

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTIONS 2002-2007

Ralf Otto, with Ted Paterson & Vera Bohle | Geneva | January 2010

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Synthesis Report on the Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes: 2002-2007, Geneva, January 2010

This project has been managed by Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation and Policy Research, GICHD, t.paterson@gichd.org

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Centre International de Déminage Humanitaire | Genève

7 bis, av. de la Paix | P.O. Box 1300 | 1211 Geneva 1 | Switzerland | t. + 41 (0)22 906 16 60
f. + 41 (0)22 906 16 90 | info@gichd.org | www.gichd.org

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ACRONYMS

AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office	LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
APM	Anti-Personnel Landmines	LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
AXO	Abandoned ordnance	MA	Mine Action
BAC	Battle Area Clearance	MAG	Mines Advisory Group
BiH	Bosnia Herzegovina	MRE	Mine Risk Education
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit	NCDR	National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of War	NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	NPA	Norwegian Peoples Aid
DCA	DanChurch Aid	QA	Quality Assurance
DDG	Danish Demining Group	QC	Quality Control
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
DFID	Department for International Development	SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
DG DEV	European Commission Directorate General for Development	Spot UXO	Isolated UXO which does not impact a community even though it poses a possible threat
DG	European Commission Directorate General for External Relations	TA	Technical Advisor
RELEX	Relations		
EC	European Commission	UNDG	United Nations Development Group
ECHO	EC Humanitarian Aid Office	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ECOSORN	Economic and Social Relaunch of the Northwest	UNDP/BCPR	UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	UNMACA	United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
EU	European Union	UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office in Sudan
FSD	Fondation Suisse de Déminage (same as SFD)	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	USD	United States Dollar
HI	Handicap International	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	VA	Victim Assistance
IFS	Instrument for Stability	VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund (of the UN)
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action	VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) provides a framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by anti-personnel mines. Even if recorded casualty rates continue their apparent decline, both landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)¹ still pose a serious threat to civilians in many countries. More than ten years after the APMBC was signed, a reliable estimate of the size of the global landmine problem does not yet exist. More than 70 states were believed to be mine-affected.²

In 2001, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP) adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the European Union's (EU) response against Anti-personnel Landmines (APL).³ These (referred to collectively as "the Regulation") laid the foundation of an integrated and focused European policy. The Regulation states the need to regularly assess operations financed by the European Community (EC) and that the European Commission shall submit to the EP an overall assessment of all EC mine action support. To implement these provisions, the European Commission commissioned a Global Assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004 (completed in March 2005).

The Regulation further specifies that more specific, geographic evaluations of EU-funded mine actions shall be conducted, analysing their results and impact. Accordingly, the Commission's Mine Action Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007⁴ provided for this. The European Commission entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in six regions: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Caucasus-Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.

The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.

The overall objective of the evaluation exercise is to provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions and to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies. The regional studies comprised an assessment of the relevance of EC-funded mine activities, an analysis of the allocation of funds among mine-affected states, and an assessment of the effectiveness of EU-funded mine action support. The evaluation teams looked into coordination among the Commission and other agencies supporting mine action, assessed the impact of deconcentration and the potential impact of the end of the

¹ Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. ERW refers to ordnance left behind after a conflict and includes Abandoned Ordnance (AXO) as well as Unexploded Ordnance (UXO – artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munitions)

² Landmine Monitor 2008 <http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/es/toc.html>

³ Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

⁴ This was the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines. Each team made recommendations to improve the identification, definition, implementation, and impact of EC-funded mine projects, and to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine action programmes in the regions and globally.

This report summarizes the findings from the six regional studies and draws common conclusions and recommendations.

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation exercise covered EC support to mine action for the period 2002-2007. Evaluation teams first visited Brussels and distributed questionnaires to the European Commission mine action team in Brussels and to Delegations in mine-affected countries in the six regions. This helped confirm key issues for the exercise.

Country missions for this study were undertaken from March 2007 to August 2008. Missions went to Cambodia and Laos (Asia-Pacific report), Peru and Colombia (Latin America report), Angola, Sudan, Somalia (Africa report), Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan (Caucasus-Central Asia report), Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan (Middle East), and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (Europe). Countries such as Sri Lanka and Iraq were covered by desk studies.

On 28-29 April 2009, evaluation team leaders met in Brussels for a workshop on all studies. A preliminary report on common findings was presented verbally to the European Commission on 30 April 2009.

According to the Terms of Reference (ToR), the assessment criteria are based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.⁵ For the purpose of this exercise these are defined as:

- **Relevance:** the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor
- **Effectiveness:** the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives
- **Impact:** the positive and negative changes produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended
- **Sustainability:** whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. This includes environmental, financial, and institutional sustainability.

The regional evaluation reports do not strictly follow a common framework and therefore differ in focus and depth of assessment of each evaluation criteria. The evaluations did not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues. Prior to their public release (along with this Synthesis Report), some of the regional reports were updated somewhat (e.g. to reflect the issuance of the Guidelines on EC Mine Action 2008-2013).

⁵ http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html

2. CONTEXT

OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTIONS

It has proved impossible to compile a complete and accurate list of all EC-financed mine action funding and projects, and the figures below should be seen as our best estimate.⁶ Challenges in the data collection were:

- confusion between planned and committed figures
- amounts may have been spent but could not be confirmed by the study (e.g. € 2 million for Russia/Chechnya and Serbia)
- amounts have been earmarked but not spent (e.g. € 10 million for Belarus and Ukraine)
- inclusion of demining sub-components in both emergency aid and development projects
- challenges with documentation, related in part to deconcentration (e.g. the transfer of project files from Brussels to the delegations of the European Commission)
- rotation of personnel in Brussels and the delegations and, last but not least
- the fact funds for mine action came through a variety of EC funding mechanisms.

Table 1 – EC Mine Action funding to regions relative to total EC Mine Action funding

Region	Funding 1999-2007 ⁷ (Euro millions)	% of total EC funding to Mine Action
Africa ⁸	€ 86.6	33.8%
Caucasus-Central Asia ⁹	70.8	27.6%
Europe ¹⁰	40.6	15.9%
Asia-Pacific ¹¹	23.1	9.0%
Middle East ¹²	20.1	8.6%
Latin America ¹³	7.9	3.1%
Global	5.2	2.0%
Total	€ 254.3	100.0%

In recent years the EC has been – after the United States (U.S.), Norway and Canada – the fourth largest donor for mine action in the world. Combined, the EC and EU member states provided the largest amount of mine action funding in both 2006 and 2007. In 2007, EC and EU member states together provided €143.6 million for mine action, compared to €191.2 million in 2006 – a decline of approximately € 47.6 million (25%).¹⁴

For the EC itself during the 2002-07 period, the largest recipients by far were Afghanistan (25% of all EC mine action funding) and Angola (16.8%), followed by Sri Lanka (5.7%), Bosnia &

⁶ This difficulty was also highlighted in the 2005 report on the Global Assessment of EC Support to Mine Action and raises concerns regarding accountability.

⁷ Source: Regional reports.

⁸ Almost half of all EC funding for mine action in Africa went to Angola, but significant support also was allocated to Sudan, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Senegal, Mozambique and Somalia.

⁹ Almost 90% of the total went to Afghanistan: € 63.5 million for the period 2002 to 2008.

¹⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia received most support.

¹¹ About 64% of the funding was for Sri Lanka: around €14 million since 2002.

¹² About 70% of the funding was for humanitarian demining in Iraq and South Lebanon: € 9.87 million for Iraq in 2003 alone, and over € 11 million for Lebanon (2002-2008).


¹³ Almost 60% of the funding was for Colombia: € 4.84 million.

¹⁴ In dollar terms the decline was less as the Euro appreciated in value relative to the dollar. Source:

http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/es/support_for_mine_action.html#International_Contributions_to_Mine_Action

Herzegovina (5%), and Sudan (5%).

Figure 1 – Top recipient countries: 2002-07



SOURCES OF EC FUNDING

Sources of funding for mine action were:

- European Development Fund (EDF)¹⁵
- Humanitarian aid instrument (HAI)
- the dedicated APL budget line
- other thematic budget lines
- regional budget lines (e.g. CARDS for BiH)
- thematic programmes (such as Non-States Actors and Local Authorities)
- the Rapid Response Mechanism – RRM¹⁶
- STABEX¹⁷

As shown in Figure 1 the most important sources of funding for mine action were: in Africa, the country budgets for Angola (EDF); in Caucasus-Central Asia, the country budget for Afghanistan;¹⁸ in both the Middle East and Asia-Pacific, the humanitarian aid budget; and in Latin America, the APL budget line.

¹⁵ For Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries, the EDF is the funding mechanism that is administered by EuropeAid (European Commission) but supported by contributions from Member States to a common pool. Other countries receive EC funds from the assessed budget, also administered through EuropeAid.

¹⁶ The RRM was created by EC Council Regulation No 381/2001 "...to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis."

¹⁷ STABEX (*Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation*) was an EC compensatory financing scheme to smooth export earnings from ACP exports of agricultural commodities. It was part of the Lomé Convention, and abolished by the Cotonou Agreement in 2002.

¹⁸ There is no fundamental difference between the country budget for Angola and country budget for Afghanistan. EDF funds country envelopes to ACP states and EC funds country envelopes elsewhere through the assessed budget. However, recipient countries have greater input via the ACP Secretariat in Brussels and through National Authorising Officers (NAO) in each country.

Figure 2 – Mine action funding by region: 2002-2007





Figure 3 – Sources of mine action funding by year




ORGANISATIONS SUPPORTED

EC funding for mine action goes to or through international and national NGOs, international organisations (UN agencies;¹⁹ Organization of American States), national governments, police and civil defence organisations, and commercial companies. The bulk of EC funding to mine

¹⁹ UN agencies are often not “final recipients” but rather “agents” who transfer most of the funds to final recipients.

action ultimately goes to **international NGOs (INGOs)**.²⁰ In contrast, for Latin America there was only modest funding to INGOs: national military, police and civil defence organisations are the main recipients of mine clearance funding and local NGOs for mine risk education (MRE).

Figure 4 – EC funding by type of organization



UN agencies are the final recipients of the next largest portion of EC mine action support. In Afghanistan – which has received the most EC funds for mine action – all funding in the 2002-07 period was via the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). In the Asia-Pacific region, UN agencies have received at least 20% of the EC funding – all in Sri Lanka. UNDP is the second largest recipient of EC funding to mine action in Africa. UNDP also received almost 90% of the funding in Caucasus and all the funding in the Middle East, other than humanitarian funds to INGOs.

MINE ACTION COMPONENTS SUPPORTED

It proved impossible to obtain complete and accurate data on the breakdown of financial commitments by mine action component, in part because many projects are for ‘integrated mine action’ that covers more than one mine action ‘pillar’ – demining, mine risk education (MRE), stockpile destruction, victim assistance (VA), and advocacy – as well as capacity building.

All components of mine action have been supported by the EC. The bulk of the funding, however, went for demining.²¹ Other activities were either funded with specific programmes or as part of programmes where the main component was demining. In case of “integrated projects” only limited amounts were allocated, for example, for MRE and VA; typically less than 10% of the total value of the project.

²⁰ UN agencies received in fact about 50% of all EC funding, with Mine Action NGOs getting 34% & national agencies getting 11%. However, much of the UN funding went on to NGOs or national agencies as implementing partners.

²¹ Demining = survey, marking, and clearance.

EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY

EC Mine Action Strategy has been determined mainly at the global and national levels.²²

- Globally:
 - EC Mine Action Strategies until 2007²³
 - Since late 2008, Guidelines on EC Mine Action: 2008-2013
- Nationally:
 - EC Country Strategy Paper (CSP)
 - National Mine Action Strategy and Programme

Until 2006, there were over a hundred specific regulations authorising EC assistance for specific aid purposes, including the two Regulations for mine action which established both policy guidance and the special budget line for AP landmines (APL thematic budget line B7-661, then 19 02 04). The underlying principle was that EU efforts should relate directly to the goals set by the international community in the context of the APMBBC and other international instruments and agreements. EC support for mine action was to be geared increasingly towards addressing the problems faced by populations in a context that was understood as humanitarian, developmental, legal and political at the same time. The Directorate General (DG) for External Relations (DG RELEX), in consultation with other relevant DGs and member states' representatives, formulated the two EC Mine Action Strategies (2002-04 and 2005-07). These outlined how the EC would implement mine action and provided an overall framework for EC mine action programming.

This strategic framework mentions 'humanitarian demining'. In the mine action field, with its strong military roots, 'humanitarian demining' normally refers simply to demining that is not done for military or commercial purposes. Conversely, development practitioners naturally understand this phrase to refer to demining activities in the context of humanitarian crisis. In the EC, humanitarian assistance falls within the mandate of the DG in charge of humanitarian aid (DG ECHO). However, there is no specific strategy **demining in the context of humanitarian crises** and no EU guidelines for funding or implementing such projects. Due to this gap in strategy and guidance, there also is no clear concept articulated on how to integrate humanitarian demining into a wider rehabilitation or reconstruction context – an important issue given the EU policy on Linking Relief, Recovery and Development (LRRD) and the fact that most demining programmes start during conflicts or in the immediate post-conflict period.

Within the reform of the EC external policy instruments, the APL Regulation terminated in 2007 (with the funds programmed for 2007 from the APL budget line transferred to the country delegations). Most funding for mine action now is through geographic budget lines and depends mainly on the prioritisation of mine action by the national government and its inclusion in the EC CSP, which usually is prepared by the EU delegation in-country. In the case of states in crisis or emerging crisis, mine action is now covered by the new "Instrument for Stability".²⁴

²² For regional approaches, see the following chapter.

²³ "EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and multiannual indicative programming" and "The European Roadmap towards a zero victim target – The EC mine action strategy & multi-annual indicative programming 2005-2007"

²⁴ Under Article 3 "Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging Crisis". The evaluation team is not aware of any use of the Stability Instrument for mine action at the time of the study.

Textbox 1 – Reforms to the EU aid delivery system

In 2006, the EU significantly reformed its aid delivery system with a number of objectives, including:

- Enhancing aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration) and coordination within the EU aid system (EC and EU Member States)
- Deconcentration (more authority to the 128 overseas EC Delegations in managing the implementation of development assistance) and decentralisation (more authority to host governments in determining their development priorities)
- Simplification, moving from over 100 regulations/instruments to six (for external assistance):

Geographic (EU budget)

- Development Cooperation Instrument, covering Asia, Latin America, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Africa (DCI, €16.9 billion for 2007-2013)
- European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, covering European neighbourhood and Russia (ENPI, €11.2 billion for 2007-2013)
- Instrument for Pre-Accession, covering EU accession countries (IPA, €11.5 billion for 2007-2013)

Geographic (non-EU budget)

- European Development Fund for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, funded through voluntary contributions from Member States

Thematic

- Instrument for Stability to address crises and instability in third countries and trans-border threats (IfS, €2.1 billion for 2007-2013)
- Humanitarian Aid Instrument to provide funding for emergency and humanitarian assistance (€5.6 billion for 2007-2013)

In addition, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR – €1.1 billion for 2007-2013) has worldwide coverage.

Further reforms will take place in 2010, assuming the Lisbon Treaty is ratified in time to come into force on 1 January 2010.

INSTITUTIONAL FABRIC

Under the Treaty of Maastricht, EU policy spheres are divided into three “pillars”:

- the first or “Community” pillar concerns economic, social and environmental policies
- the second or “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters
- the third or “Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters” (PJCC) pillar concerns co-operation in the fight against crime

Mine action has usually been considered within the first pillar, as it relates mainly to humanitarian and development assistance, but the EU has also supported mine action as a component of the security sector (second pillar – see Textbox).

Textbox 2 – EU Joint Action in Support of the AP Mine Ban Convention

Joint Actions are one of three instruments (along with Common Positions and Common Strategies) available to implement decisions relating to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Usually, these are time-limited projects committing EU Member States to the



positions adopted (i.e. coordinated action by all member states). Traditionally, Joint Actions have been employed to mandate EU military or police missions, but more recently the instrument has been used to promote universalisation and implementation of disarmament and arms control conventions, and to support international organisations with disarmament or arms control mandates.

In mid-2008, the EU Council of Ministers approved the APMBBC Joint Action, with the following objectives:

- promote universalisation
- support preparations for the 2nd Review Conference of the APMBBC (December 2009)
- support full implementation by States Parties to the APMBBC

The APMBBC Joint Action is being implemented by the GICHD, mainly via six regional conferences and a number of technical assistance missions to States Parties.

The European Commission is responsible for the implementation of the EU budget and the EDF. Within the European Commission, DG RELEX has the lead in overall policy development and in programming for EC funded mine action. DG Development (DG DEV) and EuropeAid are involved in mine action as part of their geographical responsibilities. DG ECHO uses the Humanitarian Aid Instrument (HAI) to finance mine action operations in countries affected by humanitarian crises.

Since the 2006 reforms, the importance of thematic, non-geographic funding as a channel for the delivery of development assistance²⁵ has been reduced. Some thematic actions previously covered by the APL budget line (such as advocacy for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty) might conceivably fall under the second pillar, assuming the issues are perceived as security related. Pressure for this comes from the mainstreaming of most mine action activities within the regular development programme, leaving other components (advocacy; stockpile destruction) perceived as security rather than development issues. A move in this direction could increase fragmentation by moving parts of mine action from the first to the second pillar, with its different procedures, including implementation by different Member State ministries and not by the EC (see below section 'Risk of further Isolation and fragmentation of funding to mine action'). While fragmentation is hard to avoid under the new structures, there is a need to address the consequences for mine action, in particular at the delegation-level. This suggests the need for additional guidance and advice on both programming and technical issues.

²⁵ The remaining thematic instruments cover humanitarian aid (HAI), response to instability/crises (SI), as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights (EIDHR). In addition, there remain a number of 'thematic programmes' within the new instruments for external aid (e.g. non-state actors and local authorities), but none of these are mine action specific.

3. FINDINGS

RELEVANCE

The ToR for this exercise specified an assessment of the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:

- the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-04 and 2005-07
- national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities
- EC CSP and National Indicative Programmes (NIP) for mine affected countries
- EC strategy and indicative programme documents for the regions or major sub-regions.

Priorities defined in the Strategies

The ‘vision’ of the EC Mine Action Strategy for the years 2002-2004 was:

The EC envisions that all anti-personnel mine affected countries be equipped with the necessary means and capacity to properly and efficiently manage the problem while, in the process, reducing the magnitude of the threat to their populations, meeting their most pressing needs and helping their socioeconomic development and political stability.²⁶

The Strategic Objective for the years 2005-2007 was:

...to drastically reduce the lingering threat and impact of landmines in the context of increased local security and regional confidence.

Thematic objectives of the Strategy 2005-2007 were:

- *to Reduce the Anti-Personnel Landmine Threat*
- *to Alleviate Mine Victim Suffering and Aid Socio-Economic Reintegration*
- *to Enhance Local and Regional Impacts of Effective Mine Action Capacity²⁷*

Overall, EC support for mine action has been relevant to the objectives and priorities set-out in the mine action Regulations and Strategies. Financing has been provided to all pillars of mine action, with the bulk going toward demining (as was appropriate). Overall EC financing to mine action was consistent with the strategies for both periods.

So far as the evaluation could assess, funding for mine action has also been relevant to other objectives of EC development, reconstruction and emergency assistance.

National and regional needs, strategies, and priorities

The evaluation teams observed that EC funding for mine action was generally relevant to the needs of the individual country to address the mine/ERW contamination. The evaluators also concluded that, on balance, EC funding to mine action was relevant to the countries’ development strategies and priorities.

On the other hand, EC funding allocations to countries within one region, and across regions, did not always correspond to the relative needs in terms of the mine/ERW contamination problem

²⁶ EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and multi-annual indicative programming, p. 7.

²⁷ The EC mine action strategy & multi-annual indicative programming 2005-2007, p. 18.


(proportionality).²⁸ Global EC funding to mine action was not based on a global needs assessment made via a central decision-making structure. EC funding to mine action appears to reflect more the overall importance the EU gives to regions/countries (e.g. higher priority for Africa than South-East Asia; higher priority for Afghanistan than countries in Latin America).

Table 2 – Relative importance of the EC as a donor in 4 regions & 10 countries

▼ Country mission countries in ▼	Total donor aid (USD millions)	EC aid (USD millions)	EC % of total
SE Europe (BiH; Croatia)	\$4,143	\$1,050	25.4%
Africa (Angola; Somalia; Sudan)	12,412	1,814	14.6%
Caucasus-Central Asia (Afghanistan, Armenia; Azerbaijan)	13,194	1,599	12.1%
Asia-Pacific (Cambodia; Laos)	5,129	204	4.0%

Source: OECD Stat, DAC dataset 2a: ODA by recipient by country, extracted 16-17 Dec 2008


Figure 5 – Estimated annual casualties per 100,000 (2005-07): selected countries²⁹



²⁸ Problems stemming from mine/ERW contamination should be assessed in both absolute and relative terms (e.g. the extent/absolute size and the intensity/per capita impact).


²⁹ Casualty data are from Landmine Monitor except for Lao PDR where data from the recent victim survey are used. Low and high estimates are provided where undercounting (Afghanistan, Angola; Eritrea; Sudan) or inflated counts (parts of Somalia) are deemed significant, but data quality is poor in many countries.

Figure 6 – Estimated total annual casualties (average 2005-07): selected countries



In Asia-Pacific, for example, the regional study concluded that EC funding to the region was very modest given the scale of the problem (see Laos and Cambodia in Figures 5 and 6). For Africa it was at first sight appropriate that more than half of all EC assistance to mine action was spent in Angola and Sudan in the initial post-conflict years. In Somalia the number of victims however was higher than in Angola and in Sudan (both total casualties and victims per 100,000). Somalia however received less far funding than Angola and Sudan. As depicted in Figure 7, four of the countries with the most casualties (including three of the top four in the world³⁰), were not among the top recipients of EC mine action funding from 2002-07, while three countries with modest numbers of casualties (including two European countries) were among the top recipients.

Figure 7 – Total casualties versus EC mine action funding



Although casualties are not (and should not be) the only criterion for determining mine action funding, the difference in EC funding levels relative to casualties is remarkable. Particularly for the 2002-07 period, when the EC was pursuing a ‘global strategy’ and had the APL thematic

³⁰ We have excluded Colombia and Iraq due to significant problems with mine/ERW casualty statistics, including the difficulty in distinguishing between military and civilian casualties.

budget line available for this purpose, the correlation between EC funding and the scale of the need, seems remarkably weak. The following table gives some comparisons across countries.

Table 3 – EC mine action funding and casualties: selected countries³¹

	Avg. funding 2002-07 (€ millions)	Annual casualties (est. 2005-07)	€ 000 per casualty
Angola	€ 0.12	116	€ 61.4
Sudan	€ 2.11	129	€ 16.3
Somalia	€ 0.55	346	€ 1.6
Lao PDR	€ 0.66	315	€ 2.1
Cambodia	€ 0.61	559	€ 1.1

Iraq was another example where funding decisions were driven by criteria other than the strategic objectives set-out for mine action. Although Iraq is the country with the highest casualties in the Middle East, it was not the priority target country for EU funding as, due to EC regulations, ‘remote’ project management from outside Iraq was considered as not possible.³²

EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes

CSP and NIP have increased importance for mine action under the recent EU aid reforms. The EC would usually respect the priorities set by the national government and described in the CSP, and so would only allocate money from the country envelope to mine action when it is mentioned in national development plans and CSP.³³ Therefore, mine action needs to be a national priority and part of the negotiations about aid priorities between the EC and the partner country.

Mine action is never a country’s top development priority and, even in some highly impacted countries, may not even be mentioned in the national development plan. In such cases, it is unlikely to be reflected in the CSP unless there is an individual or organisation that makes an exceptionally strong case for EC support to mine action. In some cases, individual government representatives did approach the EC directly to seek support for mine action (e.g. in Jordan). In many cases however, mine/ERW contamination is a problem affecting poor, remote communities whose interests are not reflected in capital cities.

Of course, it may be appropriate for the EC to withhold support for mine action when it is not highlighted as a priority by national authorities: far more people may benefit if funding is used for other purposes like health care or education rather than mine action.³⁴ However, funding decisions should be well informed and should not depend on idiosyncratic criteria (e.g. the views of individual EC officials or the existence of a well-placed local ‘champion’ for mine action). To make informed decisions, EC officials need to be aware of mine action needs, funding options, modalities and so on.

Mine action also has its peculiarities. Unlike with health and education projects, development officials often are uncomfortable when dealing with mine/ERW contamination issues, which can seem distant from ‘traditional’ development concerns. This is why achievement of the objectives specified in the EU Regulations and the EC Mine Action Strategies needs specialist attention and

³¹ For the African countries, we used the high estimate for annual casualties.

³² Iraq’s Article 7 report dated 31 July 2008 noted that “there is no reliable information available on mine/ERW victims in most of the country.” Landmine Monitor identified at least 216 mine/ERW/IED casualties in 2007 through 99 incidents.

³³ This in general is in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

³⁴ On the other hand, mine action often is a problem that can be solved in the short- to medium-term, while programmes in health, food security, etc. address issues that cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future.

additional measures to guide those who take decisions on aid budgets. This is particularly true for those delegations where few (or no) staff members have any knowledge of mine action or prior experience in the design and oversight of mine action initiatives.

In Afghanistan – an obvious priority for the EU – it appears that significant effort has gone into the formulation of well-conceived EC CSPs and Indicative Programmes, which include mine action. However, there are other cases where mine/ERW contamination was noted as a problem in the CSP, but there is no provision for EC support to mine action. For example, the contamination problem is mentioned in eight CSPs for African countries: six of those CSPs also specify EDF support to mine action, but the other two do not (Mozambique and Senegal).

EC strategy documents for the regions and major sub-regions

EC funding to mine action is not, in general, guided by EC strategies for specific regions. The problem of explosives contamination is, for example, not reflected in the EC Strategy for Asia, and the regional strategy paper (RSP) for the Balkans made no mention at all of landmines.³⁵

In Africa, EC programming decisions are influenced by the EU Strategy for Africa (adopted in late 2005) and by the continuing dialogue aimed at forging a Strategic Partnership between the AU and EU. In addition to Country Strategies and the new EU Strategy for Africa, the EC issued RSP/indicative programmes for 2002-2007 and 2008-2013 for Eastern and Southern Africa; Central Africa; West Africa; the Southern African Development Community; and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Mine action is not addressed explicitly in any of these. However, all the RSP envisage support for conflict prevention or other peace and security issues, which could include programmes to deal with the legacies of war, such as mines/ERW.

For the Southern Caucasus, there is an EC RSP developed for the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007. The Eastern Regional Programme Strategy Paper 2007-2013, covering Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, recognises the problem of mines and ERW in the regional context of the Southern Caucasus, and the need for the use of the ENPI to address this problem in a regionally coordinated manner. However, the objectives of the RSP are to be implemented through bilateral Action Plans and the evaluation team found no evidence of efforts to put into practice these statements from the Eastern RSP.

EFFECTIVENESS

As mentioned in the methodology section, the evaluators did not systematically assess individual projects and did not determine how completely interventions achieved their specific objectives. However, the evaluations examined whether EC funding has been effective in the sense of contributing to the reduction of mines/ERW impacts at the country and regional levels.

The contamination problems have been addressed to some degree in all regions and in most countries, and EC support has contributed to these achievements. EC assistance has been less effective in terms of fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities. In Africa for example, EDF funding for capacity development has been channelled mainly through UNDP and UNMAS, whose efforts to promote national ownership have been ineffective, or only modestly successful, in most instances in that continent.

Across countries and regions, the effectiveness of EC funding to mine action varied greatly. However, the regional evaluations and country case studies do not show a clear pattern of where

³⁵ CARDS Assistance Program to the Western Balkans Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006

and why EC funding was more or less effective.

In some cases funding was partially effective in the sense that it advanced one project objective but not others. In Peru, for example, the EC funded mine action project was effective in terms of contributing to the peace process following the recent Peru-Ecuador border war, but ineffective in terms of clearing landmines.

The analysis of the effectiveness was hampered by the fact that the regional studies could not build upon existing data about the results of EC funding to mine action. The majority of EC-funded mine action interventions have not been evaluated.³⁶

COORDINATION

Donor coordination for mine action was perceived as weak in most of the countries where the evaluation teams could assess this. The evaluations identified a number of factors contributing to the inadequacies observed.

Coordination among donors usually takes place at the national level in the beneficiary countries, involving representatives from the delegations/embassies. The staffing complements in European Commission delegations in many countries are insufficient for effective coordination on mine action.

Donor coordination for mine action usually takes place within a broader donor coordination process for reconstruction or development. Mine action is not always included in these coordination frameworks as it often is not perceived as a priority sector. In such cases, decisions by individual donors in a country rarely add-up to a coherent programme of support to address the contamination problem in the country. Again, this is less of an issue in countries with major threats from contamination.

Coordination in the mine action sector is seen by some as a simple matter as there are only a few actors. Nevertheless, there is little coordination among donors at country level. Even in countries with few mine action actors, the evaluators did not always find the EC participating actively in coordination efforts. Funding is often channelled through the UN agencies and the responsibility for coordination is passed to that agency (with or without the national authorities and irrespective of whether the UN agency perceives this as a priority).

Regarding coordination at the regional level, the evaluators concluded there is no overall responsibility for EC mine action in any given region, and no expertise in the mine action field at the regional level. It is also unclear how – if at all – the initiatives of the different EU institutions are coordinated within a region.

Regarding global coordination, the APMBC gives the framework, sets the goals and provides for a global coordination structure (e.g. annual and inter-sessional Meetings of States Parties). This has clear benefits but cannot compensate for donor coordination at the regional and country levels. In particular for the EU member states and institutions, there is potential for more synergy. Coordination within the EU has the potential to better address the mine action problem at country and regional levels. For some years, there was an EC Group of Mine Action Experts: a body chaired by a representative of DG RELEX with members from each EU Member State. It has not met since restructuring took place.

³⁶ Exceptions are sporadic evaluations of country portfolios or evaluations of EuropeAid or DG ECHO funded projects, which often focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness.

Textbox 3 – The Mine Action Support Group (MASG)

The European Commission is part of the MASG; a forum of donor countries and institutions. The MASG facilitates discussions with UN agencies involved in mine action and meets on a regular basis to promote information exchange among donors and the UN Mine Action Team concerning mine action activities and evolutions in policy. The MASG is not connected to the APMBC or the CCM, so non-States Parties can participate. The objectives are to simplify coordination among donors and to achieve greater transparency on funding availability and needs, as well as to share different experiences in reducing the impact of mines/ERW.

In some countries, including a number in Africa, there is weak coordination as host governments are somewhat confrontational in their relationships with the Western donor community, or the host government barely functions (e.g. Somalia). In Afghanistan, the effectiveness of coordination could benefit significantly from some leadership and direction provided by the Afghan Government.

LRRD/EXIT STRATEGY/SUSTAINABILITY

Linking Relief (immediate life-saving support), Rehabilitation (getting people back on their feet), and Development (long-term change towards socio-economic sustainability) contributes to quality in aid programming. LRRD is a challenge not only for the EC and not only in mine action. LRRD means that humanitarian relief and development assistance should be planned and implemented in a mutually reinforcing way before, during and after emergencies. For a big donor with many different funding mechanisms, LRRD has two dimensions: internal coordination so the various instruments are used effectively to ensure good linkages and, secondly, linkages with or handovers to other actors (other donors or the host government).

The evaluation teams observed some good examples of LRRD in terms of coordination among the different parts of the European Commission “RELEX family” (DG RELEX, DG ECHO, DG DEV, EuropeAid), (e.g. in Laos and in Sri Lanka). Some officers responsible for mine action in the Delegations have shown great initiative in obtaining funds to promote LRRD from sources outside the APL budget line and the country envelope. Good examples could be also found in Africa – where officers found sources of funding outside the EDF – and in Lebanon where responsibility for funding clearance projects passed from DG ECHO to EuropeAid. These achievements were not the result of a consistent approach to LRRD, but rather the achievements of officers who reacted well to the needs and found the requisite funding within the instruments available. In some places, the fact that the officer responsible for mine action was also in charge of rural development, favoured an integrated approach (e.g. Angola, Cambodia).

While LRRD worked in some cases, it did not in others. Sometimes efforts lacked strategic vision and planning for an exit (e.g. Lebanon, Azerbaijan). When it came to linking with other actors for LRRD, there was less coordination. The fact that the APL budget line ended was another factor that worked against LRRD, at least during the transition phase: in many cases, EC officers failed to communicate to mine action organisations that the budget line was being eliminated, and there was no planning for a handover of initiatives that had been funded by the EC (e.g. in Azerbaijan).

A coordinated shift of capacity to national and local levels is one way of achieving sustainability. Often, there is a need to increase local ownership and get local actors directly responsible. Some good cases of transitions national ownership for mine action were observed (those where the EC contributed included Jordan, Yemen, Colombia), but there were unsuccessful cases as well (e.g. Armenia). As there was significant focus on clearance and less on handover to national

capacities, sustainability was often neglected.

As well, there were many short-term interventions, with large financial outlays, during the start-up phase of activities. Demining is often more expensive than other aid sectors during the start-up phase as heavy machinery and specialised equipment needs to be purchased. High costs are often an obstacle to sustainability as national actors cannot afford them. On more than one occasion, evaluators observed that first start-up costs for projects had been financed by the EC, but no continued funding was planned and no efforts were made to identify alternative sources of funding (e.g. Laos and Lebanon). Once it became clear this was a problem, delegations made efforts to ensure better return on investment.

This issue is a clear example where decision makers need to have some technical knowledge of the sector and where an understanding of mine action's peculiarities can lead to better use of funds. If EC officials had greater knowledge about mine action programming, they would be able to apply more scrutiny when it comes to programme design and sustainability. The clear formulation of intended results, combined with a proper results-based monitoring, would enhance the effectiveness and impact of EC funding.

THE END OF THE APL BUDGET LINE AND DECONCENTRATION

The period covered by the evaluation saw fundamental institutional and programmatic changes. These changes were not aimed at mine action *per se*, but they had significant effect on EC support to the sector. All the regional evaluations concluded that (i) the deconcentration process within the European Commission and (ii) the end of the APL budget line risk further fragmentation of EC mine action funding and greater isolation of delegates responsible for mine action initiatives. Furthermore, the EC no longer has a mechanism to promote the Ottawa process more globally, or to support the full resolution of modest contamination problems in specific countries. In addition, the Commission has no instrument to address potential requests for assistance arising from the new Convention on Cluster Munitions.

DROP IN FUNDING

According to the staff working document, "Guidelines on EC Mine Action 2008-2013," the European Commission expected a significant drop in EC commitments – relative to previous years – in the first year after the repeal of the APL budget line (2007). Most of the regional evaluations did not report a significant decline in funding to mine action at the time the missions were conducted. This is not surprising as the APL funds programmed for 2007 were transferred to the authority of the appropriate Delegations and, overall, the APL budget line was rarely the most important source of funds. Some countries with significant contamination had already included mine action in the CSP (e.g. Afghanistan) or – as in the case of Africa and the Middle East – large parts of funding came from non-APL budget line sources (in particular EDF and humanitarian funds via ECHO). In contrast, in Armenia and Azerbaijan (where funding came exclusively from the APL budget line) the ending of the budget line had significant impact.

FEWER SOURCES FOR EC FUNDING TO MINE ACTION

Except in countries in crisis or emerging crises, funding for mine action now comes principally from geographic envelopes and normally depends on the prioritisation of mine action by the national government, leading to its inclusion in the CSP.

There is an absence of a mechanism to fund a rapid (but not emergency) response in mine action. The cases of Latin America (e.g. Peru and Nicaragua) and the Middle East (Lebanon) showed the desirability of such a mechanism. The new geographic instruments share a large-scale and mid-



to long-term approach. Mine action is mentioned in the new Instrument for Stability (IfS) under its Article 3 "Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis"³⁷. As well, DG ECHO can still fund mine action, but is restricted to short-term projects for humanitarian purposes.

RISK OF MARGINALISATION OF MINE ACTION AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

It seems unlikely that European Commission delegations will allocate significant funding to mine action when this is not a development priority in a country. Mine action has to be integrated as a small part of a larger portfolio, which means it is unlikely that there will be a focus on it. Support for mine action in a country depends, in practice, on how long the list of development priorities is, and on how successfully mine action managers link their programmes to *bone fide* development priorities.

Funding to mine action will also depend on the number of sectors a delegation can cover, which is affected by policy, the size of the country envelope, and human resource constraints within the delegation. There is a risk that the EC priorities for mine action, as outlined in the global strategy, cannot be supported because these are not priorities at the country level.

Large sums of international funding for mine action tend to be allocated to countries emerging from conflicts (e.g. Angola after 2002; Sudan in 2005). In a few countries with severe and extensive contamination, continued funding for mine action is warranted on developmental grounds to support the reconstruction of infrastructure and community, or for area development efforts in the most contaminated regions. The evaluation team observed that the EC is effective in contexts where peace is enforced after conflict and opportunities for quick impacts open up (e.g. in Caucasus). In longer term development contexts, however, and in countries with an 'older' mine problem and a smaller overall aid portfolio, it is less likely that mine action is funded in proportion to needs. Again, the evaluators see the risk that the EC priorities for mine action, as outlined in the last global strategy, cannot be promoted.

LOSS OF VISIBILITY AND INFLUENCE

Potentially, there will be a loss of visibility and influence for the EC well beyond the scale of the fall in its mine action funding. With the repeal of the mine action Regulations (which were a 'direct response' to the APMBC), there no longer is an instrument for furthering the implementation of the Convention *per se*.³⁸

Finally, the European Commission has not yet positioned itself with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). On 3-4 December 2008, 94 governments signed the CCM in Oslo. Based on the model of the APMBC, the CCM prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions and places obligations on countries to clear affected areas, assist victims and destroy stockpiles.

LACK OF SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE AND STAFF CONTINUITY

The end of the APL thematic budget line was accompanied by the deconcentration process in the European Commission. These developments led to the reduction in the staff complement dedicated to mine action at headquarters, and to the empowerment of Delegations in terms of

³⁷ The IfS has been used for mine action only in one project in Bosnia, implemented in between July 2008 and December 2009 and aimed at addressing the threats posed by ERW

³⁸ Although not a state and, therefore, not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention, the EC is represented in the continuing Ottawa process.

programming. In most countries, it was too early to assess the full impact of these changes on mine action but the European Commission itself expects a decline in funding.³⁹

In some countries (particularly in Africa) the evaluators observed that, where the delegates responsible for mine action felt it should be a priority, they worked hard to put a sound programme in place, often showing some entrepreneurial flair in securing resources from a number of different EC funds. On the other hand, the EC delivers large and often complex aid programmes in African countries, and delegates typically must cover a number of sectors. Not all the officers assigned responsibility for mine action were convinced it should be a priority and/or felt comfortable in dealing with the specialised technical issues.

EC delegates working on implementation of aid programmes are normally development specialists with little or no experience in mine action, and no specialist technical knowledge about demining. These individuals are negotiating project contracts with personnel from the national implementing partners, INGOs, or UN agencies (UNMAS, UNDP, and UNICEF), who often have technical expertise and considerable experience in a field where there are considerable risks and safety issues. EC delegates do not have the time or the supporting resources to be able to become fully informed about the technical aspects of demining.

RISK OF FURTHER ISOLATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF FUNDING

Negative impacts of the reform could be the increase in isolation due to deconcentration, and the difficulty in accessing technical support for improved project design, contracting and monitoring. Deconcentrated offices typically are too small to justify teams of officers working on a sector, so when the delegate responsible for mine action moves to another post there may well be no one with experience on the evolution of the country's mine action programme and EC assistance to that programme.

The Brussels-based staff working on mine action were aware of the evolving policy debates at the international level; of innovations in the field that might be useful in other countries; of lessons learnt; and so on. They also maintained wide-ranging contacts within the mine action field and could put EC Delegations in touch with relevant experts in the field. They could also help the Delegations in coping with the loss of institutional memory following a transfer of a Delegate responsible for the mine action portfolio in a country.

The regional evaluator teams observed fragmentation of EC mine action funding and isolation of the responsible delegates, both of which affect efficiency and the likely impact of EC funding. Some fragmentation may have stemmed from the use of the APL thematic budget to support projects in countries where the Delegation had not allocated funds for mine action from the country envelope. But on balance, the 2006 reforms raise risks of greater fragmentation and (even more so) of isolation.

For example, apart from Colombia, no EC delegation in Latin America has had more than one mine action project. The same is true for some countries in the Middle East and in Europe. In many locations, limited resources are spread thinly so many countries receive small amounts of support. The limited number of projects covered by one delegation means that there is little or no accumulated knowledge and know-how. As mine action represents a small proportion of the project portfolio, staff cannot spend the time required to become knowledgeable in the field. At present, there are only limited mechanisms to allow staff from different delegations to share knowledge and experiences in mine action. As well, normal turnover of staff in delegations means it is likely that most projects will see a change of the responsible officer during the project

³⁹ Guidelines on EC Mine Action 2008-2013, 24 November 2008.

duration, so the learning process will be repeated and know-how lost.

These effects are hard to avoid under the new structures. There is need to address the consequences and potential difficulties for mine action in particular, and delegations need more guidance and advice in technical issues to fund mine action in a strategic manner.

Textbox 4 – Funding channels and efficiency

It was not an objective of the evaluations to assess the efficiency of individual mine action projects. Nevertheless, most evaluation teams reported on efficiency or aspects related to it. One common observation was that a significant amount of EC mine action funding is channelled through UNDP. These arrangements raise concerns regarding efficiency. UNDP does not normally implement mine action activities itself, but channels funding to other organisations. There is no mechanism within the EC to assess the effectiveness or efficiency of this funding. Management and monitoring of EC funds is left entirely to UNDP, generally with little oversight by the EC.

4. MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In the years 2002 to 2007 the EC was one of the largest donors to mine action in the world. **Funding** to mine action came from a variety of funding sources with country envelopes, the humanitarian aid budget, and the APL budget line being the most important sources. At the time of the regional missions, the end of the APL budget line and the deconcentration process did not yet have a significant impact on EC funding to mine action. A drop in funding can be expected for some regions and could already be observed in one (Caucasus).
 - Recommendation 1: The EC should continue funding mine action to further contribute to reducing the impact of mines/ERW and to build national capacities in affected countries to address the problems deriving from mines and ERW.
2. EC funding lacked **strategic guidance and integration for a wider EU approach** to mine action and cluster munitions. EC funding to mine action today is no longer guided by a strategy document. The current *Guidelines on EC Mine Action 2008-2013* are useful, but need to be supplemented by more detailed information on appropriate funding to mine action. The fact that there is no longer an instrument available for advancing the goals of the APMBBC *per se*, and the absence of a mechanism to fund rapid (but not emergency) mine action response raises concerns, as needs for those were apparent. Although supporting the CCM, the European Commission has not yet positioned itself more specifically to contribute to the implementation of the new convention.
 - Recommendation 2: The European Commission should review options for funding further support to the implementation of the APMBBC and the CCM.
 - Recommendation 3: The EC should clearly identify options for funding mine action for a rapid (but not emergency) response.
3. The loss of the **central pool of funds** and **specialized personnel** weakens the EC's position as a principal donor addressing the global landmine/ERW problem. It reduces the EC's ability to address the problem strategically and to lead and coordinate at the country, regional, EU and global levels. This is a missed opportunity as the EC (particularly in combination with the EU member states) is one of the largest donors to mine action in the world. It raises concerns regarding the achievement of EC's objectives in mine action (Zero Victim Target) as formulated in past strategies.
 - Recommendation 4: Even if a central thematic budget line is no longer an option, the European Commission should recognise the need for more capacity in Brussels to guide and support mine action globally.
 - Recommendation 5: To compensate for the reduced in-house capacity, the European Commission should review options to better involve (external) mine action experts that can advise on programming and strategy issues.
4. The largest shares of EC funding went to Africa and the Caucasus/Central Asian region (in particular, to Afghanistan). The emphasis of funding was on clearance, which was appropriate overall. Overall EC funding to mine action was **relevant** to the individual country needs to address the mine/ERW contamination. EC funding to mine action was, in general, relevant to the countries' development strategies and priorities as well. On the other hand, EC funding

allocations to countries within one region and across regions did not always correspond to the severity of needs in terms of mine/ERW contamination or its impact on civilians.

- Recommendation 6: EC funding should be based more on clear assessments of potential benefits (socio-economic; peace building, etc.). The EC should follow a more transparent process for determining which regions, countries and projects will receive EC funding for mine action.
 - Recommendation 7: The European Commission should review options for modest mine action programmes at selected regional or sub-regional levels. EC funding mechanisms and management procedures should foresee funding to projects throughout regions (and preferably throughout the world) based on common standards and on experiences from different countries/regions. How this can be achieved within the current instruments needs to be explored.
5. EC financed mine action projects throughout **regions** (and preferably throughout the world) are not based sufficiently on common standards and on experiences from different countries/regions.
- Recommendation 8: EC funding to countries and regions should follow mine action specific strategies and should be more based on needs, opportunities and sector specific priorities within regions but also between the regions.
 - Recommendation 9: The EC should in particular avoid standalone projects, but should instead address mine action problems comprehensively. This recommendation might entail prioritisation of selected priority countries. More strategic funding of mine action could reduce the fragmentation and isolation of individual mine action projects funded by the EC.
 - Recommendation 10: The EC should prioritise funding better, concentrating adequate resources on those projects where EC funding has the potential for significant added-value and where the EC can follow-up adequately. For this, the EC would need a mechanism to allocate funding at a global or regional level. The EC should consider regional approaches to counter isolation of EC delegates responsible for mine action.
6. The final recipients of the most EC funding were international NGOs. The most important funding channels were through UN agencies (in particular UNDP). The level of **programme ownership, oversight and strategic influence** of the EC was often very low, which raises concerns regarding accountability. There was, and still is, a lack of information in a suitable format to support EC Delegation staff by providing them the key information they need to successfully formulate and oversee mine action projects, and draw-up demining contracts. Improved information and communications, and perhaps specialist training, are warranted to enhance project design and the drafting and enforcement of contracts or grant agreements.
- Recommendation 11: To implement a more coherent EC global strategy for mine action, the EC needs more oversight and more sector specific expertise.
 - Recommendation 12: More selective funding and the allocation of resources for project/programme oversight would allow the EC to better monitor projects and to ensure an appropriate exit strategy or handover to other funding mechanisms. For

countries where the EC has large mine action portfolios, country-level reviews of EC-funded mine action should be considered.

- Recommendation 13: In those cases where the EC cannot follow mine action projects adequately but a need for EC funding is apparent, the EC should opt for more coordinated (joint) funding with other donors or funding to common mechanisms (e.g. the UN). The EC should in particular support EU member states' commitment to the APBMC. Where the EC funds UN mechanisms, a more rigorous oversight and accountability mechanism should be considered globally (e.g. a more formal partnership including regular assessments of the partnership).
7. The **effectiveness** of EC funding to mine action varied greatly and there was no clear pattern emerging from this study as to where and why EC funding was more or less effective. While the contamination problems have been addressed to some degree in almost all regions, EC assistance to foster national ownership and the development of local capacities has been less effective overall (with some exceptions). As the focus tended to be on clearance rather than the handover to national capacities, sustainability was often neglected.
- Recommendation 14: There should be better planning for results and EC funded programmes should be clearer in formulating and specifying desired results.
8. Donor **coordination** for mine action in general often was weak. This concerns coordination of EC instruments (for example, to promote LRRD), coordination with EU member states and coordination among all donors. Coordination among mine action donors usually took place only at the national level in the recipient countries. Resources available to European Commission (sub-) delegations in the regions often were insufficient for effective coordination. Also, it is unclear how the initiatives of the different European Commission institutions were coordinated within one region. Funding was often channelled through UN agencies and coordination was left to the UN agency and the national authorities.
- Recommendation 15: The EC should adopt a more strategic approach when it comes to coordination. In particular, this should be done regarding coordination with EU Member States to better exploit the potential of the EU and its member states as the world's largest funder to mine action. The EC should also review options to enhance contacts among European Commission staff in different delegations who are responsible for mine action projects to share experience and best practice.
9. In terms of **LRRD**, there were some good examples of effective collaboration between the different EC services. These achievements were the due to the initiative of individual officers rather than a consistent strategic approach to LRRD. Planning for exit was weak overall and lacked strategic vision. There was, and still is, no policy or guidance for DG ECHO to link up demining.⁴⁰
- Recommendation 16: The EC should continue its efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development in mine action.
 - Recommendation 17: Except when responding to emergencies, no EC funding to mine action should be granted without an explicit exit strategy

⁴⁰ DG ECHO puts a lot of attention to LRRD and follows guidelines and procedures to promote the concept. LRRD in mine action has its particularities which are not taken into account in these procedures.

- Recommendation 18: The EC should give greater weight to fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities
- Recommendation 19: The EC should develop clear guidelines and support for European Commission delegations to improve LRRD in mine action. This should include mine action in the context of humanitarian emergencies, with guidance to DG ECHO field representatives.

APPENDIX 1 - OVERVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EC FUNDED MINE ACTION EVALUATION REPORT IN AFRICA

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Angola	Somalia	Sudan
EC funding	The EC is the biggest donor for mine action in Angola , with funding coming mainly from the EDF, but with contributions as well from the thematic budget line and via ECHO.	It appears that the total mine action funding for Somalia has been reasonably steady . The bulk of this funding has been delivered via international NGOs, with all of the remainder channeled via the UNDP.	The EC has provided significant assistance to mine action, but most of its support is not being channeled via the UN system, or incorporated into the UNMAO annual work plans.
EC support for mine action relevant to the country priorities	The mix of EC support for mine action appears relevant in light of Angola's priorities, which included access and circulation ; demining in support of major infrastructure projects ; and clearance of land and roads for development (and, in the case of roads, elections).	Support for mine action has been relevant , because, when compared to other African countries, the impact of mine/ERW contamination seems severe.	Support for mine action has been extremely relevant , even though the number of landmines appears to be far fewer than was the case in conflicts such as Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia.
Effectiveness of EC support to Mine Action	The programming of EC assistance within Angola appears to have been effective . In Angola the amount of funding for mine action rose dramatically in the immediate post-conflict period, when the landmine contamination leads to a humanitarian crisis.	EC assistance has been less effective in Somalia where virtually all mine action funding was channeled via the UNDP.	In Sudan, EC support appears to have been effective . The EC supported early mine action initiatives that contributed significantly to the broader peace process. The amount of funding for mine action rose dramatically in the immediate post-conflict period.

<p>EC support of reconstruction and development priorities</p>	<p>The process of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) has gone the furthest in Angola. Once the transition has been made to reconstruction, the link to development appears as the biggest difficulty in the region. Angola, can however be used as an example for this transition. Current strategies and priorities of the international demining NGOs are appropriate for opening the interior of the country and promoting rural development.</p>		<p>The process of LRRD is starting in Sudan.</p>
<p>EC Coordination with other MA partners</p>	<p>Coordination between donors and the government on mine action or on broader aid and development issues appears far from ideal. Such coordination is greatly hampered because the broader relationships between the government and the international community have been strained for some time. Donor countries have comparatively little leverage over the government which has access to substantial financial resources from other sources (oil revenues)</p>	<p>Coordination between donors and the government on mine action or on broader aid and development issues appears far from ideal. In Somalia there is simply no internationally recognised government with de facto control over the country. Coordination in the country is constrained because Somaliland is not recognised as an independent state and senior donor officials are mostly based in Nairobi.</p>	<p>Coordination between donors and the government on mine action or on broader aid and development issues appears far from ideal. Such coordination is greatly hampered because the broader relationships between the government and the international community have been strained for some time. Donor countries have comparatively little leverage over the government which has access to substantial financial resources from other sources (loans from China).</p>

<p>Impact of the Deconcentration of the EC</p>	<p>At the time the evaluation was completed (February 2008) the full impact of deconcentration had not been felt. Still the nature - both positive and negative – of the deconcentration is apparent. The principal benefit is the empowerment of EC Delegations in terms of programming. Deconcentration should also allow for more coordination among those donors with representatives in the country. However, the EC delivers large and complex aid programmes in African countries, and delegates must cover a number of sectors. Not all officers (responsible for mine action) will be convinced that it should be a priority and/or are comfortable in dealing with specialised technical issues. There is the issue of institutional memory which is particularly difficult for agencies that decentralise authority and maintain a policy of regular staff rotation. In Angola, the EC Delegation has engaged a local consultant to advise on mine action, which worked well. However, the EC mine action portfolio in Angola is far larger than in any other African country.</p>	<p>At the time the evaluation was completed (February 2008) the full impact of deconcentration had not been felt. Still the nature - both positive and negative – of the deconcentration is apparent. The principal benefit is the empowerment of EC Delegations in terms of programming. Deconcentration should also allow for more coordination among those donors with representatives in the country. However, the EC delivers large and complex aid programmes in African countries, and delegates must cover a number of sectors. Not all officers (responsible for mine action) will be convinced that it should be a priority and/or comfortable in dealing with specialised technical issues. There is the issue of institutional memory which is particularly difficult for agencies that decentralise authority and maintain a policy of regular staff rotation.</p>	<p>At the time the evaluation was completed (February 2008) the full impact of deconcentration had not been felt. Still the nature - both positive and negative – of the deconcentration is apparent. The principal benefit is the empowerment of EC Delegations in terms of programming. Deconcentration should also allow for more coordination among those donors with representatives in the country. However, the EC delivers large and complex aid programmes in African countries, and delegates must cover a number of sectors. Not all officers (responsible for mine action) will be convinced that it should be a priority and/or comfortable in dealing with specialised technical issues. There is the issue of institutional memory which is particularly difficult for agencies that decentralise authority and maintain a policy of regular staff rotation.</p>
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<p>Impact of the End of Dedicated Mine Action</p>	<p>The end of dedicated funding for mine action has had little or no effect on the quantity of assistance being provided to mine action. There is no indication that the end of dedicated funding for mine action has had an effect on the quality of EC assistance. After 2002, when refugees and IDPs are returning and attempting to rebuild their livelihoods, large sums of international funding for mine action were flowing into Angola EC funding for mine action can be expected to continue when mine action is a humanitarian or developmental priority. However, with the repeal of the mine action Regulations there is no instrument for furthering the implementation of the Ottawa Convention per se. This is a problem in that barring future conflicts, mine action is not a humanitarian or development priority for most of Angola. In addition, it seems unlikely that the EC Delegation in the country will allocate resources through the European Development Fund (EDF) for mine action when this is not a development priority.</p>	<p>In Somalia the EC Delegation opposes funding to mine action because it intends to limit EC support to three sectors. As well, mine action managers have not done a good job in demonstrating how mine action supports other priorities and programmes.</p>	<p>The end of dedicated funding for mine action has had little or no effect on the quantity of assistance being provided to mine action. There is no indication that the end of the dedicated funding for mine action has had an effect on the quality of EC assistance. Large sums of international funding for mine action are allocated when peacekeepers – particularly UN Peacekeepers - are in place. EC funding for mine action can be expected to continue when mine action is a humanitarian or developmental priority. However, with the repeal of the mine action Regulations there is no instrument for furthering the implementation of the Ottawa Convention per se. This is a problem in that, barring future conflicts; mine action is not a humanitarian and development priority for most of Sudan. In addition, it seems unlikely that the EC Delegation in the country will allocate resources through the EDF for mine action when this is not a development priority.</p>
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Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Africa Region
EC funding has been significant in Africa overall	3 countries out of 3 evaluated: Angola, Somalia, and Sudan.
EC support for mine action has been relevant to African regional priorities overall	3 out of 3 countries evaluated: Angola, Somalia, and Sudan.
Overall EC support to Mine Action in Africa has been effective	EC assistance to mine action within Angola and Sudan has been effective . It has, however, been less effective in Somalia .
EC support of reconstruction and development priorities in Africa has been good?	The process of LRRD has gone the furthest in Angola and it is starting in Sudan .
Overall EC Coordination with other MA partners in Africa has been?	Overall, coordination with other MA partners has been far from ideal and greatly hampered by broader relationships with the governments in Angola, Somalia and Sudan .
Impact of EC Deconcentration	Overall, it is too early to assess the qualitative and quantitative impact of deconcentration . However, this phenomenon is likely to have some positive as well as negative results. Certainly deconcentration will allow for a greater empowerment of the delegations. However, that might cause problems in terms of coordination, expertise as well as institutional memory.

Impact of the end of dedicated mine action funding

In **Angola** and **Sudan**, the end of dedicated mine action funding has had **little or no effect on the assistance being provided**. As long as there are humanitarian or development priorities, funding will continue flowing into these countries. But this might end with changes in priorities. In **Somalia** the **EC delegation opposes funding to mine action**.

APPENDIX 2 - OVERVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EC FUNDED MINE ACTION EVALUATION REPORT IN LATIN AMERICA

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Colombia	Peru
Relevance of EC Funding	Relevant given the constraints identified in Colombia.	The border clearance project was relevant in supporting the consolidation of the peace process and in providing mine clearance (both to reduce the local impact of the mines and to assist Peru in meeting its clearance obligations under APMBC). But the lost opportunity to work with the police demining program could be considered as a significant reduction to the overall relevance of the program.
Effectiveness	The substantial support to national mine action structures in Colombia has not been particularly effective. The other projects are still at an early stage so an overall judgment is difficult to make.	In terms of the peace process , the outcome was highly effective. In terms of the demining it was highly ineffective.

<p>Efficiency</p>	<p>As with effectiveness, support to national mine action structures has not been particularly efficient. The other projects are still at an early stage so an overall judgment is difficult to make.</p>	<p>It is difficult to quantify efficiency of support to consolidating the peace process, especially in the absence of clear and objectively verifiable programme goals. However, the results are very positive. The efficiency of the demining programme, instead, is extremely low, even taking into account the very difficult terrain.</p>
<p>Significant Impact</p>	<p>The impact in Colombia has been disappointing. This is due to: a.) significant constraints which apply in Colombia due to the conflict b.) the results of the fragmentation and isolation of mine action c.) due to other factors such as the extremely high level of politicisation of mine action in Colombia.</p>	<p>The same considerations as for efficiency apply. For the consolidation of the peace process, there has been good impact; whereas the impact of demining along the border region has been very limited</p>
<p>Sustainability</p>	<p>The Colombian government is providing substantial national funding for mine action and the national structures appear likely to be sustainable. Victim assistance is also supported as part of the national health system. MRE is unlikely to be sustainable at present.</p>	<p>This is also mixed. There are some very good and sustainable results in the peace process. Demining is heavily dependent on donor aid and completely unsustainable.</p>

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Latin America
EC support for mine action in Latin America in line with the support from all donors	The EC has allocated 8 million euros to Latin America in recent years, which is roughly 2% of total EC mine action funding . This is fully in line with support from all donors who have allocated about 3% of funding to Latin America.
“Appropriateness⁴¹” and relevance o	Overall funding in Latin America was appropriate
Financial impact of the Four new instruments for Cooperation	The financial impact for mine action of the new financial instruments is likely to be modest in the short to medium term in Latin America with only a few exceptions: 1) the lack of a «rapid response» mechanism that this instrument implies, will have a negative impact on having a mine action plan in place to support any movement towards peace in Colombia; 2) A regional mechanism will have to be identified for support to the Geneva Call process if they are to play a role in encouraging non-state actors in Colombia to abandon their continuing use of APLs.

⁴¹ When used as an evaluation criterion, ‘appropriateness’ refers to input (e.g. it is appropriate to include a mine action project into an Integrated Rural Development Project); whereas ‘relevance’ relates to the envisaged results (outputs, outcomes, and impacts).

Challenges to EC Mine Action in Latin America n	Fragmentation of resources and activities and the associated isolation of staff were identified as the most important challenges of the EC mine action to Latin America . In addition, EC staff cannot be experts in demining when they have only one, or a few, mine action projects as part of a large portfolio . There is also a serious lack of information in a suitable format to support delegation staff.
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APPENDIX 3 - OVERVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EC FUNDED MINE ACTION EVALUATION REPORT IN ASIA – PACIFIC

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka	Burma/ Myanmar
<p>EC support for mine action relevant to the country needs and development strategies</p>	<p>EC financed mine action initiatives in Cambodia have been relevant to Cambodia's needs and development strategies</p>	<p>UXO contamination represents an enormous problem within Laos. In that light, EC assistance to the UXO sector has been relevant to the country's needs.</p>	<p>EC assistance to mine action has been relevant to the needs of the country. Sri Lanka is seriously impacted from explosives contamination. Contamination tends to have a disproportionate impact on poor and vulnerable groups. Problems with mine contamination have been highlighted in key reconstruction strategies.</p>	<p>EC assistance to mine action has been relevant to the needs of the country. Burma/Myanmar is seriously impacted from explosives contamination. Contamination tends to have a disproportionate impact on poor and vulnerable groups. Problems with mine contamination have been highlighted in key development strategies.</p>

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka	Burma/ Myanmar
<p>EC has provided assistance to mine action in the country</p>	<p>EC assistance to mine action has been limited, considering the size of mine contamination in the country and in comparison with other seriously mine affected countries. This is in part because the country financial envelope is modest and in part due to concerns over the Cambodian Mine Action Authority ex- Secretary General.</p>	<p>EC mine action assistance in Laos has been marginal considering: the size of the contamination problem and compared to EC funding for other mine/ERW affected countries.</p>	<p>Since the February 2002 ceasefire, the EC has provided significant funding for mine action in Sri Lanka.</p>	<p>EC Mine Action assistance to Burma/Myanmar has been extremely modest given the scale of the explosives contamination problem, whether measured in absolute and relative terms.</p>
<p>“Appropriateness”⁴² of the incorporation of dedicated mine action support into broader development planning</p>	<p>Whilst the strategy for incorporating dedicated mine action support into ECOSORN⁴³ was appropriate, the means for effective execution of the strategy was lacking.</p>	<p>Given the modest financial and human resources available to the EC country programme, it is appropriate that the bulk of UXO funding to date has come from the APL budget thematic line or from ECHO⁴⁴.</p>		

⁴² When used as an evaluation criterion, ‘appropriateness’ refers to input (e.g. it is appropriate to include a mine action project into an Integrated Rural Development Project), whereas ‘relevance’ relates to the envisaged results (outputs, outcomes, and impacts).

⁴³ Economic and Social Relaunch of the Northwest (ESRN) is the largest community development and Integrated Rural Development (IRD) project in Cambodia.

⁴⁴ European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka	Burma/ Myanmar
EC Mine Action efficiency in the assistance of the UXO sector	The scale of EC assistance to mine action in Laos has been too small to be assessed .	EC assistance to the UXO sector has been steady but modest in scope .		EC assistance has been too small to garner efficiencies of scale.
Effectiveness	Effectiveness of EC Mine Action support concerns only operators' support and less so the capacity development of national organs . The mine action components of the ECOSORN programme promise to be effective in terms of the results envisaged for the SAL (Safer Access to Land) programme. As for broader aid effectiveness, demining assets will be deployed to some areas not significantly affected by contamination, when the same funds could have been more significantly used for clearance in heavily contaminated communes. Mechanisms for awarding contracts for demining services are inappropriate. Early to assess the effectiveness of two new victim assistance projects .	EC assistance to the UXO sector also appears to be effective . For the most part, it has supported well-established NGOs from EU member states and with extensive experience in Laos.		

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka	Burma/ Myanmar
<p>Coordination among EC Agencies for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)</p>	<p>The EC could have contributed to the delivery of essential public services by aligning itself with EU policies on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). However, the EC decided to bundle the mine action funds into the ECOSORN IRD programme-</p>	<p>Coordination among ECHO, RELEX⁴⁵ and AIDCO⁴⁶ to link relief, rehabilitation and development appears to have worked reasonably well.</p>	<p>Coordination among ECHO, RELEX and AIDCO to link relief, rehabilitation and development appears to have worked reasonably well.</p>	<p>Sri Lanka provides a good example of how the various EC directorates can coordinate for LRRD purposes.</p>
<p>Effects of EC deconcentration on the planning and programming of EC support to the mine action/UXO sector</p>	<p>For non-focal issues such as mine action, deconcentration appears likely to have a negative impact as the (sub-) Delegations do not have the staff resources to monitor development of the programmes.</p>	<p>Deconcentration is likely to affect the planning and programming of EC support to the UXO sector. The sub-delegation has few staff, none of whom have specific expertise in mine action.</p>	<p>For non-focal issues such as mine action, deconcentration appears likely to have a negative impact as the (sub-) Delegations do not have the staff resources to monitor development of the programmes.</p>	<p>For non-focal issues such as mine action, deconcentration appears likely to have a negative impact as the (sub-) Delegations do not have the staff resources to monitor development of the programmes.</p>

⁴⁵ EC Directorate General for External Relations (RELEX).

⁴⁶ European Aid Cooperation Office (AIDCO).

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka	Burma/ Myanmar
<p>Coherence, Complementary, Coordination with other development partners</p>	<p>In recent years AusAID has served as an ‘anchor donor’ for mine action in Cambodia with knowledgeable and experienced personnel plus medium term financial commitment and some flexibility in how these are allocated.</p>	<p>In recent years AusAID has served as an ‘anchor donor’ for mine action in Laos with knowledgeable and experienced personnel plus medium term financial commitment and some flexibility in how these are allocated. In Laos AusAID was able to step-in quickly to keep the HI UXO program running when the sub-Delegation learned that the funds programmed for Laos from the APL budget line would not be forthcoming. AusAID’s ‘bridge finance’ allowed the sub-Delegation to explore other funding possibilities, which eventually proved successful.</p>		

APPENDIX 4 - OVERVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EC FUNDED MINE ACTION EVALUATION REPORT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Lebanon	Jordan	Yemen	Iraq
Relevance of EC Funding	<p>Overall EC funding to Lebanon is relevant – The EC proved to be responsive to the situation and to developments in the sector. However, EC funding does not follow a long term or pro-active strategic approach.</p>	<p>EC funding for Mine Action in Jordan is highly relevant.</p>	<p>EC support to MA in Yemen is limited to the funding of the Phase III UNDP “Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW in Yemen” programme. This has been running since 1999.</p>	<p>EC support to MA in Iraq is also limited. Spanning 2003-4, it was channelled through UNDP and NGOs for humanitarian mine action.</p>

<p>Efficiency</p>	<p>Regarding the choice of funding channels, the EC has followed more administrative imperatives than strategic decisions.</p>	<p>The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) through the Royal Engineer Corps (REC) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), has introduced innovative methods to make MA cost efficient. By contributing to NCDR, the EC has shared in this process. However, EC support is provided indirectly through UNDP, which influences efficiency. The EC monitored the project at the administrative level and not at the operational and technical levels. Concerning effectiveness, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the new €4.5 million grant signed in May 2008. However the Northern Shauna project ending in 2008 has met all of its objectives. NCDR has become a competent organisation, and the EC, by funding NCDR through UNDP, is contributing to these achievements</p>		
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<p>Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development</p>	<p>Missing strategic vision and planning for an exit strategy has resulted in no real link between MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction process.</p>			
<p>Coordination</p>	<p>Very weak donor coordination.</p>	<p>Cannot assess since NPA is the sole operator. NCDR will do the QA/QC operations.</p>	<p>No donor coordination in mine action in Yemen.</p>	
<p>Sustainability and Link to Development</p>	<p>The missing strategic vision and planning also becomes relevant when it comes to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). There is no real link between MA and reconstruction and development. Activities for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not aligned with other EC funded programs.</p>	<p>Neither in any of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor in the project document is there any direct link between MA and the development process. However, the grant application refers to socio-economic development and regional peace-building benefits, viewed as substantial. Longer term impacts of the project appear highly tangible as the land and water resources will be put into productive use immediately. But the programme is limited to the clearance activities and capacity development of the counterpart.</p>		

Coherence	Coherence in funding is present despite the lack of coordination mechanisms in the country, the region, or at the European level.	Cannot assess since NPA is the sole operator. NCDR will do the QA/QC operations	Coherence in funding is present despite the lack of coordination mechanisms in the country, the region, or at the European level.	
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Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Middle East
Relevance of EC Funding	EC MA Funding in the Middle East is relevant overall . The EU does not follow a regional strategy or approach for the Middle East. Few regional aspects are outweighed by national elements. No need for a regional approach to MA.
Role of the Global EC Strategy	The Global EC Strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions
EC Funding in the Region	Fragmented
Integration of Humanitarian Demining into Reconstruction context	Despite the fact that humanitarian demining is highly important in the region, there is no specific strategy , nor any guidelines to integrate demining into the reconstruction process.
EC role to the assessment of the MA problem in the region	The EC is generally supporting assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by funding LIS.
Appropriateness of EC Funding	EC MA funding in the Middle East has been appropriate overall . Emphasis of EC funding in the Middle East is on clearance.

Integration of the EC Funding to MA into wider national reconstruction or development strategy	Links between MA programs to other EC-funded programs in the Middle East are not considered consistently . MA programs contribute to the reconstruction and development process (e.g. by making agricultural land accessible) but the links are limited since there is no joint planning for broader results or specific emphasis on linkages between programs.
Efficiency	EC funding has not been very efficient overall
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development	Still a challenge in the region.
Priority country	With an annual percentage of 0% and 10% of the overall EC funding to MA in the world, the Middle East is not a priority .
Coordination	Lack of coordination mechanisms both in the countries, the region or the European level.
Coherence	EC funding to MA in the region is coherent overall when it comes to defining target countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is Iraq, where EU member states fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not
Direct Funding to NGOs	Only provided for humanitarian demining
Adequate response to the challenge of cluster munitions	EC as well as other donors face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster munitions.
Programme ownership, oversight and strategic influence	EC has a very low profile approach in the region. The level of programme ownership, oversight and strategic influence is very low.

APPENDIX 5 – OVERVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS FROM EC FUNDED MINE ACTION REPORT IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	Afghanistan	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Relevance to the country's needs	For over a decade the EC has been one of the principal donors to mine action in Afghanistan. This is relevant to the country's needs given: 1. Afghanistan is one of the most affected countries by landmines. 2. Landmine clearance is a pre-requisite for the sustainable resettlement of many of the million refugees or IDPs; 3. More generally landmine clearance is a prerequisite for rural development in many areas of Afghanistan.	The EU/UNDP project was relevant for Armenia given the impact that mined areas have on livelihoods, poverty, and the development of the economies of the bordering regions. In Armenia the EC projects significantly contributed to setting up a national capacity and directly helped to reduce the contamination	In Azerbaijan the EC project significantly contributed to setting up a national capacity and directly helped to reduce the contamination
Appropriateness	In the 2002-2006 and 2007-2013 Country Strategy Papers as well as in the Indicative Programmes appropriate links were made between mine action and focal sectors for EC support (refugee repatriation, rural development).		

<p>Effectiveness</p>	<p>Since 2001, EC funding has been provided via UNMAS to support the MACA and channel funding to the mine action NGOs. This has been an effective delivery strategy.</p>	<p>The contamination problems have been addressed effectively as far as possible in a situation of unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the lack of political commitment to international disarmament treaties on behalf of the national Government. National ownership has been fostered effectively. Victim assistance could have been addressed more effectively.</p>	<p>The contamination problems have been addressed effectively. National ownership has been fostered effectively. Victim assistance could have been addressed more effectively.</p>
<p>Efficiency</p>		<p>The Evaluation Team was not in a position to assess the efficiency of individual mine action operations. But it observed that EC funding goes through many layers: EC to UNDP, UNDP to others (SAC working with VVAF and Ronco). Beyond the terms of reference to assess the performance of key implementing partners, such as UNDP. A clear mechanism within the EC to assess the quality of UNDP was not found.</p>	<p>The Evaluation Team not in a position to assess the efficiency of individual mine action operations. But it observed that EC funding goes through many layers</p>
<p>Coordination</p>	<p>Coordination between the Government and donors has been effective during those times when a representative of the Afghan Government provided leadership and direction – during other periods, coordination has been barely adequate (although still better than in many other sectors).</p>		

<p>Deconcentration</p>	<p>Deconcentration does not appear to have posed major problems for the EC Delegation, at least with respect to assistance for mine action.</p>	<p>The impact of deconcentration could be observed in Armenia, where mine action is not a priority for the delegation which also lacks specific mine action expertise.</p>	<p>In Azerbaijan projects were managed from Brussels until these ended in 2006. In this case as well there has not been expert knowledge available for mine action programming and no knowledge where to get advice and funds.</p>
<p>The Impact of the End of the Dedicated Funding and Units</p>		<p>The decisions not to prolong the project and not to commission an evaluation or a follow up project were not strategic but the consequence of the termination of the thematic budget line. As mine action in the country was exclusively funded through the APL budget line, the impact of ending this budget line is significant.</p>	<p>Mine action in the country was exclusively funded through the APL budget line; the impact of ending this budget line is significant.</p>

APPENDIX 6 - OVERVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EC FUNDED MINE ACTION IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Conclusions on EC Funded Mine Action	South East Europe ⁴⁷
EC Funded Mine Action in South East Europe was relevant overall	The selection of countries to receive funding was relevant . The allocation of funding was also generally relevant .
EC funded mine action in South East Europe was appropriate	The selection of countries to receive funding was appropriate .
Sustainability	Many EC-funded projects had a very strong emphasis on training and equipping deminers. They may therefore be expected to be sustainable. All of the projects in South East Europe had good sustainability prospects as far as it was possible to confirm . There is no doubt that Croatia has a sustainable programme and, to some extent, all the other country programmes are sustainable. The exception might be BiH with its high level of mistrust and poor transparency .

⁴⁷ The EC Funded Mine Action Programmes in South East Europe involved the following countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia/Chechnya, Serbia, and Ukraine.

APPENDIX 7 - OVERVIEW OF RECCOMENDATIONS FROM THE REGIONAL STUDIES

Recommendation	Africa	LA	MiddleEast	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Caucasus-Central Asia
Implement a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will receive EC funding for mine action		X				
EC Delegations should formulate exit strategies for their support to mine action	X					
Strengthen the focal point for mine action in Brussels	X		X			
Assess whether a thematic funding 'window' within existing budget instruments can be created at headquarters level to support Treaty implementation and global issues	X					
Crete an enhanced mechanism for EC financial support to mine action and base allocations mainly on the basis of needs and opportunities rather than the strategic importance of a country to the EU				X		

Recommendation	Africa	LA	MiddleEast	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Caucasus-Central Asia
Review the options for modest mine action programmes at the regional or (sub-)regional level	X					
The EC should advise ASEAN that its regional programme in the Field of Security could support cross-border demining when such actions are needed to allow the permanent demarcation of borders				X		
Continue to work with national approaches and do not introduce a regional strategy for MA			X			
Identify and perhaps pre-qualify mine action experts that can advise Delegations on programming issues/engage qualified experts to assist with strategy & programming	X	X	X	X		
Delegations should request proper strategic plans from national mine action authorities and/or the lead UN agency for mine action in each country.	X					
Delegations should avoid funding standalone projects & ensure projects align with national development priorities			X			

Recommendation	Africa	LA	MiddleEast	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Caucasus-Central Asia
For countries where the EC has large mine action portfolios, commission country-level reviews of EC-funded mine action	X					
Enhance contact among EC staff in different delegations who are responsible for mine action projects or programmes to share experience and best practice and reduce isolation.		X				
Improve mine action information for EC staff/prepare a comprehensive set of reference documents		X	X			
Require applicants to prepare better project documents, in line with established EC business processes		X				
Future funding for mine action should be based on a clear socio-economic benefit, or a clear political benefit such as peace-building, or both		X				
Conduct an appraisal of any proposed grant to determine the appropriate programme model and to ensure value for money		X				

Recommendation	Africa	LA	MiddleEast	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Caucasus-Central Asia
Give attention to supporting moves to persuade non-state actors that continue to use anti-personnel landmines on a large scale, to change their position		X				
Mine action in support of peace-building and emergency relief should remain a higher priority than increasing the number of mine free countries by expensive clearance of mined areas that have very little or no impact		X				
Avoid project proliferation and fragmentation/be more strategic		X	X			
Strengthen LRRD to build on expensive short-term emergency projects			X	X		
Support efforts to strengthen mine action data			X			
In all explosives contaminated Asia-Pacific countries, the EC should meet with representatives from EU member states to agree who should take the lead in the mine action sector, in line with the <i>EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour</i> .				X		

Recommendation	Africa	LA	MiddleEast	Asia-Pacific	Europe	Caucasus-Central Asia
EC delegations, with other donors, should encourage and support sector-wide evaluations of national mine action programmes, and take the outcomes from such evaluations into consideration when making programming decisions.				X		