

REGIONAL EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION SUPPORT IN ASIA-PACIFIC 2002-2008

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Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Support in Asia-Pacific: 2002-2008, Geneva, February 2009

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ACRONYMS

AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office	M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines	MAC	Mine Action Centre
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations	MAG	Mines Advisory Group
AXO	Abandoned ordnance	MAPU	Mine Action Planning Unit
BAC	Battle Area Clearance	MDD	Mine Detecting Dog
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions	MDG	Millennium Development Goal
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority	MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre	MRE	Mine Risk Education
CMVIS	Cambodian Mine Victim Information System	NDO	National Demining Office
COPE	Co-operative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	NIP	National Indicative Programme
DEVCO	EC Directorate General for Development	NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
DIPECHO	Disaster preparedness/mitigation programme	NPA	Norwegian Peoples' Aid
EC	European Commission	NRA	National Regulatory Authority
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office	NSA-LA	Non-State Actors & Local Authorities
ECOSORN	Economic and Social Relaunch of the Northwest	NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan (Cambodia)
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights	NSEDP	National Socio-Economic Development Plan (Laos)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	PBA	Programme-Based Approach
EU	European Union	PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
FSD	Fondation Suisse de Déminage	PTF	Project Task Force
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	QA	Quality Assurance
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	QC	Quality Control
HALO	Hazardous-Area Life support Organisation	RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
HI	Handicap International	RELEX	EC Directorate General for External Relations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	SAL	Safer Access to Land (an ECOSORN component)
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards	SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action	TA	Technical Advisor
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation	TOR	Terms of Reference
IRD	Integrated Rural Development	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
KR	Khmer Rouge	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development	UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam	USD	United States Dollar
LUPU	Land Use Planning Unit	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
		VA	Victim Assistance

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).¹ These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of an integrated European policy. The Regulation states the need to regularly assess operations financed by the Community and that the European Commission (EC) shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine action. To implement these provisions, the EC commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004 and entered into an agreement with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the six regions, one of which is Asia-Pacific.

The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. The evaluation does not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Cambodia and Laos were selected for country missions, with other countries in the region covered by desk research.

The Evaluation Team comprised Ted Paterson (GICHD) and Dr. Mao Vanna (independent consultant) for the Cambodia mission, and Ted Paterson and Erik Tollefsen (both GICHD) for Laos. The desk study was conducted by Ted Paterson, assisted by Nara Weigel and Ginevra Cucinotta.

The main constraint in this study – which did not prove serious – was access to some of documents relating to tenders and contracts for mine action services.

OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION IN ASIA-PACIFIC

For the periods covered by the two EC APL Strategies, total EC funding to mine action in the Asia-Pacific region fell somewhat, both in absolute terms (a 30% drop from € 13.6 million to € 9.4 million) and as a percentage of global total of EC-funding to mine action.

Mine Action funding to the Asia-Pacific

Period	Total EC Mine Action Funding	EC Mine Action Funding for Asia-Pacific	% for Asia-Pacific
pre-2002	n.a.	€ 10.3 million	--
2002-2004	€ 145.2 million	€ 13.6 million	9.6%
2005-2007	€ 141.1 million	€ 9.4 million	6.7%
2008	n.a.	€ 2.2 million	--


Sources: Total EC funding – Landmine Monitor 2003-2008; Funding for Asia-Pacific – our data.

This is a very modest amount given the scale of the problem in the region.

¹ Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

Significant albeit declining funding was provided from both ECHO and the APL thematic budget lines during both periods covered by the EC Strategies. In 2005-07, large sums were provided for mine action from a variety of global or regional thematic programmes. Throughout the 2002-2007 period, no EC funding for mine action appears to have come from the country envelopes.

EC funding for mine action in Asia-Pacific



EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR ASIA-PACIFIC

The problem of explosives contamination is not reflected explicitly in the EC Strategy for Asia. However, one component of this strategy for Association of South-East Asian Nation (ASEAN) members is Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border security. Demining would be an important supporting element to the implementation of any agreement to resolve the current border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. As such, EC support to a cross-border demining initiative could be extremely relevant to this component of the EC Regional Strategy.

EC strategy and programming documents for most of these countries have also highlighted the explosives contamination problems.² Thus, EC assistance to mine action has also been relevant from the perspective of EC strategy and programming documents.

COORDINATION

Donor coordination often represents a problem for the EC in Asia-Pacific. The human and financial resources available to the (sub-) Delegations in the region are, for the most part, modest. At the same time, efforts to implement the *Paris Declaration* and to enhance aid effectiveness typically raise aid management transaction costs in the short-term (i.e. until General Budget Support schemes and Programme Based Approaches [PBA] can be formulated and agreed). This makes it extremely difficult for the (sub-) Delegation to adequately cover non-focus sectors.

In recent years, AusAID has served as an ‘anchor donor’ for mine action in both Cambodia and Laos, with knowledgeable and experienced personnel plus medium-term financial commitments and some flexibility in how these are allocated. In Laos for example, AusAID was able to step-in quickly to keep the HI-B UXO programme running when the sub-Delegation learned that the funds programmed for Laos from the APL budget line would not be forthcoming. AusAID ‘bridge finance’ allowed the sub-Delegation to explore other funding possibilities, which eventually proved successful. This experience suggests that there would be significant benefits if the EC Delegations and EU member state embassies could implement the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*.

² The EC Strategy Paper for Burma/Myanmar: 2007-2013 includes only incidental remarks on landmine contamination.

In recent years, two joint UXO sector evaluations have been commissioned in Laos (by UNDP and UXO Lao/NRA) and a joint donor evaluation on the mine action sector was commissioned in Cambodia. Such programme-wide evaluations have many advantages over individual project evaluations and generally provide a better basis for programming decisions, particularly for marginal donors such as the EC for mine action in the Asia-Pacific region that do not have the funds or expertise on hand to maintain a coherent programme and coordinate with the government and other donors to the sector.

Coordination among ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) appears to have worked reasonably well in Sri Lanka and Laos. LRRD – at least in the context of EC development agencies continuing support for ECHO-financed initiatives – was not achieved in Cambodia. In spite of a positive evaluation of ECHO funded projects with a number of NGO operators, the sub-Delegation decided not to continue support to standalone mine action projects. From a broader perspective, however, the sub-Delegation's decision to incorporate funds for mine action within a large integrated rural development (IRD) project seems both appropriate and a good example of LRRD.

COUNTRY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

CAMBODIA

Cambodia is severely impacted by landmines (particularly in the north-west) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW – throughout most of the country, but heaviest in the east). The mine action programme started in 1992 under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), followed in late 1993 by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), which served both the national mine action centre (MAC) and the largest operator.

A corruption scandal led to the resignation of CMAC's director in 1999, but subsequently he was appointed as Secretary-General to the new national authority – the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) – when it was established in 2000. Accordingly, CMAA has received only modest donor support and has never adequately discharged its responsibilities.

In spite of these difficulties, Cambodia's mine action programme has many strengths because a very decentralised system has evolved. Most of the funds for demining are in the hands of the operators, which gives them significant independence to determine their priorities. Increasingly however, the operators are selecting tasks from preference lists established by the 'bottom-up' Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) process. Priorities are also established by a number of community development and integrated rural development (IRD) projects that incorporate mine action components. The largest of these is the EC-funded Economic and Social Relaunch of the Northwest provinces in Cambodia (ECOSORN) project, which has a Safer Access to Land (SAL) component – comprising demining and land titling – in lieu of a € 5 million standalone mine action project that had originally been included in the National Indicative Programme: 2002-04.

Mine action features prominently in Cambodia's Millennium Development Goals, the Government's 'Rectangular Strategy, and the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP), which serves as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Regardless, EC assistance to mine action has been limited, in part because the country financial envelope is modest and in part due to concerns over the CMAA Secretary-General. Since 2002, about 40% of the € 3.7 million in EC mine action funding to Cambodia was provided by ECHO. Most of the rest is represented by an ECOSORN sub-contract for demining (about € 1.17 from the original € 5 million standalone mine action project).

The EC Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2007 had also programmed € 1.5 million for Cambodia,

which ultimately financed two grant agreements of € 500,000 each for victim assistance projects. These two projects had not begun at the time of the mission, but both build on established programmes run by experienced NGOs and there is every reason to expect the projects will be effective.

The demining component of ECOSORN is also likely to prove effective in spite of serious project design flaws and start-up problems. The plans for the SAL component were not properly elaborated in the financing agreement and there was no provision for technical assistance in either demining and land titling, which took a year to rectify. In part because of this, there were a number of serious problems with the Terms of Reference in the tender issued for demining, which could not be rectified because of time pressure imposed by EC administrative procedures.³ In the end, ECOSORN received only one proposal for demining. Our calculations suggest that achievement of the demining target will cost approximately \$3 million, for which the contractor will receive only \$1.5 million from ECOSORN. This implies that other donors are cross-subsidising the EC-funded project by approximately \$1.5 million.⁴

In the first days following the award of contract, the demining contractor recommended to ECOSORN management that risk reduction measures (MRE for ECOSORN and sub-contractor personnel plus survey of all planned rural infrastructure works) be undertaken immediately. For various reasons, this recommendation was not acted upon straight away. In February 2008, an equipment operator working on an ECOSORN rural infrastructure task drove into a suspected minefield and exposing an anti-tank mine, which did not explode. A CMAC rapid response team located another four anti-tank mines nearby. Had the original antitank mine detonated, the equipment would have been completely destroyed and the operator almost certainly killed, while others in the vicinity could have been killed or injured. Had the other anti-tank mines exploded, the damage would have been correspondingly greater. About the same time a large UXO was discovered embedded in a dam on another ECOSORN worksite.

The ECOSORN project yields a number of important lessons, including:⁵

- When a project entails working in an area that may be contaminated by explosives:
 - Initial design surveys should investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or around work sites
 - Arrangements for mine action support should be made
- For projects entailing civil engineering works (especially infrastructure reconstruction), land preparation for agriculture, etc. in areas that may suffer from explosives contamination, the following additional steps should be taken:
 - Initial design surveys, social and environmental impacts surveys, etc. should:
 - investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or around work sites
 - investigate the potential future dangers from people migrating to contaminated areas because infrastructure has been built or reconstructed, land has been improved for agriculture, etc., and
 - incorporate appropriate risk mitigation measures in the project design based on the findings of these investigations
 - Mine action experts should be involved in the preparation of all statements of work and

³ The main problem was the 'D+3' rule. This refers to EC procedures for external operations that require 'contracts implementing the financing agreement' to be signed within three years of the budgetary commitment by the Commission. For ECOSORN, the deadline was by 16 November 2007.

⁴ While cross-subsidisation is not uncommon in aid, in this case better outcomes could have been achieved in a more transparent manner via a grant agreement with one of the operators to provide demining support to ECOSORN. See the chapter on Cambodia in this report, plus the *Cambodia Mission Report*, for an extended discussion of this issue.

⁵ See the Cambodia section of this report or the *Cambodia Country Mission* report for a more detailed list.

- contracts/grant agreements for mine action activities
- Mine action risk mitigation measures should be in place before work on civil engineering or land preparation components begins
 - All tenders for civil engineering works should make explicit reference to the possibility of explosives contamination and that all sub-contractor personnel assigned to the project shall be required to complete a workplace safety Mine Risk Education (MRE) course prior to deployment in areas where contamination is suspected
 - As there is a residual risk to equipment and personnel when undertaking road reconstruction projects in contaminated regions, supplemental risk reduction measures (e.g. armour-protected equipment; fully-enclosed operator cabs; minimum safety distances for observers; standby demining support) should be required for specific sections of a road where the risk of contamination is high.
- For both workplace safety and liability reasons, in some cases the EC may wish to require contactors and sub-contractors to provide insurance to their workers that covers legacy of war issues such as explosives contamination.
 - Contracts or other agreements with organisations responsible for demining support services to development activities should include clear statements that the overarching responsibility of the demining operator is the mitigation of explosives contamination risks for workers and the intended beneficiaries and that, where there is reasonable concern that workers or beneficiaries could be killed or injured, prior administrative approval is not required for any necessary and reasonable actions.

Recommendations⁶

1. The EC sub-Delegation should meet with managers from ECOSORN, CMAA, and the Socio-Economic section of CMAA to discuss lessons learned from the experience to date with ECOSORN, and possible steps to enhance the coordination between mine action and rural development (including the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries – MAFF).
2. The EC should let it be known to the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia that it is willing to support the implementation of an agreement to permanently resolve the current dispute centring on the Preah Vihear temple. Such support could include financial assistance for a joint effort to demine the disputed area, its vicinity and that adjacent to Preah Vihear temple, as was agreed at the 28 July 2008 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Siem Reap.
3. The EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*.
4. EC headquarters should develop and issue clear principles and guidelines for its personnel responsible for mine action projects or development projects in areas affected by explosives contamination.⁷

LAO PDR

The U.S. dropped more bombs on Laos during the Vietnam War than all combatants combined used in the Second World War. As such, Laos has probably the worst explosives contamination

⁶ The Cambodia Mission Report contained another recommendation concerning the classification of the ECOSORN project in Cambodia's aid database which is not relevant for the regional report.

⁷ EC headquarters recently issued *Guidelines on European Community Mine Action*, which is a sound document but needs to be supplemented by more detailed guidance on technical mine action issues.

problem (mainly unexploded ordnance – UXO) in the world. A survey undertaken over 20 years after the cessation of bombing showed that 25% of all communities in the country were impacted by contamination.

The UXO programme was started by MAG in 1994 and the following year the government established UXO LAO as the national operator, which eventually assumed responsibility for all operations. The programme continued expanding until 2002, when a drop in funding led to a UXO sector review that recommended a variety of reforms. In response, the government approved a 10-year UXO sector strategy, created the National Regulatory Authority (NRA – a combined national authority and MAC), and allowed international NGOs and firms to resume clearance operations. Funding has rebounded, and productivity – whether measured in metres squared or devices destroyed – has increased significantly.

UXO contamination features prominently in the current national socio-economic development plan (NSED), where UXO clearance is one of three ‘poverty-focussed national programmes’. The NSED sets a clear and ambitious target – to clear UXO from all high priority agricultural areas by 2013.

The EC has provided modest but steady support for the UXO sector since 1998, with most of the funding coming from ECHO, the APL thematic budget line or, most recently, other thematic programmes. No funds have been provided from the EC country envelope since the adoption of the EU Mine Action Strategy in 2002.

The dependence on global or regional programmes – with no provision for UXO funding from the country envelope – led to a problem that threatened the continuation of an EC-financed UXO project implemented by HI. The € 1.5 million earmarked in the EU Mine Action Strategy for Laos in 2006-07 failed to materialise. Fortunately, AusAID stepped in with A\$500,000 to allow the HI project to continue until the EC sub-Delegation arranged an alternative source of funding.

The EC currently finances five UXO projects, all of which appear to be soundly conceived and promise to be effective:

1. € 100,000 from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to COPE (a consortium of international NGOs) and the NRA for a national UXO victims survey
2. € 500,000 from the thematic programme for Non-State Actors & Local Authorities (NSA-LA) to HI for a UXO clearance and risk education project in Savannakhet
3. € 500,000 from the thematic programme for Non-State Actors & Local Authorities to MAG for UXO clearance and institutional strengthening of provincial authorities in Khammoune
4. € 150,000 from the NSA-LA programme to UXO Lao in support for its programme (risk education; survey; roving tasks/spot clearance; and area clearance) in Attapeu province, and
5. € 150,000 from the NSA-LA programme to UXO Lao in support for its programme (risk education; survey; roving tasks/spot clearance; and area clearance) in Sekong province

In spite of modest human and financial resources at its disposal, the EC sub-Delegation has done a good job in maintaining steady support for the UXO sector in Laos. This is relevant to the country’s need and in terms of both national development plans and the CSPs. Most support has gone to experienced and well-established INGOs which, for the most part, have implemented the projects effectively.⁸ The sub-Delegation – together with ECHO when it had an office in Laos – have been able to link relief, rehabilitation and development.

⁸ The two recent grants from the NSA-LA programme to UXO Lao represent the first time the EC has directly funded a state agency within the UXO sector.

The major issues for future EC support to the UXO sector in Laos are:

- the APL thematic budget line has been terminated, and Laos is ineligible for the closest alternative (the Instrument for Stability)
- the performance of the UXO sector has significantly increased in recent years
- the Government has instituted reforms to further strengthen the UXO sector
- both the NSEDP and the NGPES place priority on the UXO programme, which operates largely in the priority 47 very poor districts and is one of the three national poverty eradication programmes
- increasing evidence suggests that UXO contamination accentuates poverty, while UXO clearance is correlated with poverty reduction
- the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was signed in Oslo by 94 countries, including Lao PDR (which was one of four countries that immediately ratified)

Lacking much flexibility within its geographic envelope, the sub-delegation has shown ingenuity in obtaining modest amounts of funding for UXO sector. However, given that Lao PDR is a signatory of the CCM and the increased priority given to the UXO sector by the Government, the case for additional and increased EC funding is greatly strengthened.

SRI LANKA

Explosives contamination from mines and ERW stems from two decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). International mine action funding began in the late 1990s and has waxed and waned in an inverse relationship to the level of conflict, reaching a peak during the 2002-06 ceasefire. Since then, most funding has been closely tied to the need to resettle people displaced by the conflict or by the December 2004 tsunami.

Since the February 2002 ceasefire, the EC has provided over € 14 million in funding for mine action. Until 2005, most EC funding came via ECHO. However, by early 2004, ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO had agreed that responsibility for funding mine action should be assumed by the latter two agencies.⁹ In 2004 RELEX began funding mine action projects in Sri Lanka, drawing both on the APL thematic budget line and that for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing Countries. Since 2002, funding from both ECHO and RELEX has accounted for about 47% of the total, with only 6% coming from AIDCO's geographic envelope for Sri Lanka.

BURMA/MYANMAR

The Burmese/Myanmar government forces and a number of ethnic armed groups continue to lay antipersonnel mines in significant numbers. Landmines are concentrated on its borders with Bangladesh, India and Thailand, and in eastern parts of the country. No humanitarian demining programs are known to exist, although there are reports of sporadic clearance by the military and of 'village demining' (i.e. informal demining), as well as 'atrocious demining' (e.g. civilians being forced to carry or remove mines against their will).

In 2007, at least 438 new mine/ERW casualties were reported to Landmine Monitor, a significant increase from the 243 casualties reported in 2006. Operating in Thailand, the ICRC, Handicap International, and other international NGOs provide assistance to civilian war casualties and others with disabilities from Burma/Myanmar.

⁹ In 2005, following the tsunami, ECHO again funded some mine action projects, including € 800,000 for post-tsunami demining (survey and clearance) and € 200,000 for mine action technical assistance capacity in the field. In 2008 ECHO again resumed funding to support demining in support of the resettlement of IDPs.

In 2003-04, the EC funded three mine action projects based in Thailand for people from Burma/ Myanmar.

- € 500,000 to the ICRC for prosthetics, MRE and advocacy
- € 200,000 in 2003 to HI for MRE and victim assistance, followed by another € 250,000 the following year

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS¹⁰

1. Should an enhanced mechanism be created for EC financial support to address explosives contamination problems, indicative programming allocations should be based mainly on the basis of needs and opportunities rather than the strategic importance of a country to the EU.
2. The EC should advise ASEAN Foreign Ministers that its programme on Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border security, could address cross border demining/explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) initiatives when such actions are needed to allow the permanent demarcation of borders between ASEAN member states.
3. In addition to the new *Guidelines on European Community Mine Action*, EC headquarters should identify and pre-qualify a roster of mine action experts who could provide technical advice to delegates in mine-affected countries who are responsible for mine action.
4. In all explosives contaminated Asia-Pacific countries, the EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*.
5. EC delegations, ideally in conjunction with donor representatives from EU member states in the country, should encourage and support programme-wide evaluations of national mine action programmes, and take the outcomes from such evaluations into consideration when making programming decisions.
6. The EC should put a greater emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to demining, and should consider a specific sub-strategy for demining and LRRD. Given the importance of ECHO funding in the early stages of many mine action programmes, DG ECHO should consider a focal point for mine action at its headquarters to achieve this aim.

¹⁰ See also the recommendations stemming from the Cambodia country case study.

1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).¹¹ These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy. Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that:

“The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.”

The APL Regulation goes on to state:

“Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions (...).”¹²

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007¹³ further specifies that “*more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact*” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:

Africa
Asia-Pacific

Caucasus-Central Asia
Europe

Latin America
Middle East

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,¹⁴ while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on:

¹¹ Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

¹² Article 14

¹³ This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

¹⁴ Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, *Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004*.

- (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and
- (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.

Thus, the evaluation does not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.¹⁵

Overall objective of the evaluation:

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine action in the Asia-Pacific region to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

Specific objectives of the evaluation:

- To assess the **relevance** of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
 - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
 - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
 - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in the Asia-Pacific region 2002-2007;
 - EC strategy documents for the Asia-Pacific region
- To analyze the **allocation** of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Asia-Pacific region, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);¹⁶
- To assess the **effectiveness** of EC-funded mine action support in:
 - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
 - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
 - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/programmes of the beneficiary countries;
 - supporting local mine action organisations;
- To assess the **coordination** among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the impact of **deconcentration** on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in the Asia-Pacific region, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
- To assess the adequacy of the **EC national strategies and plans**, and the effectiveness of implementation;
- To assess the existence of an **'exit strategy'** for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);
- To assess the **linkages** between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
- To assess the impact of the **end of the specific budget line** for anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new **"stability instrument"** on future mine action support from the EC to the Asia-Pacific region;

¹⁵ For this evaluation, we made a more in-depth assessment of the mine action component of the ECOSORN project in Cambodia because it illustrated a number of critical programming issues.

¹⁶ This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that "Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty" is one of the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.

- To make **recommendations** to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-funded mine projects;
- To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among mine action programs in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The full Terms of Reference (TOR) are attached as Appendix 1.

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Two countries in the region were selected for country missions, while others were covered only by a desk review.

The evaluation was implemented in four phases:

- Planning, desk research and data collection in Geneva
- Country missions to Cambodia by Ted Paterson and Dr. Mao Vanna
- Country mission to Laos by Ted Paterson and Erik Tollefsen
- Analysis and reporting

Ted Paterson, Erik Tollefsen (both GICHD) and Dr. Mao Vanna comprised the Evaluation Team. The key phases of the exercise were organized as follows:

Country	Timing	Team Members
Cambodia	18-29 Feb	Ted Paterson & Mao Vanna
	19-30 Apr ¹⁷	Ted Paterson & Mao Vanna
Interviews in Bangkok	1 May	Ted Paterson
Lao PDR	14-29 June	Ted Paterson & Erik Tollefsen

As the evaluation did not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team members spent most of their time in capitals and major centres for meetings and to collect documents and data from:

- EC sub-delegations and the Bangkok delegation
- the ECHO office in Bangkok
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators
- other government officials

The Evaluation Team undertook brief field visits to:

- Siem Reap in Cambodia to the main project offices of the Economic and Social Re-launch of the Northwest Provinces (ECOSORN) project

¹⁷ The April mission was undertaken mainly for a different project, but the Team undertook a few follow-up meetings related to the EC regional evaluation.

- Savannakhet Province in Lao PDR to visit the field offices and operations of Handicap International-Belgium (HI-B)
- Khammuone Province in Lao PDR to visit the field offices and operations of and Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

Additional information was obtained from:

- The review of:
 - EC CSP and National Indicative Programmes (NIP)
 - Project documents (project proposals, final reports, evaluations, etc., where available)
 - National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies
 - Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
 - Other standard sources of mine action information (e.g. Landmine Monitor Reports)
- A questionnaire survey with 20 questions and a scale ranking from 1 (unimportant issue) to 6 (extremely important issue)

The evaluation team used the standard development evaluation criteria as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) and in International Mine Action Standard 14.10 – The Evaluation of Mine Action Interventions.

LIMITATIONS

The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of certain types of documents (Requests for Proposals; contracts and grant agreements; etc.).

It is also necessary to acknowledge that the completion of the regional evaluation took far longer than anticipated. This stemmed from factors that delayed the Laos country mission and the finalisation of the Cambodia country mission report, coupled with the fact that the evaluation team leader was over-committed in terms of work obligations in the second half of 2008.

2. GENERAL FINDINGS

OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION SUPPORT

TOTAL EC MINE ACTION FUNDING TO THE REGION

For the periods covered by the two EC APL Strategies, total EC funding to mine action in the Asia-Pacific region fell somewhat, both in absolute terms (a 30% drop from € 13.6 million to € 9.4 million) and as a percentage of global total of EC-funding to mine action.

Table 1 – Mine Action funding to the Asia-Pacific


Period	Total EC Mine Action Funding	EC Mine Action Funding for Asia-Pacific	% for Asia-Pacific
pre-2002	n.a.	€ 10.3 million	--
2002-2004	€ 145.2 million	€ 13.6 million	9.6%
2005-2007	€ 141.1 million	€ 9.4 million	6.7%
2008	n.a.	€ 2.5 million	--

Sources: Total EC funding – Landmine Monitor 2003-2008; Funding for Asia-Pacific – our data.

This is a very modest amount given the scale of the problem in the region.¹⁸ By any measure, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are among the top 10 countries in the world in terms of the impact of explosives contamination. Burma/Myanmar had the second highest number of civilian landmine/UXO casualties in the world in 2007 (after Afghanistan). Sri Lanka has less contamination and fewer casualties, but is in the midst of conflict and the contamination exacerbates the difficulties faced by the many internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as reconstruction efforts in former LTTE-controlled areas now under Government control.

Significant albeit declining funding was provided during both periods covered by the EC Strategies from both ECHO and the APL thematic budget lines. In the second period, large sums were provided for mine action from a variety of global or regional thematic programmes.¹⁹ Throughout the 2002-2007 period, no EC funding for mine action appears to have come from the country envelopes.

Figure 1 – EC funding for mine action in Asia-Pacific



¹⁸ In contrast, Angola received € 47.7 million from the EC for mine action from 2002-07 – more than double the amount the EC provided to the entire Asia-Pacific region.

¹⁹ In Sri Lanka for example, 19 10 04 – Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing Countries.

Total EC mine action funding to Asia-Pacific actually exceeded the modest targets set in the two APL Strategies, although allocations from the APL budget line itself were below the amounts shown in the indicative programmes for both periods.

Table 2 – Targets and actual funding for mine action (EUR millions)

	Target		Actual		% Variance	
	APL	Total	APL	Total	APL	Total
2002-2004	€ 4.9	€ 10.8	€ 4.6	€ 13.6	94%	126%
2005-2007	€ 5.1	€ 5.1	€ 2.3	€ 9.4	45%	184%

ALLOCATIONS OF MINE ACTION FUNDING

Allocations among countries

Since 2002, the bulk of all EC mine action funding to Asia-Pacific countries has been allocated to Sri Lanka – 61% compared to 21% for Laos, 14% to Cambodia, and 4% to Burma/Myanmar.

Figure 2 – Allocation of funding by country

In part, this pattern reflects the fact that Sri Lanka has been eligible for ECHO funding for the entire period since 2002, and that ECHO has been the most important source of funding (44% of the € 25.6 million total – see second pie chart). But even excluding ECHO funds, Sri Lanka received 53% of EC mine action funding to the region since 2002, with Laos receiving 28%, Cambodia 15% and Burma/ Myanmar 4%.





Figure 3 – Source of funds since 2002




This allocation is hard to reconcile with the scope of the problems in the countries concerned. Measured by extent of contamination, Cambodia and Laos are certainly far more contaminated than Sri Lanka (and Burma/Myanmar may be as well). Measured by the numbers of casualties, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are all far more impacted than is Sri Lanka.²⁰ Of the four countries that received EC mine action

funding, only Cambodia is a signatory to the APMBC.

²⁰ In 2007, Sri Lanka had 34 casualties – Burma/Myanmar had over 400; Cambodia over 350, and Laos perhaps 200.

The following chart provides the pattern of EC mine action funding to Asia-Pacific countries for as far back as we have obtained figures. What stands out most dramatically is that almost no funding for mine action in Asia-Pacific has come from the EC country envelopes. About 39% came from ECHO, 19% from the APL budget line, and 39% from other budget lines (regional or thematic) or thematic programmes (such as Non-States Actors and Local Authorities).


Figure 4 – Mine action funding by budget line category



Note: 'Thematic' refers both to various regional budget lines and thematic programmes

More fundamentally, except in the case of Sri Lanka, EC mine action assistance to these countries in the period covered by this evaluation (2002-to date) has been extremely modest given the scale of their explosive contamination problems, whether measured in absolute and relative terms. In particular, EC mine action assistance in recent years has been marginal in both Cambodia and Laos, even though these countries have mine/UXO problems that greatly exceed those faced by many countries that have received far more substantial mine action funding from the EC.²¹

Figure 5 – EC mine action funding relative to total from international sources 2002-07²²




²¹ One of the principal conclusions of the Global Assessment on EU Mine Action Strategy was the need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects receive EC funding for mine action. This issue will be explored in detail within the Synthesis Report on the Evaluation of EC Support to Mine Action, planned for 2009.

²² From Landmine Monitor (various years) with adjustments to correct clear cases of incorrect reports of EC funding.

Allocation across mine action components²³

Since 2002, most EC mine action funding went to demining, although the percentage for this (59% of the total) is lower than might be expected given the overall expenditure patterns for mine action in these countries (typically 75% or more of total expenditures are on demining).




The EC has provided very significant sums for victim assistance (VA – 17% of all mine action funding since 2002). The bulk of these funds are likely for general

disability programmes that may target, but are not restricted to, landmine and UXO survivors.

Allocations among different types of recipient agencies

Figure 6 – Funding by type of recipient



The bulk of EC mine action funding (at least 60%²⁴) since 2002 has gone to international NGOs (INGO), most of which are based in an EU member state. UN agencies have received at least 20% (all in Sri Lanka), and smaller amounts have been granted to humanitarian NGOs and the ICRC. A paltry 6% has gone to national organisations, and the bulk of this was via a sub-contract issued by the ECOSORN project.²⁵

²³ Many projects support more than one type of mine action. Calculations are based on what appears to be the principal purpose of each project.

²⁴ We could not determine the recipient of 9% of the EC funding, so the other percentages are given as 'at least'.

²⁵ Somewhat more substantial amounts were provided to CMAC and CMAA in Cambodia prior to 2002.

3. COUNTRY FINDINGS

CAMBODIA²⁶

CONTEXT

Cambodia is one of the countries most affected by explosives contamination,²⁷ stemming from:

- The Vietnam War, when the U.S. dropped enormous quantities of bombs in the north-east to interdict Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and subsequently conducted a clandestine invasion, bringing Cambodia into the conflict, leading ultimately to the overthrow of the U.S.-backed regime by the Khmer Rouge (KR) in 1975;
- The 1979 invasion by the Vietnamese to overthrow the KR, leading to a protracted war between the Vietnamese-backed regime and the KR which did not fully end until 1998. The Vietnamese-backed regime in used forced labour to lay the 600 km ‘K-5’ minefield along the border with Thailand, where the KR had taken refuge. In turn, the KR dug-up Vietnamese landmines and laid their own minefields. Thus, the bulk of the landmine contamination – including the K-5 belt of minefields – is in the north-western provinces;²⁸
- While the large minefields are concentrated along the north-western borders, and the heaviest concentration of ERW is in the north-east, the extended conflicts resulted in contamination throughout much of the country. The Landmine Impact Survey (2000-02) surveyed almost 14,000 communities and found 1,640 (12%) were impacted by mines, and another 5,500 (almost 40%) affected by ERW. In total, the LIS identified 3,037 suspected hazards areas, amounting to 4,466 km² (2.5% of the country).²⁹



The extensive contamination, coupled with internal migration to the heavily mine-affected areas following the end of the war³⁰ and the growth in the scrap-metal trade (leading to ‘harvesting’ UXO), led to extremely high numbers of casualties – almost constant at about 800/year from 2000-2005. In 2006, however, the number of casualties fell by almost 50% (see graph).³¹

HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME³²

Mine action began in Cambodia in 1992 under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). When the UNTAC mandate ended in late 1993, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) became the key national organization, serving as both the national mine action centre (MAC) and the largest operator. In addition, international NGOs established

²⁶ From Paterson and Mao Vanna, 2008, *Cambodia Mission Report*

²⁷ Explosives contamination includes landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). ERW comprises unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).

²⁸ Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear, along with the Pailin municipality.

²⁹ It is agreed that the actual contamination will prove to be far lower than this figure (perhaps only 10%).


³⁰ New migrants are unfamiliar with minefield locations, and may be forced to settle contaminated areas.

³¹ A further 22% fall in casualties occurred in 2007; rates in the 1st quarter of 2008 are down another 15%.

³² Cambodia signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December 1997 and ratified it in July 1999. The Treaty entered into force in January 2000.

programmes, with HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) still implementing large demining operations,³³ and Handicap International Belgium (HI-B) supporting the Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS).

Figure 7 – Landmine and UXO casualties: 2000-2007



CMAC was rocked by a corruption scandal in 1998-99, resulting in the resignation of its Director and a drop in funding. It has since recovered and dramatically enhanced its performance. However, it no longer serves as the national MAC; a role assumed by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), established in 2000.

Formally, the CMAA is a inter-governmental body of high-level officials chaired by the Prime Minister. However, the CMAA Council has never met and only the general secretariat functions. The Secretary-General is the same individual who resigned in the aftermath of the CMAC corruption scandal. Accordingly, CMAA has received only modest donor support and has never adequately discharged its responsibilities. Of particular concern, it has not recorded the survey and clearance work done by the operators, which means it does not have the information needed to formulate national strategies and plans as a basis for coordination.³⁴

In 2004, the Royal Cambodia Government (RCG) also established a government-donor Technical Working Group (TWG) on Mine Action as part of the country's overall aid coordination mechanisms.³⁵

In 2004, a number of donors and the UNDP commissioned a joint evaluation of Cambodia's mine action programme.³⁶ It recommended that CMAA focus on a limited number of responsibilities, transferring to other ministries responsibility for MRE, victim assistance, post-clearance land use, and the mine and ERW mapping/database functions. These recommendations have never been implemented and the functions remain weak within the CMAA.³⁷

Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU) represent an important innovation in Cambodia's mine

³³ In addition, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) conducts demining for its own purposes and in support of large infrastructure projects financed by the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and bilateral donors. There are also a number of private demining firms, and extensive 'village demining'.

³⁴ The main operators maintain their own databases, and CMAA – with the support of NPA – committed to compiling all contamination and clearance data into a single database by mid-August 2008.

³⁵ The TWG is chaired by a Minister of State, who also serves as the Vice-President of the CMAA.

³⁶ Griffen and Keeley, 2004, *Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia*.

³⁷ The evaluation also recommended competitive tendering. UNDP established a new Clearing for Results trust fund for this purpose. However, it appears it will not move to competitive tendering, for reasons discussed later.

action programme. These were originally established as Land Use Planning Units (LUPU) with a dual role: (i) assisting communities in establishing clearance preferences and (ii) ensuring the intended beneficiaries actually received the land. However, a new Land Law in 2001 clarified that the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) is responsible for land titling. The MLMUPC did not recognise the land allocations organised by LUPU. On the verge of collapse, LUPU were reorganised as MAPU, without the land use planning function.

MAPU became the lynchpin in a three-tiered mechanism to establish community preferences for demining. Throughout the year, MAPU work at the village and commune levels to review demining requirements. Annually, they facilitate district workshops at which commune preferences are aggregated into district preference rankings. These are then aggregated into provincial mine action plans by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC). Understandably, the mechanism has experienced some teething problems, but has been improving over time.

The Cambodia mine action programme also features a number of initiatives that incorporate mine action within development projects. The largest of these is the EC-funded Economic and Social Relaunch of the Northwest Provinces in Cambodia (ECOSORN), an EC-funded integrated rural development (IRD) project that is discussed in a following section.

In brief, since the corruption scandal in 1999, a very decentralised system for mine action has evolved in Cambodia. Most of the funds for demining are in the hands of the operators, which gives them significant independence to determine their priorities. Increasingly however, the operators are selecting tasks from the preference lists established by the ‘bottom-up’ MAPU process. Priorities are also established by a number of community development and IRD projects that incorporate mine action components, and by the UNDP-managed Clearing for Results project, which adopts preferences established via the MAPU process.³⁸ Casualties are seen by all groups as a key criterion for setting priorities, and the CMVIS provides very good data on these.

MINE ACTION IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

The "Rectangular Strategy" (July 2004) is the manifesto of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC).³⁹ It has four axes – social stability; regional and international integration; partnership with the international community and the private sector; and macro-economic development – with Good Governance at the core. Agriculture is one of the priority sectors identified in the strategy, and both landmine clearance and land reform are explicitly mentioned as requirements for agricultural development.

In early 2006, the RGC adopted a National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP), which serves as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and lays out how the Rectangular Strategy is to be implemented. The NSDP is also linked tightly with Cambodia's Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The government added a 9th MDG covering de-mining, UXO and victim assistance,⁴⁰ which included targets for 2005, 2010, and 2015, as follows:

³⁸ There is also a large Community-based Mine Risk Reduction (CBMRR) network of community volunteers and district coordinators, managed by CMAC. These can be an excellent source of mine action information.

³⁹ This will be updated by the government elected in mid-2008, but may not change greatly as the same party has formed the Government, under the same Prime Minister.

⁴⁰ Landmines and UXO are also mentioned in a number of places in the NSDP.

Table 3 – Mine action targets in NSDP & MDGs

Indicator	Actual	Targets		
	2005	2005	2010	2015
1. Annual victims	797	500	< 200	0
2. % suspected hazard cleared	50.3%	51%	77%	100%
3. Develop comprehensive victim assistance framework by 2007				

EC SUPPORT FOR CAMBODIA

The EC has only a small sub-Delegation in Phnom Penh, reporting to the Delegation in Bangkok, and a relatively modest development assistance programme in Cambodia, averaging \$25 million/year in 2005-06. Given this, EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and Indicative Programmes (NIP, then MIP)⁴¹ have focussed on a limited number of programming areas (rural development; social services; governance).

The most recent CSP and MIP states that the EC will channel its assistance mainly through sector support programmes, plus general budget support via the a pooled funding mechanism led by the World Bank. This represents continued evolution towards a simpler programming structure. It also reflects reforms to EU aid policies more generally: deconcentration (more authority to the Delegations) and decentralisation (more responsibility to the partner countries to promote national ownership). As well, in line with the *Paris Declaration*, ‘centralised’ projects managed by the EC on behalf of the recipient government are being phased-out, with the bulk of assistance provided via sector support and general budget support.

In addition, EU donors in Cambodia have issued a *European Road Map for Increased Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia*.⁴² Among other actions, the *Road Map* seeks to enhance the Technical Working Groups (TWG) through increased EU participation, co-ordination of EU positions, and systems of mutual representation.

Textbox 1 – The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour

Following a commitment in 2006 to improve the division of labour in EU development assistance, both within and across countries, the EU adopted a number of guiding principles in May 2007:

In country:

1. Each EU donor to work in a maximum of three sectors per partner country
2. Redeploy funds programmed for other sectors
3. EU to support the establishment of lead donor arrangements in all priority sectors.
4. “Delegated cooperation” (one donor delegating another to administer its funding in a given sector) is encouraged.
5. EU to ensure involvement of at least one donor in every sector relevant for poverty reduction. EU donors to limit number of active donors per sector to maximum of five.

Cross-country or regional

6. Principles 1-5 also to be applied at regional levels.
7. EU donors to focus on a limited number of “priority countries.
8. EU donors also commit to address the ‘aid orphans’ issues.

⁴¹ Starting in 2007, the name of these changed from National Indicative Programmes (NIP) to Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (MIP).

⁴² This is in line with the European Consensus on Development (2005), Cambodia’s Aid Effectiveness Plan, and the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour* (2007).

Complementary principles:

9. EU donors deepen self-assessments and evaluations as regards their comparative advantages in sectors and aid modalities.
10. The EU commits to make progress on other dimensions of complementarity, vertical complementarity, and cross-modalities and instruments.
11. Successful implementation requires political and technical support at both the headquarter and field levels.

Sources:

The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour,
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09558.en07.pdf>
 ActionAid & ECDPM, *Whither EC Aid*, 2008

ECHO provided significant assistance following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords but, since 2004, it has scaled down and now restricts itself to its natural disaster preparedness/mitigation programme (DIPECHO), plus the EC Food Security Programme (a global programme). As well, the latest MIP indicates that the EC country programme could be supplemented by initiatives financed under the regional programme for Asia (see textbox) and under other thematic programmes.⁴³

Textbox 2 – Relevant issues in the MIP for Asia: 2007-2010

For potential mine action initiatives, the most likely component of the MIP for Asia is called ASEAN Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Security Field. Its overall objective is to support cooperation and reform in the security field, mainly through a more coherent system of Border Management. More specifically it is meant to strengthen the capacities of the ASEAN Border Management system both at regional cooperation level and at selected Border Crossings.

In Cambodia's case, much of the explosives contamination is in the north-west (bordering Thailand) and the east (bordering Vietnam). In both cases, the contamination straddles the border. As well, Cambodia has unresolved border disputes with both neighbours, including the politically contentious dispute with Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple. More generally, the border dispute has hampered clearance operations along the massive K-5 mine belt. A resolution of this border dispute would enhance regional security and facilitate landmine clearance of the most heavily contaminated areas in both Cambodia and Thailand.

EC ASSISTANCE FOR MINE ACTION

From 1998 to date, we have identified 20 EC-funded mine action projects for Cambodia, totalling just over € 10,275,000.⁴⁴

Before 2002

The EC provided support to mine action in Cambodia prior to the release of the first EC mine action strategy in 2002. Records suggest the EC provided about € 6.6 million from 1998 through 2002. Over half of this funding (58%) appears to have come from special budget lines for rehabilitation and reconstruction in developing countries (B7-6410 and B7-5076), with the remainder provided by ECHO. Most EC funding was provided in support of demining operations, but a significant amount was provided for capacity development for CMAC, CMAA, and Land Use Planning Units (LUPU).

⁴³ Identified thematic areas are democracy & human rights; non-state actors in development; security, migration & asylum; human & social development; and environment and sustainable management of natural resources.

⁴⁴ The list of EC-funded mine action projects in Cambodia is provided in Appendix 4.

Since 2002

Since 2002, slightly more than half of the € 3.65 million in new EC mine action funding commitments to Cambodia have been provided by ECHO. A number of these were evaluated in 2003, with very positive results (Durocher et al, 2003 – see textbox). Since 2004 however, ECHO has restricted its programming in Cambodia to disaster preparedness projects (DIPECHO).

Textbox 3 – Evaluation of ECHO-funded Mine Action Projects in Cambodia

The Evaluation Team obtained a report on three ECHO-funded pilot risk reduction projects conducted by HALO Trust, MAG, and HI-B/CMAC. (Durocher et al) While noting start-up difficulties in each project, the evaluators concluded (p. 159):

“...all three casualty and risk reduction projects have carried out significant interventions that will greatly benefit the villagers in the villages in which they intervened. The high degree of villager satisfaction with the interventions is a good indication that these projects are on the right track...Additional support will ensure that these initiatives attain their full potential and that the mine/UXO casualty and risk reduction models and methodologies developed by these three projects will have a significant impact on mine action programs in Cambodia and elsewhere.”

The authors of the ECHO evaluation also concluded that *“The most important factor [in ongoing high mine/UXO casualty rates] has undoubtedly been the migration of people into highly mine/UXO contaminated areas ... Therein lies the challenge for the humanitarian demining agencies...identifying areas with significant recent population migrations and truncating the casualty profile with appropriate interventions; and identifying areas where there will be significant migrations in the near future and applying proactive preemptive measures.”* (p. 156)

Figure 8 – EC Funding for Mine Action in Cambodia





Figure 9 – Main purpose of EC funding for mine action



CSP 2000-03 and NIP: 2002-04

The NIP 2002-2004 included € 20 million for ECOSORN – an IRD project in the mine-affected provinces in the north-west (discussed later in this report). The NIP also specified € 5 million for demining. However, the EC subsequently decided not to provide the € 5 million directly to the mine action sector. Instead, these funds were added to ECOSORN to finance an additional Safer Access to Land (SAL) ‘result’ covering both mine action and land titling.

The decision not to proceed with a standalone € 5 million demining project appears to have stemmed from dissatisfaction with the results achieved with earlier EC funding to CMAC and CMAA. In 2000, EC headquarters had approved about € 860,000 in dedicated mine action funding for Cambodia. Originally, this was intended for CMAC (then, the national MAC). In light of the CMAC corruption scandal, € 360,000 was awarded instead to Handicap International-Belgium (HI-B) to provide support to the LUPU in two provinces, with the remainder awarded to two firms to provide long- and short-term technical assistance to the newly-established CMAA.

Following passage of the 2001 Land Law, LUPU lost authority to allocate demined land to target beneficiaries, and HI-B decided not to continue its support.⁴⁵ As well, progress at CMAA was discouraging.⁴⁶ Following discussions, the Vice President of CMAA’s Governing Council wrote the EC in July 2003 requesting the € 5 million planned for mine action be allocated as follows:

- € 3.5 million to CMAC for demining
- € 1.0 million to an NGO to support the LUPU/MAPU mechanism
- € 0.5 million for assistance to CMAA

However, in late 2003 the EC Sub-delegation commissioned an exercise covering (i) an Evaluation of the TA Project with the CMAA and (ii) a Review of the Mine Action Sector.⁴⁷ The evaluation of the TA project concluded: “CMAA has struggled to meet some of its responsibilities and many of the EC project objectives have not been fully achieved. This has been mainly due to the lack of assistance and support given to the EC TA’s [sic] from the Secretary General.” (p. 6)

Among the recommendations from the sector review were that (i) donors should increase support to MRE⁴⁸ and (ii) the ECOSORN project should receive dedicated mine action support.⁴⁹ As a result, the € 5 million originally programmed for CMAC in the NIP for 2002-04 was reallocated to ECOSORN to finance mine action and other ‘safer access to land’ activities.

CSP: 2004-06 and NIP: 2005-06

The CSP 2004-06 noted that Cambodia was eligible for funding from a number of EC horizontal budget lines, including that for anti-personnel mines. The EC Mine Action Strategy for 2002-2004 had indicated € 500,000 for support to capacity building in CMAA, but this was not used. Again, this may reflect concerns with the leadership of CMAA.

⁴⁵ See Bolton et al, 2003, *LUPU Project Evaluation*.

⁴⁶ In addition, there were concerns that Government had appointed the individual implicated in CMAC’s corruption scandal of 1998-99 as the Secretary General of CMAA.

⁴⁷ ArmorGroup 2003a and 2003b.

⁴⁸ This recommendation based on the claim the MRE had reduced in recent years which *is likely to result in an increase in victims in the near future.*”(p. 34) Such an increase did not occur and, in 2006, the number of victims fell by 50%. See Bottomley et al, 2007.

⁴⁹ This recommendation had, in fact, been presaged in the EC CSP for 2004-06: *However, experience has shown that constraints to access to land due to UXO and landmine contamination is [sic] better addressed from a rural development perspective, rather than a purely humanitarian response as they can be major obstacles to the implementation of rural development programmes.* (p. 28)

The EC Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2007 indicated € 1.5 million in 2006-07 for Cambodia from the thematic budget line for mine action and, in 2007, the EC Delegation issued a call for proposals. Subsequently, two grant agreements of € 500,000 each were awarded for victim assistance projects to:

1. Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y África (IEPALA), partnered with Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS)
2. Handicap International, France (HI-F)

CSP 2007-2013 and MIP 2007-2010

The CSP highlights a number of development constraints in Cambodia including landmine and other ERW contamination. However, the NIP provided no country funds for mine action.

Current EC-funded Mine Action Projects

ECOSORN

The EC conducted mission in mid-2000 and mid-2003 that resulted in a € 20 million integrated rural development (IRD) project with four ‘envisaged results’ (i.e. components):⁵⁰

- Agricultural, livestock and fisheries production
- Off-farm economic and employment activities (including microfinance)
- Community empowerment
- Rural access to roads, potable water and sanitation

However, one of the outcomes of the mine action sector review commissioned by the EC in late 2003 was that the € 5 million planned for mine action should not proceed as a standalone project; instead it should be a component of the IRD project. Accordingly, ECOSORN was redesigned as a € 25 million initiative with mine action incorporated into a fifth component for safer access to land (SAL), ‘...through the provision of land title, installation of a sustainable capacity at the commune level for a mine risk education programme fully integrated with commune development plans, and necessary mine clearance activities.’

Project activities got underway in December 2005. ECOSORN is to last five years, but the first two years focus on detailed design, preparation and issuance of tender documents, and contracting with the successful bidders.⁵¹ (As well, 80 ‘Quick Impact Projects’ were implemented, including 20 for the SAL component, of which seven related to mine action.⁵²) Thus, there are only three years to implement the main activities – a remarkably short period for a complex IRD project.

The Safer Access to Land (SAL) Component

The SAL components posed a number of problems for the ECOSORN project task force (PTF). First, the plans for this component were not properly elaborated in the financing agreement. There are only 13 lines of text describing all aspects, embracing demining, MRE, and land titling plus

⁵⁰ ECOSORN focuses on 90 target villages in 40 communes in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Siem Reap provinces. It is managed by a ‘project task force’ (a project implementation unit under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [MAFF], supported a team of technical advisors).

⁵¹ In EC parlance, this is termed the D+3 rule. EC procedures for external operations require that all sub-contracts (‘contracts implementing the financing agreement’) be signed within three years of the budgetary commitment by the Commission. For ECOSORN, this meant that all sub-contracts had to be signed by 16 November 2007. Given lags between the passage of the budgetary commitment and the project start-up, project management units typically have only two years to complete detailed design, preparation of tender documents, issuing requests for proposal, selecting winning bids, and negotiating/signing contracts.

⁵² Under the original financing agreement, the maximum value of each of these was € 5,000.

capacity development of communes and – perhaps – ‘village deminers’ or informal demining firms. Second, there was no provision in the project agreement for technical assistance in either demining and land titling. The PTF recognised this problem and sought approval from the EC Delegation in Bangkok to engage four local TAs,⁵³ who were in place by early 2007.

Third, the districts and communes to be covered by ECOSORN had been identified during the formulation mission in mid-2003, prior to the decision to merge the mine action project into ECOSORN. Thus, the presence of landmine contamination was not considered when determining the project’s geographic scope, and it was unclear how many communities were mine-impacted.⁵⁴

Fourth, links between the MAFF and the mine action community are not well established, and each had evolved very different approaches to needs analysis, priority-setting, planning, and implementation. ECOSORN did attempt to bridge the gap with two workshops in an attempt to elaborate the mine action work. However, these efforts do not appear to have bridged the ‘cultural divide’ between the mine action community and ECOSORN’s rural development specialists.⁵⁵

Tendering for the mine action sub-component⁵⁶

In spite of these problems in determining the detailed design of mine action activities, preparation of the tender documents proceeded. All the tenders for the mine action and land titling sub-components were drawn-up by a consultant land surveyor who had expertise on land management issues in Cambodia but, it appears, not on mine action. Ultimately, the TOR for the mine action sub-component contained a number of specifications that caused uncertainty among potential bidders.

The most serious concern related to the target area for either de-mining or clearance. On page 11 of the TOR, it is specified as *de-mining of 400 ha of land...*; on page 23, the first of the indicators is *Minimum of 400 hectares of contaminated land...cleared*. The performance indicator in the Logical Framework Matrix states *300 ha arable land cleared*. (emphasis added) ‘De-mining’ and ‘clearance’ are not equivalent terms. In the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and other foundation documents within the mine action field:

- ‘clearance’ means full intrusive inspection of 100% of the specified area with manual deminers and/or machines and/or explosives detection dogs or devices backed by manual deminers, with a goal of locating and destroying 100% of all devices to a specified depth.
- ‘de-mining’ comprises survey and marking as well as clearance.

The costs of different demining activities in Cambodia vary significantly, from fractions of a cent per square meter⁵⁷ to an average of perhaps \$1 per m² or more for clearance. If clearance was the intent, the cost for 400 ha. would have been in the neighbourhood of \$4 million or more – well over double the € 1.173 million budgeted for this lot. A difference of this magnitude should probably have halted the tender process until prospective bidders could be assured of the target

⁵³ There are 1 senior and 1 junior local technical advisor for both demining and land titling.

⁵⁴ Following the commencement of the project, participatory planning led to the identification of 90 target villages, selected principally on the basis of agricultural development criteria. Landmine contamination was listed as a medium-to high-priority in only a few villages. Source: meeting with ECOSORN PTF, 20 February 2008.

⁵⁵ In retrospect, part of the problem seems simply that the mine action personnel did not fathom the logic behind the D+3 approach to project implementation.

⁵⁶ The sub-component was divided into two ‘Lots’, covering de-mining and MRE respectively. No contract for the MRE lot was awarded. We do not discuss the MRE lot further in this report – see the *Cambodia Mission Report* for details.

⁵⁷ For non-intrusive survey inspections to document that areas recorded as suspected hazards are unlikely to contain explosive devices. In Cambodia, this process is termed ‘land reclassification’. One operator reported that this costs an average of \$0.0003/m².

outputs. However, under EC regulations, all ECOSORN contracting had to be signed by 16 November 2007 (the D+3 rule). There was no time to revise and reissue the tender.

In the end, ECOSORN received only one proposal for this lot. CMAC submitted the bid (which includes ‘institutional support’ to government agencies involved in the determination of demining priorities) and it was accepted. It proposed clearance of 200 ha. and ‘area reduction’ of 200 ha.⁵⁸

The Evaluation Team was advised that a contract for Victim Assistance has been issued to the German firm ABU. However, of this € 791,512 contract, only € 150,000 from the SAL component budget will go specifically to assist landmine survivors.

Activities since the Contract Award for Demining

In the first days following the award of contract, the key demining expert assigned by CMAC recommended to ECOSORN management that risk reduction measures (MRE for ECOSORN and sub-contractor personnel plus survey of all planned rural infrastructure works) be undertaken immediately. This recommendation was not acted upon straight away, apparently because (i) CMAC’s work plan had not been approved by the EC, so no work under the demining sub-component would be authorised for reimbursement, and (ii) the schedules for the infrastructure works had not provided for MRE for sub-contractor staff or further survey of the planned works.

By January 2008, some of the civil engineering sub-contractors were already working on roads and infrastructure. In February, an equipment operator working on road rehabilitation in Battambang went off the road surface, drove into a suspected minefield (reportedly driving over a number of minefield markers) and exposed an anti-tank mine, which did not explode. ECOSORN personnel contacted CMAC, which sent a rapid response team to the site, where it located another four anti-tank mines. Had the original antitank mine detonated, the equipment would have been completely destroyed and the operator almost certainly killed, while others in the vicinity could have been killed or injured. Had the other anti-tank mines exploded, the damage would have been correspondingly greater.⁵⁹

We understand that the civil engineering personnel at ECOSORN had checked with CMAC and the relevant MAPUs about the possibility of explosives contamination on planned work sites. We understand that ECOSORN personnel had been advised that the road in question had been cleared. However, the clearance standard for ‘opening’ a tertiary road was six meters on both sides of the centre line. This is adequate to allow the road surface to be used, but is inadequate for safe rehabilitation or reconstruction.⁶⁰

Clearly, these incidents could have had tragic consequences, as demonstrated by other anti-tank mine incidents in Cambodia at about the same time which resulted in the death of two workers and serious injuries to others, the destruction of a water tanker, truck, and excavator, and the stoppage of a large road reconstruction project.

The Decision to Issue a Competitive Tender for Demining

The Evaluation Team has other concerns over the decision to proceed with a competitive tender for the demining services. There were three potential bidders that clearly could manage a project

⁵⁸ Area reduction is only loosely defined in the CMAA *Area Reduction Policy*. CMAC advised the team that it would use processes that would cost between one-third and two-thirds the cost of full clearance.

⁵⁹ In addition, on another ECOSORN worksite, a large unexploded munition was discovered embedded in a dam. UXO is less likely to explode but the risk is far from negligible, particularly when heavy equipment is being used.

⁶⁰ The World Bank has developed mine action guidelines for Bank-financed road reconstruction projects. These specify up to 35 meters on both sides of the centerline, and demining of related work sites, borrow pits, etc.

of this scale of the contract – two international NGOs (HALO Trust and MAG) and the national operator, CMAC. In addition, some demining firms expressed interest,⁶¹ but it is unlikely a firm could match CMAC’s price-output proposal, for reasons outlined below.

The NGOs and CMAC receive the bulk of their funding as grants. There is opportunity for them to ‘cross-subsidise’ by using capital equipment, facilities, and management time that has already been financed by other donors. In the specific case of Cambodia, CMAC receives very large donations of equipment from Japan, some of which is not used to full capacity. Because of this, at least, the international demining NGOs have never bid on tenders against CMAC.⁶²

These matters are well known in Cambodia. For example, in 2006 another tendering system for demining services was established – the Clearing for Results pooled-funding project managed by UNDP. Plans to introduce competitive tendering have been put on hold pending a mid-term evaluation because:

- no system is in place to accurately define demining tasks, leaving significant discretion in the hands of the operator, requiring much tighter quality assurance and control (QA/QC);
- the time and cost of strengthening the QA/QC system would be significant, and
- given the market structure in Cambodia, it was unlikely a knowledgeable operator would bid against CMAC⁶³

Thus, ECOSORN initiated a process that provided strong incentives to demining operators to cross-subsidise an EC-financed project and, in the opinion of the Evaluation Team, virtually ensured that CMAC would be the successful bidder. As it turned out, only CMAC submitted a bid, which was extremely attractive, with a target of 200 ha. clearance and 200 ha. ‘area reduction’. A back-of-the-envelope calculation is that CMAC will spend the following to fulfil its ECOSORN contract:

Full clearance: 200 ha. @ \$10,000 per ha. = \$2 million⁶⁴
 Area reduction: 200 ha. @ \$5,000 per ha. = \$1 million

CMAC will receive €1,172,848 = approximately \$1.75 million from ECOSORN. But this includes the costs of ‘institutional strengthening’. If we assume a maximum of \$1.5 million for demining, other donors to CMAC will be subsidising ECOSORN by perhaps \$1.5 million.

There is nothing untoward about incremental costing by NGOs and public entities. Most such programmes never capture full scale economies because they are too small and – in the case of demining certainly – tied-aid contributions mean they may have under-utilised equipment. In the case of CMAC, its other donors are supporting Cambodia’s development and/or its treaty obligations and, in the end, ECOSORN is making a contribution toward those objectives. However, the competitive tender was a cumbersome process that was unlikely to (and did not) elicit any real competition and – in the opinion of the evaluation team – created incentives that

⁶¹ Conceivably, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) could also have submitted a proposal. However, a proposal by RCAF would contravene standard international competitive bidding rules as applied by the World Bank, ADB and others unless it established an arm’s length subsidiary, with clear safeguards against cross-subsidisation. As well, there have been many questions raised over the years regarding the quality of RCAF demining operations.

⁶² HALO Trust and MAG do not receive equipment donations that are unrelated to specific grant agreements. Thus, they do not have significant amounts of surplus equipment available to cross-subsidise a new contract.

⁶³ Discussions with Steve Munroe and Dylan Gelard, UNDP, 26 August 2008.

⁶⁴ This implies a cost of \$1/m² – higher than what CMAC claims its costs are but at the low end of cost-estimates by outside observers. See, for example, Gildestad or Griffen & Keeley.

would reduce rather than enhance transparency.⁶⁵ Better outcomes could have been achieved in a more transparent manner by simply granting the money to CMAC (or to one of the other operators) with the proviso that demining tasks specified by ECOSORN would receive priority.

There are other reasons why the competitive tender was inappropriate, even if there was a viable competitor to CMAC. It creates commercial ‘rules of the game’ that give incentives to achieve output targets rather than intended outcomes. It also creates incentives to minimise costs per area demined, which could compromise safety to both deminers and end-users. Thus, commercial demining contracts require more rigorous quality assurance (QA) to ensure these incentives do not dominate. There is no national capacity to perform QA on behalf of ECOSORN.

In summary, the design of the mine action sub-component was ill-conceived and the early outcome were unacceptable and unnecessary exposure to risks for ECOSORN and sub-contractor personnel and equipment.⁶⁶

Community-Based Victim Assistance Projects

The CSP 2004-06 noted that Cambodia was eligible for funding from a number of EC horizontal budget lines, including that for anti-personnel landmines. In 2007, the EC Delegation to Cambodia issued a call for proposals for ‘Community Participation to the Actions Related to Antipersonnel Mines’. Subsequently, two grant agreements of € 500,000 each were awarded to:

1. Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y África (IEPALA), partnered with Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS)
2. Handicap International, France (HI-F)

IEPALA and CWARS

CWARS is a Canadian-Cambodian NGO providing rehabilitative services to war amputees.⁶⁷ It has been active in Cambodia for over 15 years, providing mainly vocational training to disabled people, many of whom are landmine victims. CWARS is one of the largest Cambodian NGOs and the largest provider of vocational training to disabled people. It operates four large residential training facilities each with a capacity of 300 or more trainees. This capacity would allow a significant programme expansion if sufficient funding could be obtained for operational costs.

CWARS receives funding from a number of official donor agencies and a large private foundation. Compared to its experience with other donors, CWARS found the EC tendering process to be frustrating. The initial IEPALA/CWARS proposal was rejected by the Bangkok Delegation, reportedly over concerns regarding sustainability. It dealt with the Phnom Penh sub-Delegation on the second submission and found the process to be smoother.

The proposal itself is to train 900 amputees (300 per year for 3 years) in vocational skills and functional literacy. Trainees will receive trade tools and there will be post-training assistance in small business management. As the target EC areas are Oddar Meanchey and Pailin, disabled people from there will be brought to the existing centre in Banteay Meanchey. CWARS will establish systems in Oddar Meanchey and Pailin to monitor the success of the trainees.

⁶⁵ Enhanced transparency typically is one of the principal rationales for the introduction of competitive bidding.

⁶⁶ In follow-up meetings in April, the Evaluation Team was advised by the CMAC manager assigned to ECOSORN that he was satisfied with the measures put-in-place after our February mission. There is every reason to expect CMAC support to ECOSORN, and to the communities in the areas covered by ECOSORN, will be effective.

⁶⁷ CWARS has a established partnership with Oxfam Québec. The link with IEPALA was created when an Oxfam Québec staff member joined the Spanish foundation.

Handicap International–France

HI-F has been active in Cambodia for many years. Since 2002, it has focused on disability programming, including management of two rehabilitation centres, health programmes, and a variety of social and economic initiatives. HI-F has significant experience with EC-funded projects and experienced few difficulties with the recent call for proposals.

The specific initiative proposed for the EC grant is called The Way to Socio-Economic Integration, which represents an extension of earlier initiatives covering social support and economic integration. Economic integration represents a relatively new innovation for HI-F in Cambodia. This entails a shift from traditional charity to a rights-based approach, with increased emphasis on beneficiaries' own solutions and exit points for HI-F and its local partner (Operation Enfant Cambodge – OEC – which has experience in working with child mine victims).

The genesis of the current project was a 2005 pilot to assist vulnerable people (many of which were disabled) to attain sustainable livelihoods. Following the pilot, HI-F held a workshop that led to a proposal for a full project, with two distinct components: livelihoods and social support (emphasis on social support is required in poorer districts, where fewer livelihoods opportunities exist). AusAID provided funding in 2007, allowing HI-F to further develop its methodology.

AusAID-funding finishes at the end of March 2008, at which point the EC-funded project will begin. The project will cover four districts in Battambang selected on two criteria: impact of landmines (ranked by casualties) and economic potential to develop livelihoods. Some 560 beneficiaries (70% mine victims) will receive support. In addition, HI-F will provide capacity development support for the 52 staff of its local partner so OEC can make the shift to an 'independent living' programming approach and assume responsibility for the project.

CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, & RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Relevance

EC-financed mine action initiatives in Cambodia have been relevant to Cambodia's needs and development strategies, EU Strategies for Mine Action, and the CSPs for 2002-04 and 2004-06.⁶⁸

Given the evolution of the Thai-Cambodia border dispute,⁶⁹ EC assistance to a joint demining programme for the border would be highly relevant both to the needs of these two countries and to the EC Regional Programming Strategy & Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Asia.

While EC support for mine action has been relevant, it has provided relatively little assistance to mine action in Cambodia in comparison to other seriously mine-affected countries.⁷⁰ In this regard, the following observations warrant discussion:

⁶⁸ Note in particular, the latter document states, *However, experience has shown that constraints to access to land due to UXO and landmine contamination is better addressed from a rural development perspective, rather than a purely humanitarian response as they can be major obstacles to the implementation of rural development programmes.*

⁶⁹ See, for example, 'Cambodia, Thailand agree to withdraw troops from border temple', Associated Press, 28 July 2008, reporting that the Foreign Ministers of Cambodia and Thailand agreed on "the setting up of a joint border commission to solve any differences, and the demining of the disputed area, its vicinity and that adjacent to Preah Vihear temple". <<http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D926V2A02&show_article=1>> accessed 5 Aug 08

⁷⁰ Probably the only other countries in the world with comparable landmine contamination problems are Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. Laos and Vietnam have comparable ERW contamination, but neither is a signatory to the APMB.

- the EU has a global policy to support mine action, particularly in countries that are States Parties to the Ottawa Convention,
- the EC provides only an insignificant amount of mine action funding to one of the world's most mine-impacted countries (which is a State Party)
- the EC does not envisage any further mine action funding to that country from its geographic envelope for at least the period 2007-2010.

One possible answer is that, in light of the *Paris Declaration* and the *EU Code of Conduct*, the EC delegation has determined that it should selectively focus its efforts on a few sectors. Selectivity is warranted, particularly where the EC assistance envelope is rather modest. It would have even stronger merit where either or both of the following conditions prevailed:

- mine action did not feature strongly in the country's PRSP and other development policy documents
- as provided in the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*, one of the EU member states was taking the lead on mine action to (i) develop common EU positions on mine action, (ii) enhance the effectiveness of the TWG for mine action as a forum for policy dialogue, and (iii) make possible joint programming

However, neither of these conditions prevailed in Cambodia when the relevant programming decisions were made.⁷¹

A second possibility is that, irrespective of the RGC policy pronouncements on mine action, its actual commitment to the sector was negligible, so there was no possibility for effective programming. In 2003-04, members of the EC sub-delegation did have significant concerns about the Government's willingness to address weaknesses in the CMAA. However, many development sectors in Cambodia are hampered by weak state organs, and the donor response ranges from (i) reinforcing capacity development efforts, (ii) utilising alternative service delivery mechanisms (e.g. NGOs), and (iii) abandoning the sector.

In the case of Cambodia, there are very capable mine action NGOs, and ECHO evaluators had adjudged that ECHO support channelled through these NGOs had been effective. So the EC could have provided additional support directly to HALO Trust, MAG, or HI-B (which partnered with CMAC for the ECHO grant). This would have allowed the EC to contribute to the delivery of essential public services and been in line with EU policies on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Indeed, in 2003 the Vice President of CMAA had written to the EC proposing € 4.5 million of the € 5 million programmed for mine action should go directly to demining operators rather than to the CMAA.

However, the EC decided instead to bundle the mine action funds into the ECOSORN IRD project. Was that decision appropriate?

Appropriateness⁷²

If there had been any doubts before, the mine/ERW incidents experienced on ECOSORN work sites in the first few months of 2008 (as well as similar incidents on other infrastructure projects in Cambodia) make it clear that the strategy of incorporating mine action within an IRD project is appropriate when such projects are working in mine contaminated areas of a country. Indeed, it is

⁷¹ It is possible that Germany might cover the Technical Working Group for mine action in the future.

⁷² When used as an evaluation criterion, 'appropriateness' refers to inputs (e.g. it is appropriate to include a mine action component in an IRD project) whereas 'relevance' relates to the envisaged results (outputs, outcomes, and impacts).

clear that ECOSORN and any other such project operating in north-western Cambodia will depend to some degree on support from the mine action programme.⁷³ However, the general strategy of incorporating mine action in an IRD project was not backed-up by work by the EC to (i) make the necessary modifications to the overall design of the IRD project, (ii) provide for specialised mine action expertise, (iii) monitor the evolution of Cambodia's mine action programme, or (iv) consult with other donors to draw-upon their knowledge of the mine action programme and to benefit from lessons learnt.⁷⁴

ECOSORN had an extremely long gestation period – over five years from the initial identification mission to the project start-up. This period saw rapid evolution for the mine action sector and for Cambodia more generally. However, the EC Delegation in Bangkok and the sub-Delegation in Phnom Penh did not have the capacity to monitor the evolution of the mine action programme, draw conclusions and (potentially) suggest adjustments to the ECOSORN project design.

Thus, while the strategy of incorporating dedicated mine action support into ECOSORN was appropriate, the means for effective execution of the strategy were lacking. An inadequate project design, coupled with inflexible EC rules (e.g. the D+3 rule), led to problems in implementation.

Efficiency

The scale of EC assistance to mine action has been far too small to garner efficiencies of scale, a problem compounded by the tendency to support multiple initiatives (e.g. three distinct ECHO projects in 2002; two victim assistance projects in 2007). This would be less a concern if EC support had been well coordinated with other initiatives, either through RGC efforts (e.g. the formulation of a clear and feasible strategy for the national mine action programme) or via a donor coordination mechanism. Unfortunately, there was no adequate government strategy in place, and donor coordination has been fitful, with limited participation from the EC.

The mine action component in ECOSORN promises to be extremely cost-effective⁷⁵ from the perspective of the EC. However, this is in large part due to hidden cross-subsidisation of EC-supported activities by other donors.

It is far too early to assess the efficiency of the two new victim assistance projects. However, the fact that EC support is (i) utilising spare capacity in CWARS vocational training centres and (ii) building on a pilot HI-F project funded by AusAID compensates, to a degree, for the fact that these projects are far too small to garner economies of scale.

Effectiveness

Past EC support to operators appears to have been effective, but support to capacity development of national organs has been less so.⁷⁶

In spite of problems along the way, the mine action component of ECOSORN promises to be effective in terms of the results envisaged for the SAL component. This is due in large part to the competence of CMAC and supporting elements of the mine action programme (e.g. the MAPU).

⁷³ Previous IRD projects in the North-West appear to have obtained contamination data from CMAC largely so they could avoid mine affected communities. Such a strategy is hardly consistent with the poverty focus of the CSPs.


⁷⁴ The officer in the sub-delegation responsible for rural development and mine action departed in 2004, and the position remained vacant for two years.

⁷⁵ Cost-effectiveness is one specific measure of efficiency.

⁷⁶ HI-B's support to the LUPU was effective in the short-term, but LUPU operations were disrupted by the enactment of the new Land Law in 2001. Key LUPU capacities have been retained within the MAPU.

On broader measures of aid effectiveness, ECOSORN fares less well. It appears that demining assets will be deployed to some areas that are not significantly affected by contamination (see graph), when the same funds could have paid for clearance in heavily contaminated communes.⁷⁷ As well, the combination of a faulty project design for the mine action activities and inflexible EC procedures (such as the D+3 rule) led to the use of an inappropriate mechanism for awarding the contract for demining services. Simpler and more transparent alternates were available to achieve results commensurate with the actual EC financial contribution, without hidden cross-subsidisation from other mine action donors.

Figure 10 – Highly-impacted districts (per capita basis highlighting ECOSORN districts)



The long build-up to the tender for mine action services also seems to have exacerbated coordination problems between the MAFF and the mine action programme. This is a matter of real concern as it is clear that (i) mine action needs to align more closely with rural development initiatives and (ii) rural development projects in mine/ERW-contaminated parts of Cambodia require mine action support, particularly for infrastructure reconstruction activities. It is possible that good performance by CMAC could mitigate these problems to some degree.

It is far too early to assess the effectiveness of the two new victim assistance projects. However, both projects are being implemented by organisations with long experience in disability programming in Cambodia, and both seek sustainable solutions for their target beneficiaries. There is every reason to hope that both projects will deliver good outcomes.

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

There was no RELEX or AIDCO follow-up to capitalise on ECHO mine action assistance in Cambodia, in spite of an evaluation that concluded the ECHO-funded projects “carried out

⁷⁷ Just fifteen communes account for 50% of all landmine casualties in Cambodia. We do not have a list of all communes and target villages covered by ECOSORN, so cannot do analysis below the district level.

significant interventions that will greatly benefit the villagers ...Additional support will ensure that these initiatives attain their full potential and that the mine/UXO casualty and risk reduction models and methodologies developed by these three projects will have a significant impact on mine action programs in Cambodia and elsewhere.”

Lessons Learned

The following lessons learned stem from the ECOSORN project.

1. Some EC regulations, such as the requirement to issue all contracts for goods, services, and works be signed within three years of the budgetary commitment by the Commission (the D+3 rule), mean EC delegates and the organisations implementing projects (or providing technical assistance to implementing agencies) do not have the flexibility required for effective management of complex projects, which inevitably require the adjustment of plans based on conditions on the ground. This problem is even more crippling when – as in the case of ECOSORN – (i) the initial project design is inadequate and (ii) projects have long gestation periods before the start of implementation.
2. When a project entails working in an area that may be contaminated by explosives:
 - Initial design surveys should investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or around work sites
 - Arrangements for mine action support should be made, whether by incorporating a mine action component into the project or by a side agreement/directed contract with the national mine action authority and/or with mine action operators in the vicinity
3. For projects entailing civil engineering works (especially infrastructure reconstruction), land preparation for agriculture, etc. in areas that may suffer from explosives contamination, the following additional steps should be taken:
 - Initial design surveys, social and environmental impacts surveys, etc. should:
 - investigate the possibility of explosives contamination in or around work sites
 - investigate the potential future dangers from people migrating to contaminated areas because infrastructure has been built or reconstructed, land has been improved for agriculture, etc., and
 - incorporate appropriate risk mitigation measures in the project design based on the findings of these investigations
 - Mine action experts should be involved in the preparation of all statements of work and contracts/grant agreements for mine action activities;
 - Mine action risk mitigation measures should be in place before work on civil engineering or land preparation components begins. Such measures should include MRE for all project and sub-contractor personnel, and may include additional survey of some or all of the planned civil engineering/land preparation sites;⁷⁸
 - All tenders for civil engineering works should make explicit reference to the possibility of explosives contamination and that all sub-contractor personnel assigned to the project shall be required to complete an MRE course (specifically designed to address workplace safety in areas of suspected contamination) prior to deployment in areas where contamination is suspected. Contracts should include a clear statement

⁷⁸ This would depend on whether the national mine action authority has sufficient data to certify whether the specific work areas proposed are free of contamination. Even where records exist that contamination has been cleared, the clearance depth is normally in the range of 30 cm, so additional surveys would be required for infrastructure work sites.

- that failure to abide with workplace safety provisions in potentially contaminated areas by a sub-contractor or its personnel could be considered a breach of contract;
- As the effectiveness of current methods for locating deeply buried landmines have not been thoroughly tested, there is a residual risk to equipment and personnel when undertaking road reconstruction projects⁷⁹ in contaminated regions. Supplemental risk reduction measures (e.g. armour-protected equipment; fully-enclosed operator cabs; minimum safety distances for observers; standby demining support) should be required for specific sections of a road where the risk of contamination is high.
4. For both workplace safety and liability reasons, in some cases the EC may wish to require contactors and sub-contractors to provide insurance to their workers that covers legacy of war issues such as explosives contamination.
 5. Contracts or other agreements with organisations responsible for demining support services to development activities should include clear statements that the overarching responsibility of the demining operator is the mitigation of explosives contamination risks for workers and the intended beneficiaries and that, where there is reasonable concern that workers or beneficiaries could be killed or injured, prior administrative approval is not required for any necessary and reasonable actions.

Recommendations⁸⁰

5. The EC sub-Delegation should meet with managers from ECOSORN, CMAA, and the Socio-Economic section of CMAA to discuss lessons learned from the experience to date with ECOSORN, and possible steps to enhance the coordination between mine action and rural development (including MAFF).
6. The EC should let it be known to the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia that it is willing to support the implementation of an agreement to permanently resolve the current dispute centring on the Preah Vihear temple. Such support could include financial assistance for a joint effort to demine the disputed area, its vicinity and that adjacent to Preah Vihear temple, as was agreed at the 28 July 2008 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Siem Reap.
7. The EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*.
8. EC headquarters should develop and issue clear principles and guidelines for its personnel responsible for mine action projects or development projects in areas affected by explosives contamination.⁸¹

⁷⁹ When building a new road, it normally will be less expensive to avoid suspected hazards. When reconstructing a road however, it normally is less expensive to reinforce and build on the existing foundation. This could expose landmines that were too deeply to be detected in standard demining operations.

⁸⁰ The Cambodia Mission Report contained another recommendation concerning the classification of the ECOSORN project in Cambodia's aid database which is not relevant for the regional report.

⁸¹ EC headquarters recently issued *Guidelines on European Community Mine Action*, which is a sound document but needs to be supplemented by more detailed guidance on technical mine action issues.

LAO PDR⁸²

CONTEXT

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has perhaps the world's worst explosives contamination problem. Most of this is unexploded ordnance (UXO) stemming from the Vietnam War. Starting in 1964, the US began saturation bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, used by North Vietnam to supply its forces and the Viet Kong in the South. This prolonged bombing was the most intense in history, averaging the equivalent of one mission every eight minutes for nine years. Over two million tons of ordnance was dropped on Lao PDR – equal to the combined total dropped by all combatants during the Second World War.⁸³ An estimated 10%-30% of this ordnance, including millions of 'bombies' from cluster bombs, did not explode. In addition, the North Vietnamese established munitions depots along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, some of which were partially detonated by air strikes, scattering more UXO.⁸⁴

It was not until June 1996 – 21 years after hostilities ended – that Handicap International (HI) undertook a broad survey of the impact of UXO contamination on behalf of UXO LAO, the government agency established to coordinate mine and UXO programmes. In brief:

- Over 2,800 villages, or 25% of all communities in 15 of the 16 provinces⁸⁵ reported the continued presence of UXO, while 214 villages reported landmines;
- Almost 12,000 UXO-related accidents were reported, with accident rates peaking at about 1,400 per year in 1974 as people returned to their homes and fields. Casualty rates fell to an average of 360/year from 1977-1986, then 240/year the following decade;
- 31% of all victims were children (mostly boys);
- Almost 2/3 of accidents occurred within the village or in nearby rice fields;
- A significant percentage of accidents arose when men purposely handled UXO to extract scrap metal or explosives;
- Accidents peak at the end of the dry season (March-May) when farmers plough lowland rice fields or, in upland areas, clear new fields by slash-and-burn.



The overall picture is a familiar one, with a high rate of casualties during the initial return to villages abandoned during the conflict, followed by a slow decline in accidents as those in affected communities adapt to the contamination. Risk-taking behaviour, as extremely poor people attempt to capitalise on the UXO 'resource', also resulted in many accidents. Many

⁸² See *Lao PDR Country Mission Report*.

⁸³ This represents only the tally from 'official' air strikes. Recently released data suggests that the carnage from clandestine flights may have been even more extensive.

⁸⁴ The U.S. also used massive quantities of Agent Orange. Studies have confirmed that Agent Orange resulted in significant dioxin contamination in nearby western Vietnam (Hatfield Consultants, 2000), where there have been unusually high rates of birth defects and 'wasting' diseases. Studies are trying to confirm these are the result of dioxin. Researchers also found high levels of dioxin in the food chain; particularly from aquaculture.

⁸⁵ The capital, Vientiane, has a distinct administration and, until recently, there also was a 'special administrative zone.'

villages were reported to have relocated due to mine contamination.

More than 100 UXO accidents are still reported to authorities each year, implying a continuing rate of perhaps 200 accidents a year because reports cannot be obtained from many remote communities. Tampering has become an even larger problem due to the availability of inexpensive metal detectors and the establishment of foundries and mini-mills in Laos.

Many rural development projects also have been adversely affected by UXO contamination, including those supported by INGOs. In addition, many of the larger aid-financed infrastructure projects (road and bridge construction, dams for hydro-electricity), as well as private investments in mining, have been affected by UXO contamination. In some cases, explicit provision for UXO/mine clearance had been made during the planning phase of the project, while in others UXO was discovered only during the construction phase.

HISTORY OF THE UXO SECTOR

In 1994, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) established a UXO project in Xieng Khouang at the behest of the Mennonite Central Committee. Subsequent discussions among the government, UNDP, UNICEF, and MAG led to the establishment of the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund in late 1995, followed by a decree establishing UXO LAO as the equivalent of both a national Mine Action Centre (MAC) and a national operator. Shortly thereafter, UNICEF, along with MAG and UXO LAO, developed a strategy to establish a national UXO awareness programme

Victim assistance also expanded, with involvement of HI and other NGOs providing prosthetics, physiotherapy, community-based rehabilitation, and financial assistance to UXO victims. In 1998, a number of NGOs and government agencies joined to form Co-operative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE). It supports the National Rehabilitation Centre with technical assistance, equipment and training.

UXO LAO pursued a strategy of enlisting implementation partners to establish provincial operations. This allowed for rapid expansion, and gave interested donors the option of providing direct funding to an international NGO. The first of the implementing partners engaged local staff directly and were responsible for operations management in three provinces. Since mid-1997, new implementing partners were taken-on as advisors, responsible in the main for capacity building. In such cases, Lao personnel were hired and trained by UXO LAO and then assigned to provincial operations. By April 2000, UXO LAO changed strategy and assumed responsibility for managing all operations, with partners in capacity building roles.

Following the change in strategy, funding to the UXO programme declined significantly in 2002, forcing UXO LAO to cut its work force almost in half. This led UNDP and UXO LAO to commission an assessment of the UXO Sector.⁸⁶ Among the recommendations were to:

- separate the planning, coordination and regulatory functions of UXO LAO from implementation (and consider allowing other operators to re-establish)
- develop a 10-year strategic plan
- focus the UXO programme more clearly on broader development priorities

In response to the UXO sector assessment, in April 2004 the government approved a new 10 year UXO sector strategy – the *Safe Path Forward*. This recommended the establishment of a new

⁸⁶ Keeley et al (2002), *Mission to Assess Future Sustainable Options of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme: Mission Report*.

National Regulatory Authority (NRA), which the government created later in 2004. However, it took another two years before the legal framework was in place and the office established.

The UXO sector is now headed by a national mine action authority – the NRA Board⁸⁷ – whose secretariat (the NRA Office) discharges a number of responsibilities typically found in a national Mine Action Centre (MAC). Since the NRA office was established in 2006, it has been active in the Oslo Process and in promoting government acceptance of the proposed Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). It also has made some progress on:

- enhancing coordination of UXO programme operations
- developing draft standards for UXO clearance operations
- updating the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)

As yet, however, it has made little progress in raising its own profile within the government, or in getting the government to increase its own contributions to the UXO sector.

The Safe Path Forward sets-out the following objectives for the UXO programme:

1. Accidents will be reduced to a national rate not exceeding 100 persons/year
2. clearance of all “high priority” agricultural areas by 2013, as well as a sizeable portion of other areas identified as “medium priority”
3. the development and maintenance of a national database on Mine/UXO accidents
4. factoring-in the specific needs of UXO/mine survivors into all public health initiatives.

The strategy also lays out guidelines for establishing clearance priorities:

Table 4 – UXO/Mine Clearance Priorities⁸⁸

Priority	Types of Tasks
Priority I (High)	1. Agricultural tasks 2. Roving tasks 3. Public service utilities (medical/public health, water points, etc.) 4. Educational facilities
Priority II (Medium)	1. Grazing land and forested areas 2. Communal facilities (religious/cultural sites, markets, recreational areas, etc.) 3. Government facilities and offices
Priority III (Low)	1. Public infrastructure work 2. Communal “profit-making” areas 3. Tourism sites 4. Commercial/private business sites

There are now a national operator (UXO LAO), three international NGOs, and three commercial demining operators.

Table 5 – Clearance operators & provinces or clients covered in 2007

Organisation	Expend. (2007)	Province(s)/Contract
UXO LAO	\$6.0 million	Luang Prabang, Houaphan, Xieng Khouang, Khammouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Sekong, Champassak, Attapeu

⁸⁷ The Board is an inter-ministerial body comprising representatives of nine ministries concerned with UXO activities under the leadership of a Deputy Prime Minister (who is also Minister of Defence).

⁸⁸ Clearly, there are problems with these guidelines. Why, for example, should all public infrastructure work be low priority? Why should all agricultural tasks be high priority when it varies in potential?

Organisation	Expend. (2007)	Province(s)/Contract
MAG	4.6 million ⁸⁹	Xieng Khouang, Khammouane
FSD	1.0 million	Savannakhet, Sekong
HI-B	0.5 million	Savannakhet
Phoenix (PCL)	0.6 million	various
Milsearch	4.0 million	Oxiana
BACTEC		

Collectively, they cleared 4,190 ha (4.2 km²) in 2007, about 53% of which was for agriculture, with the rest classified broadly as ‘other development’. UXO LAO accounted for about 61% of the total area cleared.⁹⁰ In addition to area clearance, roving teams of the demining operators conducted almost 1,700 village visits, destroying 37,000 items of UXO in the process.

UXO LAO, MAG, and HI-B also conduct UXO risk education activities, while MAG provides an MRE technical advisor to the NRA as part of a project to update MRE policy and standards. COPE – a partnership between the National Rehabilitation Centre (Ministry of Health) and four international NGOs – supports the national rehabilitation service. The service operates through five rehabilitation centres with about 40% of its clients being victims of UXO.

UXO IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

The government issued its sixth *National Socio-Economic Development Plan: 2006-10* (NSEDP) in October 2006.⁹¹ This has a strong focus on poverty reduction. Given most of the population (and an even higher proportion of poor households) live in rural areas, rural development is key for poverty reduction. The 6th NSEDP highlights 47 very poor and 25 poor districts for targeted interventions. It also outlines three national poverty-focussed programmes, one of which focuses on UXO.

As in most countries, explosive contamination in Laos affects rural areas disproportionately. Rural development policy centres on improved service delivery in the 47 very poor districts. Public service delivery to highly dispersed populations is unaffordable, so a process of village consolidation is under way to move all villages into clusters (*khets*) of viable size, coupled with targeted development of ‘focal areas’. This leads to the controversial policy of relocating minorities from upland areas to *khets* in the lowlands. However, the relocated people are then exposed to lowland diseases to which they have no resistance, and must adapt to dramatically different livelihoods. Donors and human rights organisations are also concerned that political motivations may underlie the relocation policy.

Initially, the UXO programme was very much donor-driven, and UXO was not seen as a government priority. For example, the *1999-2000 Socio-Economic Plan* had but one sentence on UXO in 34 pages of text. This has changed progressively and dramatically, and the 6th NSEDP highlights the UXO programme as one of three ‘poverty-focussed national programmes’ (see, in particular, pp. 102-04). The negative impact of UXO is highlighted in other sections on poverty, human security, gender, natural resources and the environment, food security, and education (p. 150). The 6th NSEDP sets a clear and ambitious target – to clear UXO from all high priority agricultural areas by 2013.

⁸⁹ About 25% of MAG expenditures are for technical advisors assigned to the NRA or UXO Lao.

⁹⁰ As in most countries, there are significant differences in the nature of tasks undertaken under commercial contracts. Firms averaged just over 4 items of UXO/ha., while not-for-profit operators found almost four times as many. Among the latter group, the international NGOs located approximately three times as many UXO per ha. as did UXO LAO.

⁹¹ The Government has also developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a relatively participatory process. The current version is called the *National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy* (NGPES).

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2005-06, the EC was the 10th largest donor to Lao PDR, with gross disbursements averaging only \$10 million/year. The amounts available for new programming via the NIP/MIP have been extremely modest. From the late 1990s until 2002, the bulk of EC support to Laos focussed on rural development and health. It also supported UXO clearance (HI-B in Savannakhet and MAG in Khammouane).

CSP 2002-06 and NIP 2002-04

The CSP for 2002-06 identified three ‘focal areas’ for EC assistance: rural development; social sector (education and health); and trade and development. It did note the problem of UXO contamination, particularly in relation to the development problems faced in upland areas. It also mentioned that Lao authorities emphasised their desire for the EC to make a direct contribution to UXO Lao. Regardless, the CSP/NIP did not provide for any funding for UXO. However, a total of € 2 million from the thematic APL budget line was made available for Laos in 2003 and 2004.

CSP 2007-13 and MIP 2007-10

The main focus (58% of the budgeted allocation) of the country strategy for 2007-2013 is to be delivered via a multi-donor poverty reduction programme led by the World Bank. The CSP also identified actions in three non-focal sectors: (i) food security, highlighting sustainable development in the uplands and policy dialogue on relocation (24% of the budgeted allocation); governance and human rights (5%); and trade and economic cooperation (13%). In addition, the CSP highlighted possible actions in Laos via various thematic programmes: food security; non-state actors (NGO co-financing); and democracy and human rights.

The CSP did highlight the problem of UXO contamination in a number of places including the fact that UXO contamination complicates rural development (p. 12) and that Lao PDR is, on a per capita basis, the most bombed country on the planet. (p. 27) A separate section on mine action concluded that “Continued funding of UXO clearance in Lao PDR should therefore be favourably considered under Thematic Programmes.” (p. 28) The option of funding via the UXO-Lao Trust Fund rather than calls for proposals was held out, but only if Lao PDR signed the APMBC.

The *EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programme: 2005-2007* shows € 1.5 million from the thematic budget line for 2006-07. However, this million never materialised,⁹² to the surprise of the sub-delegation and HI, which had been anticipating some of this money for its project in Savannakhet. The start-up costs for this project had been financed by the EC in 2004 and the expensive equipment, as well as the personnel, would have been idle if it did not receive continued funding. HI had not arranged an alternative source of funding, and the EC sub-delegation did not have funds available within the country programme budget.

Eventually, AusAID stepped-in with A\$500,000, allowing HI to continue its UXO project for nine months. Before the end of the AusAID project, HI was able to obtain € 500,000 via the call for proposals issued by the EC for the Non-State Actors & Local Authorities thematic programme (UXO contamination had been highlighted as a target issue in the call for proposals). MAG also obtained € 500,000 from the same competition for a project in Khammouane. Another grant of € 100,000 was awarded in 2007 to the NRA for a national survey of UXO victims via an open call for proposals for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.

⁹² The thematic budget line had been eliminated as part of the broader reform of EC aid programmes. However, the unspent funds from the budget line were transferred to the relevant country programmes. It remains unclear why the funds programmed for Laos were not transferred – perhaps the concern that Laos had not signed the APMBC?


ECHO

ECHO does not support mine action *per se*, but will provide funding for demining, MRE, or victim assistance where this allows other humanitarian activities to proceed. Prior to 2005 in Laos, ECHO provided significant assistance focussed on ethnic minorities and their resettlement, primarily in the north of the country. In some projects, provision was made for UXO clearance and awareness activities. In 2004, however, a grant was issued to MAG for emergency UXO clearance to support three other ECHO-financed projects in Khammoune.

From 2005, ECHO phased-out of emergency projects in Laos, restricting itself to disaster preparedness (DIPECHO). The task of supporting upland minorities/relocation was handed-over to the EC thematic programme for food security.

The overall picture we have been able to piece together shows about € 8.5 million in EC funding for UXO since 1998, with somewhat of a declining trend.⁹³

Figure 11 – Estimated EC funding for the UXO sector⁹⁴



Current EC-funded UXO Projects

Three EC-funded projects are now underway, all funded via thematic programmes rather than the geographic envelope for Laos.

National UXO Victims Survey – NRA & COPE

In February 2007, the NRA and COPE submitted an application for the open call for proposals for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights for € 100,000 to undertake a national UXO victims survey. They received notice in May 2007 that their application had been accepted, pending submission of some supporting documents (which the NRA and COPE say been included with the original application). A problem then arose as the NRA financial audit was ‘qualified’.⁹⁵ Hence, the grant agreement was not signed until November 2007, with the

⁹³ This graph does not show commitments, but estimated expenditures per year.

⁹⁴ The full list of EC-funded UXO projects in Laos is given in Appendix 4.

⁹⁵ Most but not all the funding to NRA comes from the UNDP Trust Fund, which commissions an annual audit. The auditors mandate only covers the transactions and the resulting financial statements covered by the Trust Fund, and so do not reflect the totality of NRA operations. It is normal practice for auditors to qualify the audit on these grounds, but such a qualification, in itself, does not imply weakness in the financial system or management control. Regardless, this caused problems for the EC Delegation in Bangkok which took months to resolve.

initial tranche of funding arriving the following month. Meanwhile, the project had started with a grant of \$50,000 from UNICEF.⁹⁶

After some start-up difficulties, the full survey got underway in February 2008. The initial results were just being tabulated at the time of our mission. Following the survey, the NRA and COPE plan to support a national surveillance system using provincial government staff to collect data for NRA. From experience in other countries (e.g. Cambodia), this type of surveillance system could result in better targeting of clearance, UXO risk education, and survivor assistance services.

The NRA/COPE say they have received informal feedback from the EC Delegation in Bangkok that it likes the project and would consider additional support in the future.

Handicap International (HI)

HI has been working in Laos in both the disability assistance and UXO sectors. Its UXO work began in 1996 with the national UXO survey, and it continued with technical and financial assistance to UXO Lao in Savannakhet from 1997. In 2001, it decided to scale-down its level of assistance to one technical advisor supporting UXO LAO in both Savannakhet and Khammoune; an activity funded by the EC that lasted until December 2004.

In the meantime, UXO LAO had decided it should again allow international partners to establish separate operations, so HI decided to open a new programme in Savannakhet. In 2004, the EC issued a call for proposal for € 2 million in funding from the APL budget line. This call specified Savannakhet and the HI country office understood that the EC expected HI to win. In the end, its proposal was disqualified on a technicality⁹⁷ and the call for proposals was reissued without specifying Savannakhet, and with two 'lots' – one for clearance plus MRE and the other for victim assistance.

HI re-submitted the same core proposal (dropping the term 'partner' in the text, and eliminating the victim assistance component). In the end, the EC decided not to fund the victim assistance lot, transferred those funds to clearance/MRE, and awarded two projects for € 1 million each to HI and to MAG's project in Khammoune. The grant agreement was signed in December 2004 and, following months of delays in obtaining the MOU from provincial authorities, HI started area and roving clearance plus UXO risk education operations in October 2005.

Initially, HI did not have an exit strategy because it and the EC sub-delegation had been expecting an additional € 1.5 million in earmarked mine action money would be available for Laos in 2006-07, as specified in the EU Mine Action Strategy. They were surprised to learn that these funds would not be forthcoming, but HI managed to secure an A\$500,000 grant from AusAID to cover nine months of operations, during which time the EC issued the call for proposals for the Non-State Actors & Local Authorities thematic programme. This specified UXO as one of the target sectors and HI was able to win a grant for € 500,000 to continue its UXO project.

In March 2007, HI commissioned an evaluation of its EC-funded UXO project. The evaluator found the project to be relevant and effective, but too small to garner full economies of scale. Regardless, UXO clearance is not a central part of the overall HI mandate, so it follows what it terms an integrated risk strategy in Laos, with its clearance and risk education activities linked with a separately-funded community-based rehabilitation programme.

⁹⁶ The total budget is \$247,000, and the project also has received support from the UNDP Trust Fund for UXO (\$35,000) and the Swiss (\$75,000).

⁹⁷ In the text of its proposal, HI had referred to an 'associate' organisation as a 'partner', and was disqualified.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

MAG was the original UXO clearance operator in Laos, running programmes in Xieng Khouang and Saravane until 2001, at which point responsibility shifted to UXO LAO with MAG providing technical advisors. Following the 2002 UXO Sector evaluation, UXO LAO again allowed the international NGOs to establish operations, and in early 2004 MAG re-opened in Xieng Khouang and Khammoune with a principal focus on clearance for food security.

The MAG programme in Laos is supported by many donors and it provides clearance support for the work of a number of UN agencies, international NGOs, and Lao organisations.⁹⁸ MAG also provides technical advisors to the NRA (for MRE) and to UXO LAO (advisors in three provinces).

From the EC, it obtained ECHO funding to support food security projects in Khammoune in 2004-05 and then, in late 2004, received € 1 million from the APL thematic budget line for clearance in Khammoune – a project that continued until early 2008. In 2008, MAG was awarded a new EC grant for € 500,000 over two years. In addition to UXO clearance, this aims to build the capacity of provincial and district officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in Khammoune to set clearance priorities based on participatory approaches.

UXO Lao

In mid-2008 (after the mission to Laos), the EC and UXO Lao agreed on two grants of € 150,000 each to support the UXO programme in Attapeu and Sekong provinces. Both projects run for two years, and covered risk awareness, survey, roving clearance, and area clearance (i.e. all aspects of UXO Lao's provincial operations). These grants represent the first direct support from the EC to a public UXO agency.

CONCLUSIONS AND KEY ISSUES

Principal Conclusions

Relevance

Clearly, UXO contamination represents an enormous problem within Laos. In that light, EC assistance to the UXO sector has been relevant to the country's needs.

EC Country Strategy Papers have noted the extent of UXO contamination and the challenge this creates for rural development and, particularly, development in upland areas. Thus, EC assistance to the UXO sector has been relevant to the problems identified in its CSPs. Given the modest financial and human resources available to the EC country programme, it is appropriate⁹⁹ that the bulk of UXO funding to date has come from the APL thematic budget line or from ECHO.

Given the EC has placed some priority on mine action and on supporting the APMBC, and Laos is not a signatory to the APMBC, the fact that EC support has been steady but modest seems to strike a fair balance.

Efficiency

EC assistance to the UXO sector has been steady but modest in scope. Assistance to HI does not garner economies of scale because that NGO has no other current donors for UXO clearance. MAG and UXO Lao are able to make more efficient use of EC funding – at least in terms of

⁹⁸ MAG also provides technical assistance and funding to support the Risk Education unit in NRA.

⁹⁹ Appropriateness is similar to relevance but, when used as an evaluation criterion, generally refers to inputs rather than planned results.

UXO clearance – because they have multiple donors, allowing larger operations that reap scale economies.

Effectiveness

EC assistance to the UXO sector also appears to be effective. For the most part, it has supported well established NGOs from EU member states and with extensive experience in Laos.

Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)

The sub-delegation – together with ECHO when it had an office in Laos – appear to have done an effective job in maintaining modest but steady support to their partners working in the UXO sector. LRRD was achieved with the late 2004 decision to provide the € 1 million grant to MAG, allowing it to continue its support – started with ECHO funding – to NGOs working on food security for resettled communities.

Effect of deconcentration

Deconcentration is likely to affect the planning and programming of EC support to the UXO sector. The sub-delegation has few staff, none of whom have specific expertise in mine action. In this light, channelling future support to trusted and experienced partners is a sound strategy.

Coherence, Complementarity, and Coordination

When HI and the sub-delegation learned that the € 1.5 million programmed in the APL thematic budget line for 2006-07 was not forthcoming, threatening continuity of the HI project, arrangements were made with AusAID to provide financing for nine months. This enabled the sub-delegation to designate UXO contamination as one of the focus issues in the open tender for the Non-State Actors & Local Authorities thematic programme, which gave reasonable assurance that multi-year funding from the EC would be secured by HI.

The role of AusAID deserves special mention. For some years, it has served as the ‘anchor donor’ for UXO issues in Laos. This meant that its officer responsible for the UXO portfolio was knowledgeable and was able to put in place ‘bridge financing’ that ensured the HI project – with its EC-financed assets – remained viable until the EC delegate could secure additional funding. The existence of an anchor donor allows other donors in a sector to be more effective, even with modest resources. This value-added from AusAID in the Lao UXO sector suggests:

- there would be significant benefits for mine action and other ‘secondary’ development sectors if the EC and EU members could implement the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*
- even when neither the EC nor an EU member is willing and able to serve as an anchor donor for a sector such as mine action within a country, they should encourage another donor to assume this role and, then, support that donor

Key Strategic Issues

EC programming decisions in Laos have long had to address the following strategic issues:

- Laos is the most heavily bombed country on earth, with contamination heaviest in rural, often remote, districts
- Laos is poor (particularly the rural population, and particularly in remote upland areas) but with rapid economic growth
- NGOs from EU member states are heavily engaged in all facets of the UXO sector
- the EU is strongly in support of mine action, but with a focus on signatories of the

- APMBC (which Lao PDR has not signed)
- the EC maintains only a modest aid programme in Laos
- the EC has been represented only by a sub-delegation (which, even after it becomes a Delegation, will have limited human resources available)

In this context, EC funding for the UXO sector has remained modest, and has come from the APL thematic budget line, from ECHO, and – more recently – from various thematic programmes rather than the country envelope. For the most part, the projects funded by the EC appear sound, implemented mainly by NGOs which are well established both globally and in Laos.

Current and future programming also must consider the following recent developments:

- the APL thematic budget line has been terminated, and Laos is ineligible for the closest alternative (the Instrument for Stability)
- the performance of the UXO sector has significantly increased in recent years
- the Government has instituted reforms to strengthen the UXO sector
- both the NSEDP and the NGPES place priority on the UXO programme, which largely operates in the priority 47 very poor districts and is one of the three national poverty eradication programmes
- increasing evidence suggests that UXO contamination accentuates poverty, while UXO clearance is correlated with poverty reduction
- the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was signed in Oslo by 94 countries, including Lao PDR (which was one of four countries that immediately ratified)

Lacking much flexibility within its geographic envelope, the sub-delegation has shown ingenuity in obtaining modest amounts of funding for UXO sector. The five most recent projects have all been funded via thematic programmes. However, given that Lao PDR is a signatory of the CCM, plus the increased priority given to the UXO sector by the Government, the case for additional and increased EC funding is greatly strengthened.

OTHER ASIA-PACIFIC COUNTRIES

SRI LANKA

Two decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) has left Sri Lanka with extensive contamination from mines and ERW. Government figures from 2006 (i.e. before the August 2006 collapse of the February 2002 ceasefire) showed about 560 villages were affected. The northern Jaffna peninsula, is the most severely affected area, with at least 228 villages impacted,¹⁰⁰ but other areas in the north-east are also affected.

Landmines are but one of the inter-related challenges people in the North and East. The long conflict has resulted in extensive population displacement, which was further aggravated by the December 2004 tsunami that killed 35,000 and destroyed 80,000 homes. As a result, there are an estimated 600,000 IDPs whose return is hampered by the continuing conflict and, in many cases, by landmines.

The Mine Action Program

In 1998, UNICEF began an MRE programme in Jaffna that was absorbed the next year by a UNDP project, which also included survey and emergency clearance. Due to an escalation of the conflict, this project was suspended in 2000.




Mine action started again following the February 2002 ceasefire. UNICEF and UNHCR re-started MRE activities while the World Bank granted \$1 million to the UNDP to start a new demining programme, which included components to build local capacities and develop a national structure to coordinate mine action activities. This led to the establishment of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA) in August 2002. HALO Trust, MAG, FSD, and NPA¹⁰¹ also started activities in that year, and DDG followed in 2003.

Renewed conflict in mid-2006 led the government to focus mine/UXO clearance on the Eastern province where its security forces retook control of large areas previously held by the LTTE. Government efforts have attempted to coordinate emergency demining in these areas to expedite resettlement of IDPs, reconstruction, and development. At the same time, operators have complained of abductions of deminers in areas controlled by security forces or pro-government militias. Some deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory were forcibly recruited into “local security forces.” Operators also faced constraints in moving Tamil deminers to different districts. Recently, NPA stopped its demining programme and then pulled-out entirely from Sri Lanka because of restrictions imposed by the Government, which accused NPA of being pro-LTTE.

International support for mine action in Sri Lanka has waxed and waned in an inverse relationship with the level of conflict.

¹⁰⁰ These figures exclude High Security Zones (HSZ), which are often protected by a defensive minefields.

¹⁰¹ NPA worked with the Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) of the Sri Lankan Army.

Figure 12 – International funding to mine action in Sri Lanka¹⁰²

EC Development Cooperation & Support for Mine Action

The EC frames its relations with Sri Lanka as economic co-operation based on mutual interests and benefits, rather than more narrowly on development co-operation.¹⁰³ Regardless, relations in recent years have been dominated by the conflict and the need to address the needs of the many war-affected people, together with the emergency response to the December 2004 tsunami.

Since the February 2002 ceasefire, the EC has provided significant funding for mine action in Sri Lanka. Until 2005, most EC funding came via ECHO.¹⁰⁴ However, by early 2004, ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO agreed that responsibility for funding mine action should be assumed by the latter two agencies.¹⁰⁵ In 2004 RELEX began funding mine action projects in Sri Lanka, drawing both on the APL thematic budget line and that for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing Countries (19 10 04).

In 2005, following the tsunami, ECHO again funded some mine action projects, including € 800,000 for post-tsunami demining (survey and clearance) and € 200,000 for mine action technical assistance capacity in the field.¹⁰⁶ In 2008 ECHO again resumed funding to support demining in support of the resettlement of IDPs. In the current year, the Delegation also began funding MRE, victim assistance, and advocacy.

In total, the EC has provided over € 14 million for mine action in Sri Lanka since early 2002, with both ECHO and RELEX accounting for about 47% of the total and only 6% coming from the AIDCO geographic envelope for Sri Lanka. According to Landmine Monitor data, the EC provided about 37% of all mine action funding for Sri Lanka in the start-up period of the programme (2002-04), with the EC contribution dropping to under 10% of the total since then.


¹⁰² Landmine Monitor, various years

¹⁰³ The EC and Sri Lanka: Cooperation Strategy 2002-06.

¹⁰⁴ In 2002, RELEX also provided € 800,000 for Landmine Impact Survey and clearance via budget line B7-303 – Rehabilitation and reconstruction in favour of Asian developing countries.

¹⁰⁵ See ECHO, Humanitarian Aid Decision: 23 02 01, decision reference number ECHO/-SA/BUD/2004/01000, p. 9.

¹⁰⁶ Records provided by the EC also show €1.57 million from ECHO to HI-F for mine victim assistance for 2005-07. This seems to represent a series of ECHO grants to HI-F for support to the disabled in general. If so, most of this would not properly be classified as mine action and it is not reflected in the Graph.

Figure 13 – EC funding to mine action in Sri Lanka

BURMA/MYANMAR

The Burmese/Myanmar government forces and a number of ethnic armed groups continue to lay antipersonnel mines in significant numbers. Landmines are concentrated on its borders with Bangladesh, India and Thailand, and in eastern parts of the country

No humanitarian demining programs are known to exist, although there are reports of sporadic clearance by the military and of ‘village demining’ (i.e. informal demining). As well, a number of agencies have reported ‘atrocious demining’ (i.e. civilians being forced to carry or remove mines against their will; to clear brush in suspected mined areas, etc.).

In 2007, at least 438 new mine/ERW casualties were reported to Landmine Monitor, a significant increase from the 243 casualties reported in 2006. Operating in Thailand, the ICRC, Handicap International, and other international NGOs provide assistance to civilian war casualties and others with disabilities from Burma/Myanmar.



In 2003-04, the EC funded three mine action projects based in Thailand for people from Burma/Myanmar.

- € 500,000 to the ICRC for prosthetics, MRE and advocacy
- € 200,000 in 2003 to HI for MRE and victim assistance, followed by another € 250,000 the following year

KEY ISSUES

The case of Sri Lanka illustrates how quickly the EC can respond with substantial funding via ECHO. While this funding is for humanitarian emergencies, it can be used to capitalise on openings, such as peace process that emerged following the unilateral ceasefire declaration by the LTTE in December 2001.

Sri Lanka also provides a good example of how the various EC directorates can coordinate for LRRD purposes. The existence of the APL thematic budget line, plus other global or regional budget lines (e.g. 19 10 04 – Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing Countries) seemed to provide the flexibility for RELEX and AIDCO to assume responsibility for initiatives started with ECHO funding.

7. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the following, overall conclusions for the Asia-Pacific region are derived from the observations from individual countries, and from the analysis of cross-country data. Where appropriate, conclusions are followed by one or more recommendations.

RELEVANCE


To recipient country needs

Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Sri Lanka are all seriously impacted from explosives contamination. In all cases, the contamination tends to have a disproportionate impact on poor and vulnerable groups: rural poor in general; refugees and internally displaced people from countries in conflict; and people subject to resettlement following a conflict or due to a development project. Problems with mine/UXO contamination have been highlighted in key development or (for Sri Lanka¹⁰⁷) reconstruction strategies. As such, EC assistance to mine action has been relevant to the needs of these countries.

There are questions, however, regarding the scale of EC support to mine action relative to the scale of the problems in many Asia-Pacific countries. The regional EC-funding targets for mine action were achieved in both APL Strategy periods, but these targets were themselves modest and – for 2005-07 – envisaged funding only from the APL budget line.

Mainland South-East Asia is the region with the world’s worst explosives contamination problem. In spite of this fact, relatively small sums were programmed for EC mine action funding to the Asia-Pacific region. Part of the reason for this is that EC country envelopes to Asia-Pacific countries are rather modest, which presumably reflects South-East Asia’s strategic importance to the EU and the fact that mine action tends to be a non-focal issue even in heavily contaminated countries. However, only 11% of the APL budget line funds were indicatively programmed for South-East Asia.

Figure 14 – Indicative programme allocations by region: 2002-2007



¹⁰⁷ The Re-awakening of the East Programme

Thematic instruments targeting a humanitarian and development issue, such as the APL budget line, provide the EC with an opportunity to address problems on a more coherent basis from a global perspective. As such, allocations should reflect humanitarian needs and development opportunities in the affected countries more than the strategic importance of a country to the EU.

The APL budget line has been terminated. However, earlier reports on regional evaluations of EC-funded mine action support have recommended that the EC explore options for some sort of funding ‘window’ for mine action support within existing budget instruments. As well, the new Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) may add impetus to efforts to create an enhanced mechanism for EC financial support to countries heavily impacted by explosives contamination.

Recommendation – Should an enhanced mechanism be created for EC financial support to address explosives contamination problems, indicative programming allocations should be based mainly on the basis of needs and opportunities rather than the strategic importance of a country to the EU.

To EC Country and Regional Strategy Papers & NIPs/MIPs

EC strategy and programming documents for most of these countries have also highlighted the explosives contamination problems.¹⁰⁸ Thus, EC assistance to mine action has also been relevant from the perspective of EC strategy and programming documents.

To the EC Regional Strategy for Asia: 2007-2013

One component of this strategy for ASEAN members is Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border security. Demining would be an important supporting element to the implementation of any agreement to resolve border issues, including the current dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. As such, EC support to a cross-border demining initiative could be extremely relevant to this component of the EC Regional Strategy.

Recommendation – The EC should advise ASEAN Foreign Ministers that its programme on Cooperation and Policy Reform in the Field of Security, which highlights border security, could support cross-border demining/explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) initiatives when such actions are needed to allow the permanent demarcation of borders between ASEAN member states.

To the Priorities Defined in the APL Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007

APL Strategy for 2002-04

EC financing to mine action in Asia-Pacific was consistent with the MIP for 2002-04 in all cases except Cambodia. The MIP had programme € 5 million from budget line B7-300 (Cooperation to Development – Asia) plus € 500,000 from the APL thematic budget line. The € 5 million programme for ‘mine clearance’ in the APL Strategy eventually shrunk to € 1.17 million by the time the contract was signed in late 2007 (the remainder went to land titling). The € 500,000 for TA to CMAA was never utilised for Cambodia (it may have been made available to Laos).

APL Strategy for 2005-07

Once again, less mine action funding was provided for Cambodia (€ 1 million) than had originally been programmed (€ 1.5 million). As well, the € 1.5 million programmed for Laos from the APL thematic budget line never materialised, which caused difficulties for the sub-Delegation and its implementing partners.

¹⁰⁸ The EC Strategy Paper for Burma/Myanmar: 2007-2013 includes only incidental remarks on landmine contamination.

EFFICIENCY

In many cases, EC grants have been too small and too short in duration to garner economies of scale (i.e. efficiency) on their own. This is not a problem when the recipient has many donors and can achieve scale economies from a pool of funds, which is often the case for UN agencies and some of the well-established international mine action NGOs. The issue is of particular relevance to ECHO, as it often has to cover the initial equipment costs but can only provide funding for short-durations.

EFFECTIVENESS

EC support to mine action operators appears to have been effective. For the most part, the EC has funded experienced international NGOs that are based in EU member states.

Pre-2002 EC assistance for capacity development of national organs in Cambodia was adjudged to have been less effective, and the EC provided only modest support to capacity development since 2002. Thus, EC assistance has been ineffective in terms of fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities in the Asia-Pacific region.

DECONCENTRATION AND THE END OF THE APL BUDGET LINE

Deconcentration will have significant effects – both positive and negative – on EC assistance in Asia-Pacific countries.¹⁰⁹ For non-focal issues such as mine action, it appears likely to have a negative impact as the (sub-) Delegations do not have the staff resources to monitor developments in these programmes.

The recently-issued *Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013* will assist to a degree. However, the elimination of the APL thematic budget line, coupled with the reduction in the complement of headquarters staff working on mine action, means that Brussels will not be in a position to provide expert guidance.

Recommendation – In addition to the new *Guidelines on European Community Mine Action*, EC headquarters should identify and pre-qualify a roster of mine action experts who could provide technical advice to delegates in mine-affected countries who are responsible for mine action.

DONOR COORDINATION

Donor coordination often represents a major problem for the EC in Asia-Pacific. The human and financial resources available to the (sub-) Delegations in the region are, for the most part, modest. At the same time, efforts to implement the *Paris Declaration* and enhance aid effectiveness typically raise aid management transaction costs in the short-term (i.e. until General Budget Support schemes and Programme Based Approaches can be formulated and agreed). This has been the case in Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, in Laos, making it extremely difficult for the (sub-) Delegation to adequately cover non-focus sectors. As well in Cambodia, the position responsible for mine action was vacant for two years.

In recent years, AusAID has served as an ‘anchor donor’ for mine action in both Cambodia and Laos, with knowledgeable and experienced personnel plus medium-term financial commitments and some flexibility in how these are allocated. In Laos for example, AusAID was able to step-in quickly to keep the HI UXO programme running when the sub-Delegation learned that the funds programmed for Laos from the APL budget line would not be forthcoming. AusAID ‘bridge

¹⁰⁹ Positive and negative effects are discussed in the *Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in Africa*, p. 36.

finance' allowed the sub-Delegation to explore other funding possibilities, which eventually proved successful. This experience suggests that there would be significant benefits if the EC Delegations and EU member state embassies could implement the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*.

Recommendation – In all explosives contaminated Asia-Pacific countries, the EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour*.

In recent years, two joint UXO sector evaluations have been commissioned in Laos (by UNDP and UXO Lao/NRA) and a joint donor evaluation on the mine action sector was commissioned in Cambodia. Such sector-wide evaluations have many advantages over individual project evaluations, and generally provide a better basis for programming decisions. These exercises also provide a good opportunity for marginal donors to a national mine action programme – such as the EC in both Cambodia and Laos – to assess programming options in a more strategic manner.

Recommendation – EC delegations, ideally in conjunction with donor representatives from EU member states in the country, should encourage and support sector-wide evaluations of national mine action programmes, and take the outcomes from such evaluations into consideration when making programming decisions.

COORDINATION AMONG EC AGENCIES FOR LRRD

Coordination among ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) appears to have worked reasonably well in Sri Lanka and Laos. In Sri Lanka, funds from the APL thematic budget line and from that for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Asian Developing Countries (19 10 04) were used when ECHO funding to mine action in that country stopped after 2004. ECHO funding to mine action resumed in the wake of the tsunami, and to provide demining support to resettlement of IDPs, but this simply reflects the rapid evolution of many emergencies.

In Laos, the sub-Delegation did not allocate funds from its geographic envelope to support ECHO mine action initiatives, but it was able to arrange APL thematic funding and funds from other thematic programmes for this purpose.

LRRD – at least in the context of EC development agencies continuing support for ECHO-financed initiatives – was not achieved in Cambodia. In spite of a positive evaluation of ECHO funded projects with a number of NGO operators (and a clear recommendation for continued support to these initiatives), the sub-Delegation decided not to continue support to standalone mine action projects. From a broader perspective however, the sub-Delegation's decision to incorporate funds for mine action within a large IRD project seems both appropriate and a good example of LRRD. Unfortunately, an inadequate project design coupled with inflexible EC procedures (such as the D+3 rule) resulted in problems at the start-up of the demining component of the IRD project.

Recommendation – The EC should put a greater emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to demining, and should consider a specific sector sub-strategy for demining and LRRD. Given the importance of ECHO funding in the early stages of many mine action programmes, DG ECHO should consider a focal point for mine action at its headquarters to achieve this aim.

APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in the Asia-Pacific region: 2002-2007

1. BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).¹¹⁰ These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: *The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.*

The APL Regulation goes on to state: *Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions...* (Article 14)

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007¹¹¹ further specifies that “*more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact*” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

3. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
4. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:¹¹²
 - Africa
 - Asia-Pacific
 - Caucasus-Central Asia
 - Europe
 - Latin America
 - Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,¹¹³ while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

¹¹⁰ Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

¹¹¹ This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

¹¹² Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:

- provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies;
- train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
- support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

¹¹³ Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, *Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004*.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

Overall objective:

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in the Asia-Pacific region to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

Specific objectives:

- To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
 - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
 - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
 - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in the Asia-Pacific region 2002-2006;
 - EC strategy documents for the Asia-Pacific region
- To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Asia-Pacific region, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);¹¹⁴
- To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
 - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
 - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
 - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries;
 - supporting local mine action organisations;
- To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in the Asia-Pacific region, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
- To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of implementation;
- To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);
- To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, development, and armed violence reduction

¹¹⁴ This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.

- To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC to the Asia-Pacific region;
- To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-funded mine projects;
- To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among mine action programmes in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.

Expected results

The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to the Asia-Pacific region, and to particular mine-affected countries in the region, since 2002. It shall incorporate more detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other donors, and UN agencies for the next years.

3. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:

- Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
- Desk Research
- Country Missions
 - Cambodia
 - Lao PDR
- Analysis and Reporting

Country Missions

As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and collect documents and data from:

- EC delegations
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
- other key government officials
- representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

Additional data collection

Additional information will be obtained from:

- Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available);
- Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);

- Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC Delegations, managers of operator organizations, both in organizations' headquarters and on the field, and beneficiary countries' officials, etc.).
- EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
- National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies from the focus countries
- Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine action) and the World Bank
- Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
- Other sources, as appropriate.

4. OUTPUTS

An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and data collection stage.

A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.

Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.

A final report will be submitted to the EC Brussels.

All reports will be in English.

All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the European Union. The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm. The GICHD logo shall be provided by the GICHD.

Annex 1 to the ToR

Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were:

- The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will receive EC funding for mine action;
- In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action within the EC;
- Request for proposal and selection processes, including:
 - The need for more high quality proposals,
 - The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and
 - The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of proposals and projects.
- Contracting issues, including:
 - The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements;
 - The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority;
 - The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short durations.
- All interventions should incorporate exit strategies.

APPENDIX 2 – PERSONS MET

CAMBODIA

Note – To reduce costs, Ted Paterson (TP) and Dr. Mao Vanna (MV) conducted research on other initiatives in addition to the Country Mission for the EC Regional Evaluation. Meetings unrelated to the EC Evaluation are not shown. Meetings for multiple purposes are marked thus *.

16-17 February 2008 – TP fly Geneva → Phnom Penh		
18-20 February – TP & MV in Phnom Penh		
18 Feb	CMAA*	H.E. Leng Sochea, Deputy Secretary General Chan Rotha, Director, Socio-Economic Planning & Database
	MAG*	Rupert Leighton, Country Director
	HALO Trust*	Tim Porter, Programme Manager
		Richard Grindle, Finance Manager
19 Feb	TWG Meeting*	H.E. Prak Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister & Chair, plus members
20 Feb	CWARS	Sam Oeurn Pok, Managing Director
20 Feb – TP & MV fly Phnom Penh → Siem Reap		
20 Feb	ECOSORN	Chan Saruth, National Project Director
		Philippe Becu, Acting Team Leader, ITAT
		Ab Koster, Intern'l Civil Engineering Advisor
		Oum Sang Onn, Key Mine Action Expert (CMAC)
		Norm Sinath, Senior Mine Action Officer
		Keo Chhunly, Senior Land Titling Officer
	Chueang Viola, Senior Secretary	
	CMAC	Oum Sang Onn, Key Mine Action Expert (dinner)
21 Feb	National holiday	
22 Feb	ECOSORN	As 20 Feb above
	EIC	Dy Phalla, Senior M & E Expert (assigned to ECOSORN)
22 Feb – TP & MV fly Siem Reap → Phnom Penh		
23-24 Feb – weekend		
25 Feb	UNDP*	Steve Munroe, Senior Programme Officer
26 Feb	EC	Koen Evereart, Officer responsible for ECOSORN
27 Feb	HI-F	Lucile Papon, Country Director
	CMAC	H.E. Heng Rattana, Deputy Director General
		Oum Phumro, Director of Planning & Operations
	EIC	Dourng Kakada, Senior Researcher
28 Feb	MAG*	Rupert Leighton, Country Director
	HI-B*	Hugo Hotte, Mine Action Programme Manager
29 Feb	Writing report	
1-2 March 2008 – TP fly Phnom Penh → Geneva		
Follow-up meetings (TP & MV mission of 19 April–3 May and 18-29 August 2008)		
27 Apr	ECOSORN	Oum Sang Onn, Key Mine Action Expert (CMAC)
		Norm Sinath, Senior Mine Action Officer
28 Apr	ECOSORN	Manfred Staab, Team Leader, ITAT
29 Apr	CMAC*	H.E. Heng Rattana, Deputy Director General
		Oum Phumro, Director of Planning & Operations
2 May	EC Bangkok	Andrew Jacobs, Head of Operations
2 May	ECHO Bangkok*	Aldo Biondi, Head of Regional Support Office
		Onpreeya Chitpakdee, Regional Programme Assistant
29 Aug	UNDP*	Steve Munroe, Programme Officer for Mine Action
		Dylan Gelard, Contracts

LAOS

May 2005, Bangkok (following mission to Cambodia)		
Friday 01.05.08	Overview of EC aid	Andrew Jacobs, EC Bangkok
	Overview of ECHO in Lao PDR	Aldo Biondi, ECHO Bangkok
Saturday & Sunday, 14-15 June 2008 – T. Paterson & E. Tollefsen fly Geneva → Vientiane		
Monday, 16.06.08	Introduction to MAGs activities	David Hayter, MAG
	Reception at BACTEC	BACTEC, UNDP, Australian Embassy, Oxiana
Tuesday 17.06.08	NRA database and IMSMA	Beat Schoch and Khammoungkhoun Southivong, NRA
	General briefing on strategy for the UXO sector for joint UNDP and EC evaluation team	NRA, UXO LAO, FSD, US Embassy, UNICEF, WFP, BACTEC, Hi-B, MAG, AusAID, UNDP
	Lunch meeting with UNDP and NRA	Stephan Vigie, Mariko Harado, Tim Horner + Somnuk Vorasarn, Deputy Director, NRA and UNDP evaluation team
	Planning, accreditation and QA/QC	Phil Bean, NRA/ArmorGroup
Wednesday 18.06.08	Briefing on UXO victims survey	Mike Boddington, NRA/COPE
	Briefing on EC funded projects	David Hayter, MAG
Thursday 19.06.08	Briefing on AusAID funding of the UXO sector	Warren Hoye and Sounisa Sundara AusAID + UNDP evaluation team
	Briefing on UXO LAO work and strategy	John Dingley, UXO LAO/UNDP
	Coordination of the UXO sector in Laos	Bounphone Sayaseth, UXO LAO
	Dinner meeting on Mine Action sector	Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP
Friday 20.06.08	Information of WFP involvement in priority setting for UXO clearance	Julie Spooner, WFP
	Quality Management in UXO LAO	Marco Heuscher, ArmorGroup/UXO LAO
	FSD operations in Laos	Tony Fish and Nigel Orr, FSD
Sunday, 22.06.08 – Travel with HI-B from VTE to Sepon		
Monday 23.06.08	Visit to HI-B PCA, clearance and MRE teams in Sepon District	HI-B
Tuesday 24.06.08	Visit MAG clearance teams and previously EC funded projects in Khammuone Province.	MAG
Wednesday 25.06.08	Meeting with EC mine action sector coordinator in Laos	Francesco Straniero, EC
	Briefing on the MRE sector in Laos	Thongdy Phommavongsa and Ruth Bottomley, NRA
Thursday 26.06.08	Briefing on HI-Bs programme in Laos and feedback from field visit	Luc Delneuveville and Kim Warren, HI-B.
	Dinner with FSD	Tony Fish, FSD
Friday 27.06.08	Meet with UXO Sector Assessment Team (dinner)	Bob Griffin, Robert Keeley, plus Mariko Harado (UNDP)
Saturday & Sunday, 28-29 June 2008 – Vientiane → Geneva		

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

FOR CAMBODIA

EC & EC PROJECT DOCUMENTS

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Cambodia – European Community : Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013.

Eaton, Paul, *Preparation of Terms of Reference for Contract and/or tender documents on Result 5 'Access to Land': Mission Report of the ISTA Land Specialist*, ECOSORN, 13 March 2007

ECOSORN, *Result 5: SAL (Safer Access to Land, presentation slides, Siem Reap, (not dated but delivered on 20 February 2008)*

_____, Annex II: Terms of Reference (Annex to the Tender for *Safer access to arable lands and social infrastructures through implementation of mine risk reduction strategies with related activities for ECOSORN Project*)

EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour, European Commission, May 2007.

European Union Road Map for Increased Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia (no date)

Financing Agreement between the European Community and the Royal Government of Cambodia: Economic and Social Relaunch of Northwest Provinces, Financing Agreement No. 16793, KHM/AIDCO/2004/16793. (last signature, 18 June 2005)

IEPELA, *Community participation to actions related to antipersonnel mines: Grant Application Form* (Budget line 19 02 04; Europaid/125980/L/ACT/KH), November 2007

Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Asia: 2007-2010

Multi-Annual Indicative Programme: 2007-2010 – Cambodia

Regional Programming for Asia – Strategy Document: 2007-2013

MINE ACTION DOCUMENTS

ArmorGroup, *Review of the Mine Action Sector in Cambodia for the European Commission*, 2003a

ArmorGroup, *Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Project for the Development of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)*, 2003b

Bolton, M., Praivan Limpanboon, and Chhim Vanak, 2003, *LUPU Project Evaluation*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France.

- Bottomley, Ruth, *A study on the dramatic decrease in mine/UXO casualties in 2006 in Cambodia*, CMVIS, HI-B, NPA, and UNICEF for CMAA, February 2007
- _____, *Crossing the Divide: Landmines, Villagers and Organisations*, PRIO Report 1/2003, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2003
- _____, *Spontaneous Demining Initiatives: Mine Clearance by Villagers in Rural Cambodia*, Handicap International-Belgium, 2001
- CMAA, *National Strategy on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); 2008-2015*, (Final Draft of 12 September 2006), November 2007
- _____, *Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005-2009*, 3rd Edition, April 2005
- _____, *National Mine Action Strategy*, 2004
- CMVIS, *Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System: Annual Report 2006*, Cambodian Red Cross and Handicap International-Belgium, 2007.
- Durocher, Marcel, Agim Hoti, Mok Tonh, Keo Vuthy, *Evaluation Report on ECHO funded Humanitarian Mine Action Pilot Projects in North-West of Cambodia*, ECHO, October 2003
- Gildestad, B., *Cost-Benefit Analysis of Mine Clearance Operations in Cambodia*, February 2005.
- Griffen, R. and R. Keeley, 2004, *Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action*, [two volumes]
- ICBL, *Landmine Monitor*, various year
- Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y África (IEPALA) and Cambodian Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society (CWARS), _____
- Meindersma, C., A. Sprangemeijer, , G. Gisbers, T. Sweijjs, and Mao Vanna, *Evaluation of the Netherlands' financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in 1996-2006: Cambodia*, HCSS-07-004r, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, September 2007.
- Moyes, R., *Tampering: Deliberate handling and use of live ordnance in Cambodia*, (report for Handicap International-Belgium, Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian People's Aid, 2004
- Meindersma, C., A. Sprangemeijer, G. Gijsbers, T. Sweijjs, and Mao Vanna, 2007, *Evaluation of the Netherlands' Financial Assistance for Humanitarian Demining Activities in 1996-2006: Cambodia*, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
- Mine Action Investment Database, <http://www.mineactioninvestments.org/frameset.asp>
- Paterson, Ted, *Capacity Development in Mine Action: The Case of Cambodia*, internal report for GICHD, 2004.

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Land Law, [No. 14 of 2001], 30 August 2001.

Sub-decree No. 76, [organisation and functioning of CMAA], 8 August 2001

Sub-decree No. 19, [Social Land Concessions], 19 March 2003

Sub-decree No. 70, [socio-economic management of mine clearance operations], 20 October 2004

Other RGC Documents

Action Plan on Harmonization, Alignment, and Results : 2006-2010

Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007, (Prepared for the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum, June 2007)

Cambodia Millennium Development Goals (excerpt from the Human Development Report), 2003

National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010, Council of Ministers, January 2006

Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management, January 2006

The Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia, (address by Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister), July 2004

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(2004) *National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy*

Committee for Planning and Investment, Department of International Cooperation (2007a)
Achievements, Constraints and Future Direction within the Implementation of the National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010

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Report on the Round Table Implementation Meeting

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A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR

- Government of Lao PDR (2004)
National Strategic Plan for the UXO Programme in Lao PDR: The Safe Path Forward
- Griffin et al (2008)
UXO Sector Evaluation – Lao PDR
- Keeley et al (2002)
Mission to Assess Future Sustainable Options of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme
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An Evaluation of the Integrated UXO Threat Reduction Project in Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR
- National Regulatory Authority (2008)
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Vientiane Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
- IMF and World Bank (2004)
Joint Staff Advisory Note of the PRSP
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Lao PDR Poverty Assessment Report: From Valleys to Hilltops – 15 Years of Poverty Reduction, Report No. 38083-LA, 2 volumes
- World Food Programme (2007)
Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment
- _____ (2008)
Standard Project Report: Recovery Assistance to the Disaster Prone and Vulnerable Food Insecure Communities in the Lao PDR



APPENDIX 4 – EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROJECTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC

CAMBODIA

YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
1998	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	HI-B		B7-641	1,205,000	Support to CMAC Kampong Cham & Kampong Thom
1998	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	Franklin Advisory Services		B7-641	745,000	Support to CMAC Siem Reap + Sisophon
1998	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	Planet Consultants		B7-5076	1,035,000	Capacity building -- CMAC
1998	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HI-B		B7-210	350,000	Prosthesis for disabled
1998	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HALO		B7-210	1,000,000	Demining
1999	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HALO		B7-210	700,000	Demining
2000	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HI-B		B7-210	20,000	Survey on spontaneous demining
2000	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	MAG		B7-210	700,000	Demining Battambang & Preah Vihear
2000	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	PIRNEY	28/12/01 to ?	B7-641	392,113	LT TA to CMAA
2000	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	TEA CEGOS	01/06/02 to 31/05/03	B7-641	115,589	ST TA to CMAA
2000	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	HI-B	01/06/01 to 01/11/03	B7-641	360,000	LUPU project?
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HI-B		ECHO B7-210	450,000	Mine clearance
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HALO		ECHO B7-210	305,000	Mine clearance
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	MAG		ECHO B7-210	105,000	Mine clearance
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX			B7-661	0	Not used????
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	HI-B	01-12/2004	ECHO B7-210	270,000	Mine clearance
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	MAG	01-12/2004	ECHO B7-210	179,539	Mine clearance



YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
2004	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	ECHO	MAG	01/11/2004-30/10/2005	ECHO B7-210	170,000	Demining and Mine Risk Education
2007	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	RELEX	CMAC	2008-	B7-300 (ASIA)	1,172,848	Mine Clearance and Land Titling (ECOSORN)
2007	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	EuropeAid/125980/L/ACT/KH	HI-F	2008-	19 02 04	500,000	Community participation to actions related to antipersonnel mines
2007	ASIA-PACIFIC	CAMBODIA	EuropeAid/125980/L/ACT/KH	leaplia	2008-	19 02 04	500,000	Community participation to actions related to antipersonnel mines

LAO PDR

YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
1998	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR		HI-B			3,000,000	UXO clearance Savannakhet
2000	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	RELEX	HI-B	26/02/01 to 25/02/02	B7-661	665,405	Support to Lao national UXO operations in Savannakhet
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	RELEX	HI-B	01/09/02 to 31/12/04	B7-661	877,300	Technical Assistance to UXO Clearance in Savannakhet province
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	ECHO	CARE		ECHO B7-210	100,000	Mine clearance & mine awareness
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	ECHO	CARE	2003-2004	23 02 01	254,339	Awareness-raising, capacity building and livelihood improvement
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	RELEX	HI-B	24/12/04 to 23/06/07	B7-661	1,000,000	Integrated UXO Threat Reduction in Savannakhet Province
2004	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	ECHO	ZOA	2004-2005	23 02 01	503,027	Clearance and livelihood development
2004	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	RELEX	MAG	10/01/05 to 9/01/08	B7-661	1,000,000	Humanitarian UXO Clearance in Khammoune Province
2004	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	ECHO	MAG	01/10/04 to 31/01/05	ECHO B7-210	127,997	improving security, livelihood and ensuring safer behaviour



GICHD | CIDHG



YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
2007	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	AIDCO	NRA	10.07 - 9.10	19 04 03 EIDHR	100,000	Survey of UXO accidents & victims
2008	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	AIDCO	HI	2008-10	21 03 01	500,000	Integrated Savannakhet
2008	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	AIDCO	MAG	2008-10	21 03 01	500,000	Clearance Khammoune
2008	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	AIDCO	UXO Lao	2008-10	21 03 01	150,000	Integrated Attapeui
2008	ASIA-PACIFIC	LAO PDR	AIDCO	UXO Lao	2008-10	21 03 01	150,000	Integrated Sekong

SRI LANKA

YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	RELEX		12 months	B7-303	800,000	LIS & mine clearance
2002	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	Halo Trust, MAG, NPA, UNICEF	12 months	ECHO B7-210	3,050,000	Mine surveys, Mine clearance & mine awareness
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	UNICEF	01.07.2003-21.12.2003	ECHO B7-210	240,000	Mine Risk Education
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	HALO Trust	01/01/2004 - 31/01/2005	ECHO B7-210	600,000	De-mining
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	MAG	01/01/2004 - 31/12/2004	ECHO B7-210	400,000	Surveys and MRE
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	NPA	01/01/2004 - 31/12/2004	ECHO B7-210	600,000	De-mining and MRE
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	UNICEF	01/01/2004 - 31/12/2004	ECHO B7-210	300,000	MRE
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	HI-F	01/06/2004 - 28/02/2005	ECHO B7-210	100,000	Mine victims assistance
2004	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	RELEX	MAG	2005-06	B7-661	1,239,000	Mine Clearance possibly combined with minefield survey and marking



YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
2005	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	RELEX	UNDP		19 02 04	1,300,000	Technical survey, marking and fencing
2005	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	RELEX	UNDP		19 10 04	1,999,976	Mine action support
2005	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	RELEX	UNICEF		19 10 04	1,299,973	MRE + Mine victims assistance
2005	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	Halo Trust	01/02/05-31/01/06	23 02 01	800,000	Demining and technical surveys
2005	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO			23 02 01	200,000	TA capacity in the field
2005	ASIA-PACIFIC	SRI LANKA	ECHO	HI	2005-2007		1,573,560	Mine victim rehabilitation

BURMA/MYANMAR

YEAR	REGION	COUNTRY / ORGANISATION	COMMISSION / SERVICE	AGENCY	PERIOD	BUDGET LINE	AMOUNT (€)	TYPE OF ACTION
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	BURMA / MYANMAR	ECHO	HI-F	01/05/2003-31/04/2004	ECHO B7-210	200,000	Victim assistance/Rehabilitation of people with disabilities/MRE among the refugee population
2003	ASIA-PACIFIC	BURMA / MYANMAR	RELEX	ICRC	Jan 2004 – Jan-05	19 02 04	500,000	Advocate against APLs, victim assistance
2004	ASIA-PACIFIC	BURMA / MYANMAR	ECHO	HI	Jun 2004 – Jun 2005	ECHO B7-210	250,000	Mine victims assistance, mine risk education