QA/QC function.

Currently, there are two almost distinct demining programmes in Angola. The INGOs work mainly in rural areas on route opening and clearance of areas that pose dangers to lives and livelihoods. Increasingly, the INGOs coordinate effectively with provincial governments and CNIDAH sub-offices. Meanwhile, the Government has focused its mine action funding on its

<sup>43</sup> HALO Trust, NPA, MAG, MgM, and DCA are operating currently, while Santa Barbara Foundation and INTERSOS had demining operations in the past. In addition, the firm Mechem conducted large route-verification operations in support of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations following the Lusaka Peace Accord.

huge infrastructure reconstruction programme – demining support to that programme is provided by local commercial firms plus three national operators<sup>44</sup> working under the coordination of the Comissao Executiva de Desminagem (CED).

Funding for mine action from both international donors and the Government has been increasing since the end of the war.<sup>45</sup> However, coordination both among donors and between donors and the Government remains weak. In 2005, 6.9 km<sup>2</sup> of land was cleared of mines and 16.9 km<sup>2</sup> was released via area reduction. At this rate, clearance of known minefields would take 30-50 years, but the Government believes that its planned investments in national capacity<sup>46</sup> will allow clearance of all high- and medium-priority sites in 6-8 years.

### EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The EC has been the principal donor to mine action in Angola,<sup>47</sup> contributing over EUR 47 million from 2002-07<sup>48</sup> for (in order of size) demining by INGOs; demining in support of infrastructure rehabilitation; capacity development support to CNIDAH (via UNDP); the LIS; stockpile destruction; and victim assistance. Broadly, EC support to mine action has followed the EU policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD – see textbox). This seems the appropriate strategy and a transition has been made from funding emergency operations to support for rehabilitation. The EC and the INGOs it has been funding are still struggling with how best to link mine action and development. The plans and monitoring and evaluation (M & E) frameworks for demining projects still do not incorporate clear development objectives and indicators to ensure the projects can be assessed in terms of developmental outcomes.

#### Textbox 4 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

The concept of LRRD originates from the 1980s in response to concerns about the “grey zone” between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The instruments and working methods used in these different types of assistance programmes differ in time frames, implementing partners, the role of national authorities, and the content of interventions.

In 1996, the EC developed a basic rationale for LRRD.\* It was acknowledged that short-term relief mechanisms do not and, in some cases, cannot systematically take into account long-term development issues. At the same time, development policy should better assist countries to deal with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises. These deficiencies could be reduced if relief and development were appropriately linked, which is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition from emergency to development assistance; rather, it includes disaster preparedness and preventing/resolving conflicts.

There is no unique model for LRRD. Broad recommendations include: improved donor coordination; adjustment of the EU’s own instruments, working methods and internal mechanisms; avoiding parallel structures for relief and development in a country; and clarifying who is responsible for what.

Demining is mentioned in various contexts in the LRRD documents,\*\* which stress the need to

<sup>44</sup> The Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (INAD), established in 2003 from the remains of INAROE; the Angolan Army (FAA) and the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN).

<sup>45</sup> Donors contributed \$21 million in 2003, \$28 million in 2004, and over \$35 million in 2005.

<sup>46</sup> The Government has announced plans to train and equip 43 demining brigades (about 3,000 personnel) in FAA, GRN, and INAD and to develop a significant mechanical clearance capacity.

<sup>47</sup> Other major donors are Japan, U.S.A., Norway, U.K., the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany.

<sup>48</sup> The EC Delegation stated total contributions of about EUR 60 million since 2003.

integrate mine action into post-conflict planning and the wider development context.

In theory, LRRD can be promoted within EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which analyse all aid-relevant aspects in a country and outline a five year plan (indicative programme). The plan includes aid provided through all EU mechanisms including the EDF, thematic budget lines, ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM).

\* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001

\*\* In the 1996 document under a separate paragraph “The particular case of anti-personnel mines” (p. 8), and as instrument reacting in post-conflict situations (p. 19). The 2001 document also mentions demining under post-conflict situation needs (p. 7), and a separate paragraph on demining stresses the importance of integrating demining within the CSPs (p. 19).

In line with the LRRD approach, the EC has provided significant funding to demining in support of infrastructure, while coordination among the INGOs, provincial governments, and CNIDAH sub-offices to determine local priorities has been improving. However, coordination with the national ministries in Luanda remains inadequate and mine action organisations appear not to be aware of the impending ‘Dutch disease’ crisis for agricultural and rural development. As such, no one in mine action is working through the implications of, and appropriate programming responses to the potential devastation of rural livelihoods.

## KEY ISSUES

It appears that the EC should base any strategy for future support to mine action on two broad principles:

- the need to address Angola’s humanitarian and development requirements (which in many areas will require mine action), as well as the MBT objectives,
- the fact that it is – first-and-foremost – the Government’s responsibility to meet the needs of its citizens and to address the country’s landmine problem. The new Strategic Plan for Mine Action is an improvement on earlier plans, but it is for the GOA to take the lead on implementing this strategy and meeting the targets, with donors playing a supporting role.

While continued support for mine action is warranted, the EC Delegation should now formulate more thorough plans for its future support to mine action in Angola – a task which is complicated by the absence of adequate strategic mine action plan (from the government) or capacity development strategy (from the government or the UNDP).

There remain serious questions concerning the Government’s commitment to capacity development so it can assume responsibility for Angola’s landmine problem. In particular, there appears to be a reluctance to acknowledge performance shortcomings and to discuss realistic ways of overcoming these. However, many observers believe that CNIDAH’s performance has improved in some areas and that some of its staff are both capable and committed. It may be feasible to work with these individuals and focus more tightly on the most essential capacities (e.g. information management and QA/QC), while recognising that strengthening CNIDAH overall will require greater senior-level commitment than currently exists.

While there remain concerns whether there is adequate commitment in Luanda to build the

appropriate capacity for the national mine action programme, there might also be a credible option at the province level where Vice Governors appear to be engaged, reasonably well-informed, and not overly confident about their capacities. As a result, coordination is better at the provincial level, with a move toward provincial mine action plans generated in cooperation with the international mine action organisations. Over time, the provincial governments might voice demands for increased government attention to the development priorities of the interior, including mine action and, more generally, rural development.

The two points mentioned above suggest the possibility of using possible entry points for effective mine action more aggressively.

#### UNDERSTANDING AND MONITORING DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES

Now that Angola has emerged from its emergency, it is important that mine action is more tightly aligned with development priorities at the national, provincial, and local levels. This is happening, but it remains impossible to assess how much mine action is contributing to development because the INGOs and other mine action actors have not yet devised systems of reporting progress and achievements based on meaningful measures of *outcomes* (e.g. changes in the well-being of people in mine-affected communities, plus growing national capacities) rather than simply *outputs*.

#### MORE COMPLEX STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMING ISSUES

The danger of rural impoverishment has important implications for Angola's mine action programme. The Government is focussing its mine action contributions on demining support by Angolan operators (both public and private) to the infrastructure programme. Meanwhile, donors continue to finance international demining NGOs to work in rural areas, both to open secondary roads and to clear contaminated areas that pose a danger to rural lives and livelihoods. This demining work is facilitating the economic integration of the interior, which opens new potential markets but also exposes agricultural producers to competition from imports. With the exchange rate bolstered by massive natural resource revenues, rural producers will not be able to compete with imports without significant increases in agricultural productivity. But the government has not been investing in agriculture. On the current trajectory, therefore, demining is hastening the influx of imports that could destroy the livelihoods of the rural people the demining agencies are trying to assist.

## SOMALIA

### CONTEXT

#### GENERAL

In the Cold War geopolitical environment of the 1970s, Somalia's President, Siad Barre, built sub-Saharan Africa's largest army and invaded Ethiopia's Ogaden region, initiating one of the continent's major post-colonial wars. Somalia has suffered from internal conflict for most of the subsequent period. Prolonged civil war led to the overthrow of Barre regime in 1991. Since then, Somalia has lacked a central government<sup>49</sup> and, for long periods, anarchy has reigned in South Central Somalia. At the same time, Somaliland has achieved de facto independence and a significant degree of stability, while Puntland has established an autonomous administration that is able to discharge at least some state functions.


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<sup>49</sup> The international community recognises the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed following the adoption of a constitutional framework for a five-year transition based on federal principles – the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic – by the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in January 2004.

Within the past year, Ethiopia’s army (backing the Transitional Federal Government – TFG) overthrew the Islamic Courts Union in heavy fighting, intermittent conflict has raged in Mogadishu (mainly between Ethiopian forces and local clan militias), and there have been repeated conflicts between Somaliland and Puntland over the disputed regions of Sool, Sanaag, and the south-western Togdheer.

The Ogaden War and the extended period of internal conflicts led to extensive landmine and other ERW contamination. While minefields in Somalia are less extensive than those in some other post-conflict African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, border minefields appear to have a significant impact in some areas, and all parts of the country suffer from widespread ERW contamination. Continuing conflicts (including, in all probability, the laying of new minefields) plus population movements mean that the contamination problem has a serious impact. On a per capita basis, Somalia appears to be the most seriously impacted country in Africa.

**Figure 9 – Estimated annual victims per million (high and low estimates)**



### THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

Mine action began in Somaliland during 1991-93 with clearance by the company Rimfire. After a five-year hiatus, the current mine action programme began in 1998 (again in Somaliland), with the beginning of a UNDP mine action programme, followed by the arrival of three international mine action NGOs – the Danish Demining Group (DDG), the HALO Trust, and St. Barbara Foundation – all operating in Somaliland. St. Barbara Foundation has since departed while DDG has shifted its focus from demining to broader weapons contamination programmes (EOD and, more recently, small arms light weapons – SALW), leaving HALO Trust as the only demining operator. In addition, Handicap International has worked with other mine action organisations in Somaliland to provide Mine Risk Education (MRE), and a smattering of international organisations and their local partners provide some assistance to disabled people, including landmine survivors.

The UNDP mine action programme has been a component of the Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme (see textbox). UNDP has focused principally on the establishment of mine action centres in both Somaliland and Puntland, and the development of explosive ordnance



disposal capacities within the police forces in all parts of Somalia.<sup>50</sup> However, UNDP mine action plans have, for many years, advocated the development of local demining capacities within Somali militaries. It is questionable whether this is an appropriate approach for a country in conflict. Further, these UNDP plans appear to be based on a serious misconception that the ‘military model’ for humanitarian demining has been successful in many other countries.<sup>51</sup>

### Textbox 5 – The UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme

ROLS is an ambitious programme with the following components:

- Judiciary,
- Law Enforcement (basically, strengthening police services),
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), coupled with Small Arms Control,
- Mine Action, and
- Gender and Human Rights.

ROLS evolved from the Somali Civil Protection Programme (SCPP) which started in 1997 with funding mainly from Italy. SCPP was managed by UNOPS but, due to “serious management and efficiency problems”, UNDP redesigned it as ROLS for direct execution, which started in 2002 (DfID, 2005). Mine Action is the only component still managed by UNOPS. Funding has come from Canada, DFID, the EC, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UNDP/BCPR, and USAID.

ROLS covers all regions of Somalia, but in practice most activities and expenditures have been in Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland.

Assessments of ROLS were conducted by DfID (in December 2004) and the EC (January 2006). Both missions were broadly positive and recommended continued donor support. Unfortunately, **neither assessment mission examined the mine action component** because the relevant DfID and EC funds did not cover mine action. In turn, this seems due to UNDP mobilising resources for mine action separately from the other ROLS components, perhaps because mine action is executed by UNOPS rather than by UNDP directly.

Further, the evaluation team had the distinct impression that this bifurcated approach to resource mobilisation is a serious problem for the mine action component. Recent documents on ROLS issued by UNDP Somalia have often failed to include any budget allocation for the mine action component.\* As well, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) documents\*\* make scant mention of the need for mine action, with the RDF Report for Somaliland lacking anything at all on mine action. Finally, the draft UNDP Country Strategy Paper dropped any mention of mine action (although some key donors asked for it to be included during consultation meetings the week of 17 April 2007).

This suggests that UNDP and ROLS management view mine action as something apart from the directly executed components of ROLS, which may be why comparatively little has been done to capitalise on the clear synergies between mine action and other security system components (law enforcement; DDR; SALW).\*\*\*

\* For example, UNDP Somalia (2006), Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS): Programme Strategy Phase II 2006-2008, June 2006

<sup>50</sup> Security conditions have prevented the EOD team in South Central from resuming operations.

<sup>51</sup> For example, there are repeated references to the Yemen model as a successful example of using the military as the national demining capacity. In fact, Yemen’s mine action agency (YEMAC) is a civilian agency using demobilised military personnel who have been retrained to demine to international mine action standards. The civilian YEMAC has been extremely successful, while the military model was a failure. YEMAC has been supported for many years by UNDP, so these facts should be common knowledge among the UNDP mine action personnel.

\*\* The RDP incorporates four main volumes (the overall RDP plus one volume each for Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central) based on the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) reports for six priority clusters and three cross-cutting issues. All are available from:

<http://www.somali-jna.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=home>

\*\*\* This may also reflect a tendency on the part of previous CTAs for Mine Action to see their role as a traditional technical advisor rather than as a project manager.

## OVERALL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

Following the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter in January 2004, a donor conference in Stockholm (October 2004) agreed a draft Declaration of Principles to guide assistance from the donor community. This called for a short-term Rapid Assistance Programme (RAP) to address immediate needs plus the preparation of a longer term Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The following year, the UN and World Bank initiated the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) to provide the basis for the RDP (see textbox).

### Textbox 6 – Preparing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

In late 2005-2006, the UN Development Group (UNDG) and World Bank mobilised a technical needs assessment team to conduct a post-conflict Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of South Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. Working under the guidance of the Coordination Support Group,\* the team produced six ‘cluster reports’ covering:

- Governance, Security and the Rule of Law (including extensive material on mine action)
- Macro-economic policy and data development
- Infrastructure
- Social services and protection of vulnerable groups
- Productive sectors and the environment
- Livelihoods and solutions for the displaced

From this, the UN and World Bank teams for Somalia produced a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, in four volumes covering Somalia as a whole, South Central, Puntland, and Somaliland), structured along three ‘pillars’:

1. Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance
2. Strengthening essential basic services and social protection
3. Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth

The RDP now serves as the principal framework for international assistance to Somalia. For example, the draft UNDP Country Assistance Strategy is derived from the RDP, and the World Bank has just adopted an Interim Support Strategy based on the RDP. As well, the EC Somalia Strategy for EDF 10 follows the three RDP pillars.

\* Comprising the key supporting donors (EC as chair, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK); the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the International Finance Corporation, the NGO Consortium, and the UN and WB.

The RDP is a five-year, \$2.25 billion programme of sequenced activities agreed with Somali authorities (TFG, plus Puntland and Somaliland),<sup>52</sup> which is intended to provide a framework for donors to design their own assistance programmes. As a durable peace is far from certain, it remains unclear whether the increases in assistance envisaged by the RDP will be feasible, so key

<sup>52</sup> As in the past, there is provision for ‘asymmetric engagement’ in recognition that security and absorptive capacities vary widely across Somali regions.

agencies are also revising their short- and medium-term plans. For example, the UN country team has determined its short-term focus will include “strengthening the national police force...disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (*Report of the Secretary General*, 20 April 2007, p. 10) – core elements of the UNDP ROLS programme but, apparently, not including mine action. The UN country team has also prepared a Transition Plan for 2008-2009, with one of the core areas being “contributing to better public security and access to justice to replace impunity and mistrust in institutions.” (ibid, p. 11) Again, it is unclear whether this embraces mine action.

## EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

It appears that total mine action funding for Somalia has been reasonably steady at about \$4+ million since 2001. The bulk of this funding has been delivered via international NGOs, with all the remainder channelled via the UNDP. Perhaps 90% or more of total funding has been expended in Somaliland.

Since 2002, the bulk of EC funding for mine action has been provided via the dedicated budget line for mine action, managed in Brussels. This funded two project agreements totalling approximately € 3.3 million (about \$3.95 million).<sup>53</sup> This represents about 16% of total donor funding for Somalia over that period. Both grants were awarded to UNDP for support to (i) the LIS (Phases 2 and 3 respectively) and (ii) capacity development (of the regional MACs, Police EOD teams, plus mine action policy development).

While the current strategy and programming document does not preclude funds for mine action, it is clear that the EC Delegation for Somalia does not believe it should be providing such support. It does not see landmines and ERW as priority requirements for the country and, in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration<sup>54</sup> and with guidelines for working with fragile states, the Delegation is trying to focus the EC programme more strategically on a limited number of sectors, as follows:

- governance (including the links to security)
- education (consistent with the EU Consensus and EU Strategy for Africa), and
- livelihoods.

## KEY ISSUES

The explosives contamination problem in Somalia appears to have been misdiagnosed and undersold by the initial UNDP mine action team. This means that donors, including the EC Delegation, are forced to make decisions with an inadequate frame with which to assess needs and potential benefits.

The initial UNDP team formulated an inappropriate vision for capacity development. The underlying concept is for the militaries to provide local demining capacity. This was based on a lack of understanding about how successful demining programmes in countries such as Yemen are organised, and is extremely inapt in a country where the local militaries are still engaged in

<sup>53</sup> The first (€ 1.5 million) was from funds available in 2002 (but not awarded until 2003), while the second (€ 1.8 million) was from funds available in 2004, but not awarded until 2006.

<sup>54</sup> Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results, and Mutual Accountability, 2005.

conflicts. As well, the MACs in both Somaliland and Puntland are viewed as UN units by local officials.

UNDP plans for the ROLS programme give little consideration of potential synergies among mine action and SALW, DDR, reform of police services, etc. More broadly, the potential contributions of mine action to other pillars of international support to Somalia remain unrecognised. By clearing pastureland and traditional migration routes, mine clearance enhances livelihoods and reduces vulnerability for pastoralists. All aspects of mine action can also be viewed as simply public services, the effective delivery of which restores public confidence in the state and its organs.

## SUDAN

### CONTEXT

Sudan is Africa's largest country (twice the size of Angola). With an estimated population of 37 million, large areas are sparsely populated, including the South which has suffered from conflict for all but 10 years since independence in 1956, resulting in serious neglect, lack of infrastructure development, and extensive destruction. During these conflicts, more than 2 million people died, and over 4 million were internally displaced or become refugees.

Major conflicts include the two prolonged civil wars (1955-72, then 1983-2005) between the North and the South. However, other conflicts exist, principally in Darfur (which at times has spread into Chad<sup>55</sup>),<sup>56</sup> while rebel groups from other countries have had bases in Sudan for long periods (e.g. the Lord's Resistance Army).

While language, religious, and ethnic differences underlie the various internal conflicts, the discovery of oil has become a complicating factor, as some of the principal reserves lie in disputed areas. As well, oil has brought higher government revenues and heavy foreign investment (particularly from China), which means the international community has less leverage on the Government and UN Security Council members are less likely to agree on decisive actions in response to intransigence on the Government's part in negotiating or adhering to peace agreements with opposition groups.

The second North-South civil war ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in early 2005, which established a power-sharing government<sup>57</sup> in Khartoum to rule the country for six years. It also granted autonomy for South Sudan until 2011, at which time an independence referendum will be held. The CPA included specific regulations for the oil-rich "Three Transitional Areas",<sup>58</sup> where the final North-South boundary has not yet been agreed.

Following the signing of the CPA, the international community established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1590. UNMIS has a seven year mandate to see through the implementation of the result of the national unity referendum. UNMIS operations follow three pillars, to:

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<sup>55</sup> Chad declared war on Sudan in December 2005 because of Sudanese support for the Rally for Democracy and Liberty rebel movement.

<sup>56</sup> Another insurgency ended in the east when the Government and the Eastern Front movement signed a power-sharing agreement in October 2006.

<sup>57</sup> The Government of National Union (GoNU).

<sup>58</sup> The Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area

1. Make peace sustainable;
2. Guarantee human rights of all the people of Sudan;
3. Reduce poverty and the high levels of economic inequality.

Mission tasks include support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the investigation of violations; donor liaison; assistance to DDR programmes and police services reform; rule of law and human rights; facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs; and humanitarian assistance (in part, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions). Within the mandate, UNMIS should also *assist the parties to the CPA in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination.*<sup>59</sup>

A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is mandated to coordinate all UN activities in Sudan. The Mission has a force protection mandate to protect UN personnel and ensure their freedom of movement. The Military component of the Mission is headed by the Force Commander, who is responsible for monitoring the ceasefire and force protection.

Contamination stems from multiple conflicts from World War II onwards, but the major problems are the result of the Second North-South civil war (1983-2005). This was a guerrilla conflict in which the Government used anti-personnel landmines to protect its garrison towns and to interdict the SPLA,<sup>60</sup> while the SPLA used landmines to block government forces in the towns and to interdict their supply lines by planting anti-vehicle mines on roads.<sup>61</sup> As a result, 21 of the 26 states in Sudan are believed to have an explosives contamination problem, with contamination heaviest in the South and the “Three Areas”, where contaminated areas include agricultural land, grazing land, access routes and connection roads between major towns and villages, plus bridges, and major transport routes to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Kenya. In addition, the contamination affected the delivery of food aid and other humanitarian assistance and has delayed the return of displaced persons and refugees.

While surveying has not been completed, at the time of the country mission the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) had registered dangerous areas (DAs) in seven regions (18 states, as some regions such as Darfur and Kordofan have more than one state). A total of 1,905 Dangerous Areas (DAs) have been recorded of which over 737 have been cleared or verified as safe. About 4,000 mine victims have been recorded, but the number of new casualties has been under 100 per year since 2004.

Broadly speaking, landmines and other ERW create a problem in Sudan –mainly in the South and the Three Areas – by hindering refugee return, the delivery of emergency aid, and development efforts. Often it is not a large number of explosives, but the suspected contamination – mainly on roads – has been the principal problem. Still, the perceived threat remains a problem as it inhibits use of infrastructure and other socio-economic assets.

## THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

Mine action has played an important role in the achievement of a cease fire and, ultimately, the

<sup>59</sup> Sudan Unified Mission Plan, page 7, [www.sudanig.org](http://www.sudanig.org)

<sup>60</sup> The armed wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

<sup>61</sup> Landmines were also used to terrorize local populations to diminish support for the opposition. Further, Human Rights Watch also reported that the GOS has used landmines in its efforts to control the oil fields in southern Sudan.

peace agreement. The 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement between GOS and SPLM/A established the international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire and created an opportunity for safe mine action in Southern Kordofan. In the same year, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the GOS, SPLM, and UNMAS. The ensuing concept plan for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan established national and regional coordination mechanisms in Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains and Rumbek.

The first mine clearance projects were also launched as peace-building initiatives.<sup>62</sup> Deminers were trained from both north and south to work in the same organisation. Both GOS and SPLM/A showed further commitment to a mine action programme by accepting the obligations of the APMBC. SPLM signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001. GOS ratified the Convention in October 2003 and it entered into force on 1 April 2004.

Chapter VI of the CPA states that UNMIS will assist the Parties' demining efforts by providing technical advice and coordination. (This is also reflected in UN Security Council Regulation 1590, which established UNMIS.) According to the UNMIS Unified Mission Plan, UNMAS is the coordinator of a common UN mine action programme, focussing on three components:

1. Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area, clearance of priority areas, victim rehabilitation and mine risk education.
2. Clearance of priority roads to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police components of the Mission. This includes Juba airport and UNMIS and other UN deployment sites.
3. National capacity building through support to the national mine action authorities and national NGOs in both the North and the South. This includes the development of national technical standards.

The Mission Plan further proposes the development of a country-wide mine action strategy for the United Nations and its partners to:

1. Support the GoNU and the GoSS in their development of national capacity to carry out their mine action programme;
2. Oversee the work of UNMAS and UNDP, as well as other UN mine actors;<sup>63</sup>
3. Assist in creating a safe and secure environment for humanitarian and development activities, and the deployment of UNMIS. (Sudan Unified Mission Plan, p. 32)

UNMAS, in collaboration with UNOPS, has established a UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Khartoum, with regional offices in Juba (controlling sub-offices in Wau, Rumbek, Malakal and Yei), Kadugli (controlling sub-offices in Damazin and Kassala), and Darfur (controlling the sub-office in Al Fashir). This decentralised structure is expensive and requires many international personnel, but it serves the needs of a large country with little infrastructure.

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<sup>62</sup> The NGOs Danish Church Aid (DCA) and Landmine Action U.K. (LA) started operations in the Nuba mountains. LA had taken over from Oxfam, was EC-funded and worked with SLIRI. DCA had the national NGO partners JASMAR from the north and OSIL from the south. The idea behind this was capacity building, but subsequently the arrangements created command and control difficulties.

<sup>63</sup> The UN Interagency Policy and Strategy specifies roles for a number of UN agencies such as UNDP (capacity building), UNICEF (MRE), WFP (mine action in support of emergency assistance/food delivery), UNHCR (mine action in support of repatriation of refugees).

The CPA specifies the establishment of two national demining authorities (Northern and Southern). These should coordinate their activities in close cooperation with UNMAO. In the North, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established 24 December 2005 through Presidential Decree No. 299 and officially launched on 07 March 2006. It is based in the same building as the UNMAO, and reports to the government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which in turn reports to an inter-ministerial commission under the lead of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs.

In the South, the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (NSMAD) was formally established in Juba<sup>64</sup> in 2005. It is also collocated with the UNMAO Regional Office. NSMAD was established in name only with little capacity to conduct coordination activities, liaison, or mine action planning. In August 2005, the Deputy Director of the NSMAD was removed from his duties by the SPLM/A without explanation. In 2006, NSMAD was re-named to South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), headed by the same Director, who wants to establish sub-offices throughout the regions for direct operational control over the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDU) of the national army. As well, in 2006, the Transport and Demining Steering Committee was established in Southern Sudan to agree mine action priorities. It is chaired by the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator and is said to work well.

UNMAO oversees the work of commercial contractors<sup>65</sup> and coordinates with the demining assets of the Troop Contributing Countries and the international NGOs that receive direct funding from donors. In addition, the WFP issues contracts for survey and road clearance.<sup>66</sup> Coordination between WFP and UNMAO has generally been sound, and priorities for road work are relatively clear as the criteria are (i) opening access to Uganda and Kenya and (ii) supporting IDP and refugee return through major regional areas and then to smaller communities.

A National Mine Action Policy and a Strategic Framework have been developed. They list a variety of measures required to both (i) address the current needs in Sudan and (ii) support the development of national capacities to assume greater ownership over time and, eventually, to deal with the residual contamination. However, these frameworks do not provide a clear picture of:

- the likely capabilities that will be required to address the residual contamination after the UNMIS mandate, and
- the ways, means, and timings for transferring responsibilities progressively from UNMAO to national organs.

Without these, a proper implementation plan for capacity development support cannot be formulated.

## EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Since the signing of the CPA, the EC has contracted approximately EUR 700 million for Sudan. The EC response strategy focussed on two issues – Food Security and Education. Additionally, support was provided for the resettlement of IDPs and for capacity building to improve governance. Mine clearance is specifically mentioned in the context of DDR.

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<sup>64</sup> Having been relocated from Nairobi where it had been since its formation in 2002.

<sup>65</sup> Firms and NGOs, which are formally contracted by UNOPS.

<sup>66</sup> In the build-up to the CPA, WFP began road repair/reconstruction to reduce costs – since 2002/3 WFP has reduced the percentage of airlifted food from 80% to less than 7%.

Although it is difficult to compile a comprehensive accounting of EC-funding for Mine Action in Sudan, it appears that, since 2001, the EC has funded 16 projects totalling approximately EUR 12.5 million. Over half of this came via the dedicated budget line for mine action (APL budget line). The EDF Humanitarian Plus Programmes (HPP 1 & 2) funded 4 projects, and others were funded by ECHO (3 projects) and the Rapid Response Mechanism (1 project). As well, the Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), with EUR 50 million in STABEX funding at its disposal, has granted EUR 10.7 million to two NGO consortia for projects that incorporate mine action.

The bulk of EC-funding for mine action has been directed to the Three Areas (primarily Southern Kordovan – Nuba Mountains), with support going also to the South and Eastern regions once programming became possible in these areas in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Much of the EC assistance has been provided to three international NGOs (in sequence, Oxfam, LMA, HALO Trust) which sought to work with SLIRI and its associated local NGOs. At present, the EC is funding projects implemented by MAG.

## KEY ISSUES

There are two different systems in one country. A main concern is the unstable political situation making any future planning difficult. This refers not just to the North-South conflict, but also to Darfur and the East.

There is sufficient funding for mine action through the UN Mission.<sup>67</sup> At the same time, the resources available to Sudan's governments are growing rapidly and they should be able to provide significant funding for mine action. In this context, the EC is a small donor for mine action. Also, within the EC country programme, mine action is a secondary issue. This leaves little influence and policy options for EC mine action in Sudan. Consequently, there is no EC strategy for mine action in Sudan, and funding depends on the engagement of the responsible officer. There has been no monitoring and evaluation regime.

Overall, clearance is going ahead well in Sudan, and MRE and victim assistance programmes are also being established. The weak point remains national institutional and operational capacity. Therefore, a multi-year strategy and plan for capacity development is required, including steps for progressive handover of functions (including resource mobilisation and alignment of mine action with development plans at the national, regional, and state levels).

Mine action support needs to be provided to development agencies working in contaminated areas that are beyond the current focus of the UNMAO. The consortium approach appeared to be a suitable solution.

Most fundamentally, the EC Delegation should agree on whether to focus on either or both of the following broad goals:

- capacity development for the national programme;
- the delivery of mine action services in support of community and area development programmes in rural areas.

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<sup>67</sup> This means however that the bulk of funding is used to support the needs of the UN mission.



## REGIONAL OR MULTI-COUNTRY INITIATIVES<sup>68</sup>

### CONTEXT

Conventional wars between sub-Saharan African states have been relatively rare, but many of Africa's wars of independence and internal conflicts have had a regional dimension. For a few of many examples:

- Following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the Ian Smith government in Southern Rhodesia fostered the RENAMO movement in Mozambique, leading to a protracted civil war and – after the creation of Zimbabwe – the involvement of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Rhodesian forces also made frequent incursions into neighbouring 'front-line states' to attack or interdict forces fighting for independence;
- The apartheid regime in South Africa also made frequent incursions into the frontline states to attack forces of the African National Congress and – during the Cold War period – undertook a full-scale invasion of Angola, where the government at that time was being supported by Cuban forces.
- In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was invaded by forces from a number of neighbouring countries, causing continued instability in the Great Lakes region;
- The instability in Somalia is becoming a broader regional conflict, with Ethiopia intervening on behalf of the Transitional Government and Eritrea supporting the forces of the Islamic Courts Union.

As well, many of the on-going conflicts in Africa (e.g. the Horn; the Great Lakes) have a distinctly regional dimension.

Past conflicts have resulted in contamination from landmines and other ERW in a large number of countries, particularly Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia/Eritrea but including a number of countries that have not been at war themselves (e.g. some of the former frontline states such as Malawi and Zambia). Conceivably, some of these contamination problems would be best dealt with via regional or, at least, multi-country mechanisms.

### EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Given this context, the EU has incorporated conflict prevention elements into all of its Regional Strategies and Indicative Programmes, and has formulated newer strategies (for the Horn and Africa-wide) with very strong peace and security components. It also created the African Peace Facility as the Community's major instrument for assistance to African Peace Support Operations and the capacity of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), centred of the with the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

However, while Peace and Security in broad terms is becoming a more pronounced element of the EC aid programming framework in Africa, this has not resulted in much support to regional or multi-country mine action activities. The evaluation team has only uncovered two EC mine action initiatives in Africa involving more than one country.<sup>69</sup> The first – support to the SADC Landmine Programme – was initiated before the initial Mine Action Strategy and is outside the

<sup>68</sup> In reference to EC mine action initiatives, we use "regional" to refer to agreements with formal African Regional institutions (e.g. SADC; ECOWAS).

<sup>69</sup> There was also a Regional Consultation held in Addis Ababa in 2006, but this

scope of this evaluation.<sup>70</sup> The second was the decision in May 2002 to allocate €20 million in unspent funds from an earlier EDF tranche to assist Eritrea and Ethiopia recover from their border war.<sup>71</sup> The funds were to be split equally between the two countries.

For Ethiopia, the government and the EC agreed that €8 of the €10 million would go to support mine action in the two regions most affected by the border conflict (Tigray and Afar). The grant agreement for the mine action project was finally signed in late 2006. The timing of this grant was very propitious, as the bulk of the financing for mine action in Ethiopia to that point had been coming from the World Bank loan for the Emergency Rehabilitation Program,<sup>72</sup> which was scheduled to wrap-up at the end of 2006. It appears that the EC grant will be the principal source of funding to Ethiopia's mine action programme in 2007 and 2008.

## KEY ISSUES

The most obvious issue is that, with but two exceptions, the EC has not supported regional or multi-country mine action initiatives in Africa – this in spite of the fact that:

- the bulk of the landmine/ERW contamination in sub-Saharan Africa stems from conflicts that had clear regional dimensions;
- many of the ongoing conflicts that are most likely to result in significant landmine/ERW contamination are largely regional in nature.

The second issue is that neither of these two initiatives appears to have been successful from a regional/multi-country perspective. The SADC landmine programme has not played a significant role in either of the two major mine action programmes in Southern Africa (Angola and Mozambique), and does not appear to be a going-concern as a regional programme. The grant to Ethiopia is critical for that country's mine action programme, but was originally conceived as part of a broader cross-border peace-building effort. The other components of this cross-border initiative have never gone forward, and the EC funding for mine action will probably be used mainly to finance demining activities away from the border with Eritrea, as the bulk of demining in Tigray and Afar is completed.

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<sup>70</sup> Although we have not been able to obtain the project documents, we understand this was a significant grant (€5 million?) to the SADC Secretariat, and that much of the grant was unspent.

<sup>71</sup> Martina Fors, Mission Report, Addis Ababa, 25 Feb. 2003.

<sup>72</sup> The mine action component of this loan was initially set at \$40 million, but was subsequently reduced to \$15 million and then (following an extension of the Program), increased again to approximately \$18.5 million.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

### RELEVANCE<sup>73</sup> OF EC SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN AFRICA

#### GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Clearly, EC support for mine action in Africa has been relevant to the objectives and priorities set-out in the mine action Regulations and Strategies. Financing has been provided to all pillars of mine action, with the bulk going toward demining (as is appropriate).

#### RELEVANCE TO AFRICAN AND SUB-REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Assistance to mine action is certainly relevant to both the EU Strategy for Africa<sup>74</sup> and to the needs of many African countries. On some measures, Africa is considered the continent most affected by landmines, and the EC has allocated a significant proportion of its total mine action support to it, with financial support provided to mine action programmes in 12 African countries. Since 2002, landmine contamination has been a major humanitarian concern in certain countries in Africa; particularly in Angola and Sudan following the peace agreements in those countries, when landmines threatened the return of millions of refugees and IDPs and constrained the delivery of humanitarian assistance.<sup>75</sup> In this context, it is appropriate that more than half of all EC assistance to mine action was spent in Angola and Sudan in the initial post-conflict years.

Note however that, in the period covered by this evaluation, no real EC support for mine action has been provided as an explicitly regional initiative. Thus, there has been no effort to capitalise on the potential contributions from the organs of the AU and the main regional associations. Further, to the degree that some landmine and ERW contamination in Africa represents a regional problem, it can be argued that a relevant response would include explicitly regional components.

There was one effort to finance a multi-country initiative (post-conflict recovery in Ethiopia and Eritrea) that incorporated an explicit mine action component (€8 million for mine action in Ethiopia).

#### RELEVANCE TO COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS

##### Angola

Clearly, support for mine action has been relevant to Angola's requirements, particularly since the end of the protracted civil war in 2002, leading to the return of millions of refugees and IDPs. As such, mine action is mentioned in the EC Country Strategy Paper for 2002-07, which envisaged funding from the EDF as well as the thematic budget line. Further, mine action has been a priority not simply from a humanitarian perspective, but also for the post-conflict

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<sup>73</sup> Relevance = The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are appropriate to the requirements of the beneficiaries, the country's needs, global priorities, and the policies of the donor and its overseas partner. DAC, 2002, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, OECD, Paris.

<sup>74</sup> Particularly for the (i) Peace and Security, and (ii) trade and regional integration components of this strategy.

<sup>75</sup> Landmine contamination was also a humanitarian crisis in Mozambique following its peace agreement in 1992, but by the time covered by this evaluation, the number of landmine casualties in Mozambique was quite modest. Landmine and ERW contamination is also a constraint in the DRC, Northern Uganda, Senegal, etc., but the scale and density of the contamination in those countries appears to be far lower.

reconstruction programme – particularly for roads and bridges. Thus, the Delegation's adoption of the LRRD approach meant that mine action has remained relevant as Angola's priorities have evolved. A further change in focus from relief towards reconstruction and development will be needed in the coming years.

The Government has decided that demining contracts in support of the major reconstruction programme will be reserved for Angolan organisations, including companies that may be owned by senior mine action officials. This means that international support for mine action will soon have to be justified in terms of agricultural/rural development. Unfortunately, the rural economy may soon be undermined by systematic under-investment coupled with (i) the rise in the value of Angola's currency due to oil revenues and (ii) the reconstruction programme itself, which will soon expose rural producers to competition from cheap imports.

### **Somalia**

In our opinion, support for mine action has been relevant, because, when compared to other African countries, the impact of landmine/ERW contamination seems severe. At the same time, the Delegation's view is correct that the EC aid programme should become more focussed in this failed state environment. Given that tough choices must be made, it is hard to fault the Delegation's decision not to support mine action *per se*, particularly when the UNDP strategy for supporting the development of national capacities appears flawed, and mine action is not tightly linked with the broader programme to re-establish security and the rule of law in the parts of Somalia where this is a feasible goal (Somaliland and Puntland).

### **Sudan**

Support for mine action has been extremely relevant, even though the numbers of landmines appears to be far fewer than was the case in conflicts such as Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. Mine action was used strategically as a confidence-building measure, which advance the peace process. As a result of this early start for mine action, the UN mine action programme has been able to establish large operations in a vast country within a reasonable period, thus supporting the peacekeeping mission and contributing to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis. Mine action assets are in place to support the post-conflict reconstruction effort, which is now expanding. International mine action NGOs are establishing operations in more remote areas in support of community development programmes.

## **EFFECTIVENESS OF EC SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION**

### **ADDRESSING THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS**

The authors of the Global Assessment were perhaps most critical about technical and contracting matters that would reduce the efficiency of EC aid for mine action. Our evaluation did not attempt to assess efficiency, which would have required detailed analysis of individual projects. Instead, we focussed on 'effectiveness' – a term that can mean many things.

Given this evaluation focuses on programming decisions, perhaps the best measure of effectiveness is whether EC mine action portfolios (i) contributed substantially to the amelioration of the most pressing or serious impacts in the transition from conflict to sustained development and (ii) capitalised on opportunities to deliver additional benefits by promoting broader objectives, such as peace-building, reconstruction, and development. Broadly these are:


Stage in transition	Critical contamination problems	Opportunities
<b>While conflict continues</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• mine action is only feasible in contaminated areas that are secure or when the warring parties agree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initiatives that foster cooperation between warring parties, to build confidence and promote peace</li> <li>• encouraging warring parties to ban the use of landmines</li> </ul>
<b>Immediate post-conflict period</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clearance of roads so refugees/IDPs can return safely, and so humanitarian aid can be delivered</li> <li>• Where a peacekeeping mission is deployed, support for the mission (force mobility)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• hiring deminers from all factions, contributing to DDR and peace-building in general</li> <li>• support to security system reforms in general, (e.g. building police EOD capacities)</li> </ul>
<b>Reconstruction</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contamination along roads and other infrastructure networks</li> <li>• Contamination that prevents the resumption of essential public services (e.g. schools, clinics)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective support to major infrastructure projects</li> <li>• Effective support to community development/human security programmes.</li> </ul>
<b>Normal development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More varied and dispersed problems, with fewer obvious priorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective support for development actors (sector, area, &amp; community development)</li> </ul>

Generally, the programming of EC assistance within most mine-affected countries appears to have been effective. In Sudan, the EC supported early mine action initiatives that contributed significantly to the broader peace process. In Angola and Sudan, the amount of funding for mine action rose dramatically in the immediate post-conflict period, when the landmine contamination can lead to a humanitarian crisis. In recent years, the Delegation in Angola has sought to steer its mine action partners (mainly European NGOs) to focus increasingly on support to reconstruction and development. In Angola as well, EC assistance has supported the development of capacities in the provinces, where many Vice Governors appear to be committed to the mine action programme even if some officials in Luanda are not. Recently, the EC in Sudan has also added projects in its mine action portfolio to support community development in more remote areas which could provide greater scope for state governments to get involved in the priority-setting process.

EC assistance has been less effective in Somalia, where it has channelled virtually all its mine action funding via the UNDP.<sup>76</sup> At the same time, the case of Somalia relative to other African countries suggests that donor programming mechanisms for mine action – including those of the EC – are not effective in allocating aid across countries in accordance to need.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>76</sup> There are far fewer potential partners in Somalia than in Angola or Sudan.

<sup>77</sup> In part this is probably due to the same reasons that humanitarian aid is not allocated in proportion to need – donor country foreign policy interests, the lack of news media attention on some emergencies, etc. (see, for example, Smillie, Ian and Larry Minear, 2003, *The Quality of Money: Donor Behavior in Humanitarian Financing*, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University). In the case of mine action, some African governments have played high profile roles in the Ottawa Process (e.g. Mozambique), which probably led to increased donor funding.

Figure 10 – Estimated funding per landmine victim<sup>78</sup>

This shortcoming is likely to be exacerbated by the deconcentration policy and by the termination of the AP landmines budget line. As yet, there are no EC mechanisms in place at the pan-African or regional levels that would compensate for the difficulty in achieving appropriate allocations of resources across mine-affected countries in Africa.

### FOSTERING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

The EC has achieved less in terms of fostering national ownership of national mine action programmes in Africa. The EC has provided no mine action support directly to an African government or, since 2002, via an African regional institution.<sup>79</sup> This reflects the fact that most African mine action programmes were initiated in failed or fragile states, where governments may lack capacity, commitment to equitable development, or both. Accordingly, the bulk of EC mine action funding has been channelled through international NGOs and, secondly, through the UNDP.

UNDP mine action projects typically focus on fostering national ownership, in large part by supporting capacity development within the national mine action organs. However, such UNDP support appears to have been ineffective in most instances in Africa. More than a decade of support for capacity development in Angola has not led to an effective national programme. The Angolan government seems content to leave ‘humanitarian’ (i.e. neither military nor commercial) mine action to international NGOs and their supporting donors, while focussing its own efforts on demining in support of major infrastructure projects.<sup>80</sup> UNDP has been assisting Somaliland for nearly a decade, where the MAC and the Police EOD teams remain almost completely dependent

<sup>78</sup> Annual averages for the two most recent years. See the report on the Somalia mission for details on data sources.

<sup>79</sup> It did provide a grant to SADC for its regional landmine programme, but that was prior to the period covered by this evaluation.

<sup>80</sup> The same basic conclusion was reached in 2005 in the *Review of Ten Years Assistance to Mine Action in Mozambique* – another country in which the EC channelled significant assistance via the UNDP for capacity development. However, Ethiopia has developed significant capacity, in part with UNDP assistance: see GICHD, 2007, *Evaluation of NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project and Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme*.

on continued UNDP support.<sup>81</sup> Such assistance to Sudan has been in place for only three years, where some progress in building national capacities has been achieved, particularly over the past year. But it remains too early to conclude that the UNDP support for capacity development in Sudan will lead to good outcomes.

A particular problem in Sudan is the sheer scale of the mine action programme in support of UNMIS, coupled with the large number of international personnel in decision-making rather than advisory roles. The domination of mine action by international organisations and managers inhibits the growth of national ownership and capacities. This has been a recurrent problem when large UN Peacekeeping Missions have been fielded, such as in Mozambique in the mid-1990s.<sup>82</sup> This problem was highlighted in a major 1996 UN study on developing mine action capacities,<sup>82</sup> which led to an overhaul of UN involvement in mine action, with UNMAS designated as the lead agency and UNDP focussing on capacity development. However, in most cases where a Peacekeeping mission is present, UNMAS has a large programme and direct operational responsibilities for UN mission support, and UNDP remains very much a junior partner. In Sudan for example, the UNDP budget is perhaps only 2% of the overall UN budget for mine action.

Of course capacity development of public sector agencies in Africa is often a difficult proposition,<sup>83</sup> particularly in failed or fragile states. But the UNDP record to date in developing the capacity of national organs and fostering national ownership is far from encouraging.

Conceivably, national ownership concerning mine action could also be fostered within civil society actors. Unfortunately, international NGOs have not been very successful in developing capable African mine action NGOs<sup>84</sup> – particularly for demining.<sup>85</sup>

## SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

As noted above, the officers responsible for mine action in some of the EC Delegations have encouraged their mine action implementing partners – and particularly the European demining NGOs – to make the transition from relief to reconstruction. This LRRD process has gone furthest in Angola, but it is starting in Sudan as well. However, demining in support of reconstruction is a relatively easy transition to make: typically, combatants mine roads and other infrastructure networks and demining of road surfaces is generally undertaken during the humanitarian assistance phase of a mine action programme, so operators are aware of the remaining hazards that need to be cleared once reconstruction begins. Once the reconstruction begins in earnest, there are comparatively few major projects, so coordination and priority-setting problems are comparatively modest.

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<sup>81</sup> Indeed, the SMAC is still regarded by many government officials as a UNDP unit – hardly a sign of growing national ownership.

<sup>82</sup> Eaton, Robert, C. Horwood, and N. Niland, *The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, DHA, 1997: overall report and separate country reports for Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique.

<sup>83</sup> This was a major finding of the large World Bank study, *Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support*, 2005.

<sup>84</sup> Interestingly, in Ethiopia and some non-African countries, NPA has focussed on supporting capacity development of national organs (national authorities, MACs, operators) rather than local NGOs. However, a recent evaluation of NPA programmes in Angola has recommended that NPA explore a ‘nationalisation strategy’ to, essentially, convert its mine action programme into a national NGO. Isaksen, J., I. Samset, and F. Pacheco, 2006, *Mid-term Review of the Angola Programme of Norwegian People’s Aid*, Chr. Michelsen Institute.

<sup>85</sup> As well, the effort by UNDP in Mozambique to transform the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) into a local NGO was a failure, and ADP collapsed after a decade of UNDP support. See *Ten Years Assistance to Mine Action in Mozambique*.

The transition to mine action in support of development appears to be more difficult. Development initiatives are more widespread, involving many more actors, so coordination is a greater challenge. Often, the major contamination problems have been cleared by the time development picks-up pace, so demining operators often need to reorganise based on smaller, multi-skilled mobile teams that can respond flexibly to smaller, more widespread hazards in support of many development actors, including local authorities. Demining agencies face real problems in defining their objectives in terms of developmental outcomes, in identifying the correct priorities in a transparent manner, and in coordinating with a far larger number of actors.

As well, successful development requires sound policies and strategies at the macro level if meso-level programmes and micro-level activities are to lead to sustained benefits. Mine action practitioners are not used to considering macroeconomic policies. Again, Angola is a good example. The current strategies and priorities of the international demining NGOs are appropriate for opening the interior of the country and promoting rural development. However, the rise in Angola's exchange rate due to oil revenues means that rural producers in newly accessible areas will soon face competition from cheap imports, which could lead to rural impoverishment and accelerated rural-urban migration unless complementary measures are taken to raise agricultural productivity.<sup>86</sup>

## COORDINATION BETWEEN THE EC AND OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORTING MINE ACTION

In all three countries visited by the evaluation team, coordination between donors and the governments on mine action or on broader aid and development issues appears far from ideal. In Somalia of course, there simply is no internationally recognised government with de facto control over the country. Coordination in the relatively stable region is constrained because (i) Somaliland is not recognised as an independent state and (ii) senior donor officials are mostly based in Nairobi.

In both Angola and Sudan, such coordination is greatly hampered because the broader relationships between the governments and the international community have been strained for some time. In both cases, donor countries have comparatively little leverage over governments that have access to substantial financial resources from other sources (oil revenues; loans from China).

In such cases, UN and other multilateral agencies may facilitate coordination with the government or among donors. In both Somalia and Sudan for example, the UN and World Bank recently undertook joint Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (the Joint Needs Assessment [JNA] in Somalia and the Joint Assessment Mission [JAM] in Sudan), which undoubtedly have helped establish a broad strategic focus for donors.<sup>87</sup>

However, there does not appear to be a mechanism for facilitating coordination among all mine action stakeholders in any of the countries visited for this evaluation. In Angola, the government does not convene meetings with all mine action donors, and discourages meetings among the donors themselves. For Somalia, coordination with the de facto governments is constrained as the

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<sup>86</sup> While one must be realistic in terms of what mine action programmes can achieve in terms of rural development in the face of unpropitious macro-economic developments, combined community/area development and mine action projects (such as the Community Based RRP projects in Sudan) might be appropriate in such situations.

<sup>87</sup> Landmine contamination and the need for mine action are featured in both the JNA and JAM.



EC and other donors are based in Nairobi, while the UNDP does not appear to have been active in convening meetings of the main mine action stakeholders, including donors. In Sudan, coordination of mine action focuses primarily on the UNMAO programme. There appears to have been little systematic dialogue between donors and the Sudanese governments concerning the longer-term strategy and a transition to national ownership.<sup>88</sup>

In the absence of a coordination mechanism established by the government or a UN agency and, ideally, a long-term government strategy for mine action, it will always be difficult for EC Delegates to coordinate effectively with other agencies supporting mine action.

### **THE IMPACT OF DECONCENTRATION OF EC AID**

As the EC Mine Action Strategy incorporated an indicative programme through 2007, the full impact of deconcentration has not yet been felt. For the most part, the planned projects for APL budget line funding have gone forward. Still, the nature of the impacts – both positive and negative – are apparent.

The principal benefit of deconcentration is the empowerment of EC Delegations in terms of programming. The Delegations are in a better position to monitor the political and economic evolution of the country, the evolution of government priorities, and the achievements of the projects already being implemented. This is essential information for making sound decisions on the programme should evolve.

It appears that deconcentration of responsibility and authority has led also to empowerment in a wider sense. Where the delegates responsible for mine action believe mine action should be a priority in a country, they have worked hard to put a sound programme in place, often showing some entrepreneurial flair in securing resources from a number of different EC funds (e.g. unspent STABEX balances; the Rapid Response Mechanism).

Deconcentration should also allow for more coordination among those donors with representatives in the country. On the other hand, the EC delivers large and often complex aid programmes in African countries, and delegates typically must cover a number of sectors. Not all officers assigned responsibility for mine action will be convinced that it should be a priority (at all or for the EC) and/or comfortable in dealing with the specialised technical issues.

As well, there is the issue of institutional memory, which is particularly difficult for agencies that decentralise authority and maintain a policy of regular staff rotation. Deconcentrated offices typically are too small to justify teams of officers working on a sector, so when the officer responsible for mine action moves to another post, there will be no one with significant experience on the evolution of the country's mine action programme and the EC assistance to that programme. The EC Delegation in Angola has engaged a local consultant to advise on mine action, which has worked well. However, the EC mine action portfolio in Angola is far larger than in any other African country.

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<sup>88</sup> As well, neither UNMAO nor the governments have formulated a medium-term plan for mine action, which would be an essential requirement for coordinating multiple stakeholders who have to make decisions within at least a medium-term time horizon.

Deconcentration has been accompanied by the end of the APL thematic budget line and the reduction in the staff complement dedicated to mine action at headquarters, which have had, or can be expected to have, a number of impacts, which are discussed in the next section.

## THE IMPACT OF THE END OF DEDICATED MINE ACTION FUNDING & UNITS

As yet, the end of the dedicated funding for mine action has had little or no effect on the quantity of assistance being provided to mine action in Africa. Indeed, most of the mine action funding in Africa has come from the EDF, and we understand that the sums budgeted from the APL thematic budget for 2007 were made available to the relevant EC Delegations.

There is no clear indication that the end of the dedicated funding for mine action has had an effect on the quality of EC assistance. The Global Assessment correctly noted that EC Delegations lack officers with the expertise to assess project proposals<sup>89</sup> (particularly in their technical elements) and to monitor implementation.<sup>90</sup> However, the small units in Brussels charged with managing the thematic budget line did not contain officers with technical expertise in mine action, so they would not have been able to directly assist the EC Delegations in this regard.

It may be that the end of the thematic budget line will lead to some changes in the type of mine action projects that are funded. From our records, all of the funding for Landmine Impact Surveys or to projects that explicitly incorporated LIS components came from the thematic budget line. It is unclear whether this is because delegates in mine affected countries tend to put a lower priority on the LIS,<sup>91</sup> or because the Survey Action Center (the NGO that designed and oversees the LIS process) focused on Brussels when raising resources for surveys.

While the end of the dedicated budget line and mine action units in Brussels may not yet have had any significant effect on the quantity or quality of EC assistance to mine action, their absence will almost certainly have impacts in the future. Even though the officers responsible for mine action in Brussels lacked technical expertise, they did work full-time on mine action and would be important points of contact and advice for officers in the EC Delegations. The Brussels-based staff were aware of the evolving policy debates in mine action internationally, of innovations in the field that might be useful in other countries, of lessons of experience, and so on. They also maintained wide-ranging contacts within the mine action field and could put EC Delegations in touch with relevant experts in the field. They could also help the Delegations in coping with the loss of institutional memory following a transfer of a Delegate responsible for the mine action portfolio in a country.

The reduction in the dedicated mine action section in Brussels will also have an impact over time because there is no convenient way to implement some of the performance improvement recommendations contained in the Global Assessment. For example, the Global Assessment recommended outside experts be contracted for technical assessments of mine action project

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<sup>89</sup> The authors of the Global Assessment also stated that “Greater contractual rigour is needed to...[obtain]... better value for money.”

<sup>90</sup> For countries in which the quality assurance/control regime is weak, technical expertise may also be required for project monitoring.

<sup>91</sup> The LIS was an important innovation in mine action, but they have been controversial because of their expense and because the results have rarely been used to good effect. DEMEX and Scanteam, 2003, *Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process*.

proposals (pp. 15, 18). The EC Delegation in Angola, with by far the largest mine action portfolio, has taken this step, which appears to have been an appropriate decision. But it may not be cost-effective in financial or (perhaps more critically) delegate work-load terms to engage outside technical experts for each project or for countries with smaller portfolios of mine action projects. A stronger headquarters section might have arranged for this technical expertise on behalf of the EC Delegations in all countries with relatively small mine action portfolios. There appears to be no EC unit covering Africa or the African regions that could perform this task. Thus, it is difficult to implement an otherwise reasonable recommendation.

More fundamentally however, the absence of the dedicated budget line seems likely to lead to a decline in future EC support for mine action to Africa. It is clear that the truly large sums of international funding for mine action flow to countries emerging from conflicts (e.g. Angola after 2002), when refugees and IDPs are returning and attempting to rebuild their livelihoods, and when large amounts of humanitarian aid must flow. Even larger sums are allocated when Peacekeepers – particularly UN Peacekeepers – are in place (e.g. Sudan after 2005).<sup>92</sup> In a few countries with severe and extensive contamination, continued funding for mine action is warranted on developmental grounds to support the reconstruction of infrastructure and community or area development efforts in the most contaminated regions.

So EC funds for mine action can be expected to continue when landmine contamination is a humanitarian or developmental priority. But with the repeal of the mine action Regulations (which were a ‘direct response’ to the Ottawa Convention), there is no instrument for furthering the implementation of the Ottawa Convention *per se*. Even with the dedicated funding in place, mine-affected States Parties such as Malawi and Zambia never received EC funding to assist them in meeting their Treaty obligations. Perhaps this is reasonable on the grounds that mine action projects which support humanitarian and developmental priorities as well as Treaty implementation should be preferred over those justified mainly in terms of Treaty obligations alone. However, barring future conflicts, mine action is not a humanitarian or developmental priority in Mozambique or Ethiopia today, and will not be a priority for most of Angola or Sudan a few years hence. It seems unlikely that EC Delegations in these countries would allocate significant EDF funding to mine action when this is not a development priority.

How soon support for mine action will end in a country would depend, in practice, on how long the list of development priorities is and on how successfully mine action managers link their programmes to *bone fide* development priorities. The case of Somalia is instructive, where the EC Delegation opposes funding to mine action because (i) it intends to limit EC support to three sectors,<sup>93</sup> and (ii) mine action managers have not done a good job in demonstrating how mine action supports other priorities and programmes. If such a case is valid in Somalia (which we have seen, on some measures may be the most impacted state in Africa), how long can one expect donor funding for mine action to continue in Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan?

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<sup>92</sup> The EC is not assessed by the UN to support UN Peacekeeping missions, but EU member states are. Through the African Peace Facility, the EC is a significant contributor to African Peacekeeping missions, but it has not used this instrument to finance mine action explicitly to support these missions.

<sup>93</sup> This is in line with programming guidelines for donors operating in failed states, where aid fragmentation/proliferation will quickly overwhelm government capacities. The specification that donors should assist a maximum of three sectors appears to have come from the Afghan Compact.

Finally, there are fewer human resources based in Brussels to maintain a strong EC role in international meetings on mine action, and in liaison among donor headquarters concerning support for mine action.<sup>94</sup>

### **Textbox 7 – The international dimension to mine action**

Because an international treaty exists for mine action, there is a regular programme of meetings of States Parties on Treaty implementation (the 'Ottawa Process'), including annual Meetings of States Parties, with one Intersessional each year, plus five-year Review Meetings. These provide an important forum for States Parties to the Treaty to discuss policy matters including, for one critical example, the looming issue of how to deal with requests for extension of the ten-year limit for States Parties to clear all known minefields in their territories.

Another important event in the mine action calendar is the Annual Meeting of National Programme Directors, which brings together officials from national mine action authorities and centres, the UN agencies involved in mine action, specialised mine action organisations (GICHD, Survey Action Centre, etc.), and representatives from donors. Participation at this meeting allows people to stay abreast of the principal innovations in the field and to track the emerging agenda for both policy and operational issues.

There are also regular meetings of the Mine Action Support Group, which brings together representatives of the principal donors, usually with the UN agencies and specialised mine action organisations, to discuss issues from the donor perspective.

In addition, there are moves to adopt an international instrument concerning the use of cluster munitions, either through a new protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of War (CCW) or as a separate treaty (an option being led by Norway through what is termed the 'Oslo Process'). While this issue is important from the wider disarmament arena, it has important implications for mine action, as it is mine action programmes and practitioners that deal with the clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munitions. The issue of ERW in general is already dealt with in the 2003-adopted Protocol V of the CCW – an instrument that foresees international assistance, as well as annual meetings of the State Parties. At present, there is work in progress to establish a strong international implementation mechanism.

While the EC is represented in these forums by diplomats covering disarmament issues, they are not focused purely on landmines and other ERW, and they do not work within the aid policy and delivery directorates of the Commission – an important shortcoming as many of these discussions have important implications for the EC aid programmes.

For the EC in particular, there is also the important issue of coordination with EU member states concerning landmines and other ERW from both the disarmament and aid perspectives.

## **OTHER ISSUES**

### **THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PLANS FOR NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES**

The task of EC Delegations in programming assistance for mine action would be greatly aided if there were feasible strategic plans formulated by national governments (with UNDP assistance

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<sup>94</sup> Previously, these roles were admirably discharged by the Conventional Disarmament & Human Security section in RELEX. They now fall largely to the EC representative for disarmament in Geneva, as less support is available from Brussels-based officials.

where necessary) and endorsed by the major donors providing mine action assistance in that country. There are no such plans in any of the countries visited for this evaluation, and reports from other evaluations indicate that adequate plans of this type do not exist in Eritrea, Ethiopia, or Mozambique. Therefore, this appears to be a systemic problem in mine action field.

Ideally, such plans would be developed through a process that includes all the main mine action stakeholders in the country – government, donors, UN agencies, operators, and local civil society. The process should be based on a common assessment of needs and lead to a common strategy for all mine action actors, covering the entire national programme. The strategy should be clear on what results are expected, and should incorporate indicators for monitoring progress and maintaining mutual accountability. (In short, a programme-based approach should be adopted.) Such a strategy would facilitate donor coordination among themselves and with the government, and would allow donors and operators to formulate exit strategies.

In immediate post-conflict periods or in other situations where the government lacks the commitment or capability to formulate an adequate strategy, it is normal for UN agencies to assume some of the functions of a national mine action authority (typically, UNMAS) and to support the government in developing its capacity (typically, UNDP) and in assuming ownership of the national mine action programme. While some progress has been achieved in a number of countries,<sup>95</sup> the evaluation team has not come across a single case in Africa where UNDP support to the national mine action organs has resulted in an adequate strategy for the national mine action programme. As seems clear from the case of Sudan, when UNMAS is active in a country, its priority is implementing operations in support of the UN mission, and – to date at least – it produces short-term operational plans rather than medium-term strategic plans.<sup>96</sup>

## MINE ACTION, PEACE AND SECURITY

Peace and security issues loom large in the EU Strategy for Africa and within the evolving EU-AU Partnership. The African Peace Facility is a large and important instrument. Mine action is not outside the EU's African security agenda, but it appears not adequately incorporated as yet.

As was the case with many other donors in the aftermath of the Mine Ban Convention, the EC approved dedicated mine action funding as the lynchpin of an expanded mine action portfolio. This led to mine action evolving in many instances as a relatively standalone sector. Ever since, there have been efforts to link mine action to broader programmes – principally humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, and development. Such efforts are certainly appropriate for countries making the relief → reconstruction → development transition. However there are some mine-affected countries, including a number in Africa, where insecurity is so great that it blocks this transition. In such instances, mine action should be linked to the broader peace and security agenda.

There are cases where mine action has made a significant contribution to peace and security. In Sudan, the EC supported early steps to get both the government and the SPLA to agree to a ban on the use of landmines and, eventually, agree on 'cross-border' mine action initiatives that served as a confidence-building measure in the build-up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

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<sup>95</sup> For example, the Government of National Unity in Sudan has adopted a Mine Action Policy Framework and a Mine Action Strategy Framework, but together these fall short of what is required for a strategic plan.

<sup>96</sup> UNMAS is in the process of engaging a Transitions Planner for Sudan who would, presumably, develop a medium-term plan for transferring responsibility to national authorities.

In Somalia, the Danish Demining Group's mine action programme has served as a platform for SALW activities. In a number of countries, mine action programmes have made major contributions to DDR by providing well-paid and highly respected work for former combatants. In general, mine action has often served as the 'point of entry' for international engagement with warring parties.

The incorporation of mine action into the broad Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programme in Somalia shows that the UNDP also recognises the potential synergies between mine action and other security sector programmes (SALW, DDR, police reform). However, the ROLS programme also demonstrates that the appropriate linkages among these different aspects of security system reform do not simply happen. Within ROLS, mine action is managed as a standalone component, sub-contracted to a different UN agency (UNOPS), and left largely to its own devices for resource mobilisation.

### MINE ACTION AND REGIONAL/SUB-REGIONAL PROGRAMMES

As noted earlier, there have been no African regional/sub-regional mine action programmes supported by the EC during the period covered by this evaluation – there was a global programme, and there are a number of continuing country programmes.

The absence of (sub)-regional programmes means certain types of problems created by explosives contamination are difficult to address for the EC. The approval of parallel post-conflict projects incorporating mine action for Eritrea and Ethiopia demonstrates that it is possible for the EC to provide, if not regional, at least multi-country projects.<sup>97</sup> However, there is no clear solution to address the following problems and opportunities:

- 'forgotten' problems of explosives contamination, where the limited scale of contamination in a country means it is not a priority from any broader perspective (peace-building; security system reform; reconstruction; development)
- problems that are inherently sub-regional (e.g. contamination in the former frontline states of Southern Africa)
- opportunities to use mine action to promote peace-building and functional cooperation on a sub-regional basis.

The absence of either a global programme or (sub)-regional programmes also means there is nothing to back-up the EC Delegations in countries where there are EC-funded mine action programmes.

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<sup>97</sup> This also illustrates the inherent risks in attempting such programmes, at least for countries that remain belligerent.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

### Recommendation 1 – Strengthen the focal point for mine action in Brussels

While deconcentration promises to deliver many benefits for mine action and for EC country aid programmes in general, the officers responsible for mine action in the Delegations are not specialists in the field and typically have to cover other sectors. As well, periodic staff rotation will make it difficult for the Delegations to retain the institutional memory required to make well-informed programming decisions. A bolstered focal point section in Brussels would be an important resource for the officers responsible for mine action in the Delegations, and would be in a position to help delegates who are new to mine action get up to speed as quickly as possible.

In addition, with more resources the focal point section would be able to:

- represent the EC in international forums, including meetings of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty
- coordinate with EU member states on Treaty and other mine action issues
- serve as a conduit of information to the Delegations in mine-affected states concerning the evolution of policy debates, new operational innovations, and the emerging mine action agenda
- advise Delegations concerning mine action experts who could assist Delegations in designing programmes, assessing proposals, evaluations, etc. (see recommendation 4)
- assume responsibility for programming of a dedicated mine action fund, should this be re-established (see recommendation 2)
- assist in mine action programming financed by regional programmes (see recommendation 3)
- implement the recommendations from the Global Assessment that were contingent on the existence of a mine action unit in Brussels.

Note that other important mine action donors (AusAid; CIDA; Sida) have decentralised the bulk of their mine action programming responsibilities to the country programme level, but have retained a focal point officer or unit in headquarters to provide advice on policy and practice and, in some cases, to administer a small dedicated mine action fund retained by headquarters.

### Recommendation 2 – Assess whether a thematic funding ‘window’ within existing budget instruments can be created at headquarters level to support Treaty implementation and global issues.

The EC Mine Action Regulations were adopted in part to support the implementation of the Mine Ban Convention.<sup>98</sup> This Convention has important implications for both aid and disarmament. EC Delegations are likely to continue to support mine action in countries where landmines/ERW represent a humanitarian emergency or an important impediment to reconstruction and development. EC aid funds are, however, not designed to advance disarmament issues; most obviously, how to assist modestly mine-affected poor countries which have ratified the Convention and need to destroy stockpiles and clear all known minefields as a Treaty

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<sup>98</sup> This Regulation is a direct response to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001, par. 6).

obligation.<sup>99</sup> In such countries, explosives contamination is not a development priority and (in line with aid effectiveness principles), senior government officials and the EC Delegation may reasonably decide not to include mine action in the country aid programme. To advance the global disarmament agenda, the EC may still wish to provide assistance to at least those countries that are addressing their contamination in a responsible manner, but which lack the financial resources to complete the job.<sup>100</sup>

### **Recommendation 3 – Review the options for modest mine action programmes at the regional or (sub-)regional level in Africa.**

The EC has put in place a number of Regional Strategies and Indicative Programmes covering major sub-regions in Africa, most of which have explicit provision for support to conflict prevention, security, etc. In at least two regions (the Horn of Africa; Eastern and Southern Africa), it may be appropriate to establish small regional mine action programmes designed to:

- provide an expert focal point to provide strategic advice to EC Delegations, regional institutions, and national authorities on mine action issues
- fund modest initiatives to address contamination that is clearly of a multi-country or regional nature (e.g. landmines laid by Rhodesian and South African forces in the former front line states; border minefields between Ethiopia and Somalia; cross-border contamination in the Great Lakes States)
- provide modest funding to countries in which the EC Delegation has completed its exit strategy for mine action (see recommendation 6)

In Southern Africa, it may be appropriate to dedicate this focal point and fund to mine action. In the Horn of Africa (and perhaps West Africa and Central Africa), it probably would be more appropriate to have a focal unit and fund covering security system reform issues, including landmines/ERW.<sup>101</sup>

Similarly, the African Peace Facility has significant funds available for capacity development. Modest amounts might be used to support the Peace and Security Council or a specialised institute with a regional mandate in assisting AU member states with landmine/ERW contamination issues.

The existence of regional focal points would also go some way to overcoming the inherent problems that accompany deconcentration (lack of sector specific expertise; maintaining institutional memory).

### **Recommendation 4 – Identify and perhaps pre-qualify mine action experts that can advise Delegations on programming issues.**

While the case of Angola shows that Delegations can contract-in specialists to assist with mine action projects, the Delegations in countries with smaller mine action portfolios may have more difficulty in identifying and contracting experts with the appropriate skills. A mine action focal

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<sup>99</sup> Malawi and Zambia are good examples from Africa. As well, more contaminated countries such as Angola and Sudan will reach a point where the remaining contamination does not constitute a humanitarian or development priority, but clearance still represents a Treaty obligation.

<sup>100</sup> This would be relevant as well in connection with Article V of the CCW (covering ERW), which also addresses international assistance.

<sup>101</sup> These could be housed in the relevant sub-regional organs or in specialised independent institutes dealing with peace and security issues at the sub-regional level. Where feasible, the latter option might be more effective as such institutes could operate with an ‘effectiveness’ rather than a ‘political’ mandate.



point in Brussels or, conceivably, at the (sub-)regional level, could assist Delegations by maintaining a list of persons with appropriate technical expertise and regional experience. Ideally, focal points might also manage periodic calls for proposal to pre-qualify a small list of experts and simplify the contracting process for individual assignments.

**Recommendation 5 – Delegations should request proper strategic plans from national mine action authorities and/or the lead UN agency for mine action in each country.**

A common problem with the national mine action programmes in Africa is the lack of an adequate strategic plan that would provide a framework for EC programming decisions and would facilitate donor coordination (both among themselves and with the government). The lack of such plans also greatly complicates the programming and coordination tasks of the EC Delegations.

In failed states and the immediate post-conflict period, the lead UN agency for mine action in that country may have to formulate such a plan (which should then cover support for capacity development and fostering national ownership). However, the goal would be to evolve to a country-led<sup>102</sup> programme-based approach.

**Recommendation 6 – EC Delegations should formulate exit strategies for their support to mine action.**

In the absence of new conflicts, landmine/ERW problems are finite and all support to mine action should be based on the understanding that the support will end within a reasonable period. Exit strategies are particularly important for mine action as demining involves the use of expensive, often specialised equipment, and demining operators often have large numbers of local personnel who should be given fair notice well prior to the termination or downsizing of the programme.

Ideally, an exit would not be a sudden collapse of support, but rather a staged reduction as the national mine action programme reaches a series of graduation points (end of full-time technical advisers; end of dedicated funding for standalone mine action; etc.).

**Recommendation 7 – For countries where the EC has large mine action portfolios, commission country-level reviews of EC-funded mine action.**

The scope of a regional evaluation is, by nature, very broad. As well, because the EC does not have regional programmes for mine action, the subjects of the exercise were a number of distinct but concrete country programmes, coupled with a more conceptual issue – the gap existing in the absence of a regional programme.

Time did not allow an adequate evaluation of the EC mine action portfolios in any of the three countries visited. However, the evaluation team prepared fairly extended reports following each of the country missions, in part because we needed to have a solid grasp of the country context and the evolution of the overall national mine action programme in order to assess the EC portfolios. Feedback suggests these country mission reports have been well-received by the EC Delegations in those countries and by other stakeholders who have reviewed the drafts.

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<sup>102</sup> See for example, A sector approach to working with developing countries, [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/sector-approach/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/sector-approach/index_en.htm)

Our impression is that these broad reviews of country mine action programmes will generally be more valuable to EC Delegations than a regional evaluation. Some of the EC Delegations have commissioned evaluations of individual projects, which can assess operational and technical issues and the performance of implementing partners, but which provide less guidance to the Delegations on their essential task – that of programming EC assistance for mine action in a particular country over a specific time.

Accordingly, we recommend that, where the size of the mine action portfolio warrants, EC Delegations should commission periodic evaluations of the overall country programme in the context of the country's changing political economy and the evolution of the overall national mine action programme.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Such evaluations could also be commissioned by a focal point in Brussels or at the regional level. With modest modification, country programme evaluations could be undertaken as joint exercises with other donors (e.g. EU member states active in mine action in a country).

## ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

### Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in Africa 2002-2007

#### 1. BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).<sup>104</sup> These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: *The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.*

The APL Regulation goes on to state: *Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions...* (Article 14)

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007<sup>105</sup> further specifies that “*more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact*” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:<sup>106</sup>

• Africa	• Caucasus-Central Asia	• Latin America
• Asia-Pacific	• Europe	• Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,<sup>107</sup> while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

<sup>104</sup> Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

<sup>105</sup> This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

<sup>106</sup> Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:

- provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies;
- train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
- support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

<sup>107</sup> Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, *Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004*.

## 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

### Overall objective:

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Africa to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

### Specific objectives:

- To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
  - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
  - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
  - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in Africa;
  - EC strategy documents for Africa or major sub-regions in Africa;
- To analyse the allocation of funds among mine-affected states in Africa, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
- To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
  - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
  - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
  - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries;
- To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in Africa;
- To assess the potential impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines on future mine action support from the EC to Africa;
- To make recommendations to improve the identification, the definition, the implementation and the impact of EC-funded mine projects;
- To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine action programmes in Africa and globally.

### Expected results

The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Africa, and to particular mine-affected countries in Africa, since 2002. It shall incorporate more detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other donors, and UN agencies.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:

- Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
- Desk Research
- Country Missions
  - o Angola
  - o Somalia (& Nairobi)
  - o Sudan
- Analysis and Reporting

#### Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team will comprise:

- Ted Paterson, GICHD Head of Evaluation (Team Leader)
- Vera Bohle, GICHD Evaluation Officer
- Leonie Barnes, GICHD National Mine Action Standards Officer
- Mohamed Ahmed, GICHD Regional Coordinator for MENA and East Africa
- Pamela Rebelo, Consultant

CVs of each team member are attached in Annex 2.

#### Country Missions

The proposed timing of the country missions, and the evaluation team members travelling to each, is as follows:

Country	Timing	Team Members
Angola	28 March-5 April*	Vera Bohle & Pamela Rebelo
Somalia	26 March-3 April*	Ted Paterson & Mohamed Ahmed
Sudan	20-27 March*	Vera Bohle (to Khartoum)
	10 April-??*	Leonie Barnes (to Juba & Yei)

\* To be confirmed

As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and collect documents and data from:

- EC delegations
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
- other key government officials (e.g. representatives from ministries of finance and planning; regional governments; etc.)
- representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

In addition, Ted Paterson and (perhaps) Vera Bohle will attend the joint EC-AU Workshop, currently planned for April in Addis Ababa, and will take the opportunity to meet with officials

from the EC Delegation in Addis, Ethiopian mine action officials, and the African Union secretariat.

#### **Additional data collection**

Additional information will be obtained from:

- Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available);
- Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
- Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC Delegations, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations' headquarters and on the field, and beneficiary countries' officials, etc.);
- EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
- National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies from the focus countries
- Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine action) and the World Bank
- Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
- Other sources, as appropriate.

#### **4. OUTPUTS**

A detailed evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and data collection stage (estimated for 24 February 2007).

A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.

A draft report will be prepared and distributed for comments within one month of the end of the joint EC-AU workshop in Addis (dates still to be confirmed).

A final report will be submitted within two weeks of the submission of comments from the EC delegations, EC in Brussels, and other stakeholders.

All reports will be in English.

## ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY AND LIST OF PEOPLE MET

### ANGOLA

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>Tuesday 27 March and Wednesday 28 March Pamela Rebelo and Vera Bohle arrive in Luanda</b>		
Thurs. 29 March	EC Delegation Angola	Dominique Albert, Rural Development Adviser
		Walter Viegas, Rural Development
		Rogério Castro, Technical Demining Adviser to UTA
	CED/INAD/FAA	Eng Leonardo Severino Sapalo, Director General INAD and member of CED
		Dora Domingas Gristavao, Administrations Director INAD
		Ernesto Chiquito, CED Operations
	CNIDAH	Edgar dos Santos Lourenço - Planning Studies and Operations Assistant
		Rita Jesus, Chief of Planning
		Manuel Buta, Chief of Operations
	UTA	Faustino Lourenco, Chief of Programming
WFP	Bradley Guerrant, Country Director	
Friday 30 March	NPA	Oddvar Bjorknes Resident Representative
		Rebecca Thomson Director, Demining Programme
	Intersos	Gianpaolo Tongiorigi, Programme Manager
	HALO Trust	Helen Gray, Project Officer
	MgM	Hendrik Ehlers, Director
Monday 2 May	Swiss Cooperation	Roland Beutler, Administrator
	Embassy of USA	Doreen P. Bailey, Political Secretary
		Nina Maria, Fite Adviser, Political and Economic Affairs
	Embassy of Japan	Mitsuo Takahashi, Second Secretary
	Embassy of Norway	Paul Sverre Tharaldsen, Second Secretary
	UNDP	Alfredo Teixeira, Deputy Resident Representative
Marc Bonnet, Chief Technical Adviser		
Tuesday 3 May	EC delegation Angola	Dominique Albert
		Walter Viegas
		João Gabriel Ferreira, Ambassador, Head of Delegation
<b>Wednesday 4 May + Thursday 5 May departure Vera Bohle and Pamela Rebelo</b>		

**SOMALIA**

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>Weekend 24-25 April – Evaluation team arrives Nairobi</b>		
Mon. 26 March	UNDP Somalia	Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
Tues. 27 March	UNDP Somalia	UN Security Briefing (David Lavery, Field Security Coordination Officer)
		Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
		Eric Overvest, Deputy Resident Representative
		Sidi Zahabi, Programme Manager, ROLS
Wed. 28 March	EC Delegation – Somalia	Richard Hands, Counsellor
		Marcelino Benet, Field Officer, Garowe
	Danish Demining Group	Nick Bateman, Representative
<b>Thursday 29 April – Evaluation team flies to Hargeisa</b>		
Thurs. 29 March	UNDP Mine Action office, Somaliland	Mark Frankish, MA Operations Advisor
		Ali Ugaas, National Mine Action Officer
	ROLS, Somaliland	Fatima Ibrahim, Area Coordinator, ROLS
Fri. 30 March	Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC)	Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, Programme Manager
		Hamoud Ali, Admin & Finance Officer
		Tour of SMAC facilities
	Survey Action Centre (SAC)	Nidaa Zein, Survey Manager
	Handicap International	Dahib Mohamed Odwaa, MRE Project Manager
	DDG	Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager
Sat. 31 March	Ministry of Defence	Aden Mohamed Mire, Minister
	National Demining Agency	Ismail Hashi Madar, Chairman
	HALO Trust	Neil Ferrao, Somaliland Desk Officer
		Christopher Pym, Operations Manager
Hassan Kossar, Operations Officer		
	Lulay Goitom, Office/GIS Officer	
	European Commission	Andre ?, Regional Coordinator
Sun. 1 April	Police	Mohamed Segadi Herla, Commissioner
		Omer Abdallah, EOD Commander
	SMAC	Debriefing
	UNDP Mine Action office	Debriefing
<b>Monday, 2 April – Evaluation team flies to Garowe</b>		
Mon. 2 April	Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC)	Abdirizak Isse Husein, Programme Manager
		Abdiaziz Yousuf Ahmed, IMSMA/Ops Officer
	EC Area Office	Marcelino Benet, Field Officer, Garowe
Tues. 3 April	Ministry of Planning	Ali Ahmed Gamuti, Vice Minister
		Ali Yusuf Hosh, Director General
	Ministry of Interior	Mohamud Sofe Hassan, Director General
	ROLS Area Office	Abdirahim Abikar, Area Coordinator
Wed. 4 April	Police Department	Col. Sayid Jama Abdulli, Vice Commissioner
		Major Abshir Osman Ali, EOD Commander
		??, EOD Team Leader
	<i>Daraweesh</i>	Yasin Salad Galeyr, Chief, Operations
<b>Thursday, 5 April – Ted Paterson flies to Nairobi, Ahmed Mohamed remains in Garowe</b>		
Fri. 6 April	UNDP Somalia	Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action



## NORTH SUDAN

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>21<sup>st</sup> March Evaluation officer Departs Berlin, arrives in Khartoum</b>		
Thursday 22 March	EC Delegation	Achim Ladwig, First Secretary Mustafa Yassin, Programme Assistant
Friday 23, Saturday 24 March	EC Delegation	Achim Ladwig
Sun. 25 March	MAG	Frederic Maio, Project Manager North Sudan
	EC Delegation	Maria Horno Comet, Operations Coordinator
	UK Department for International Development (Sudan)	Alicia Herbert, Social Development Advisor
	WFP	Marian Yun, Donor Relations Officer
Mon. 26 March	JASMAR	Dr. Hussein Elobeid, General Manager
	UNDP	Qadeem Khan Tariq, Senior Technical Advisor
	NMAC	Baballa Biraima Baballa, Deputy Director
		Yousif M. Osman
	UNMAO	Jim Pansegrouw, Programme Manager
		Jacobus Nieuwoudt, Operations Officer
		Akiko Kobayakawa, Programme Officer
		Mohammed Kabir, Chief of Information
	Christina Greene, External Relations	
Tuesday 27 March	EC Delegation	Ben Wilkinson, National QA Coordinator
		Paul Symonds, Food Security Coordinator
		Eulogio Montijano, Rural Development Coordinator
	Worldbank	Joseph Hoenen, Senior Operations Officer
	FSD	David Tooke, Deputy Programme Manager
	Embassy of Japan	Yoichiro Toda, Attaché
	EC Delegation	Achim Ladwig, Mustafa Yassin
<b>Wednesday, 28th March – Evaluation officer flies to Angola</b>		

## SOUTH SUDAN

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>11-13<sup>th</sup> April Evaluation officer Departs Geneva, arrives Juba 13<sup>th</sup> April</b>		
Friday. 13 April	UNMAO Regional South	Simon Porter, Deputy Programme Manager
	EU Regional Office	Brigitta Brosskinsky
Sat.14 April	Juba	Simon Porter, UNMAO
		Ulrich Tietze, Technical Adviser, UNDP
		Bodil Jacobsen, Programme Manager, DDG
		Tommy Thompson, WFP, Roads Manager
		NPA – Rune Kristian Andersson, Programme Manager
Sun. 15 April	Juba	MAG, Phillip Halsfield, Technical Operations Manager
Mon. 16 April	UNMAO Juba	Simon Porter, Deputy Programme Manager,
		Paul Eldred, Regional Operations Officer
	Danish Demining Group	Bodil Jacobsen, Programme Manager, DDG
	ECHO Regional Office	James Duku, Programme Officer
Tues.17	New Sudan Mine Action	Mr Jukuch Barach Barach

April	Directorate	Ms Margaret XXXX
	FSD	Alex van Roy, Programme Manager
Wed. 18 April	Ministry of Roads and transport	Dr Desmond Wannu, Secretary
	Ministry of Finance	Cancelled
	Ministry of Agriculture	Cancelled
	UNDP	UlrichTietze, Technical Adviser, UNDP
<b>Thursday, 19th April – Evaluation officer flies to Nairobi</b>		
Fri. 20 April	WFP	Tommy Thompson, WFP
	MAG	Abigail Hartley, Programme Manager, MAG
Sat.21 April	Nairobi	Research
<b>22 – 23<sup>rd</sup> April – Evaluation officer returns to Geneva (flight delayed by 10 hours)</b>		

## ANNEX 3 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005 (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>)

Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa, 20 Oct. 2006 (<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r13004.htm>)

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