

# REGIONAL EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 2002-2008

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Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in the Middle East, Brussels, December 2008

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## ACRONYMS

<b>AIDCO</b>	EuropeAid Cooperation Office	<b>LMAC</b>	Lebanon Mine Action Centre
<b>APM</b>	Anti-Personnel Landmines	<b>LRRD</b>	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
<b>APMBC</b>	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	<b>M &amp; E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>BAC</b>	Battle Area Clearance	<b>MA</b>	Mine Action
<b>CBU</b>	Cluster Bomb Unit	<b>MAG</b>	Mines Advisory Group
<b>CCW</b>	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of War	<b>MDD</b>	Mine Detecting Dog
<b>CSP</b>	Country Strategy Paper	<b>MRE</b>	Mine Risk Education
<b>DCA</b>	DanChurch Aid	<b>NDO</b>	National Demining Office
<b>DDG</b>	Danish Demining Group	<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	<b>NMAA</b>	National Mine Action Authority
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development	<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian Peoples Aid
<b>DG DEV</b>	European Commission Directorate General for Development	<b>OECD/DAC</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
<b>DG RELEX</b>	European Commission Directorate General for External Relations	<b>QA</b>	Quality Assurance
<b>EC</b>	European Commission	<b>QC</b>	Quality Control
<b>ECHO</b>	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office	<b>REC</b>	Royal Engineer Corps
<b>ENPI</b>	European National Programme for Integration	<b>SFD</b>	Swiss Federation for Demining (same as FSD)
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	<b>TA</b>	Technical Advisor
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive Remnants of War	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>UNMAS</b>	United Nations Mine Action Service
<b>FSD</b>	Fondation Suisse de Déminage (same as SFD)	<b>UNDG</b>	United Nations Development Group
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>GICHD</b>	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	<b>UNDP/BCPR</b>	UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>HI</b>	Handicap International	<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person	<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar
<b>IMAS</b>	International Mine Action Standards	<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnance
<b>IMSMA</b>	Information Management System for Mine Action	<b>VA</b>	Victim Assistance
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedure	<b>VTF</b>	Voluntary Trust Fund (of the UN)
<b>Spot UXO</b>	Isolated UXO which does not impact a community even though it poses a possible threat	<b>VVAF</b>	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
<b>LIS</b>	Landmine Impact Survey	<b>WRF</b>	World Rehabilitation Forum

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).<sup>1</sup> These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of an integrated and focused European policy. The Regulation states the need to regularly assess operations financed by the Community and that the European Commission (EC) shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine action. To implement these provisions, the EC commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004 and entered into an agreement with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the six regions, one of which is the Middle East.

The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. The evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

### METHODOLOGY


The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen were selected of which Iraq could only be covered with a desk review because of security constraints. The Evaluation Team comprised of Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen of Channel Research. The key phases of the study were a desk study in April, a field trip to Yemen in April, a field trip to Jordan in May, interviews with EC officials in parallel and a field trip to Lebanon in June. All together 64 persons were interviewed either in person, by telephone or questionnaire.

The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of some EC officials for interviews and the denial of access to some of the documentation despite requests from the evaluation team and EC staff supporting this study.

### OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The total amount of funding to Mine Action (MA in the Middle East is more or less the same in the two periods that are covered by the two EC global MA strategies (€ 10.37 million in 2002-2004 and 10.83 million in 2005-2007). The percentage of the total funding to MA rose from 7% to 10% in that period. The constancy reflected in these figures is misleading.

The biggest part of the funding during 2002-04 went to Iraq in 2003 and was related to the emergency situation. There was no funding for Yemen and Jordan during this period. In the following years the funding was more diverse but did not include Iraq anymore. Funding varies from year to year and from country to country.



<sup>1</sup> Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

EC funding to the region was divided into two categories: funding to countries in a crisis (Iraq and Lebanon); and funding to countries in a more stable situation (Yemen and Jordan). The majority of funding went to humanitarian demining in the crisis countries (70%).

### **EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST**

There is no specific EC strategy for MA for the Middle East and EC Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) in general do not include MA. In the case of Iraq no CSP exists. The application of the EC global MA strategies (the Regulation) in the four countries is not coherent. By looking at the priorities in these strategies and the funding decisions taken, it can be shown that there is no stringent logic and that funding decisions cannot always be attributed to strategic objectives. The majority of EC officials interviewed declared that they were not aware of the MA strategies or confirmed that they did not use it as a reference for funding decisions. Regarding humanitarian demining there is no specific strategy. The global MA strategy does refer to humanitarian need and the role of MA in humanitarian aid, but the strategy does not explicitly state objectives and strategic priorities for humanitarian demining.

### **REGIONAL APPROACH TO MINE ACTION**

Countries in the Middle East have national mine problems that can be addressed nationally. National entities are entrusted with the task. The need to respond to MA problems does not in general have regional implications. Present and potential new conflicts between countries in the region are a regional aspect. Their relevance for MA lies mainly on the side of prevention and in the diplomatic area. A few aspects related to clearance and the Middle East as a region could be observed (for example regional budget lines and strategies). These aspects can be seen as marginal compared to the fact that the MA problem can and should be addressed nationally.

### **COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN UNION-MEMBER STATES**

If at all, coordination between the EC and Member States regarding funding to MA in the Middle East takes place at national level in the beneficiary countries (EC delegations, embassies). In the four countries no specific coordination mechanism for MA exists between the EC and Member States. If coordination takes place it happens within the overall donor coordination process (reconstruction, development). Funding in MA is often channelled through the United Nations (UN) and coordination is left to the UN and the national stakeholder.

A number of Member States do have focal persons for MA in their governments. There is no structure or communication set up for these focal points to communicate with the EC about MA. It was stated that there is no need to have a specific coordination mechanism between the EU and Member States for MA globally as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) gives the framework, sets the goals and provides for a coordination structure. Nonetheless, in all interviews with Member States, representatives stated their wish to have a forum for exchange and information. In the past there have been meetings regarding MA between the European Union (EU) and Member States but since the thematic budget line no longer exists, these meetings have been suspended.

### **NON-GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

The EC is funding Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) directly only in Lebanon and Iraq. These are countries in emergencies where DG ECHO supports NGOs. Other funding for MA in the region went entirely to United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

NGOs in the field in general benefit from a person in the NGO Headquarter (HQ) who is aware of EC procedures and developments. For NGOs it is easier to link up with DG ECHO than with other EC services (to obtain information, to be aware of funding strategies and priorities). This is partly because they are used to work with DG ECHO and partly because DG ECHO's procedures

are perceived as clear and straight forward.

NGOs are aware of the increased importance of EC delegations. However, NGOs still have very limited knowledge about new EC instruments (and, in particular knowledge of the Stability Instrument) or how funding procedures work. The case of Lebanon shows that this could lead to difficulties regarding efficiency and appropriate exit strategies.

## **COUNTRY FINDINGS**

### **Lebanon**

The situation in Lebanon in general and in the MA sector in particular is characterized by instability. Although still contaminated with an ‘old’ landmines problem the situation changed significantly with the Israeli Lebanese conflict in summer 2006 and the new cluster munitions problem. The MA Sector in Lebanon is well established and more complex than in the other countries examined in this study. The country is divided into two zones because of the peacekeeping operations of the UN in the south, with the Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon (MACC SL – a project of the UN Mine Action Service – UNMAS) south of the Litani River, and the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC – supported by UNDP) responsible for the rest of the country. All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC SL.

Before the crisis in 2006 the EC – as well as other Western donors – did not pay much attention to the landmine problem. After 2006, funding to MA rose by more than ten times. EC funding after the war in 2006 is characterized by a challenge to avoid gaps in funding MA, first from humanitarian budget lines and, later, from European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This was further complicated by changing predictions of the end date for clearance of cluster munitions in the south.

Overall the EC funding to Lebanon is relevant. The EC proved to be responsive to the situation and to developments in the sector. The fluctuating situation in Lebanon made a flexible approach necessary and the EC showed flexibility and responsiveness. Nevertheless the weakness of this re-active approach becomes clear today when prolonged funding to the sector and the need for an exit strategy require a more strategic, better planned approach.

Regarding efficiency the decision of DG ECHO to fund four international NGOs in 2006 and 2007 for the clearance of cluster munitions instead of one or two only, is questionable in terms of efficiency and integration into longer term planning. Regarding the choice of funding channels the EC was mainly following administrative imperatives rather than taking strategic decisions.

The missing strategic vision and planning for an exit becomes relevant when it comes to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Although the MA intervention after the 2006 crisis is, without doubt, relevant and is contributing to reduced suffering, there is no direct link between the MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction process in the country. The activities for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not linked to other EC funded programs.

### **Jordan**

Landmines in Jordan are located in military-controlled border areas in the northern Syrian border area, the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba. They are marked, mapped and partly fenced today. Jordan is actively pursuing the resolution of the landmine problem. Jordan signed and ratified the APMB in 1998. The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan. The EC funded UNDP to support Jordan in doing a technical survey, demining and training of deminers.

The EC funding of MA in Jordan is highly relevant. Jordan today has managed to provide its own



means and to secure from external sources the funds needed to resolve the landmine problem. So far as could be assessed during the field visit, it seems likely the EC funded program that ends in 2008 will meet all of its objectives.

None of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor the project document for the project funded via the UNDP contain any direct link between MA and the development process. The programme is limited to the clearance activities and to the capacity development of the counterpart. The project does not foresee any activities directly related to the use of the land, nor does it link to another initiative to bridge the gap with potential follow-up development activities.

### **Yemen**

As a result of several conflicts Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Most landmines were laid in pre-unification border areas between northern and southern Yemen. The Government of Yemen is committed to eliminate the impact of mines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in Yemen. Yemen signed the APMBC on December 1997 and has now requested an extension until 2015 for fulfilling its APMBC obligations for clearing all known mined areas.

Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by Yemen Mine Action Centre YEMAC) involving staff seconded from the Ministry of Defense. The direct EC support to MA in Yemen is limited to the funding of a UNDP programme, which has been running since 1999. The EC supports Phase III of the program only.

There has been no EC funding for MA in Yemen prior to 2007 although the situation in Yemen was eligible under the EC strategy for MA for 2002-2004. The EC is funding other sectors in Yemen and contributes to the reduction of poverty. There is no linkage between this funding and the funding to MA.

### **Iraq**

Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW. Since the 2003 invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices indicate that huge amounts of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow of the Hussein regime and subsequently plundered for use in ongoing insurgencies.

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007. The Iraq's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2003 but closed down in 2007 due to corruption, political turbulence, changes of management and insecurity (kidnapping). The Kurdish Regional Government assumed responsibility for MA in three northern governorates. UNDP has provided institutional development and local capacity development support to the NMAA and regional MA centers. Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, NGOs and commercial demining operators. A number of international NGOs are present in the country.

The EC's support to MA in Iraq is limited to the years 2003 and 2004 (funding decisions in 2003). The funding to Iraq is characterized by the fact that the EC announced its decision not to fund operations in Iraq anymore after 2003. This decision is linked to the security situation and the fact that the EC cannot ensure proper monitoring and financial oversight without a presence in the country. The decision concerns the MA sector and raises some doubts. The need for humanitarian demining increased after 2003. European and non-European donors are funding MA program in Iraq whereas the EC, as one of the biggest humanitarian donors in the world, is not. The operators that received funding until 2003 are still present in the country and continue to work with funds from other donors but are not able to address all needs because of the extent of the problem.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. EC funding to the region is overall relevant. The EU does not follow a regional strategy or approach for the Middle East which is appropriate as the few regional aspects of MA in the Middle East are outweighed by the national elements (national strategies, national actors). Potential regional initiatives to complement national MA programmes are best viewed from a diplomatic perspective of conflict prevention and peace building.
2. The global EC strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions in the Middle East. The global strategy is more important at Brussels level than at country level. Some EC officials perceive strategic planning and decision-making in the MA sector as difficult due to the lack of strategic guidance from the Regulation, technical aspects in the MA sector and other sector specific aspects.
3. Funding to MA in the Middle East is fragmented. In some cases the funding is not coherent. Only some common aspects can be identified in the region (funding to the UN, differentiation between countries in crisis and more stable countries).
4. Humanitarian Demining is of importance in the region and is addressed by the EC. However there is no specific strategy for humanitarian demining, nor any guidelines or a concept on how to integrate humanitarian demining into a reconstruction context.
5. The EC is generally supporting assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by funding Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS). In some contexts the baseline data, methodology and quality of assessments is not sufficient in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability.
6. The funding emphasis is on clearance which is appropriate overall. In three of the four countries a landmine/UXO free country is a realistic option and can be achieved in the near future.
7. For the most part, EC funding to MA is not explicitly integrated into wider national reconstruction or development strategies. Linkages are limited in the sense that MA programmes take place in the wider reconstruction and development context but there is no joint planning for broader results or specific emphasis or measures on linkages between programmes.
8. Operationalising the concept of LRRD is still a challenge. Whereas DG ECHO procedures are flexible and comparably fast, procedures of other instruments are less flexible and slow.
9. The Middle East is not a priority region for MA within the EC. Before and after the cancellation of the thematic budget line, EC officials did not pay much attention to MA in the region (with the exception of humanitarian demining). By choosing the UN (and in particular UNDP) for the support to national structures, the EC follows a low profile approach in the region.
10. Funding of the EC and of Member States is overall coherent when it comes to selecting target countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is the case of Iraq, where EU Member States fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not.
11. Coherence in funding to MA in the region is achieved despite the lack of coordination mechanisms in the countries, the region, or at European capital level. The APMBC and instruments provide the overall coordination framework for donors, including the EC and Member States.

12. Direct funding to NGOs is, in general, provided only for humanitarian demining. The procedure and management follows DG ECHO standard procedures, which is not always appropriate as MA operations have some specifications different from other sectors.

13. The EC and other donors face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster munitions. Weak assessments and difficulties in determining realistic end dates for clearance are a programming challenge for donors.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. The EC should continue to work with national approaches in the Middle East and does not need to think about an explicit regional strategy for MA.

2. The EC should consider more specific guidance to those within the EC who are dealing with planning and MA strategies at the national level. To achieve better guidance in MA for the EC delegations, the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level or in the region.

3. In countries with a stable environment, the EC should follow the global strategy in a more coherent way. If the EC decides to support a country's effort in fulfilling the APMBC obligations this should be done coherently and based on a strategic approach.

4. In countries with an ongoing or recent crisis the EC should continue to fund MA quickly and flexibly regardless the countries' commitment to the APMBC.

5. The EC should put a higher emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC (and, in particular, DG ECHO) should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines. To achieve these aspects DG ECHO should consider a focal point for MA in Brussels.

6. The EC should continue to fund assessments in MA. This could be LIS as has been funded in the past but also socio economic impact studies for mine and cluster ammunition affected areas.

7. In the four countries assessed, the EC should continue (or, in the case of Iraq, start) to focus funding of clearance activities. The EC should continue to fund MA in the region until all countries have fulfilled their treaty obligations. Where the EC is funding programmes which do not only have a focus on fast clearance of contaminated sites, the EC should increase efforts in linking MA to reconstruction and development goals.

8. If the EC is funding MA in the region, it should be strategically and properly followed-up. To facilitate strategic planning and oversight, the EC should consider a focal point in Brussels or in the region.

9. The EC should reconsider its decision not to fund MA in Iraq.

10. The EC should consider increased information exchange and coordination with EU Member States without creating any mechanisms that would overlap with coordination under the APMBC. To facilitate information exchange between the EC and Member States the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level.

11. The EC should learn from the response to the cluster munitions problem in South Lebanon and ensure that, in future contexts, the lessons learnt are applied. This could be done by developing specific guidelines for cluster munitions problems or by developing compilations of good practice cases.

12. The EC should apply a coherent approach when it comes to requirements for oversight and programme ownership. In particular in Iraq the EC should reconsider the decision not to fund MA (or other humanitarian activities) because of the impossibility of monitoring and controlling.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).<sup>2</sup> These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy. Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that:

*“The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.”*

The APL Regulation goes on to state:

*“Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions (...).”<sup>3</sup>*

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007<sup>4</sup> further specifies that “*more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact*” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:

*Africa*  
*Asia-Pacific*

*Caucasus-Central Asia*  
*Europe*

*Latin America*  
*Middle East*

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,<sup>5</sup> while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year. In April 2008 GICHD contracted Channel Research to undertake the regional evaluation for the Middle East.

The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on

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<sup>2</sup> Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

<sup>3</sup> Article 14

<sup>4</sup> This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

<sup>5</sup> Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, *Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004*.

- (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and
- (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.

Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

### **Overall objective of the evaluation:**

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine action in the Middle East to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

### **Specific objectives of the evaluation:**

- To assess the **relevance** of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
  - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
  - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
  - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in the Middle East 2002-2007;
  - EC strategy documents for the Middle East
- To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);<sup>6</sup>
- To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
  - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
  - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
  - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries;
  - supporting local mine action organisations;
- To assess the **coordination** among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the impact of **deconcentration** on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
- To assess the adequacy of the **EC national strategies and plans**, and the effectiveness of implementation;
- To assess the existence of an ‘**exit strategy**’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);
- To assess the **linkages** between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
- To assess the impact of the **end of the specific budget line** for anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new “**stability instrument**” on future mine action support from the EC to the Middle East;
- To make **recommendations** to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-funded mine projects;

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<sup>6</sup> This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.

- To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among mine action programs in the Middle East and globally.

## TERMS OF REFERENCE

The full Terms of Reference (TORs) are attached as Appendix 1.

## METHODOLOGY

The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Four countries in the region<sup>7</sup> were selected of which one could only be covered with a desk review because of security constraints: Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen.

The evaluation was implemented in three phases:

- Planning, desk research and data collection in Brussels
- Country missions to Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon and in parallel interviews with EC services, EU Member States, NGO HQ
- Analysis and reporting

The Evaluation Team comprised Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen of Channel Research. The key phases of the study were organized as follows:

Country	Timing	Team Members
Yemen	12 to 16 April	Steinar Essen
Jordan	3 to 8 May	Steinar Essen
Interviews in Brussels	Mid April to end May	Ralf Otto
Lebanon	22 to 28 June <sup>8</sup>	Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen

As the evaluation did not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team members spent most or all of their time in capitals and major centers for meetings and to collect documents and data from:

- EC delegations
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centers
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
- other key government officials

Selected field visits were undertaken to the Nabatye area in South Lebanon, visiting FSD (Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) 276 and CBU 388) and MAG (CBU 390/391 and CBU 273) and Jordan, visiting Royal Engineer Corps (REC) on the North Shunha Project (Jordan Valley).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> „Middle East“ is not defined as a region in the European Commission. Sometimes the term Near East is used as well. Syria and Iran were not included in the ToR for this assignment.

<sup>8</sup> The field visit to Lebanon was originally planned for May but had to be postponed because of security concerns and the temporary blockade of the airport in Beirut.

<sup>9</sup> Due to the security situation at the time of the field visit to Yemen it was not possible to visit project sites.

Additional information was obtained from:

- Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, etc., where available);
- Interviews with relevant EC officials at Relex, Aidco, and DG ECHO (in Brussels);
- Questionnaire survey with 20 questions and a ranking from (unimportant issue (1) to extremely important issue (6); (the questionnaire survey was undertaken by GICHD)
- Follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations' headquarters and on the field, and beneficiary countries' officials, etc.).
- EC CSP and National Indicative Programs (NIP).
- National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies from the four focus countries
- Relevant documentation from the UN
- Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
- The Internet
- Other sources, as appropriate.

The evaluation team used the standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria and where appropriate the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) evaluation criteria for assessing humanitarian aid programs.<sup>10,11</sup> An open interview questionnaire was designed based on the evaluation criteria and further defined with more detailed questions, which were adapted and updated throughout the evaluation process. This questionnaire was also sent out by email either to be answered by an interlocutor or to form the basis of an interview in person or by telephone.<sup>12</sup> All together 64 persons were interviewed either in person or by telephone.<sup>13</sup>

## **LIMITATIONS**

The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of some EC officials for interviews and the denial of access to some of the documentation. Whereas overall there was interest in the study and generous support by those involved, the evaluators did not always get access to documentation requested. In particular project documentation to the NGO funding in Lebanon and Iraq could not be reviewed so that information from interviews and site visits (possible in Lebanon only) could not be cross-checked. Requests from the evaluation team and EC staff supporting this study remained unanswered.

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<sup>10</sup> [http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_34435\\_2086550\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.alnap.org/publications/eha\\_dac/index.htm](http://www.alnap.org/publications/eha_dac/index.htm)

<sup>12</sup> The questionnaire is attached in appendix.

<sup>13</sup> A full list of persons interviewed is attached in appendix.



## 2. GENERAL FINDINGS

### OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The total amount of funding to MA in the Middle East is more or less the same in the two periods that are covered by the two EC global MA strategies. The percentage of the total funding to MA rose from 7% to 10% from the old strategy to the more recent one as is shown in the following table:

**Table 1 – Mine Action funding to the Middle East**

Period	Total EC mine action funding (Euro)	EC mine action funding for Middle East (Euro)	% for Middle East
2002-2004	145.2 million	10,374,260	7%
2005-2007	107.8 million	10,831,684	10%

The constancy reflected in these figures is misleading, which is revealed by looking at the individual countries and years in detail. It shows that the biggest part of the funding during the 2002 to 2004 period goes to Iraq in 2003 and is related to the emergency situation. There is no funding to Yemen and Jordan during this period. In the following years the funding is more diverse but does not include Iraq any more.

**Table 2 – Funding per country & year<sup>14</sup>**

EU funding in mine action	Iraq	No of projects	Yemen	No of projects	Jordan	No of projects	Lebanon	No of projects	Total funding
in 2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
in 2003	9,870,000	8	-	-	-	-	504,260	1	10,374,260
in 2004	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
in 2005	-	-	-	-	800,000	1	-	-	800,000
in 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,834,493	4	3,834,493
in 2007	-	-	2,000,000	1	-	-	3,066,749	4	5,066,749
in 2008	-	-	-	-	4,500,000	1	3,930,442	5	8,430,442
<b>Total 2002-2007</b>	<b>9,870,000</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2,000,000</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5,300,000</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11,335,944</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>28,505,944</b>
<b>Total in percent</b>	<b>34.62%</b>		<b>7.02%</b>		<b>18.59%</b>		<b>39.77%</b>		<b>100%</b>
Related to humanitarian crisis	9,870,000	8	-	-	-	-	10,831,684	13	20,701,684
Percentage	100%	100%	-	-	-	-	95%	92%	72%

EC funding to MA in the Middle East varies from year to year and from country to country. It is divided into two categories, funding in countries with a crisis (Iraq and Lebanon) and the two other countries. The majority of funding goes to humanitarian demining in the crisis countries (70%).

Only in Lebanon and Iraq the EC is funding NGOs directly. The background is the fact that Iraq

<sup>14</sup> Additionally to the programs in the table one global advocacy program with a focus on the Middle East was funded by the EC in 2003: “Engaging non-state armed groups in a landmine ban” for Colombia and Middle East, implementing organisation: Geneva Call, amount 500.000, duration 36 months (<http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm>)

and Lebanon are countries with emergency situations where DG ECHO supports NGOs.<sup>15</sup> Other funding for MA in the region went entirely to UNDP, which is primarily funding state structures but can also become involved in capacity building with NGOs (local).

**Table 3 – Number of projects per partner & country**

	No of projects	No of countries
<b>UNDP</b>	5	4 (Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq)
<b>MAG</b>	5	2 (Lebanon, Iraq)
<b>FSD</b>	2	1 (Lebanon)
<b>HI-F</b>	4	2 (Lebanon, Iraq)
<b>DCA</b>	3	2 (Lebanon, Iraq)
<b>DDG</b>	2	1 (Iraq)
<b>Intersos</b>	1	1 (Iraq)
<b>NPA</b>	1	1 (Iraq)
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>4</b>

### EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

There is no specific EC strategy for MA for the Middle East. EC CSPs for the individual countries exist except for Iraq. Only in one country MA is mentioned in the CSP but, as will be shown in the section about Lebanon, the decision to fund demining was taken first (following humanitarian demining) and then MA was integrated into the CSP.

**Table 4 – Is Mine Action mentioned in the EC Country Strategy Paper?**

Mine Action mentioned in EC Country Strategy Paper	Yes/no	Documents
<b>Iraq</b>	n.a.	No CSP
<b>Yemen</b>	No	CSP 2002-2006, CSP 2007-2013, NIP 2005-2006, NIP 2007-2010
<b>Jordan</b>	No	CSP 2008-2013, NIP 2005-2006, EC annual reports and ENP report 2002, 2003, 2004
<b>Lebanon</b>	Yes	CSP 2007-2013 & NIP 2007-2010
	No	CSP 2002-2006 & NIP 2002-2004 NIP 2005-2006

The country strategies cannot be seen as the strategic framework for funding to MA in the Middle East. Consequently the only references regarding a strategy are the two EC global MA strategies (2002-2004 and 2005-2007). The application of these strategies in the four countries is not coherent. By looking at the priorities in these strategies and the funding decisions taken, it can be shown that there is no stringent logic and that funding decisions cannot always be attributed to strategic objectives (see appendix 4 for an overview).

This observation goes in line with the fact that the majority of EC officials interviewed during this study declared that they were either not aware of the MA strategies or confirmed that they did not use it as a reference for funding decisions.

This observation goes in line with the fact that a significant part of the funding in the region went to humanitarian demining which is funded by DG ECHO. Within DG ECHO there is no specific

<sup>15</sup> DG ECHO is strongly engaged in the Middle East. Funding is allocated to the West Bank and Gaza strip and to Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. DG ECHO is also supporting Iraqi refugees in the region – mostly to Syria and Jordan - and internally displaced within Iraq. [http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deljor/en/eu\\_and\\_jordan/ECHO.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deljor/en/eu_and_jordan/ECHO.htm)


strategy for humanitarian demining. The global MA strategy does refer to the humanitarian need and the role of MA in humanitarian aid. However the strategy does not explicitly state objectives and strategic priorities for humanitarian demining. There is no linkage in the strategy to DG ECHO's mandate or overall strategy.

During the period 2000 to 2006 the majority of the EC funded programs under the MA Budget Line were still managed from Brussels (four out of six).<sup>16</sup> The shift to the delegations took place afterwards and today the majority of the funded MA programs are managed in the region (in particular in Lebanon). Overall efficiency of the decentralization process was perceived as positive.

## REGIONAL APPROACH TO MINE ACTION

As stated above – and similar to findings from other regional EC MA evaluations – the EC does not have a regional strategy or a regional approach to MA in the Middle East. As will be shown in the country sections later, the countries have mine problems which can be addressed nationally. National entities are entrusted with the task. They are usually closely linked to the countries' military.

**Figure 1 – Funding allocation per country**



The reasons for the existence of mines have in some cases regional implications (e.g. conflicts with neighbours). The need to respond to the problems does in general not have regional implications.<sup>17</sup> However some aspects related to MA and the Middle East as a region could be observed:

- Regional budget lines exist (such as MEDA in the past)
- EC Regional Strategies within ENPI today<sup>18</sup> and regional cooperation
- EC partly operates with a regional structure (e.g. Yemen was managed for a certain time from Amman, the Jordan delegation includes a section for Iraq and a regional office for ECHO, EC staff members have been shifted from Amman to Lebanon and EC staff members travel to Amman regularly)
- Jordan declared its intention to become regional actor in mine action

<sup>16</sup> Only Yemen and Jordan were managed from delegations.

<sup>17</sup> This study does not look at the root causes of the mine problematic or at any preventive or advocacy measures taken or not taken by the EC. Although very interesting and important, these issues are beyond the scope of this evaluation.

<sup>18</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi\\_euromed\\_rsp\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf); does not incl. MA

These aspects can be seen as marginal compared to the fact that the MA problem can and should be addressed nationally.

## **COORDINATION WITH EU MEMBER STATES**

EU Member States fund MA programmes in the Middle East. If at all the coordination between the EC and Member States regarding funding for MA in the Middle East takes place at national level in the beneficiary countries (EC delegations, embassies).<sup>19</sup> In the four countries no specific coordination mechanism for MA exists between the EC and Member States. If coordination takes place it happens within the overall donor coordination process (reconstruction, development). MA specific coordination was perceived by interlocutors as weak.<sup>20</sup> Funding is often channelled through the UN and coordination is left to the UN and the national stakeholder.

At capital level Member States are consulted when it comes to development planning and the drafting of CSP. This does not include MA or the involvement of MA expertise. There is no MA specific coordination mechanism or procedure foreseen at capital level.

A number of Member States do have focal persons for MA in their governments (e.g. Denmark and Germany). There is no structure or communication set up for these focal points to communicate with the EC about MA. The focal points in Member States in Europe are not involved in a coordination process when it comes to EC funding to MA in the Middle East and there is generally not much awareness of EC funding to MA among Member States. EC funding is seen as not very 'visible' and funding sources are difficult to identify, which makes it difficult to follow for Member States.<sup>21</sup>

During interviews it was stated that there is no need to have a specific coordination mechanism between the EU and Member States for MA globally. The APMBC gives the framework, sets the goals and provides for a coordination structure. The UN is seen as the second coordinating body for MA. Coordination in the MA sector is by some perceived as easy to achieve as there are few actors. The country cases within this study however show that the level of coordination was rather poor.

The wish to have a forum for exchange and information was expressed in all interviews with Member States. Until 2006 there have been meetings regarding MA between the EU and Member States but since the thematic budget line does no longer exist these meetings have been suspended.

## **NON-GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

In two of the four countries the EC funded international NGO partners directly (Lebanon and Iraq). In Yemen, international NGOs are not active in clearance, but are in Mine Victim

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<sup>19</sup> According to the questionnaire to EC delegations donor coordination mechanisms exist and are useful (in three countries assessed, excluding Iraq). In all three countries the existence and utility of donor coordination mechanisms were ranked as important (4 on a scale of 6).

<sup>20</sup> In the questionnaire the EC rated the importance of coordination between the EC and EU Member States vis-à-vis MA with 5 (out of 6). In the other countries the importance of MA specific coordination for MA was rated with 3 only.

<sup>21</sup> This statement excludes DG ECHO funding to MA as DG ECHO follows a quite rigid visibility strategy. As described earlier non-DG ECHO funding in the region goes to UNDP, thus only becomes 'visible' to other donors if this funding comes to the knowledge of other donors.

Assistance (MVA) whereas in Jordan international NGOs are active but not with EC funding.<sup>22</sup>

EC support to MA is not very visible in the Middle East and EC funding sources are difficult to identify. DG ECHO is perceived as flexible and predictable for implementing partners. This is less the case for other EC services. There is no focal point for NGOs regarding MA within the EC.

NGOs in the field in general benefit from a person in the NGO HQ who is aware of EC procedures and developments. NGOs with “EC experts” have a better knowledge of EC funding procedures and decision making process. For these focal points it is easier to link up with DG ECHO than with other EC services (to obtain information, to be aware of funding strategies and priorities). This is partly because they are used to work with DG ECHO and partly because DG ECHO’s procedures are perceived as clear and straight forward.

The reform process within the EC (and in particular decentralisation) is widely known to implementing partners. However there is still very limited knowledge about new instruments among NGOs (in particular knowledge of the Stability Instrument) and how funding procedures work. NGOs are in any case aware of the increased importance of EC delegations.

The case of Lebanon showed consequences of this lack of knowledge of EC procedures. NGO partners in the South were not aware of the potential funding gap that might occur at the end of 2008, in case the activities need to continue into 2009 (which is likely).<sup>23</sup> NGO partners who started working with DG ECHO funds have expectations regarding flexibility and speed of decision taking based on ECHO procedures. The fact that other EC instruments are less flexible and require longer decision making procedures, was not commonly known. NGOs working with EC funds run a risk if they do not either discuss early on about duration of funding with the EC or look out for funding alternatives (e.g. from Member States).<sup>24</sup> The EC delegation on the other hand did not have the knowledge of NGO partners and their way of working (e.g. dependence on the EC as one donor) to raise the issue early enough.

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<sup>22</sup> Although no EC funding goes to NGOs in Jordan the questionnaire filled in by the EC ranks the importance of the “Role & Performance of international MA NGOs receiving EC funding” with 5.

<sup>23</sup> For details please see the following section on Lebanon.

<sup>24</sup> National coordinating mechanisms (be it under the UN or be it within national structures) cannot compensate for this as these institutions also do not have the specific background regarding EC procedures and are therefore not in a position to foresee potential endings or gaps in EC funding.

### 3. COUNTRY FINDINGS

#### LEBANON

##### CONTEXT

The situation in Lebanon in general and in the MA sector as well is characterized by instability. Although still contaminated with an ‘old’ landmines problem the situation changed significantly with the Israeli Lebanese conflict in summer 2006 and the new cluster munitions problem. The international response to the MA problem can be divided into periods prior to the 2006 war and after.

From the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000 mines and explosive ordnance were used extensively. In 2000 when Israel withdrew from South Lebanon it left behind some 400,000 landmines. The 2003 LIS found 306 mine-impacted communities affected by 933 mine and UXO contaminated sites over an estimated 137 square kilometres of contaminated land.<sup>25</sup>

Prior to the conflict in July-August 2006, two areas of South Lebanon were contaminated with landmines and ERW: the area north of the Litani River (so called area 6) and the Blue Line bordering Israel. United Arab Emirates (UAE) committed to clear remaining landmines and booby-traps in Area 6. This will leave South Lebanon mine-free, except for mines laid along or adjacent to the Blue Line.

During the war between Israel and Hezbollah from 12 July to 14 August 2006 about four million cluster sub-munitions were fired on Lebanon, of which an estimated one million did not detonate.<sup>26</sup>



Despite numerous calls by the international community for information regarding the firing data, Israel had not provided detailed strike information on the type, quantity and location of cluster bombs dropped.<sup>27</sup> The UN estimates that, in addition to cluster munitions, approximately 15,300 other items of UXO fell on the ground in South Lebanon. Accusations from Lebanon that Israel had laid out mines during the 2006 conflict have been disputed.<sup>28</sup>

At the end of May 2007 fighting erupted between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army in the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam is reported to have booby-trapped buildings throughout the camp, in addition to laying unspecified mines and roadside bombs.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html>

<sup>26</sup> Israel has admitted to firing only 1.2 million submunitions. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html>

<sup>27</sup> Some media sources reported that maps were exchanged at the occasion of the exchange of two dead soldiers against prisoners in July 2008.

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html>

<sup>29</sup> “Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007; “In fight against militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 2007.


About 26 percent of the affected area in Lebanon is agricultural land.<sup>30</sup> A recent study undertaken by Landmine Action calculates the total costs due to cluster munitions contamination with US\$ 233,2 million (costs of lost agricultural production, cost of clearance and risk reduction activities, cost of death and injuries).<sup>31</sup> Only the international funding to establish and run the initial cluster munitions response program in 2006 and 2007 is estimated at US\$ 80 million.<sup>32</sup> This significant contribution from the government and international actors alone could not prevent serious losses in South Lebanon which is borne mainly by individuals and their families.<sup>33</sup>

Regarding casualties it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data for Lebanon which can best be shown by a quote from Landmine Monitor:

*“Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain reliable statistics on the number of mine/ERW/IED casualties in 2006-2007 from stakeholders in Lebanon, due to the crisis situation after the conflict; other factors appear to be lack of cooperation between stakeholders, lack of verification and difficulties in providing casualty data by calendar year.”<sup>34</sup>*

The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) gives figures, which state a total of 4.292 mine victims since 1975 (1.876 killed, 2.416 injured). Casualties since 2006 are counted as 317 total (41 killed and 276 injured).<sup>35</sup>

**Figure 2 – Mine victims in Lebanon; 2000-08**



Besides numerous technical surveys and smaller studies, a number of comprehensive studies have been undertaken to review the problem and the set up to address it. The LIS conducted in 2002-2003 by MAG was certified by UNMAS in 2004 and released in 2005.<sup>36</sup> A review of the NDO

<sup>30</sup> MACC SL presentation to Handicap International, Tyre, 19 March 2007 and Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organisation, November 2006

<sup>31</sup> Counting the Cost, The economic impact of cluster munitions contamination in Lebanon, by Greg Crowther, Landmine Action, May 2008, page 3

<sup>32</sup> Counting the Cost, Page 5

<sup>33</sup> “(...) this expenditure on cluster munitions clearance has not prevented direct economic impacts on the population of southern Lebanon. This analysis suggest that between US\$ 33 million and US\$ 122 million in economic losses will have been borne in this area as direct result of cluster munitions use.” Page 6

<sup>34</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html>

<sup>35</sup> Source: Presentation of Bgd. Gen. Mohamad Fehmi, slide 28

<sup>36</sup> With funding contribution from the EC.

MA program was undertaken by the GICHD in 2006. A comprehensive review of United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) activities in Lebanon found that the overall response was rapid and effective, despite the lack of early contingency planning, and that the UN rapid response framework was capable to address large, high-profile emergencies. Coordination was identified as an area for improvement and increased focus on MRE was suggested.<sup>37</sup>

## THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

The MA Sector in Lebanon is well established and more complex than in the other countries regarded for this study. The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the APMBC. Its long-held position has been that it is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel.<sup>38</sup> The country is divided into two zones because of the peacekeeping operations of the UN in the south. Key actors are:

- North of the Litani river:
  - The Lebanese National Mine Action Authority (LNMAA, the inter-ministerial body responsible for mine action policy)
  - Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) (former National Demining Office-NDO)
  - UN Development Programme (UNDP)
  - Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
- South of the Litani river
  - Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon (MACC SL)
  - UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)<sup>39</sup> parting support of the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
  - Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

**LMAC**, a part of the LAF, has the overall responsibility for implementing the MA policy and strategy (mine free country by 2012), coordination, management and implementation of all MA in Lebanon.

**MACC SL** provides needs assessments, planning, coordination and quality-assurance support to MA operations in South Lebanon (below the Litani river), including UNIFIL's area of operations. In the south, MACC SL conducts accreditation on behalf of LMAC. MACC SL is a tripartite structure comprising the UN, LAF and UAE representation. In May 2007 the LMAC requested MACC SL to maintain its liaison function between UNIFIL and the LAF, to maintain its current structure and to provide technical, operational and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering Regiment and LMAC throughout 2008. UNMAS agreed that MACC SL would remain until the end of 2008.

All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC SL. UNIFIL's existing demining unit became involved in humanitarian clearance after mid-2006, and several countries sent troops to support humanitarian clearance. They went through the same

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<sup>37</sup> Evaluation findings in UNMAS, "Annual Report 2006," New York, p. 47.

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html>

<sup>39</sup> UNMAS manages the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). In 2006 37.1% of the VTF were earmarked by donors for Lebanon. In 2006, 27 donors contributed a total of US\$51,029,053 to the VTF. The EC's contribution was US\$6,433,962. (UNMAS Brochure)



accreditation process as the other operators.<sup>40</sup> Up to 47 demining and battle area clearance teams from seven countries were accredited by MACC SL.<sup>41</sup>

UNDP has supported the institutional development of the NDO (now LMAC), especially its management capacity, through a chief technical advisor and a national MA program officer since 2003. In the period 2003 to 2006 UNDP worked with funding from DFID, Denmark and from its own HQ schemes.<sup>42</sup> From January to December 2007 UNDP was funded again from HQ schemes and also from Sweden.

MRE in Lebanon is conducted by national and international NGOs, which considerably increased their coverage in response to the 2006 war and the May Nahr al-Bared crisis in 2007. Local NGOs with a network of 318 MRE activists, the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) and mine clearance organisations provided MRE and community liaison, coordinated by LMAC. International NGOs newly involved in MRE in Lebanon after the 2006 war were DanChurchAid, Handicap International and INTERSOS.<sup>43</sup> The Lebanon Mine Resource Centre (LMRC) at the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand provided training support. Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), WRF and UNICEF continued to provide technical and financial support to Mine Risk Education (MRE) in Lebanon.

The civil society and non-governmental disability sector is strong and provides services the government is unable to provide: however, it relies heavily on international donor support.

## EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The EC support as well as the support of most other international donors can be divided into pre 2006 and post 2006.<sup>44</sup> After 2006 the funding to MA rose to amounts more than ten times higher than before the war.<sup>45</sup>

### EC funding prior to the 2006 crisis

The pre 2006 war period was covered by the CSP 2002-2006.<sup>46</sup> The EC's strategy was related to the Barcelona process and mainly funded by the MEDA programme.<sup>47</sup> Priority sectors were:

- support for economic reforms
- the promotion of social development and equilibrium to reduce income disparities and alleviate poverty, and
- reduction of environmental degradation

<sup>40</sup> According to MACC SL there are a total of 929 persons involved in EOD/BAC of which 872 are national staff and 57 are international staff.

<sup>41</sup> Several NGOs were involved in EOD and BAC in South Lebanon: Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and DanChurchAid. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) conducted humanitarian clearance as well as commercial companies including BACTEC, ArmorGroup and RONCO.

<sup>42</sup> UNDP through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) allocates its resources through a scheme called "Target for Resource Assignments from the Core" (TRAC). The TRAC scheme earmarks 55% of UNDP core resources for country programmes and projects.

<sup>43</sup> INTERSOS did not receive EC funding.

<sup>44</sup> An exception regarding international engagement are UAE which supported demining in Lebanon at a high level over the last years-including before 2006.

<sup>45</sup> Landmine Monitor identified donations of \$68,845,934 (€54,800,553) for emergency and other mine action, reported by 20 countries and the EC, compared to \$6,300,000 provided by six countries and other funding channels in 2005.

<sup>46</sup> While the CSP refers to demining and is quite detailed on the reconstruction and development strategy, there is no link between the two. NIP 2005-2006 confirms the adequacy of the CSP, but does not refer to demining at all.

<sup>47</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euomed/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euomed/index_en.htm)

- development of human resources; and
- the promotion of human and individual rights and cohesion between Lebanon's numerous sectarian and religious groups.

The total amount of funds committed under MEDA I (1995-1999) for bilateral assistance was € 182 million, while under MEDA II (2000-2006) the total amount allocated was € 235 million.

Additionally ECHO made a significant contribution. In 2000 for example ECHO provided a grant of 4.2 million for 12 NGO actions in health, physiological support for former prisoners, farming, basic household support, schooling for children, handicap support (Palestinian refugee camps), and humanitarian demining to alleviate the humanitarian consequences after the Israeli withdrawal.

Activities related to demining were financed from non-MEDA and non-ECHO budget lines. A Level One Mine Impact Survey and a humanitarian demining program were financed from the rehabilitation budget line.<sup>48</sup> Two grant contracts were signed with Mines Advisory Group in the UK (MAG-UK) under the Rehabilitation Budget Line 2002-2004.

#### EC funding after the 2006 crisis

EC funding after the war in 2006 is characterized by the challenge to avoid gaps in funding MA first, from humanitarian budget lines and, later, from ENPI funds. This was further complicated by changing predictions for an end date for cluster munitions clearance in the south.

International funding for MA in Lebanon rose steeply in 2006 in response to the mine/UXO contamination resulting from the war. A UN Flash Appeal and the international donor Stockholm Conference for Lebanon's Early Recovery in August 2006, in addition to bilateral funding agreements, raised funds to respond to the crisis.

After the end of hostilities, the EC contributed to Lebanon € 107 million for the year 2006 at the Stockholm conference. The EC has allocated a complementary € 30 million humanitarian aid package for the populations affected by the conflict. Through DG ECHO, the EC provided humanitarian and early recovery assistance to the returnee population and victims of the conflict. Soon after the decision was taken it became evident that many of the needs were already addressed by other donors and supporters from the region. The EC showed flexibility and as the decision for funding was formulated broadly enough it became possible to finance humanitarian demining. Operations funded focused on demarcation, awareness and clearance of unexploded munitions, water and sanitation, shelter, and emergency health and food needs.

According to standard procedures DG ECHO launched a call for proposals and contracted four international NGOs (FSD, HI-F, DCA, and MAG) of which two were already in the country and two arrived because of the war.<sup>49</sup> The operation started with 11 Battle Area Clearance (BAC) teams (out of 16) under the coordination of MACC SL. For contractual reasons, the activities could only start in January 2007, meaning that DG ECHO funded activities started significantly later than the activities of NGOs with access to other funding as well (such as MAG with funding from the UK). The delay is at odds with the humanitarian character of the activity.

The reason for the delay due to contract procedures was the fact that the ECHO emergency decision did not include MA at the beginning as it was not possible to judge the scope of the

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<sup>48</sup> 19 08 05 Rehabilitation and reconstruction in favour of Mediterranean countries and Middle East

<sup>49</sup> DG ECHO cannot fund LMAC or MACC SL directly as those are military entities.

cluster munitions problem in summer 2006. DG ECHO showed flexibility and could fund MA in the end; however, the final approval of the decision took until January. For those implementing agencies which had to initiate MA in Lebanon from zero the start in January, this meant that operations could only begin in spring 2007 after all administrative and logistic set ups were arranged.<sup>50</sup>

When the 18 months maximum funding duration for DG ECHO contributions approached, the government, the EC Delegation and the implementing partners looked for a solution to continue funding as the contamination problem was not yet solved (end of 2007).

At the time of the conflict, the EC was negotiating the new CSP with the government of Lebanon. The CSP for 2007-2013 became the first CSP for Lebanon under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).<sup>51</sup> Its focus lies on immediate reconstruction, but also makes a link between the reconstruction needs, the debt problem and conditions for medium-term structural reforms.<sup>52</sup> A total amount of € 187 million was allocated for the first NIP, covering the period 2007-2010, to support these priorities with EU financial assistance from the European ENPI.<sup>53</sup> In 2007 80% of the total annual allocations and almost two thirds of the annual allocation for 2008 were directed to securing the recovery reconstruction of the country.

As a consequence of the need to address the cluster problem in the South, the Lebanese government requested that MA be added to the priorities of the CSP. A ‘last-minute’ change of the already well-advanced CSP was possible.<sup>54</sup> A budget line was shifted from support to private sector development to MA. The CSP consequently includes MA as sub-priority 3 with a budget of € 14 million.<sup>55</sup> This sum was supposed to cover two years (€7 million per year). The first *tranche* was scaled down to € 4 million when it became clear other donors were engaging as well. Additional to the clearance activities, the EC started funding the UNDP, which provided technical assistance to NDO and, today, to LMAC.

With these allocations in the CSP, continued funding to the MA implementing partners was possible beyond February 2008. A ten-month contract was signed to continue the funding of clearance teams up to the end of 2008, the end date that was predicted by MACC SL.<sup>56</sup> Today the end date is predicted for mid-2009 rather than end 2008. The EC allocated the funds for 2009 but due to administrative procedures under the ENPI rules, the EC will not be able to spend this money before autumn 2009 (or later). A funding gap will occur between end 2008 and until the second tranche of the ENPI funds can be released.

The NGO partners (who came in under DG ECHO and who usually work under DG ECHO procedures) are not aware of this potential funding gap and the administrative constraints at the EC. The new demining programme is according to the EC – and as decided by LMAC in

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<sup>50</sup> One agency started clearance activities in April, which is 8 months after the conflict ended. According to statistics from MACC SL the monthly victim rate dropped from 60 in August 2006 to 2 in February 2007 and 0 in March 2007.

<sup>51</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/lebanon/lebanon\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm)

<sup>52</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/lebanon/docs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lebanon/docs/index_en.htm)

<sup>53</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp\\_lebanon\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_lebanon_en.htm)

<sup>54</sup> The ENP is a development tool. EC officials call the instrument “heavy” because of its long procedures and the consultation process which it includes (e.g. Member States, EU Parliament). The fact that MA could be integrated shows the commitment of those involved.

<sup>55</sup> “Support for reconstruction and recovery – supporting economic and social recovery and reconstruction, local development as well as demining and clearing unexploded ordnance.” Page 4 and 29

<sup>56</sup> One of the implementing partners had to shift the contract from its Swiss entity to the French entity as only the later was eligible for ENPI funding. Under DG ECHO funding this aspect was not of relevance. The shift did not cause any difficulties in terms of administration or effectiveness.

November 2007 – not supposed to work in the South. If ever the EC decides to work through international NGOs, a new call of proposal has to be launched. Although there is regular exchange between the NGO partners and the EC delegation<sup>57</sup>, this issue has not yet been discussed clearly enough at the time of the field visit for this study<sup>58</sup>.

Lebanon is not mentioned in the indicative allocation in the global Mine Action Strategy of the EU for 2005 to 2007 although the country is the only country covered by this study where MA is mentioned in a CSP. The reason for this incoherence could be the fact that on the one hand the country is not a signatory to the APMBC. On the other hand the CSP responds to the changing environment in the region and here in particular to the conflict and the new contamination from cluster munitions.

## KEY ISSUES

### Relevance

Overall the EC funding to Lebanon is relevant. The EC proved to be responsive to the situation and to developments in the sector. On the other hand the EC funding is not following a long term pro active strategic approach for MA support to Lebanon. The EC funded the MA sector only sporadically before the 2006 crisis, increasingly after the crisis and with an open end date today.

The fluid situation in Lebanon makes a flexible approach necessary and the EC showed flexibility and responsiveness in particular after the crisis in 2006. Nevertheless the weakness of this re-active approach becomes clear today when prolonged funding to the sector and an exit strategy require a more strategic and better planned approach. A more comprehensive view on the MA problematic in Lebanon and even more flexible instruments might have allowed the EC to avoid some difficulties that occur today or might occur in the near future. Efficiency might have increased with better planning and the integration of humanitarian demining into the national response to the contamination problem might have been possible.

In line with other donors, the EC did not pay much attention to the mine problem in Lebanon before the 2006 crisis although this existed and still exists today. The EC then contributed to the scaling up of capacities for cluster munitions clearance in the south and of technical assistance to the national framework. Today the EC is faced with the challenge of deciding how to finance the capacities created and supported after the 2006 crisis, without having a clear concept or an exit strategy at hand. A more strategic approach from the beginning and a continuous focus on MA based on needs and integrated in national programs as foreseen by the EC global strategy might have prevented this.

To integrate humanitarian demining into the national framework and to make the link with other MA activities in Lebanon is a challenge. The fact that the predicted end date for the cluster clearance has been changed twice has not made it easier to have a plan for the EC and other donors. A number of factors contributed to the fact that the EC intervention did not link with the national framework for MA and did not achieve a smooth crossover from the different phases of the response (development context before 2006-crisis in 2006-humanitarian intervention in 2006 and 2007- and finally reconstruction):

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<sup>57</sup> Three programs were visited, at least once during the last 10 months.

<sup>58</sup> All the NGO were according to the EC informed that the new decision would start not before end of 2009.

- The EC intervention followed standard procedures (DG ECHO procedures for humanitarian action and EuropeAid procedures for reconstruction and development aid) which, on the one hand, could be used flexibly to make funding possible but, on the other hand, prevented the EC from looking beyond their intervention and planning more strategically.
- EC procedures limit decision-makers so that some funding options are not possible (e.g. not possible to fund MACC SL/UNMAS as part of the peacekeeping forces in the south, not possible to fund LMAC directly as it is part of the military)
- EC ‘standard approach’ is not always adapted to the local situation (e.g. call for proposal and contracting a variety of NGOs, some of which need to start operations from zero, causing significant delays)
- Lack of awareness of MA specific *problématique* (e.g. lack of awareness of the costs related to setting up clearance teams; ideas to support local NGOs as part of a LRRD strategy, although MA in Lebanon – as in some other countries – is based on military or other state structures)

Another example of the missing strategic approach is the funding to UNDP, whose program started in 2003 but was funded by the EC in 2008 only. Funding includes components which are not fully thought through or based on a national EC strategy for the sector (e.g. the capacity building component of two local NGOs for MA).

### Efficiency

Regarding the choice of funding channels, the EC was following administrative imperatives more than taking strategic decisions. To support the national framework, the EC had to fund through an intermediary (here UNDP) as NDO or LMAC were assessed as too weak in terms of capacity to procure and contract according to EC rules. For the funding of clearance activities DG ECHO had to launch a call for proposals as direct funding to military entities such as LMAC or MACC SL was not possible. Later the EC Delegation ‘inherited’ the NGO projects and started funding LMAC through UNDP.<sup>59</sup>

The decision of DG ECHO to fund four international NGOs in 2006 and 2007 instead of one or two is questionable in terms of efficiency and integration into longer term planning. Arguments such as diversity and limited capacity of the two NGOs already active in the country are outweighed by arguments against this set up.<sup>60</sup> Each NGO partner had to establish administrative and logistical structures, with all related costs. Demining activities are cost intensive as specialized equipment is needed, which is not the case for some other humanitarian interventions such as food aid distribution. Two ECHO funded NGOs came to Lebanon only for these projects and had to start operations from zero. Two of the NGOs only work with EC funds and might have difficulties obtaining access to other donor funding in case gaps in EC funding occur.

With a clearer strategic vision and planning for an exit, the decision to support four NGOs might have been avoided. Already today, some of the capacities built up with EC funding are lying idle (e.g. ambulances of one NGO partner and purchased with EC funds are not in use anymore but are parked in the courtyard of this NGO).

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<sup>59</sup> The fact that the EC first cannot, but later can fund the military shows how absurd the funding restrictions under some of the EC budget lines are: also, the fact that the EC supports UNMAS at the global level, which managed MACC SL prior to, during and after the summer 2006 conflict.

<sup>60</sup> The limited capacity of the two existing NGOs – as reported by one interlocutor – was not confirmed during interviews with the NGOs. but the question could not be assessed further during this study.

### Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

The missing strategic vision and planning for an exit strategy also becomes relevant when it comes to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Although the MA intervention after the 2006 crisis is without doubt relevant and is contributing to reducing suffering, there is no real link between the MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction process. The activities for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not aligned with other EC funded programs.

The linkage between clearance activities and other reconstruction programs is limited to the fact that agriculture in the clearance areas is an important source of income in the contaminated areas. The linkage between MA and development was rated as very important (5 out of 6) in the EC questionnaire. As shown in the box below the concept of LRRD is a complex one and requires coordination and planning if the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development is to emerge.

Under the ad hoc decision for humanitarian aid in Lebanon € 30 million were allocated for programs in the following six areas:<sup>61</sup>

- Humanitarian demining
- Psychosocial activities
- Livelihood sector
- Shelter
- Specific winter assistance
- Water and sanitation
- Coordination and protection

These activities are implemented by a wide range of UN agencies and NGOs. In the MA sector only DanChurchAid is involved in activities that are not clearance (MRE). DanChurchAid is also the only MA NGO involved in other emergency activities (component winter support: distribution of diapers, blankets, heater and fuel supply). Otherwise the MA activities are rather isolated from other assistance activities. Regardless these parallel structures the EC seems to be contented with the linkage.<sup>62</sup>

#### **Textbox 1 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)**

The concept of LRRD originates from the 1980s in response to concerns about the “grey zone” between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The instruments and working methods used in these different types of assistance programmes differ in time frames, implementing partners, the role of national authorities, and the content of interventions.

In 1996, the EC developed a basic rationale for LRRD.\* It was acknowledged that short-term relief mechanisms do not and, in some cases, cannot systematically take into account long-term development issues. At the same time, development policy should better assist countries to deal with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises. These deficiencies could be reduced if relief and development were appropriately linked, which is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition from emergency to development assistance; rather, it includes disaster preparedness and preventing/resolving conflicts.

There is no unique model for LRRD. Broad recommendations include: improved donor coordination; adjustment of the EU’s own instruments, working methods and internal

<sup>61</sup> Decision 2006/03000

<sup>62</sup> See comments in EC questionnaire.

mechanisms; avoiding parallel structures for relief and development in a country; and clarifying who is responsible for what.

Demining is mentioned in various contexts in the LRRD documents,\*\* which stress the need to integrate MA into post-conflict planning and the wider development context.

In theory, LRRD can be promoted within EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which analyse all aid-relevant aspects in a country and outline a five year plan (indicative programme). The plan includes aid provided through all EU mechanisms including the EDF, thematic budget lines, ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM).

\* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001

\*\* In the 1996 document under a separate paragraph “The particular case of anti-personnel mines” (p. 8), and as instrument reacting in post-conflict situations (p. 19). The 2001 document also mentions demining under post-conflict situation needs (p. 7), and a separate paragraph on demining stresses the importance of integrating demining within the CSPs (p. 19).

### Coordination

Finally, the coordination of donor activities regarding MA in Lebanon is very weak. MACC SL is seen as the coordinating body for the activities in the south and UNDP for the rest of the country. But donors do not coordinate at the national level, nor on their support to MACC SL or UNDP. National interests and procedural constraints dominate the coordination imperatives among donors. Donors rely on UNDP and LMAC and their capacity to plan and coordinate. At no point has the capacity of the two organizations been assessed systematically; the EC as a donor does maintain contact with both, but not at a level to assess the capacity.



## JORDAN

### CONTEXT

Jordan has a landmines problem since the 1940s. Mines were laid out in 1948 at the partition of Palestine, then during the Arab-Israeli war 1967-1969, and finally during the civil war in 1970.

Minefields are located in the northern area bordering Syria, the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba. Based on military estimates, there were about 305 000 mines laid on Jordan territory, of which 73,000 were Israeli and 232,000 Jordanian. The entire minefield along the Syrian border was laid by Jordanian army and is mapped. Both Jordan and Israel laid mines along the border between the two countries. Israel has handed over the mine location maps to the Jordanian authorities. Landmines in Jordan are located in the military-controlled border areas, and are marked, mapped and partly fenced today.

Since 1993, when humanitarian demining began, more than 101,000 mines have been removed and 25 million m<sup>2</sup> cleared, representing 183 of the 497 minefields.<sup>63</sup> Today, all known minefields along the Israel/Jordan border are cleared. The remaining problem is the 100 km long and approximately 100 m wide minefield along the Syrian border.

Challenges to clearance are the climatic condition (heat), desert sand that buries the mines deeply, and flooding that has shifted the position of mines and buried others down to 1.5 meters. In addition to clearance, a permanent fence will be constructed. As a side effect this fence is expected to reduce smuggling (which is a problem on routes established through the mine fields).



According to the findings of the Jordan retrofit survey (an “LIS light” survey) about 500,000 people or 8% of the population are affected by mines. The landmine problem has a direct impact on the population (however few accidents occur) and affects their agricultural activities. There are no solid figures on the numbers of accidents, but it is estimated there have been between 500 and 800 since the 1960s. Rehabilitation services have been available for mine victims since the late 1960s. These services include the provision of prosthetics and reintegration into work.<sup>64</sup>

Agricultural lands remain uncultivated, irrigation and hydro projects delayed and historical and world cultural heritage sites unexplored. Jordan has a high level of poverty and unemployment.<sup>65</sup> The agricultural sector accounts for 3.5 percent of the country’s GDP.<sup>66</sup>

### THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan actively pursues the resolution of its landmine problem. Jordan signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty in 1998. It came into force in May 1999 and hence

<sup>63</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/jordan.html>

<sup>64</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/jordan.html>

<sup>65</sup> <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/jordan?profile=all>

<sup>66</sup> Industry: 10.3%, services: 86.2% (2007 est.); <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html>



the completion deadline under Article 5 of the APMBC is May 2009. In compliance with Article 4 of the convention, Jordan completed its destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines in 2003. The civilian-led National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC) was established by royal decrees issued in 2000 and 2002.<sup>67</sup> In June 2005, the five-year national MA plan was launched by the NDRC.<sup>68</sup> Its goals are to:

- Develop mine clearance capacity;
- Develop a database to support all aspects of MA;
- Develop a coherent national survivor and victim assistance program;
- Launch nationally coordinated mine risk education;
- Undertake advocacy for universalisation of the Mine Ban Treaty; and,
- Develop the NCDR's capacity to manage all aspects of the MA program.

The government's engagement in the landmine cause is also reflected in a number of activities such as hosting the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2007. Jordan became co-chair of the Standing Committee for Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in December 2005.

NCDR, as the executing agency, has the overall responsibility for the effective management and execution of MA in Jordan. NCDR ensures that project outcomes and outputs are achieved and reported adequately through periodic reports from the operators. It is accountable for outputs and achievements of project objectives. It jointly approves project work plans and activities with the UNDP.

The two main executing actors in mine clearance in Jordan today are the REC and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). NPA became the sole implementing partner for NCDR, which allows for good supervision and easy coordination. The REC has done all the clearance in the Jordan Valley, an area that will be declared free of all known mine fields by the end of 2008. REC will then focus its resources on constructing a new fence along the Syrian border simultaneously with NPA mine clearance activities along the border.

To accelerate mine clearance in efforts to meet its Article 5 deadline, Jordan decided that NPA should start clearance operations in 2006. Clearance was previously carried out by army engineers only. REC, as the national capacity, will continue to respond to reports of single mines (it is still a problem with mines washed into the Jordan Valley (riverbed) on Jordan territory from the minefields on the Israel side of the river). REC has also been the main supplier of experienced staff to NCDR.

UNDP works with NCDR at the strategy/policy level and supports NCDR in donor relations. Most of the funding to MA is now channelled through UNDP. UNDP employs a full time project manager to administrate a grant from the EC. A CTA position is funded by Norway.

## EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan and aims use a range of instruments, including financial assistance, to build on past co-operation in support of Jordan's reform plans. Jordan was one of the first countries to sign an Association Agreement (AA) and is among the five countries which have expressed an interest in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and have adopted

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<sup>67</sup> <http://ncdr.org.jo/>

<sup>68</sup> [http://ncdr.org.jo/aboutus.php?%\\$mainlink=About\\_Us&%\\$contentlink=About\\_Us](http://ncdr.org.jo/aboutus.php?%$mainlink=About_Us&%$contentlink=About_Us); the plan has a budget of US\$47.79 million for the five years. A strategy and annual plan for mine risk education was agreed as well.

a three-year ENP Action Plan in 2005. A total amount of € 265 million will be allocated for the first NIP, covering 2007-2010. The priority areas are political reform and good governance, trade and investment development, sustainability of the development process, institution building, financial stability and support to regulatory reform.

National governments and the EC reported contributing US\$1,464,826 for MA in Jordan in 2005, a decrease from 2004.<sup>69</sup> The EC donated € 800.000 through UNDP to the NCDR for technical survey, demining and training of deminers.<sup>70</sup> The funding covers 75% of the overall costs of the action. Funding is for the period from late December 2005 to end 2007, and was completed by June 2008.<sup>71,72</sup> Funding to UNDP was earmarked for clearance. The decision on funding was taken in Brussels.

The objectives of the UNDP funded programme (called *The North Shunah Mine Clearance Project*) were to:

- Develop and train on National Mine Action Standards and Quality Assurance
- Procure Mine Clearance Equipment & Spares
- Technically Survey contaminated areas
- Support Mixed Mine Clearance (Manual & Mechanical)
- Undertake Quality Assurance & Quality Control

The EC monitors the programme in a limited way, focusing on administrative and financial control (financial reporting and auditing). All technical aspects are left to UNDP and NCDR.

## KEY ISSUES

### Relevance

EC funding of MA in Jordan is highly relevant. Both politically (APMBC obligations and relation to its neighbouring countries) and economically (the mine fields are mostly in fertile areas – a scarce resource in Jordan) the mine clearance operation is important.

Jordan has today managed to secure from its own budget and from external sources the funds needed to end the landmine problem. With the three year extension request, Jordan should be able to declare itself free of all known mined areas within its jurisdiction by 2012. Jordan has impressive statistics regarding the number of mines destroyed, the areas released and the related cost-effectiveness ratio. By funding MA in Jordan, the EC is contributing to this process.

MA is not mentioned in any of the EU strategy or planning documents for Jordan.<sup>73</sup> The EC global MA strategy has not been used as the basis for designing the EU funded programme in the

<sup>69</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/country/jordan>

<sup>70</sup> The sources of the funding remained unclear. Some stated that funding came from the thematic budget line for MA. Other said it was taken from a budget line for the development of the agricultural sector in Jordan.

<sup>71</sup> A new contract has been signed in May 2008 for the clearance of the Northern border to Syria (€ 4,5 mill over 24 months-ENPI/2008/154932). The initiative for this funding originates from Brussels and the lobbying of Prince Mired of NCDR for funding the MA activities in Jordan.

<sup>72</sup> <http://www.undp-jordan.org/UNDPinJordan/WhatWeDo/CrisisPreventionandRecovery/MineAction/tabid/121/Default.aspx>

<sup>73</sup> The CSP 2007-2013 including the NIP; the NIP 2005-2006; EC annual reports; and the ENP reports for 2002, 2003, 2004 do not include a reference to MA.

reporting period covered. The fact that the EU is supporting MA in Jordan stems from the government's engagement in the APMBC and from good personal contacts.

The positive impact of MA is relatively clear – removal of a permanent threat to life and development. The EC has channelled all its funds to clearance and nothing to the other pillars of MA. This is the right choice as MRE/VA is of limited need in Jordan if the threat is eliminated reasonably fast. Additionally, VA is covered by royal charities.

### Effectiveness and Efficiency

So far as could be assessed during the field visit, the Northern Shauna project ending in 2008 has met all its objectives. The project focused on clearance of 12 minefields in the Jordan Valley. These, and three other minefields, were cleared within the framework of the project.

NCDR has become a competent organisation. This is mainly due to its positive attitude towards new ideas and its capability to combine the experience of REC and NPA. NCDR has a comprehensive and qualified QA/monitoring capacity to oversee REC and NPA in the field. By funding NCDR through UNDP, the EC is contributing to these achievements.

It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the new grant of € 4,5 million signed in early May 2008. However, the process leading to the signature was said to be unsatisfactory for the partners (UNDP, NCDR) and other donors involved. It was reported that the EC was not communicating clearly on the decision making process, so that for some time it was uncertain whether continuing funding was possible or not. The risk of a funding gap or double funding from other donors became an issue.

NCDR, through REC and NPA, has introduced innovative methods to make MA cost efficient. NCDR has also adapted the “land release concept” that allows for a rapid release of land and ensure mine clearance assets are focused on areas with a confirmed presence of mines. It was a vital decision to take if Jordan wanted to become mine free within reasonable time. NCDR chose an NGO as a partner instead of building on REC or developing its own clearance asset such as is the case in Yemen.

By contributing to NCDR, the EC has shared in this process. However, EC support is provided indirectly through UNDP, which influences efficiency. The set up implies, for example, additional management costs (in-country and at the HQ level). The EC monitored the project only at an administrative level (reporting according to EC regulations). On the operational and technical side, the EC was not engaged.

UNDP is perceived to have the competence and experience to oversee and administer the funds. UNDP has a competent MA technical advisor in country, who plays a key role in fundraising, capacity building, coordination and overall quality assurance. The UNDP TA is an important “negotiator/facilitator” between (international) operators and national authorities.

NCDR hosts regular donor meetings, but these seem more an information/fundraising event where all current/potential donor countries are invited. These meetings are less an arena for discussions or dialogue, and no minutes are taken. Currently there is very little coordination among the donors.

### Sustainability and Link to Development

Neither in any of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor in the project document with the UNDP project is there any direct link between MA and the development process. Without going into detail, the grant application refers to socio-economic development and regional peace building benefits, which are viewed as being substantial. The longer term impact of the project appears to be highly tangible as the land and water resources that will be freed through the project will be put into productive use immediately, thereby contributing to the Government's national poverty reduction strategy and its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The programme itself however is limited to the clearance activities and on capacity development of the counterpart. The project does not foresee any activities directly related to the use for the land, neither has a linkage to another initiative that would bridge to a follow-up.

Regarding the capacity development component, there will be no need to have a large national capacity once the clearance of the northern border is done. Jordan will be "mine free" and the REC is more than capable to deal with single devices that will be discovered in the years to come (e.g. Israeli mines that cross the border with flooding).

NCDR and the GoJ have the vision to establish a regional MA capacity. There is already a plan and a dialogue established with GICHD and James Madison University (USA) to establish a training centre in Jordan. The purpose is, for example, to undertake mid-management courses for MA personnel in the Middle East. It remains to be seen how far this plan and the activities take off.

### Coherence and Coordination

NPA is the sole operator and NCDR will do the QA/QC of the operations. The key staff within NPA (national programme manager, senior technical advisor, operational coordinator, international relations) are all ex NCDR – ensuring a transparent and good dialogue between NPA and NCDR. In theory, this is a straightforward task with only one objective – clearance of all the mines within the treaty deadline.

## YEMEN

### CONTEXT

As a result of several conflicts, including the 1962-1975 war in the north between republicans and royalists, the 1963-1967 war of independence in the south, the 1970-1983 war against left-wing guerrillas and the 1994 Separatist War, Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and anti-vehicle mines and other ERW. Most landmines were laid in pre-unification border areas between northern and southern Yemen.<sup>74</sup>

A Landmine Impact Survey conducted in 2000 serves as the primary source of information for MA planning.

According to this survey, 592 communities were affected by landmines (1078 suspected hazard areas) covering an area of approx 923 km<sup>2</sup> directly affecting approx 6% of the population (14 communities with a population of approximately 36,000 with high impact and 578 communities with a population of 791,400 seen as medium to low impact). By June 2007, 419 km<sup>2</sup> remained to be cleared.<sup>75</sup>



The scope of the problem has been reduced since the finalisation of the 2000 LIS project through a combination of clearance and technical survey (area reduction and cancellation). However casualties continued to occur in 2007, and at a higher rate than in 2006. In 2007 there were said to be four to six new casualties per month (48-72 annually) but there is some uncertainty about figures of casualties so that the total number of mine/UXO casualties today and over the past years is not known.<sup>76</sup> A recent report by YEMAC speaks of 5,000 casualties over the past 10 years.<sup>77</sup>

In 2006, a livelihoods analysis of mine-affected communities in Yemen was undertaken. According to the study “landmines and ERW have an impact on infrastructure development, which is denying people access to economic opportunities.”<sup>78</sup> The blockage of agricultural lands, irrigation sources and grazing areas results in economic losses. Only 2.6% of Yemen’s land is arable.

### THE MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The Government of Yemen is committed to eliminate the impact of mines and UXO in Yemen. The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC-established in 1998) oversees the *Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre* (YEMAC), which is in charge of implementing the plans and policies approved by NMAC.

<sup>74</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/yemen.html>

<sup>75</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/yemen.html>

<sup>76</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/yemen.html>

<sup>77</sup> Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5., submitted by the Republic of Yemen, 31-03-2008, Page 7

<sup>78</sup> B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Volume 1, Main Report, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva, 2006, p. 1.

The Republic of Yemen signed the APMBC on December 1997 and it entered into force on 1 March 1999.<sup>79</sup> Yemen's National Mine Action Strategic Plan initially covered the period 2001-2005. Based on a LIS it was revised in June 2004 to cover the period 2004-2009. The plan's vision is to "put an end to the suffering of the people and the casualties caused by antipersonnel mines in mine-affected areas by the end of March 2009."<sup>80</sup> This year however Yemen has asked for a six year extension. Although called "one of the best demining programs in the world", the program faced some financial and technical obstacles. Repeatedly the program has had funding shortfalls (e.g. in 2003 and again in 2005). According to YEMAC for example in 2005 the total amount to implement the activities was USD 3,500,000 of which Yemen received only USD 1,800,000.<sup>81</sup> Technical obstacles are for example the fact that many mines are laid out in mountainous areas and Yemen still lacks the appropriate demining technology to deal with magnetic and iron soils.

The planned budget for the period 2009 is USD 31,216,667 of which USD 10,495,000 is planned as donor contributions.<sup>82</sup>

In compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen destroyed all stockpile antipersonnel landmines on 27 April 2002 and developed and enforced landmine legislation in the country since January 2005.

Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by YEMAC involving staff seconded from the Engineering Department of the Ministry of Defence. Since the establishment of the above-mentioned institutions, the Government of Yemen has seconded about 1.000 military personnel as deminers and other operational staff in support of MA activities nationwide. Yemen provides USD 3,500,000 per year since 1999 to cover salaries, insurance, social security, compensation and field allowances, food, and premises.<sup>83</sup>

YEMAC has adopted a "cluster clearance approach". The focus is on communities clustered close to each other, no matter whether they are high impact communities or medium and low-impact communities.

With support of UNDP, Yemen capacities and human resources has been established and trained to international recognised standard. MA in Yemen is now undertaken with no international advisors and there is national ownership to the program.

The Yemeni Landmine/UXO Victim Assistance Program was established in 1999 as an integral part of YEMAC. The Mid-Term Evaluation of YEMAC Phase II found this Program to be "one of the most advanced in the world", with some 1200 victims having been identified and 286 treated medically between 2001 and 2005.<sup>84</sup> According to a recent study there are nevertheless some doubts regarding the program's coverage, which to date is limited. Very few of the survivors had received significant help apart from emergency medical care.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Yemen was the first country in the region.

<sup>80</sup> Five year national strategic mine action plan for Yemen, 2004-2009, Revised and Extended, June 2004.

<sup>81</sup> Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5., submitted by the Republic of Yemen, 31-03-2008, Page 4

<sup>82</sup> Page 15

<sup>83</sup> Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5., submitted by the Republic of Yemen, 31-03-2008, Page 11

<sup>84</sup> Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen - Phase II; GICHD, June 2005

<sup>85</sup> Livelihood study page 17

There are two local NGOs involved in MA: Yemen Association for Landmines Survivors and Yemen Mine Awareness Association. Both are working under YEMAC coordination.

## EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The direct EC support to MA in Yemen is limited to the funding of a UNDP programme, which has been running since 1999. The EC supports Phase III of the programme (“Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW in Yemen”).<sup>86</sup> It was signed within the MAP Annual Work Program for 2006 and the corresponding call for proposals.<sup>87</sup>

The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) executed the first phase of the project from 1999 to 2003. During this phase the first UN certified LIS was completed, the above-mentioned Five-Year Strategic Mine Action Plan was developed, Mine Clearance Units and Technical Survey Teams created and trained, highly mine impacted communities cleared and mine awareness activities implemented.

During the second phase from October 2003 until the end of 2006, which was later extended to 2007, the capacity building process as well as clearance and MRE continued.

An evaluation of YMAP was carried out in 2001. In 2002 the UNDP Mine Action Team conducted an assessment of the status of the program and in 2005 UNDP undertook a mid-term evaluation. Results of the assessments were positive overall.

Phase three focuses on Yemen having a fully national MA program, with UNDP providing only modest support, mainly resource mobilization. The last UNDP chief technical advisor left Yemen in August 2006, although a programme officer remains within the UNDP Yemen office.

The decision to fund this MA activity in Yemen was taken in Brussels with the involvement of the EC delegation in Amman which was overseeing the EC office in Yemen at the time. The contract was given directly to UNDP without a call for proposals as there are no eligible alternatives in Yemen.

## KEY ISSUES

### Baseline data and estimation of end date

In Yemen the government, donors and operators have, as in a number of other countries, based their estimation of the size (extent) of the mine problem on the findings from a LIS (the scope of the problem were estimated to 923 km<sup>2</sup>). However, a known weakness with the LIS approach is that it overestimates the mine problem as non-technical people are tasked to estimate the size of a suspect hazard area.

In Yemen there was a need to follow up the LIS with a technical survey. The nationwide technical survey finished in 2008 has led to a reduction of the original suspect hazard areas to less than 10% of original size. The approach to base initial funding on LIS is appropriate. However the example of Yemen shows that the LIS only gives an indication of the impact of mines (at the time of the survey), but limited knowledge of the physical extent of the problem. Promotion and funding of technical surveys is important for national authorities and donors. Without a comprehensive/nation-wide technical survey the scope of the problem will remain unknown and end date will be at best a qualified guess. The same weakness in baseline data

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<sup>86</sup> MAP/2007/143-973

<sup>87</sup> Decision MAP/2006/17969



applies for the number of casualties occurred during the last ten years.

### Prioritisation

There has been no EC funding for MA in Yemen prior to 2007 although the situation in Yemen was eligible under the EC strategy for MA for 2002-2004. Yemen fell under both the thematic (elimination of AP Landmine/UXO threat and the alleviation of its effects and creation and reinforcement of local capacity and MA efficiency and effectiveness) and the geographic priorities of the strategy (country severely to moderately affected by APL/UXO problem; prioritization of the problem within the national framework). On the other hand Yemen is not as strategically important for the EU as other countries in the region.<sup>88</sup> The MA sector also has to “compete” with other sectors in Yemen as poverty and the need for support is big. The EC decided to prioritize the health sector.

### Mainstreaming

MRE and VA are pillars of MA in Yemen (Strategic Objective Three in the UNDP Program Phase III). There is a potential for mainstreaming and integration into already existing national structures or other development projects. Regarding prioritisation, the EC in its country strategy for Yemen has made the choice to put an emphasis on the health sector. The health sector in Yemen is established and there is potential for better integrating care for mine survivors. MRE could be better integrated into school curriculum or transferred to existing NGOs already established without the need of international funds.

The EC is funding other sectors in Yemen and contributes to the reduction of poverty, but there is no linkage between this funding and the funding to MA. The support to MA in Yemen is isolated from other EC funding to Yemen. MA is not mentioned in any of the CSP or NIP covering the evaluation period.<sup>89</sup> DG ECHO is implementing a humanitarian program covering the health sector, refugees, social support, water & sanitation. Again there is no link to MA.

### Donor coordination and monitoring

Currently there is virtually no coordination among donors regarding MA and limited interaction between donors and YEMAC or NMAC.<sup>90</sup> One of the reasons for this is the funding channel, which goes via UNDP in New York. Most contracts are negotiated from capitals and the funds are mainly thematic funds/earmarked MA budget lines. There is no or very limited knowledge of the MA programme at the embassy level (including the EC delegation). Embassies in Yemen do not feel responsible for the programme and are confident in UNDP’s capabilities to oversee the programme in an appropriate manner. UNDP approves the project and work plan, ensures appropriate project appraisal and capacity assessment, coordinates auditing process, monitoring, evaluation and validation, and ensures financial and substantive oversight.

Donor funding to MA in Yemen is handled from distance and characterized by good national ownership. However the development of mine clearance still needs attention and with the current clearance rate and delays

YEMAC has sent forward an extension request based on extensive international funding to

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<sup>88</sup> Criteria according to the EC MA strategy are proximity to EU or the political context. In the region Yemen has to “compete” with Iraq and Iran for attention.

<sup>89</sup> CSP 2002-2006, CSP 2007-2013, NIP 2005-2006, NIP 2007-2010

<sup>90</sup> Bilateral donors supported the mine action programme such as the governments of the US, Italy, France, Belgium, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, UK, Canada, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.



finalise within a six year timeframe. However, it is clear that the donors have not been engaged in the development of the extension request or committed funds for the coming years.

## IRAQ

### CONTEXT

Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW as a result of internal conflicts, the war with Iran, the first Gulf War, and the conflict that began in 2003. Since the 2003 invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices, targeted at civilians, the military and police, and at the Coalition Forces indicate that huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently, plundered, for use ongoing insurgencies.

Although there have been several mine/ERW contamination surveys, the Iraq LIS (partly funded by the EC) is the first comprehensive national survey of mine/UXO contamination. The data collection started in 2004 and ended in April 2006 and includes 13 of Iraq's 18 governorates.

According to the LIS there is mine/ERW contamination in the southern region (854.5 km<sup>2</sup>), the south-centre region (87.6 km<sup>2</sup>) and in the northern region (776 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>91</sup>



Types of contamination and impact vary significantly between the regions. The Kurdistan region, comprising the governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah, is one of the most seriously mine-contaminated areas in the world. It has 1,428 affected communities and contends with thousands of tactical minefields on the borders with Iran and Turkey.

There is further mine contamination along the Green Line, the former frontline between Kurdish forces and Saddam Hussein's army, as well as UXO across all three governorates. South-central Iraq and the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and Missan also have minefields on the border with Iran from the 1980-1988 war.

Cluster munitions and unexploded air and ground ordnance used by Coalition Forces in their advance on Baghdad, together with huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Iraqi army, have been the major cause of casualties.<sup>92</sup> Recent studies have reported at least 800,000 metric tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in and around Basra; this is mainly unused munitions; bombs, rockets and mortars discarded by fleeing Iraqi troops.<sup>93</sup>

There are no comprehensive statistics about casualties. The LIS (which does not cover all governorates) indicated that there are approximately 300 casualties per year in surveyed affected communities.

<sup>91</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/iraq.html>

<sup>92</sup> Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq, Revised Inter-agency Appeal 1 April – 31 December 2003 Chapter 9.6

<sup>93</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/iraq.html>

## THE MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007, becoming the 155th State Party. The treaty came into force on 1 February 2008.

The Iraq's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2003, within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. It had responsibility for MA policy, planning, coordination and managing the budget for MA and for donor relations. The work of NMAA has been affected by corruption, political turbulence, changes of management and insecurity (kidnapping). Finally in June 2007 the Council of Ministers closed down the NMAA within the MoPDC.

Although the NMAA was created as the authority for the whole of Iraq, in 2004 the Kurdish Regional Government assumed responsibility for MA in the three northern governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah.

UNDP has provided institutional development and local capacity development support to the NMAA and regional MA centres. UNDP works with one institutional and one senior technical advisor based in Amman. Both make frequent visits to Iraq. In March 2006 UNDP deployed a full-time national advisor to northern Iraq to support the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center (IKMAC) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA). It also contracted national advisers to support the NMAA in Baghdad and Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) South in Basra. RONCO, a US commercial clearance company, provided technical support to the NMAA until the end of September 2006 and continued to support RMAC South until July 2007, when its adviser moved to Baghdad.

Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, NGOs and commercial demining operators. A number of international NGOs are present in the country (for example MAG, DCA, the German NGO HELP, Danish Demining Group, Intersos, ICRC and NPA). A number of commercial companies are involved in clearance and technical advice (e.g. Ronco, Tetra Tech ECI). The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre employed nearly 800 operations staff in 61 MA teams in the Kurdish governorates of Erbil and Dahuk at the start of 2006.

Regarding MRE UNICEF assumed de facto coordination of activities in 2007. UNICEF cooperates with NGOs (e.g. Intersos).

## EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The EC's support to MA in Iraq is limited to the years 2003 and 2004 (funding decisions in 2003).<sup>94</sup> In total there were ten projects funded with a total amount of 9.870.000 Euro. The funding is divided among AIDCO (funding to UNDP) and DG ECHO (funding to NGOs for Humanitarian MA).

In 2004 the World Bank and the UN created the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) and the EC contributed to IFRRI.<sup>95</sup>

The EC has signed a Contribution Agreement with UNDP for a total of € 2 million for MA activities.<sup>96</sup> The funds were channelled through UNDP's Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis

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<sup>94</sup> Decision MAP/2003/76135)

<sup>95</sup> About 90% of the EC's aid to Iraq was channelled through this fund. See for details: [www.irffi.org](http://www.irffi.org)

<sup>96</sup> Contribution Agreement MAP/2003/76135

Prevention and Recovery (TTF). The funding was part of a larger contribution with a total of € 29 million Euros for recovery activities.<sup>97</sup> In addition to this EC contribution, UNDP Iraq also received funds from other donors through the MA service line of the CPR Thematic Trust Fund.<sup>98</sup>

The objective of the EC-funded programme was the provision of technical and management support to the implementation of a LIS, building of local/national MA capacities and procurement/provision of necessary MA equipment in Iraq. Programme implementation was constrained by the deteriorating security situation at the time and the limited communication possible between UNDP and NMAA. The most significant outcome of the program was the LIS.

The Progress Report for the programme states: “The activities under this agreement are to be implemented exclusively by UNDP.”<sup>99</sup> However, at the time UNDP could not deploy international staff into Iraq. To do the LIS international expertise was required. To overcome the problem, UNDP through UNOPS contracted to the US Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAf) for the provision of Senior Technical Advisor for the Landmine Impact Survey.

Regarding further activities under the programme, it is unclear what has been funded by the EC and what from other sources. UNDP reporting allocates funding to individual activities. As known from other Trust Funds, this is rather artificial and the example of UNDP in Iraq shows it is not always correct. The amounts stated exceed the total EC contribution and the activities do not match the funding purpose as intended (LIS and Mine Action Capacity Building):

**Table 5 – UNDP MA activities in Iraq and EC funding**

Activity	EC funding according to report <sup>100</sup>
Contract Danish Demining Group to continue with clearance operations in the Basrah area from end of September 2004	\$650,000 – EC Funding
Establishment of a local demining NGO in the Basrah area through an international NGO/Commercial Company in November 2004	\$2,000,000 - \$1,300,000 EC Funding
Continue funding the LIS Team Leader through VVAf until May 2005	\$270,000
<b>Total EC funding: \$2,220,000</b>	

The funding to NGOs could not be assessed as the evaluation team did not get access to files and could not visit Iraq.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>97</sup> EC Contribution Agreement MED/2003/076-486

<sup>98</sup> Report on the use of EC contributions channeled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 6 September 2004

<sup>99</sup> Report on the use of EC contributions channeled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 6 September 2004, Page 2

<sup>100</sup> United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office, Progress Report February - August 2004, 6 September 2004, page 4 and Progress Report Progress Report February - November 2004, 16 November 2004; because of the lack of precision the total EC funding amount is not entirely clear.

<sup>101</sup> The files were requested from ECHO (first directly and later also via Aidco) but not provided.

**Table 6 – ECHO MA funding to NGOs in Iraq**

Partner	Funding Decision	Amount
HI-F	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04002 Emergency humanitarian aid for the people affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance	700.000 Euro
HI-F	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06020 Explosive remnants of war clearance Baghdad	446.000 Euro
DCA	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04006 Humanitarian Mine Action Response in Southern Iraq	1.570.000 Euro
Danish Refugee Council (Danish Demining Group)	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04004 Quick response teams	1.100.000 Euro
Danish Refugee Council (Danish Demining Group)	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06007 Capacity Building of multi skilled EOD teams	559.954 Euro
Intersos	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04001 Mine Action Rapid Response	800.000 Euro
MAG	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04003 Emergency Mine Action	718.761 Euro
MAG	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06010 Humanitarian Mine Action	430.989 Euro
NPA	ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04005 Support to Emergency Landmine and UXO preventive measures	1.000.000 Euro
	<b>Total</b>	<b>7.325.704 Euro</b>

In 2006 international donations totalling \$35,288,325 (€28,089,091) for MA in Iraq were reported by 14 countries, an increase of some 27 percent from 2005 (\$27.8 million provided by 14 countries).<sup>102</sup> The list of donating countries include among non-EU countries the US, Australia, Switzerland and Norway, and from the EU, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Spain.

MA projects under IRFFI are included in Cluster A called Agriculture, Food Security, Environment and Natural Resource Management, and involve either UNDP or UNOPS:

**Table 7 – MA programmes under IRFFI in Iraq**

Title	Budget US\$	Agency	Approval date
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capacity building and clearance	3,340,612	UNOPS	11.11.04
Support to the Iraq-Kurdistan Mine Action Centre	2,921,852	UNOPS	16.03.06
Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization In Southern Iraq	3,195,797	UNDP	28.09.06
Support for Rural Development and Safer Environment through Mine Action	3,231,751	UNDP	04.10.07

## KEY ISSUE

Regarding EC funding for Iraq, the dominant feature is that the EC declared it would not fund operations after 2003. This decision was linked to the security situation and the fact that the EC cannot ensure proper monitoring and financial oversight without a presence in the country. The decision is not specific for the MA sector: nevertheless the decision affects the MA sector and raises some doubts. The following issues can be listed:

- The decision not to fund humanitarian demining is not based on the need for demining.

<sup>102</sup> <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/iraq.html>

- The need to demine did not end in 2003.<sup>103</sup>
- Whereas a long list of donors (European and non-European) are funding MA programs in Iraq, the EC – one of the main humanitarian donors in the world – is no longer funding. If the funding procedures of European donors as well as those of the UN allow support to MA programs in Iraq, it seems odd that this is impossible for the EC.
  - The operators that received funding until 2003 are still present in the country and continue the work with funds from other donors but are unable to address all needs because of the extent of the problem.
  - In the three other countries covered by this evaluation, the EC is ‘delegating’ oversight and monitoring to the UN (UNDP). This was the case in Iraq as well but only until 2003.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the following conclusions from the above observations are listed. Each conclusion is followed by at least one recommendation. Recommendations are repeated if they stem from more than one conclusion.

1. EC funding to the region is relevant overall. Funding decisions are taken either at the country level or in Brussels, which is appropriate. The EU does not follow a regional strategy or approach for the Middle East. The few regional aspects of MA in the Middle East are outweighed by national elements (national strategies, national actors), so that there is no need for a regional approach to MA.

- The EC should continue to work with national approaches in the Middle East and does not need to think about a regional strategy for MA.

2. The global EC strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions. The global strategy is little known among EC officials and other actors in MA in the region. Some who work with the global strategy see the global EC strategy as too general to guide decision-making. The global strategy is more important at the Brussels level than at country level. Some EC officials perceive strategic planning and decision taking in the MA sector as difficult due to the technical aspects and sector specifications.

- The EC should consider more specific guidance to those who are dealing with planning and MA strategies at national level.
- Guidance could have various forms and could come from a more specific strategy document, from guidelines that are coming with the global strategy, from experts (in-house or external), or from compilations of best practice examples.
- To achieve better guidance in MA for the EC delegations, the EC should consider a focal point at the Brussels level or in the region.
- Alternatively or additionally, EC officials working in EC delegations could be encouraged and guided to make increased use of external expertise. External expertise for strategies and planning could have various forms and could be requested from various sources.

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<sup>103</sup> “The Community’s humanitarian aid shall comprise assistance, relief and protection operations (...) to help people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, (...), man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, (...). It shall do so for the time needed to meet the humanitarian requirements resulting from these different situations. (Article 1 of ECHO’s mandate: Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid *Official Journal L 163*, 02/07/1996 P. 0001 – 0006)

3. Funding to MA in the Middle East is fragmented. In some cases the funding is not coherent. Only some common aspects can be identified:

- Funding through the UN in all four countries
- Differentiation between countries in crisis and countries with a more stable environment:
  - In the countries with a stable environment, the EC provides low profile support to the countries' efforts to comply with the APMBC; funding is rarely provided continuously but is limited to one project and/or a maximum of three years
  - In countries in crisis, the EC reacts quickly regardless of the countries' commitment to the APMBC; more funds are provided for humanitarian demining than for support to activities in the region related to the APMBC.
- In countries with a stable environment, the EC should follow the global strategy in a more coherent way. If the EC decides to support a country's effort in fulfilling the APMBC obligations this should be done coherently and based on a strategic approach.
- In countries with an ongoing or recent crisis the EC should continue to fund MA quickly and flexibly regardless of the countries' commitment to the APMBC but without neglecting opportunities for LRRD.

4. Humanitarian Demining is important in the region. Despite being mentioned in the recent EC global MA strategy, there is no specific strategy for humanitarian demining, nor any guidelines or a concept on how to integrate humanitarian demining into a reconstruction context.

- The EC should put a higher emphasis on humanitarian demining and in particular on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines. To achieve these aspects, DG ECHO should consider a focal point for MA at Brussels level.

5. The EC generally supports assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by funding LIS. In some contexts the baseline data, methodology and quality of assessments is insufficient in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability. This is true for both contamination and the number of casualties.

- The EC should continue to fund assessments in MA. The EC should, in its own programming but also when coordinating with other actors in MA, increasingly stress the need to base funding decisions on reliable data.
- In case reliable data is unavailable, the EC should support data collection and analysis in the region to a larger extent than is currently the case.

6. The emphasis of funding is on clearance which is appropriate overall. In three of the four countries, a landmine/UXO free country is a realistic option in the medium-term.

- In the four countries assessed, the EC should continue (or in the case of Iraq, start) to focus funding on clearance activities.

7. EC funding to MA is not explicitly integrated into wider national reconstruction or development strategies. Links of MA programmes to other EC funded programmes are not considered consistently. MA programmes contribute to the reconstruction and development process, e.g. by making scarce agricultural land accessible. The linking however is limited in the sense that MA programmes take place in the wider reconstruction and development context but there is no joint planning for broader results or specific emphasis or measures on linkages between programmes. After the land is made accessible there is no follow-up through other

initiatives or any other link to reconstructions or development programmes. Actors and donors seem to be satisfied with this level of coordination.

- Where the EC is funding programmes which do not only have a focus on fast clearance of contaminated sites, the EC should increase efforts to link MA to reconstruction and development goals. The EC should not agree to fund standalone MA within a reconstruction or development context but should encourage actors to plan specifically for joint goals and achievements under MA and reconstruction or development programmes.

8. Even in the Lebanon example, where ENPI funded humanitarian demining for an extended period, the realisation of the LRRD concept remains a challenge. Whereas DG ECHO procedures are flexible and comparably fast, procedures for other instruments are inflexible and too slow. The Stability Instrument, as a new instrument, seems to be the right tool to react flexibly but is not meant to be used to fill all gaps that might occur. The Stability Instrument is not well known outside the EC, and not known in detail by some inside the EC.

- The EC in the Middle East should put a higher emphasis on humanitarian demining and in particular on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines.
- The EC should continue to promote knowledge about new EC instruments inside and outside the EC.

9. With an annual percentage between 0% and 10% of the overall EC funding to MA in the world, the Middle East is not a priority region for MA. Before and after the cancellation of the thematic budget line, EC officials did not pay much attention to MA in the region (with the exception of humanitarian demining). Today, EC officials deal with MA as part of their portfolio and the level of engagement depends partly on personal interest and prioritisation of the individual. The MA sector has to “compete” with other sectors at country level when it comes to the development and negotiation of CSP.

- The EC should continue to fund MA in the region until all countries have fulfilled their treaty obligations.
- If the EC is funding MA in the region, it should be strategic and properly followed-up. To facilitate strategic planning and oversight, the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level or in the region.

10. Funding of the EC and of Member States is overall coherent when it comes to selecting target countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is the case of Iraq, where EU Member States fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not.

- The EC should reconsider its strategy regarding funding to MA in Iraq.

11. Coherence in funding to MA in the region is achieved despite the lack of coordination mechanisms in the countries, the region, or at European capital level. The APMBC and instruments provide the overall coordination framework for donors, including the EC and Member States.

There is, nevertheless, a declared interest and potential benefit from information exchange and coordination between the EC and Member States (as it used to be in the past). This could enhance donor complementarities and avoid funding gaps. This is only possible if donors exchange information about their programmes and funding options. For Member States, information



exchange and coordination could be achieved without much effort as focal points for MA within the government are in place.

- The EC should consider increased information exchange and coordination with EU Member States without creating a mechanism that would duplicate coordination under the APMBC.
- To facilitate information exchange between the EC and Member States, the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level.

12. Direct funding to NGOs is generally provided only for humanitarian demining. The procedure and management follows DG ECHO standard procedures, which is not always appropriate as MA operations have some features that are different from other sectors. This is particularly the case for the high start up costs (purchase of specialised and expensive equipment). There is good contact between the EC and NGOs at national level. The level of knowledge about ways of working and procedures at both sides, the EC and the NGOs, could nevertheless be improved.

- DG ECHO should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining including related specific guidelines and procedures.
- To facilitate information exchange between the EC and NGOs, the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level or in the region.

13. The EC, as well as other donors, face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster munitions. Weak assessments and difficulties in determining realistic end dates for clearance activities are a challenge for donors.

- The EC should learn from the response to the cluster munitions problem in South Lebanon and ensure that, in future contexts, the lessons learnt are applied. This could be done by developing specific guidelines for cluster munitions problems or by developing compilations of good practices.

14. By choosing the UN (and in particular UNDP) for the support to national structures, the EC follows a low profile approach in the region. The level of programme ownership, oversight and strategic influence is very low. This approach is not consistent with the fact that in Iraq the EC is not engaged because of the restriction in monitoring and overseeing the activities. The approach is also not coherent with the fact that the UN (in particular UNMAS as part of the peacekeeping forces) in South Lebanon, for procedural reasons, could not be funded by the EC during the emergency phase.

- The EC should apply a coherent approach when it comes to requirements for oversight and programme ownership. In particular in Iraq, the EC should reconsider the decision not to fund MA (or other humanitarian activities) because of the difficulties in monitoring and controlling.
- DG ECHO should consider funding of humanitarian demining through the UN system (and in particular of UNMAS) in cases such as Lebanon where the UN is present with capacities prior, during and after the humanitarian crisis.



## APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

### Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in the Middle East 2002-2007

#### 1. BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).<sup>104</sup> These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: *The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.*

The APL Regulation goes on to state: *Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions...* (Article 14)

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007<sup>105</sup> further specifies that “*more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact*” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

3. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
4. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:<sup>106</sup>
  - Africa
  - Asia-Pacific
  - Caucasus-Central Asia
  - Europe
  - Latin America
  - Middle East

<sup>104</sup> Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

<sup>105</sup> This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

<sup>106</sup> Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:

- provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies;
- train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
- support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,<sup>107</sup> while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

## 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

### Overall objective:

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in the Middle East to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

### Specific objectives:

- To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
  - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
  - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
  - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in the Middle East 2002-2006;
  - EC strategy documents for the Middle East
- To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);<sup>108</sup>
- To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
  - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
  - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
  - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries;
  - supporting local mine action organisations;
- To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
- To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of implementation;
- To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);

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<sup>107</sup> Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, *Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004*.

<sup>108</sup> This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.

- To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
- To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC to the Middle East;
- To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-funded mine projects;
- To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among mine action programmes in the Middle East and globally.

### **Expected results**

The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to the Middle East, and to particular mine-affected countries in the Middle East, since 2002. It shall incorporate more detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other donors, and UN agencies for the next years.

### **3. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:

- Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
- Desk Research
- Country Missions (two of the following – to be confirmed)
  - Jordan
  - Lebanon
  - Yemen
- Analysis and Reporting

#### **Country Missions**

As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and collect documents and data from:

- EC delegations
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
- other key government officials
- representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

### **Additional data collection**

Additional information will be obtained from:

- Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available);
- Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
- Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC Delegations, managers of operator organizations, both in organizations' headquarters and on the field, and beneficiary countries' officials, etc.).
- EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
- National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies from the focus countries
- Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine action) and the World Bank
- Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
- Other sources, as appropriate.

### **4. OUTPUTS**

An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and data collection stage (March 2008).

A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.

Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.

A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels.

All reports will be in English.

All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm). The GICHD logo shall be provided by the GICHD.

## Annex 1 to the ToR

Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were:

- The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will receive EC funding for mine action;
- In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action within the EC;
- Request for proposal and selection processes, including:
  - The need for more high quality proposals,
  - The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and
  - The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of proposals and projects.
- Contracting issues, including:
  - The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements;
  - The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority;
  - The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short durations.
- All interventions should incorporate exit strategies.

## APPENDIX 2 – PERSONS MET

Last name, first name	Organisation	Title/Function	Date of interview	Location/by phone
Abadie, Cecile	European Commission	Head of Section 'Infrastructure and local development'	27.06.08	Beirut
Abdul Radiib, Ali	YEMAC	Deputy Director	15.04.08	Sana'a
Alawi, Ahmed	YEMAC	Information Officer	15.04.08	Sana'a
Albert, Peter Christopher	DCA	Operation Manager	26.06.08	Tyr, Lebanon
Al-Jarrah, Ahmed	NCDR	Operation Department manager	05.05.08	Jordan Valley
Andrews, Stephen	British Embassy	Lieutenant Colonel, Defence Attaché	27.06.08	Beirut
Breikat, Mohammad	NCDR	Director of the NCDR	04.05.08	Amman
Bryant, Stephen	NPA	Programme Manager	04.05.08	Amman
Christiaens, Peter	European Commission	Attaché, Programs Manager	27.06.09	Beirut
Clark, Chris	Mine Action Coordination Centre South Lebanon, United Nations	Programme Manager	25.06.08	Tyre, Lebanon
De Waele, Sandra	European Commission	Desk Officer Jordan	5.05.08	By telephone
Di Martino Walter	Embassy of Italy	Deputy Head of Mission	14.04.08	Sana'a
Discherl, Johannes	German Government	Focal Point for Mine Action	5.05.08	By telephone
Eason, Abigal	Mines Advisory Group	Focal Point for EC funding	21.04.08	By telephone
Elmund Gam, Hanne B.	Danish Government	Focal Point for Mine Action	8.05.08	By telephone
Enas, Ahmed	YEMAC	Project Officer	15.04.08	Sana'a
Fabbroni, Valeria	FSD	Programme Manager Lebanon	2.05.08	Email questionnaire
Fehmi, Mohammad	Lebanese Armed Forces, Lebanon Mine Action Center	Brigade General, Director	24.06.08	Beirut
Furunes, Knut	Norwegian's People Aid	Operations Manager/Programme Coordinator Mine Action Programme	23.06.08	Beirut
Gleeson, Andy	MAG	Technical Operations Manager	24.06.08	Nabatieh
Gouzee de Harven, Antoine	European Commission	EuropeAid-Cooperation Office, Unit F 2-Central management of thematic budget lines	24.04.08	Brussels
Gross, Peter	European Commission	Relex DDG2, Policy Officer - Desk Yemen and Gulf Cooperation Council countries	15.05.08	By telephone
Hofmokl, Jan	European Commission	Relex F.3 Near East, Co-Desk Officer Lebanon	7.05.08	By telephone
Horrocks, David	MAG	Country Programme Manager	27.06.08	Nabatieh
Horvers Mary	European Commission	Programme manager	13.04.08	Sana'a, Yemen
Horvers, Mary	European Commission	Programme Manager	16.04.08	Sana'a
HRH Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein	NCDR	Chairman of the NCDR	04.05.08	Amman
Imad, Mona	DG ECHO, Lebanon Office	Programme Assistant	24.06.08	Beirut

Isabelle Combes	DG ECHO	Chef de secteur Questions politiques, stratégie, financements thématiques, DG ECHO 01	29.07.08	By telephone
Jensen, Uffe	European Commission	Programme Manager, Aidco A.2 Middle East	8.05.08	By telephone
Jones, Llewelyn	Mines Advisory Group	Operations Manager in Headquarter	21.04.08	By telephone
Juergensen, Olaf	UNDP	Chief Technical Advisor to NCDR	04.05.08	Amman
Juergensen, Olaf	UNDP	CTA	06.05.08	Syrian Border
Koch, Julia	European Commission	DG ECHO, Unit 2, Central and Eastern Europe, NIS, Mediterranean countries, Middle East	17.04.08	Brussels
Lemasson, Antoine	European Commission	DG ECHO, Desk Officer Yemen	17.04.08	Brussels
Liguori, Laura	European Commission	DG External Relations, Unit A4-Security Policy	24.04.08	Brussels
Martins, Paulo	European Commission	Aidco A.2. Geographical coordination and supervision for the Mediterranean and Middle-East	15.05.08	By telephone By Email
Mikaela Neijd	European Commission	Programme Manager	07.05.08	Amman, Jordan
Montariol, Bruno	European Commission	EC Delegation Lebanon	07.07.08	Email questionnaire
Närvi, Jussi	European Commission	Premier Conseiller, Chef de Section Coopération	24.06.08	Beirut
Neijd, Mikaela	European Commission	Programme Manager	04.05.08	Amman, Jordan
Peetermans, Michel	Belgian Government	Focal Point for Mine Action	9.05.08	By telephone
Poston, Allan	UNDP	Chief Technical, LMAC	24.06.08	Beirut
Rasmussen, Lene	DCA	Programme Manager	26.6.08	Tyre, Lebanon
Reuss Michael	German Embassy	Deputy Head of Mission	14.04.08	Sana'a
Robyns, Alain	DG ECHO, Lebanon Office	Technical Assistant	24.06.08	Beirut
Rola, El-Solh	USAID	Assistant Project Manager	23.06.08	By telephone
Ruru, Kerei	Mine Action Coordination Centre South Lebanon, United Nations	Chief of Operations	25.06.08	Tyr, Lebanon
Stephen Bryant	NPA	Programme Manager	06.05.08	Amman
Stoa, Jan Erik	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action	Operations Manager	25.06.08 26.06.08	Tyre and Nabatieh, Lebanon
Ulricksen, Hanne	NMFA	Programme Manager	06.05.08	Amman
Veble, Eva	DanChurchAid	Head of Humanitarian Mine Action	15.05.2008	By Telephone

## APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

### Background documents and Agency Reports

- Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
- “Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007
- “In fight against militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 2007.
- Presentation MACC SL, Tyre, 19 March 2007 and Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organisation, November 2006
- Counting the Cost, The economic impact of cluster munition contamination in Lebanon, by Greg Crowther, Landmine Action, May 2008,
- B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Volume 1, Main Report, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva, 2006
- Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen - Phase II; GICHD, June 2005
- Report on the use of EC contributions channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 6 September 2004
- United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office, Progress Report February - August 2004, 6 September 2004, page 4 and Progress Report Progress Report February - November 2004, 16 November 2004
- United Nations Mine Action Service, Annual Report 2006, New York
- German Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Guidelines for funding humanitarian demining „Leitlinien zur Förderung von Projekten der humanitären Minen- und Kampfmittelräumung
- durch das Auswärtige Amt“ Berlin, 18.01.2008
- Denmark’s support to Mine Action, Strategy, October 2006
- Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action Final Report Sida Evaluation 01/06
- United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office Report on the use of EC contributions channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 6 September 2004
- United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office Progress Report Jan-June 2004; 14 July 2004 Mine Action Support to Iraqi National Mine Action Authority
- United Nations Development Programme, Iraq Country Office Progress Report February - November 2004; 16 November 2004; Support to the National Mine action Authority (NMAA) in Capacity Building
- Lebanon Mine Action Program National Demining Office, Working for a Lebanon Free From The Impact of Landmines, Long Term Plan 2008-2012



- Country Program Action Plan between the Government of the Republic of Yemen and the United Nations Development Programme, 2007 - 2011

### EC Documentation

- European Community, *The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target*, The EC Mine Action Strategy & Multi-annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/mine/docs/strategy\\_0507\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mine/docs/strategy_0507_en.pdf)
- EC Council Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1)
- EC Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6)
- European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi\\_euomed\\_rsp\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euomed_rsp_en.pdf)
- Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programs [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euomed/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euomed/index_en.htm)
- EU Cooperation Partners and Programs in Lebanon [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/lebanon/lebanon\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm)
- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001

## APPENDIX 4 – ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY PROGRAMS AGAINST STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Strategy	Yemen	Jordan	Lebanon	Iraq
<b>Country</b>				
<b>Strategy 2002-2004</b>				
<b>Overall objective</b>				
To alleviate human suffering, increase humanitarian security while, at the same time, stabilising post-or frozen- conflict regions, recreating an environment in which people can live safely and economic, health and social development can occur free from constraints imposed by the hidden treat of mines, and ensuring that victims needs are addressed.	Yemen is facing a landmines and ERW problem over the past thirty years. LIS completed in July 2000 identified mine-affected villages in nineteen out of the country's twenty-one governorates. It recorded a total of 4,904 casualties over the past ten years were recorded, of which 2,560 were killed and 2,344 injured. Impact on access to critical resources, and blocking access to land. Impact on infrastructure development and the implementation of social development projects.	Conflict: no but mines were laid related to potential conflict with neighbors Post Conflict: Israeli invasion in 70s <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Very few victims</li> <li>• Very ltd. effect on farming</li> </ul>	Post conflict: yes Israel left Lebanon and left mines behind 306 communities affected  LIS co-funded by the EU  Lebanon not in the focus of the EU; sporadic funding of one MAG intervention	Human suffering: 1428 communities affected, approximately 300 casualties per year
Focus on local capacity as well as on continuing mine clearance. (After that period, (...), the main financial effort might focus on mine clearing and victim assistance.)	National programme with focus on local capacity exists.	Local capacity: Mine action was the responsibility of the army (Royal Engineers)	Local capacity building: no, only if in combination with funding to MAC SL (needs to be checked)  Victim assistance: no  Structure for both local capacity and victim assistance was in place: under LMAC there is MRE and MVA National Steering Committee	Local capacity exists partly: NMAA failed but IKMAC for Kurdistan exists
<b>Thematic Priorities</b>				
1. Actions to eliminate the AP Landmine/UXO Threat to affected populations and the alleviation of its effects on them	The government was working towards the elimination of the problem.	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above
2. Actions to create and reinforce local capacity and mine action efficiency and effectiveness	Other actors work with the government in the mine action sector (UNDP started support in 1999 to support the national capacity).	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above

<b>Geographic Priorities</b>				
Priority for support will be given to countries severely affected by the scourge of APL/UXO, which made and are making significant efforts to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Due attention will be given to populations of non-signatory countries. When aid is provided to non-Mine Ban Treaty signatories, the impact of the assistance on the country's willingness to accede will be taken into consideration for future support.	The government of Yemen is committed to the complete elimination of landmines and explosive remnants of war. The Government signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997 and ratified it in September 1998, the first country in the Middle East region to do so.	Severely affected: no  APMBC: Yes	Lebanon not signatory to APMBC	Severely affected: yes
Countries severely to moderately affected by APL/UXO problem	About 48-72 accidents annually.	See above	LIS shows high, medium and low impacted communities (28 communities were rated high)	See above
Countries/territories moderately to lightly affected with concentration of the threat in areas of high risk for the populations and/or for the socio-economic development		See above	Same as above	Same as above
Prioritisation of the problem within the national framework (complementarity with geographic or other horizontal resources or reinforcement of the capacity of the geographic resources or compensation for the absence of those resources)	The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) was established in 1998 and formulated a national mine-action strategy. The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) was established in 1999 as the implementing body of the NMAC with the primary responsibility of coordinating all mine-action activities in the country.	National framework: NCDR	Yes, national plans exist (check again)	Weak national framework but regional frameworks exist (Kurdish part)
Strategic importance for the EU (proximity to EU or political context or relation to already started assistance programmes which are blocked by pending mine issues.)	EU country strategy focuses on private sector development, food security, poverty reduction, good governance, democracy and respect of human rights.  Many EU MS were funding UNDP for the support of YEMAC (Italy, France, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Germany, Sweden + non EU donors such as US, Canada, UAE).	Check when the national committee was created	Lebanon falls within the EU Neighborhood policy (presented in 2003) <i>Others?</i>  Before crisis in 2006 Lebanon was not much in the focus of donors (check EU overall budgets for Lebanon in periods)  <i>check if other countries do as well</i>	No strategic importance for the EU
Cross cutting priorities (eg. tackle humanitarian crisis, facilitate rapid interventions)	DG ECHO finances humanitarian programmes.	-	No	Large scale humanitarian needs and funding.

Strategy 2005-2007				
<b>Strategic Objective</b>				
To drastically reduce the lingering threat and impact of landmines in the context of increased local security and regional confidence.	Regarding threat and impact see above.	No.	ECHO and subsequent funding did drastically reduce threat and impact of cluster ammunition in the South. No funding to clearing of landmines. Local security: yes Regional confidence: -	Human suffering: 1428 communities affected, approximately 300 casualties per year.
<b>Thematic Objectives</b>				
To reduce the Anti-personnel Landmine Threat (MRE, detection, marking, fencing, clearance, destruction of stockpiled APL).	Regarding threat and impact see above.	Yes.	Yes.	Threat from APL: yes, see above.
To Alleviate Mine Victim Suffering and Aid Socio-Economic Reintegration (Supporting or creating local victim assistance services).	Regarding threat, impact and suffering see above.	No.	No.	Suffering and need for socio-economic reintegration is given.
To Enhance Local and Regional Impacts of Effective Mine Action Capacity (support to national/local) mine action structures, LIS).	National Mine Action Capacity: NMAC, YEMAC.	Yes.	Funding to international NGOs incl. capacity building but it is limited to individuals. (check with FSD) Funding to UNDP is capacity building with LMAC and some future local NGOs.	Structures are weak but exist in some parts of the country.
<b>Geographic Priorities</b>				
Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty.	Yes, see above.	Commitment is given	Lebanon is not signatory	Commitment is given.
High Humanitarian and Development Need.	Development need: yes Humanitarian funding: yes	If yes, then development need. As country does not have very much fertile area the cleared area is of importance.	Humanitarian: yes in 2006 and 2007 Development need: South yes Rest of the country: not clear.	High humanitarian need is given.
Strategic Importance for the EU.	No	-	ENP: yes Besides: yes Important case for the signatory process of the cluster treaty.	No strategic importance for the EU.
Sustainability and Coherence with Wider Assistance.	EU strategy is focuses good governance and poverty alleviation (in particular health). Mine Action is not mentioned in any CSP or NIP.	-	Yes, cluster would have blocked the South entirely and would have hampered overall assistance to the country.	Assistance is provided by other donors and actors.
Proven Commitment of Non-States Parties to Mine Action and the Principles of the APMB.	Yes, see above.	N.a.	Lebanon is still not signatory but the government is keen to get rid of the problem and not to produce more mines and to get rid of the stockpile.	Commitment exists but state parties partly fail.

Efficiency and Effectiveness of Local/National Mine Action Planning Programmes.	Yes, see above.	Yes.	Strong local set up incl. UN and Army exists in the South. Set up with Army and UNDP exists for the rest of the country.	Local/National Mine Action Planning Programmes are weak.
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## APPENDIX 5 – OPEN INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>General Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Specific Evaluation Questions</i>
<p><b>Relevance</b></p> <p><b>The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent are the objectives of the programme still valid?</li> <li>• Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?</li> <li>• Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities in terms of mine action?</li> <li>• How are these needs assessed?</li> <li>• What are the geographic (regional?) and thematic priorities defined in the EC Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007?</li> <li>• What is the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.)?</li> <li>• How adequate is the process for determining which countries and projects will receive funding?</li> <li>• How transparent is the process of determining funding?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p> <p><b>A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent were the objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved?</li> <li>• What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent were the landmine &amp; UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries addressed?</li> <li>• To what extent were national ownership and the development of local capacities fostered?</li> <li>• To what extent were the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries supported?</li> <li>• In how far were local mine action organisations supported? Which ones? Through which Implementation Channels? Compare strength/weaknesses of NGOs vs. Government vs. UN.</li> </ul>

- In how far did the process of deconcentration and the question of who does what in mine action within the EC impact on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects (incl. an assessment of technical understanding of EC Delegation staff)?
- To what extent did the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new “**stability instrument**” impact on future mine action support from the EC to the Middle East; How does the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy influence funding in mine action?
- In how far did **contracting issues** influence the achievement of the objectives (contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements, clarity in defining chains of responsibility and authority, limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short durations)?
- How do implementing partners see the collaboration with the EC? How important is the EC as a funding organization? How do they perceive the contractual arrangements, supervision and reporting?

**Efficiency**

**Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly**

- Were activities cost-efficient?
- Were objectives achieved on time?
- Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
- In how far has the process of requiring and selecting projects as well as contracting have an influence on the timely delivery of activities?
- Are there alternative ways of funding and would there be more cost efficient?

<p>resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.</p>	
<p><b>Impact</b></p> <p>The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of trade and financial conditions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What has happened as a result of the programme or project?</li> <li>• What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?</li> <li>• How many people have been affected?</li> <li>• What is the impact of the programme or project and how much of the <b>change</b> can be attributed to the EU funding</li> <li>• What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries (change in number of victims, access to land, statements of perception of security, etc)?</li> <li>• Did the changes have any influence on the conflict/the reconstruction process/ development process?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Sustainability</b></p> <p>Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent did the benefits of a programme or project continue after donor funding ceased?</li> <li>• What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of</li> <li>• In how far did the EC foresee and plan for an '<b>exit strategy</b>' for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);</li> <li>• In how far is the end state clearly defined and commonly agreed between actors. In how far is there sufficient data/the situation known to define an exit strategy (survey)?</li> </ul>



<p><b>withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.</b></p>	<p>sustainability of the programme or project?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In how far is the exit strategy linked to impact (risk to leave before all risk areas are cleared);</li> <li>• In how far does the strategy foresee/link up with <b>long-term challenges</b> (development, land rights and land disputes, etc.)</li> <li>• In case of humanitarian demining, who does the concept of Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development-LRRD? Which elements in EU funding are in favour of LRRD and which ones do hamper them? What would be alternatives?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Coherence/Complementarity/Coordination</b></p> <p><b>The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations.</b></p>	<p>This criterion may have several dimensions:</p> <p>1) Coherence within the Commission's development programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Example: Can it be said that the activities and outputs logically allow the objectives to be achieved? Are there contradictions between the different levels of objective? Are there duplications between the activities?</li> </ul> <p>2) Coherence/complementarity with the partner country's policies and with other donors' interventions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Example: Can it be said that there is no overlap between the intervention considered and other interventions in the partner country and/or other donors' interventions, particularly Member States?</li> </ul> <p>3)</p>	<p>1) Specific activity vs. overall objective</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Activity vs. Ottawa convention/Mine Ban Treaty</li> <li>• Activity vs. humanitarian objectives</li> </ul> <p>2) EC intervention vs. other actors intervention (partner country, other EC member State)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are other actors' interventions related to Mine Action?</li> <li>• In how are these interventions taken into account in EC's planning and implementation?</li> <li>• Is there overlap, influence, or duplication?</li> <li>• To what extent did the intervention add benefits to what would have resulted from Member States' interventions only in the partner country. To what extent has the sharing of roles between the EC and Member States contributed to optimise the impact of the support?</li> </ul> <p>3) EC Mine Action objective vs. other EU objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the EU objectives on regional and national level?</li> </ul>



Coherence/complemehttp://www.worldvision.org/ntarity  
with the other Community policies

- Example: Is there convergence between the objectives of the intervention and those of the other Community policies (trade, agriculture, fishing, etc.)?

4) Coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.)

- In how far are they taken into account in EC's Mine Action planning and implementation?
- Is there any positive/negative influence?
- Influence of EU reform on Mine Action: Under which Pillar comes Mine Action (first or second)? How is non-geographic funding possible under new instruments?

4) Coordination

- What are the **coordination mechanisms** related to Mine Action? What is the role of **MACs**? How do they fulfill their role and what is influencing it?
- What role does the EC play in these coordination mechanisms?
- In how far are EC interventions influenced by these coordination mechanisms?