

VIETNAM

LONG-TERM RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS AND PROTOCOLS FOR RESIDUAL EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE MITIGATION





GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)

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2019

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CHA	Confirmed hazardous area	NGO
СМ	Cluster munition	NPA
CMR	Cluster munition remnant	NTS
CMRS	Cluster munition remnant survey	PCCA
DoFA	Department of Foreign Affairs of the province of Quảng Trị	PM
EO	Explosive ordnance	PTVN
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal	QTM
ERW	Explosive remnants of war	RE
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	RSP
		SEDP
HE	High explosive	SHA
IHME	Institute of Health and Metrics Evaluation	TFM
KV-MAP	Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project	TS
LTRM	Long-term risk management	UXO
LWCC	Legacy of War Coordination Centre	VMN
MA	Mine action	VNM
MAC	Mine action centre	VINIVI
MAG	Mines Advisory Group	
MORE	Management of residual explosive remnants of war	

NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NTS	Non-technical survey
PCCA	Post CMRS and clearance assessment
PM	Project manager
PTVN	PeaceTrees Vietnam
QTMAC	Quảng Trị Mine Action Centre
RE	Risk education
RSP	Render safe procedures
SEDP	Socio-economic development plan
SHA	Suspected hazardous area
TFM	Technical field manager
TS	Technical survey
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
VMND	Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence
VNMAC	Vietnam National Mine Action Centre

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War (MORE) framework is a holistic long-term risk management (LTRM) approach for handling the reality of risks posed by explosive ordnance (EO). The current Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) project in Vietnam includes – amongst other objectives – the development and pilot of LTRM processes, tools and protocols in several provinces. Vietnam offers ideal preconditions for the testing of the concept. Not being a signatory of binding conventions, yet with the recently signed national mine action decree, leaves the national authority and national mine action centre with the question of how to identify a tolerable level of risk and the appropriate point in time to change from proactive survey and clearance to reactive risk management. This report gives a retrospective view of the completed project work, presents the results of a first pre-test of the LTRM framework in Quảng Trị province, and discusses implications for further testing and a possible implementation of the framework nationwide.

Based on an initial fact-finding visit in December 2017, the GICHD drafted a concept paper to demonstrate how the LTRM approach in Vietnam could be formulated and applied. This included an indicator-based concept to identify and evaluate the tolerable risk on a national/provincial and/ or district level and tools to analyse site-specific risks posed by residual contamination. A second country visit was conducted in November/December 2018 to discuss the proposed concept and tools with the relevant stakeholders. Subsequently, the framework was reviewed based on the feedback collected, and indicators and tools to be used in the pre-test in Quang Tri province were agreed during a third country visit in February/March 2019.

This first pre-test was conducted in two districts in Quảng Trị province and showed that agreed indicators for the evaluation of the tolerable level of risk and tools to conduct site-specific risk assessments are feasible with regard to data collection and analysis. However, an important insight presented in this report is that the evaluation requires the availability of a basic set of statistical data and resources to collect additional data in the field. The data collected in the pre-test was modelled on using different indicator options and thresholds in order to analyse how this changes the evaluation results. One of the crucial findings of the pre-test was that the choice of options and thresholds needs careful consideration. Evaluation results will not attest to a residual state even if proactive clearance has been completed, if overly stringent variables are applied. Another conclusion of the pre-test worthy of mention, shows that one of the proposed indicators (land use by affected people) does not help to decide whether a district should be considered as having achieved a residual state or not, as people use the land regardless of the potential of an EO threat and its possible effect on their well-being.

On the basis of this report, stakeholders will be able to further discuss the feasibility of the proposed indicators and to make an appropriate choice of variables for further testing and a potential nation-wide implementation of the LTRM framework.

BACKGROUND AND RETROSPECTION

Vietnam's explosive ordnance (EO) problem is the result of the conflicts during the last century (First Indochina War and, more importantly, the Vietnam War/Second Indochina War). The nature of the contamination in Vietnam mainly concerns cluster munitions, aircraft bombs and other EO; mines are a minor problem. According to the official impact survey report (National Steering Committee 504, Vietnam Mine Action Centre, 2018), the survey of all provinces was completed in 2013. The official statement mentions that by 2014, 63 out of the 63 provinces/municipalities were contaminated with EO. However, the contamination problem, its handling, and the progress of proactive survey and clearance activities differs remarkably from province to province.

Vietnam's mine action programme has moved from military management to civilian oversight, but operations continue to depend largely on the armed forces. In 2013, Vietnam announced the decision of its prime minister to establish a national mine action centre (Vietnam National Mine Action Centre, VNMAC) to strengthen the management of mine action and provide a focal point for mine action operations. The centre became officially operational in February 2015, but only with the recently released national decree n° 18/2018/ND-CP on the management and implementation of mine action activities (Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2019), has responsibility officially been delegated to the VNMAC. This includes accountability for a national mine action strategy and the appropriate planning and allocation of further resources to carry out proactive survey and clearance activities. As Vietnam is not a State Party member of the Mine Ban Treaty and has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, it is not obliged to clear its mine/cluster munition contamination by a specific deadline. This implies that the considerations of what signifies "all reasonable effort" with regard to the completion of proactive mine action activities remains with the national authority and relevant stakeholders.

The long-term risk management (LTRM) framework, as compiled by the GICHD, aims to assist national authorities in this process by developing systems and tools that promote and enable evidence-based approaches to deal with EO in a post conflict country, in a residual context. The LTRM project in Vietnam, under the ownership of the VNMAC, has three main objectives:

- **Objective 1**: Study the ageing of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and environmental impact on the functionality of common residual ERW in Vietnam.
- **Objective 2**: Study, develop and pilot the long-term risk management model in order to enhance the LTRM capacity in mine action projects within Program 504 in Vietnam.
- **Objective 3**: Provide recommendations on developing an LTRM programme for mine action by piloting the information management (IM) model in certain localities, to evaluate and gain experience for the development of the IM system (IMS) at national level.

Quảng Trị province, the most heavily affected but also the most active and well-organised province with regard to mine action activities in Vietnam, was chosen for a first pre-test of the framework.

The present report gives an overview of the progress of work and the findings of the pre-test concerning <u>objective 2</u> of the project. This pre-test aims to visualise implications and recommendations for the further testing of the framework on a larger scale. This chapter focuses on the recapitulation of the core ideas of LTRM and summarises past activities, discussions and decisions taken since the dissemination of the progress report in January 2019 and in preparation of the pre-test conducted in Quang Tri in March 2019.

CORE IDEAS OF THE PROPOSED LTRM CONCEPT FOR VIETNAM

National standards and relevant treaty frameworks usually require proactive survey and clearance to apply all reasonable effort and achieve a tolerable level of risk with regard to the mine/EO threat. However, there are inevitably diminishing returns in the investment costs of a proactive approach and less effort is needed to maintain the tolerable risk level. This significant phase in the life cycle of a mine action programme marks the transition from proactive survey and clearance to a reactive risk management strategy.

The discussion of when "all reasonable effort" has been applied is equal to the discussion of what the tolerable level of risk is.¹ To identify the tolerable level of risk, not only hard facts such as, for example, the results of a cost-benefit analysis or death probability calculations should be considered, but also the risk perception of affected people which might differ from the real risk caused by the remaining contamination.

This implies that the tolerable level of risk depends on a country-specific or even on an area- specific context. What all reasonable effort stands for has therefore to be considered by national authorities/ government institutions. National guidelines have to focus on the definition of the methodology to be used to identify the tolerable level of risk and should propose appropriate thresholds for its evaluation.

It is important to note that proactive survey and clearance and a reactive risk management strategy do not conflict, but have to be applied in succession or in extension, to ensure all reasonable effort is taken to reduce the risk to a tolerable level. It is also obvious that evidence-based survey to evaluate the extent, type and impact of the contamination (risk identification phase) is mandatory and crucial for both, the proactive and the reactive approach.

Once all reasonable effort has been applied and risk dropped to a tolerable level (e.g. if only a certain extent and type of contamination is left that does not seriously affect the majority of people in their daily life) and a mine action programme changes to a reactive risk management approach, the remaining contamination will only be addressed if the specific type of ammunition (hazard) in conjunction with a specific land use (activity) in a specified area (location) poses a risk that cannot be accepted.

¹ The term "tolerable risk" is defined as: "Risk which is accepted in a given context based on current values of society", (United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, 2014).



Illustration 1: In a reactive risk management approach, contamination is only addressed if the combination of the hazard, the location and the activity poses a risk that is not acceptable.

Therefore, it must be understood that the LTRM framework includes <u>two processes</u>. The first process aims to determine the tolerable level of risk and the evaluation of whether this level has been achieved or not (on a district, provincial and/or national level). The second process includes the set-up of the structure, organisation and principles to manage the residual risk.

This is based on the evaluation of site-specific contamination in conjunction with planned activities.

The illustrations on the next two pages give an overview of the two processes as proposed in the case of Vietnam. Illustration 2 shows how the tolerable level of risk is identified and evaluated to decide whether the change from a proactive to a reactive approach is appropriate. Illustration 3 explains how risks posed by residual contamination can be evaluated, once a reactive risk management approach has been applied.





Illustration 2: First process to identify and evaluate the tolerable level of risk, which can lead to the change to a reactive risk management approach.



It is important to note that both processes include a risk review loop. The evaluation of the tolerable level of risk might not always give the same result. It is possible that a tolerable level has been achieved and the change to a reactive risk management approach is reasonable today, but the risks posed by the remaining contamination increase above a tolerable level again in a few years, due to changes in the country-specific context (e.g. an increase of EO-related accidents because of resettlement projects, general increase in living standards, etc.). This implies that the thresholds used for the evaluation of the tolerable level of risk and the evaluation itself have to be reconsidered and reviewed on a regular basis (e.g. every five years).

A risk review loop is also important for the handling of site-specific residual contamination in a reactive risk management context. Changes on assessed sites (e.g. the assessment done was for planned construction work down to 3 m but a change in the plans now require construction work down to 5 m) or an unexpected unexploded ordnance (UXO) encounter during activities on the assessed site (e.g. the assessment was based on cluster munitions and UXO < 155 mm, but during the construction work an aircraft bomb is discovered) will require a reassessment and a new evaluation of the risk posed by the residual contamination on that site.

The LTRM framework for Vietnam includes instruments (indicators) to identify and evaluate a tolerable level of risk (first process) as well as tools to evaluate site-specific risks caused by residual contamination (second process). The indicators initially proposed consider the death probability rate (indicator 1), people's risk perception, land use and benefit of former risk education (RE) activities (indicator 2) and a cost-benefit analysis (indicator 3). The tools to evaluate risks posed by residual contamination consist of two forms. Form B1 is proposed to conduct a general risk assessment for a specific site, for evaluating the contamination, location and planned activities in general. Form B2 is used to analyse the situation on a contaminated site more specifically and to propose risk mitigation measures in conjunction with the planned activities. The instruments and tools initially proposed were introduced in previous reports (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining GICHD, 2018a – 2018f) and were discussed, reviewed and finalised during the last country visit in February/March 2019. The following section gives an overview of the work progress, relevant discussions and decisions taken in preparation of the pre-test in Quảng Trị.

WORK PROGRESS, RELEVANT DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS IN PREPARATION OF THE PRE-TEST

The work for objective 2 of the LTRM project in Vietnam consists of 3 phases:

- **Phase 1)**: documentary and field research, draft of LTRM concept, tools and protocols (completed 01/2018).
- **Phase 2)**: presentation and discussion of the proposed concept, collection of feedback, finalisation of framework (completed 02/2019).
- **Phase 3)**: pre-test in Quang Tri, data evaluation and reporting (completed 06/2019, results presented in the current report).
- **Extended phase 3)**: a national workshop to inform a broader audience on the insights and pilot study of the framework in other provinces in Vietnam (ongoing).

The following table summarises relevant discussions and decisions taken in phase 2) in preparation of the pre-test in Quang Tri province (phase 3).

Table 1: Overview of discussions and decisions taken in preparation of the pre-test in Quang Tri.

RELEVANT DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS TAKEN IN PROJECT PHASE 3)

1. GENERAL SUBJECTS

Change of wording

- The provincial mine action centre advised that their name has changed from The Legacy of War Coordination Centre (LWCC) to <u>Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC)</u>.
- While the field test of the framework in Quang Tri was initially referred to as a "pilot", it was decided that it should be renamed "<u>pre-test</u>" as it only represents a first small-scale test of proposed instruments and tools.

National framework/responsibilities

With the <u>national decree</u> n° 18/2018/ND-CP on the management and implementation of mine action activities, which came into force on 20 March 2019, the overall responsibility for all mine action activities in Vietnam was officially delegated to the VNMAC. This implies a reinforcement of the VNMAC's influence, including ownership of the LTRM project.

Scope and extent of the pre-test

Instead of pre-testing instruments (indicators) and tools at provincial level (Quang Tri), it was decided to <u>conduct the pre-test at district level, in two districts of Quang Tri province</u>. The reasons for this decision are listed as follows:

- As the characteristics, as well as the situation regarding contamination and impact <u>may differ</u> <u>significantly from district to district</u>, it was agreed that it would be more appropriate to evaluate a tolerable level of risk at district level than at an overall provincial level. The different results could then be listed and would indicate how many districts could already be considered as having achieved a residual state. This will help authorities and stakeholders to better allocate resources at district level, in order to achieve a province-wide residual state as fast as possible.
- It was discussed that the LTRM framework should only be applied <u>in areas where at least proactive</u> <u>survey was advanced or has been completed</u> in order to ensure enough data is available for evaluation if the extent and impact of the contamination is within the tolerable level of risk.
- In order to test how the results of the evaluation could differ depending on the situation and proactive work done in a specific district, it was decided to pre-test the LTRM framework in <u>Cam Lô and Hải Lăng districts</u>. Both districts are heavily contaminated, but the extent and progress of proactive activities carried out, varies. In Cam Lô, proactive survey has been completed and clearance activities are quite advanced (priority 1 and 2 cluster munition clearance tasks completed). In Hải Lăng, proactive survey is still ongoing and not much clearance has yet been done.
- The pre-test aimed to trial indicators and tools and to compare the influence of different thresholds in order to evaluate if or how they change a district's rating with regard to the achievement of a tolerable level of risk (see also sub-chapter, "Evaluation of the tolerable level of risk"). To obtain this decision-making basis, limited data is sufficient. In order to respect the time frame given for the pre-test, it was therefore decided to limit it to two districts and to collect the necessary additional field data by using a feasible limited sample size.

Scope and extent of the pilot

In addition to the pre-test, of which the results are presented in this report, the VNMAC announced its plan to conduct a follow-up pilot on a larger scale in Quang Binh and Binh Định provinces. This proposal has to be seen in conjunction with the Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project (KV-MAP), a survey and clearance project in cooperation with the governments of Korea and Vietnam that is currently ongoing in the two provinces. These resources could be used to collect additional data from the field if required. The current report will support further discussion if it is feasible to pilot the LTRM framework in these two provinces, which is principally a matter of data availability. The pilot in other provinces will illustrate if it is appropriate to use the same indicators and thresholds to identify the tolerable level of risk on a larger scale.

2. EVALUATION OF THE TOLERABLE LEVEL OF RISK

The following explanations give an overview of the proposed ideas, discussions held and decisions taken with regard to the three proposed indicators to evaluate a district, provincial and/or national tolerable level of risk.

Indicator 1: Death probability rate

- <u>Basis for discussion</u>: initially proposed definition of indicator 1 to evaluate the tolerable level or risk: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if the number of victims (both injured and fatalities) caused by EO has not been one of the top XX (XX = threshold; e.g. 10, 20, 30...) causes of death within the last 10 years."
- <u>Discussions with stakeholders</u>: the idea of comparing EO victims with victims of other causes of death was discussed and it was proposed to either make this comparison by using an additional multiplying factor for EO victims (to express the low level of acceptability and high level of impact of such events), or to only look at EO victims at district level, in comparison to victims at provincial level, without considering other causes of death in the province. It was also proposed that the number of EO incidents, instead of victims, should be considered to evaluate the tolerable level of risk. This implies that not only accidents causing casualties but any events involving ammunition (e.g. EO ignited by an animal) should be taken into account.
- <u>Decisions taken</u>: it was agreed that both possibilities (the comparison with other causes of death and the comparison of EO victims at provincial and district level) should be pre-tested to get a better understanding of the indicator and its consequences on the result of the evaluation. Furthermore, it was agreed that the period covering the last 10 years should be considered (= threshold), as reliable data is only available for this period of time. On the other hand, it was decided that EO incidents should not be considered as an indicator, as such data has not been collected in the past and hence no data is available for evaluation. For the purpose of the pre-test, the following options and thresholds of indicator 1 were used:
 - Option A): "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if the percentage of EO victims (injuries and fatalities)/per population/per year in a district over the last 10 years does not exceed the lowest percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years more than XX times.*"
 - * Thresholds used: 0 times/3 times/5 times
 - Option B): "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if the percentage of EO victims (injuries and fatalities)/per population/per year in a district over the last 10 years does not exceed the average percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years more than XX times.*"
 - * Thresholds used: 0 times/3 times/5 times
 - Option C): "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if the number of EO victims (injuries and fatalities) in a district has not been one of the top XX causes of death* in Vietnam in the last 10 years more than XX times.*"
 - * Thresholds to be tested: top 10 and top 20 causes of death; 0 times/3 times/5 times

Indicator 2: Risk perception, land use and benefit from former RE activities

• <u>Basis for discussion</u>: initially proposed definition of indicator 2 to evaluate the tolerable level or risk: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if at least XX%* of the affected population has directly benefitted from RE activities, not more than XX%* of the affected population feels that their well-being is compromised by using the land and at least XX%* of the affected population use the land despite the threat of EO."

* XX = different thresholds to be tested.

- <u>Discussions with stakeholders</u>: in general, stakeholders agreed with the proposed indicator, but it was suggested that the indicator be divided into three different ones for better comprehension and to emphasise that different aspects need to be taken into account.
- <u>Decisions taken</u>: it was decided that indicator 2 be divided as follows: indicator 2 (people's perception of risk), 3 (land use) and 4 (benefit from former RE activities). Furthermore, the stakeholders agreed to use different thresholds for the pre-test in order to illustrate how this changes the evaluation results. It was acknowledged that the testing of the indicators requires additional field data collection and that the sample size of the surveyed population would be guided by the resources available, hence it would not necessarily be representative. For the purpose of the pre-test, the definitions and thresholds used for indicators 2, 3 and 4 are described as follows:
 - Indicator 2: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if not more than XX%* of the affected population feel that their well-being is compromised by using land that potentially contains EO."
 - * Thresholds used = 40%, 50%, 60%.
 - Indicator 3: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if at least XX%* of the affected population use land despite a potential EO threat."
 * Thresholds used = 80%, 70%, 60%.
 - Indicator 4: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if at least XX%* of the
 affected population have directly** benefitted from RE activities."
 - * Thresholds used = 80%, 70%, 60%.
 - ** Direct benefit = at least one person in the interviewed household has already benefitted from direct RE sessions.

Note: For the purpose of the pre-test, the "affected population" is defined as being the population of a specific village that is surrounded by a number of identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

Indicator 3 (new indicator 5): Cost-benefit analysis

<u>Basis for discussion</u>: the following definition of indicator 3 (new indicator 5) to evaluate the tolerable level of risk was proposed: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk)* is achieved if the cost to clear identified CHAs down to the required depth exceeds the increased land value for contaminated land in XX years.**

- <u>Discussions with stakeholders</u>: stakeholders did not agree with this indicator and argued that land prices differ significantly and can change very fast in Quang Tri province, and that prices for clearance activities differ based on the type of land to be cleared (hillside or flat land, dense or no vegetation, etc.).
- <u>Decisions taken</u>: stakeholders decided that the indicator should not be used to evaluate the tolerable level of risk in the chosen pre-test districts and in Quang Tri province. However, the GICHD informed stakeholders that they plan to include some basic calculations in order to evaluate whether the indicator could work in principle. Therefore, the GICHD requested information on provincial land prices and clearances prices.

3. SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENTS OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION


The following explanations give an overview of the proposed ideas, discussions held, and decisions taken with regard to the two proposed forms to assess site-specific risks caused by residual contamination.

Form B1: Mapping of residual contamination and risk-activity-matrix (general risk assessment)

- <u>Basis for discussion</u>: the proposed form B1 aims to map different types of residual contamination at community level, based on a desk study. In addition, the form includes a matrix showing which activities, in combination with which contamination types, cause a threat. It was initially planned that communities be provided with such a map/matrix when the change from proactive survey and clearance to a reactive risk management approach was considered. Such a form/overview would help local authorities to assess the general risks of different land uses and to request clearance if the planned land use signified a threat based on the remaining contamination.
- Discussions with stakeholders: the idea of having maps and a risk-activity matrix per community and handing it out to local authorities was seen as being problematic, as it may encourage people to request clearance more often than is required. The idea that residual contamination only being treated reactively if required, wouldn't be understood by locals, was also discussed. Furthermore, it was noted that the mapping of residual contamination would literally imply mapping the whole province, as residual contamination can be found in most places. During the workshop, a reviewed mapping idea was presented, showing only the likelihood of different types of residual contamination, which stakeholders found more appropriate. It was proposed that the US bombing data be overlaid, in order to calculate the likelihood of possible bomb findings. Another idea was to overlay battlefield maps, if such maps could be made available. The risk-activity matrix was seen as being feasible, in order to assess the general level of risk posed by a specific ammunition type in conjunction with a certain activity, although it was agreed that more ammunition categories and more details should be added to the activity categories.
- <u>Decisions taken</u>: the probability mapping and a reviewed risk-activity matrix (form B1) should be tested on several sites with planned development projects. The form should aim to support professional staff in carrying out risk assessments at the level of specific contaminated sites. The form should not aim to map contamination at community level and should not be handed out to local authorities. The risk-activity matrix should include recommendations for actions (risk mitigation measures) to be taken, if certain contamination in combination with a specific activity pose a threat.

Based on this feedback, form B1 was completely reviewed. The initial form B1 and the final form B1 after review are shown here, with explanations given as to the different changes made. The final form, shown subsequently, (pictures 3, 4 and 6) is the form used for the pre-test in Quang Trj.

Initial form B1



Activity risk indication matrix										
	No human activity 1	Surface activity, non-mechanical 2	Surface activity, mechanical 3	Intrusive activity, shallow 4	Intrusive activity, deep 5	Remarks				
Landmines A	A1	A2	A3	Α4	AS					
Cluster Munitions B	81	В2	B3	В4	85	The contamination map and the activity risk indication matrix should be given to the				
Aircraft bombs C	C1	C2	C3	C4	CS	community. Yellow or red combinations should b avoided.				
Other ERW D	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5					




The initial form B1 proposed a community-based mapping with four different types of possible residual contamination.

A matrix was proposed to evaluate the risk of different types of residual contamination in combination with different types of activities.

It was proposed that the form could support the change from proactive survey and clearance to a reactive risk management approach and be handed out to communities/local authorities.

Revised form B1 (used for the pre-test)



I he revised form B1 aims to assess the general risk posed by residual contamination at site-specific level (e.g. on future development sites). The map showing the likelihood of different types of residual contamination is proposed as a starting point for such an assessment. Two different possibilities to map the likelihood (see pictures 3 and 4) of different contamination types are proposed for the pre-test. Both options count the findings of all activities (explosive ordnance disposal [EOD] call-outs and clearance tasks) in a certain grid box. With mapping option 1, the likelihood based on the number of findings is summed up on the second page of the form (see next page, picture 6), mapping option 2 shows the likelihood based on the findings directly on the map, by using different shades of colour.

5

Likelihood of aircraft bombs

high = US bombing data indicates > 20 hits in 1 km diameter / grid box *medium* = US bombing data indicates > 10 to 20 hits in 1 km diameter / grid box *low* = US bombing data indicates ≤ 10 hits in 1 km diameter / grid box

Likelihood of ERW (without CM) ≤ 60 mm

high = > 20 findings from all activities in 1 km diameter / grid box medium = > 10 to 20 findings from all activities in 1 km diameter / grid box low = ≤ 10 findings from all activities in 1 km diameter / grid box

Likelihood of ERW (without CM) > 60 mm

 high = > 10 findings from all activities in 1 km diameter / grid box

 medium = > 5 to 10 findings from all activities in 1 km diameter / grid box

 low = ≤ 5 findings from all activities in 1 km diameter / grid box

5


Likelihood of aircraft bombs

high = US bombing data indicates > 5 hits in 0.5 km diameter / grid box medium = US bombing data indicates > 2 to 5 hits in 0.5 km diameter / grid box low = US bombing data indicates ≤ 2 hits in 0.5 km diameter / grid box

Likelihood of ERW (without CM) \leq 60 mm *high* = > 10 findings from all activities in 0.5 km diameter / grid box *medium* = > 5 to 10 findings from all activities in 0.5 km diameter / grid box *low* = \leq 5 findings from all activities in 0.5 km diameter / grid box

Likelihood of ERW (without CM) > 60 mm high = 5 5 findings from all activities in 0.5 km diameter / grid box medium = > 2 to 5 findings from all activities in 0.5 km diameter / grid box low = 22 findings from all activities in 0.5 km diameter / grid box

During the pre-test, two different thresholds were tested in order to analyse how they influence the result of the general risk assessment. The thresholds differ in regard of the grid/diameter to be used (1 km versus 0.5 km grid box/diameter) and the number of hits (bombs) and findings (EO) that can be located within that grid box. Three different types of ammunition are analysed: aircraft bombs, explosive ordnance larger than 60 mm and smaller or equal to 60 mm. The separation of EO into two different categories was proposed as the expected penetration depth (which is relevant in conjunction with planned activities) might differ for different calibres. Cluster munition (CM) findings from clearance tasks are not included, as the form and general risk assessment for residual contamination assumes that survey and proactive clearance of CM has been completed or advanced to a high degree.



The revised risk-activity matrix for a general risk assessment includes more activity categories and a more detailed description of the activities with regard to the depth of the intrusive work. The different ammunition categories (residual contamination caused by aircraft bombs or EO) and likelihood of encounter of the category, leads to a different evaluation of the potential risk in conjunction with the planned activity. In contradiction to the initially proposed form, the revised form and matrix link the evaluation of the risk with recommended actions for risk mitigation. A low likelihood does not require action, a medium or high likelihood requires risk mitigation measures depending on the planned work, which automatically leads to a more detailed site-specific risk assessment (see the following chapter, form B2). The matrix also allows for the evaluation of the risks posed by cluster munitions and mines, should there be findings outside of identified or cleared CHA. However, no likelihood of encounter is calculated in such a case and the risk of further findings is considered as confirmed.

6

Form B2: Detailed site-specific risk assessment


- <u>Basis for discussion</u>: form B2 is proposed in order to conduct a detailed site-specific risk assessment of residual contamination, based on a detailed desk study and non-technical survey. The first section (general information) is used to describe the planned work steps in detail. The second section offers the possibility for a detailed risk assessment by identifying the "worst-case scenario" and the analysis of the expected ammunition type, its sensitivity, condition (e.g. based on the results of the ageing study, see objective 1 of the LTRM project, page 9 of this report) and penetration depth. A separate section on page 2 is used to discuss the risk acceptability with and without risk mitigation measures and to summarise discussions and agreements with the owner/user/investor on the specific site.
- <u>Discussions with stakeholders</u>: the form for a site-specific, detailed risk assessment of residual contamination and its functionality was understood and agreed in general, although it was suggested that the form be simplified and must be tested first, before a decision could be taken on whether it could be used on a larger scale or not.
- <u>Decisions taken</u>: the form (especially the part of the risk evaluation on page 2) should be simplified and tested on different sites planned for future development work.

Based on this feedback, form B2 was slightly reviewed. The initial form B2 and the final form B2 after review are shown on the next pages with explanations given of the different changes made. The final form, shown subsequently, is the form used for the pre-test in Quang Tri.

Initial form B2

Residual risk tolerable

Residual risk partly tolerable






The initial form B2 for a detailed, site-specific risk assessment of residual contamination provides a section for the detailed description of the work steps planned for the site. A second section is used to evaluate the credible worst-case scenario for each work step based on the expected ammunition type, its sensitivity, condition and penetration depth. A classical risk matrix with a probability/ consequence axis shows if the risk of a specific planned activity in conjunction with the expected contamination type is acceptable or not.

An additional section is then used to describe the risk evaluation result and to discuss the risk acceptability of the intended land use with the party that plans the activities on the contaminated site.


Revised form B2 (used for the pre-test)



4. PROCESSES AND PROTOCOLS

The following explanations give an overview of the discussions held and decisions taken with regard to the processes and protocols needed to implement an LTRM approach.

• <u>Basis for discussion</u>: the first report (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD, 2018a) proposing an LTRM framework for Vietnam also mentioned the need for clear overall processes and supporting protocols to enable national implementation of the framework (see picture below). However, the discussions so far have focused on the LTRM purpose, instruments and tools (e.g. what indicators should be used to evaluate the tolerable risk and what the forms for site-specific risk assessments should look like). The recently released national decree (Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2019) that allocates the overall responsibility for mine action in Vietnam to VNMAC, and the experiences from the pre-test and following pilots in other provinces, will help to finalise instruments and tools and shift the discussion towards the processes and protocols required for a potential implementation of the LTRM at national level.



Possible structure, responsibilities and required protocols for the implementation of an LTRM framework in Vietnam.

- <u>Discussions with stakeholders</u>: there was agreement that protocols and guidelines are required to explain to provincial and local authorities how they have to proceed with future development sites. So far, development sites are usually cleared before any construction activities take place. Therefore, one of the required protocols in the LTRM process will have to specify that development sites have to undergo a general and detailed site-specific risk assessment (forms B1 and B2) before any clearance and construction activities are initiated.
- <u>Decisions taken</u>: no decisions were taken in regard to processes and protocols, but it was noted that the implementation of an LTRM framework requires clear guidelines and regulations at both national and provincial levels to ensure that the required process and procedures are understood.

The present chapter explained the core ideas of an LTRM framework, gave an overview of the situation in Vietnam and summarised the work progress and decisions taken with regard to the pre-test of instruments and tools in Quang Tri province. The next two chapters focus on the pre-test itself and discuss applied data collection and evaluation methodologies as well as the findings of the test.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRE-TEST IN QUANG TR!

Throughout the different phases of the development of the LTRM concept and tools, different research frameworks were developed and used. This chapter gives an overview of the data collection and evaluation methodologies applied for the pre-test in Quảng Trị. The following table summarises what data was required in order to work with the different indicators and how it was collected and evaluated.

INSTRUMENT	PURPOSE	REQUIRED DATA	COLLECTION & EVALUATION	REMARKS
		Population size per year over the last 10 years for Quảng Trị province and Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts.	Data collected from national statistics (through Quảng Trị Mine Action Centre [QTMAC]) and evaluated/modelled in a desk assessment.	The population size for 2008 to 2018 was estimated for the evaluation (information was not available). The estimation was done by adding the average growth rate of the subsequent two years (for 2008) and the preceding two years (for 2018).
Indicator 1: Death probability rate		EO casualties (fatalities/injuries) over the last 10 years per year for Quảng Trị province and Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts.	Data collected from the QTMAC database and evaluated/ modelled in a desk assessment.	No problem encountered during data collection/evaluation.
	Identification and evaluation of the tolerable	Top 20 causes of death over the last 10 years per year for Quảng Trị province and Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts.	Data collected from the Institute of Health and Metrics Evaluation (IHME) and evaluated/modelled in a desk assessment.	Initially, it was considered doing the calculation with provincial statistics, but only national statistics were available up to 2017, therefore the time period of 2008 to 2017 was considered for the evaluation.
Indicator 2: Risk perception			In a first trial, baseline data (people's opinion before any survey/ clearance had been done) was collected in eight villages in two communes in both	Due to misunderstandings, complete up-to-date data was only collected in Cam Lộ district. Therefore, only the data for Cam
Indicator 3: Land use		Number of people interviewed using land despite the threat of potential EO in Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts.	districts. In a second trial, up-to-date data (people's opinion after survey/clearance was completed to a certain	Lộ is presented in this report. Sample size: Between 29.9% (baseline data) and 28.7% (up-to-date data) of all households in the four selected villages in Cam Lộ district were
Indicator 4: Benefit from risk education (RE) activities		Number of people that benefitted from previous RE activities in Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts.	extent) was collected. The data was evaluated/modelled in a desk assessment.	interviewed.

INSTRUMENT	PURPOSE	REQUIRED DATA	COLLECTION & EVALUATION	REMARKS
		Costs for clearance to different clearance depths in Quảng Trị.	Only national clearance costs for commercial demining down to a depth of 5 m could be made available.	
Indicator 5: Cost benefit	Identification and evaluation of the tolerable level of risk.	contaminated confirmed hazardous area (CHA) agricultural and QTMAC database. And message provincial lan available in the QTMAC database. Therefore, no		Unfortunately, the key figures and messages with regard to provincial land prices were not available in English in time. Therefore, no basic modelling for indicator 5 could be done.
		Average land price for different land types in Quảng Trị today and in 5 and 10 years, per m ² , for agricultural and building land.	Provincial land prices for different land types for 2009 to 2019 collected from the Quảng Trị Province People's Committee.	
Site-specific risk assessment	Mapping of residual contamination and risk-activity matrix (form B1).	EO findings within a 1 km diameter/1 km ² and 500 m diameter/0.5 km ² of 6 different future development sites in Quảng Trị province.	QTMAC/Mines Advisory Group (MAG) established 2 different map types (diameter/ grid) by using 2 different thresholds (1 km/0.5 km). Based on these maps, 2 different thresholds of likelihood were tested.	No problem encountered during data collection/evaluation.
	Site-specific risk assessment of residual contamination (form B2).	Detailed information (planned construction/work steps) for 6 different future provincial development sites.	Out of the list provided by QTMAC, a selection of sites with different land uses was chosen. The sites were physically visited for the site-specific risk assessment.	Unfortunately, sufficient details with regard to the planned work steps could not be provided. Also, some of the sites were already under construction when visited.

Table 2: Required data for the pre-test, used data collection and evaluation methods.

CREDIBILITY AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE PRE-TEST

An important point to address in research and in the LTRM project is the credibility of the pre-test in Quảng Trị. Credibility is usually achieved by considering objectivity, reliability and the validity of research.

The researcher and stakeholders have different experiences in both mine action and risk management. In addition, language barriers and the different levels of knowledge and understanding of the LTRM approach must be considered. All these aspects can be an advantage for the objectivity of the pre-test, but may also hamper it because the involved parties are biased. However, the reliability of the pre-test is maintained through transparency throughout the collection of data and evaluation processes. Methodologies and instruments were discussed with stakeholders in advance and are explained in the present report. All information collected is accessible as raw data and helps to retrace the evaluated data presented in this report. By using desk assessments to collect statistical data, and field research to gather the opinions of the affected population through structured interviews, different data collection methods were applied to gather the validity of the pre-test.

The information collection process which includes the gathering of quantitative and qualitative data and the data evaluation process that is based on the modelling of different data sets and thresholds, aims to clarify whether the proposed instruments and models used are meaningful and potentially scalable. The pre-test in Quảng Trị is not representative but will indicate if the proposed LTRM tools are suitable to be tested and used in Vietnam on a larger scale.

FINDINGS OF THE PRE-TEST IN QUẢNG TRỊ

This chapter explains the findings of the pre-test and starts with the results per indicator including different options and thresholds used, as explained on pages 16 to 22. Subsequently, an overview of the combined evaluation findings for Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts are given, and a rating of the results is proposed in order to identify whether the two districts could be seen as having achieved a residual state or not. Furthermore, the results of the test with the general and site-specific risk assessments (forms B1 and B2) are summarised and discussed.

INDICATOR 1

The first option (option A) to be tested for the definition of indicator 1 (death probability rate) was determined as follows: "A residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if the percentage of EO victims (injuries and fatalities)/per population/per year in a district over the last 10 years does not exceed the lowest percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years (2009 to 2018) more than 0/3/5 times."

Summary of the results for option A:

- <u>Cam Lộ district has not yet achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are</u> <u>applied</u> and exceeds the lowest percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years in a total of 6 years (2009 to 2012, 2014 and 2015).
- <u>Hải Lăng district has achieved a residual state if a threshold of 5 times is applied</u>. The district has not yet achieved a residual state if a threshold of 0 and 3 times is applied and exceeds the lowest percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years in a total of 4 years (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2017).

The second option (option B) to be tested for the definition of indicator 1 sought to evaluate whether "... the EO victims per population, per year in a district over the last 10 years do not exceed the average percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years (2009 - 2018) more than 0/3/5 times."

Summary of the results for option B:

- <u>Cam Lô district has not yet achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are</u> <u>applied</u> and exceeds the average percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years in a total of 6 years (2009 to 2012, 2014 and 2015).
- <u>Hải Lăng district has achieved a residual state if a threshold of 5 times is applied</u>. The district has not yet achieved a residual state if a threshold of 0 and 3 times is applied and exceeds the average percentage of EO victims in the whole province over the last 10 years in a total of 4 years (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2017).

The third option foresees the inclusion of statistics of the causes of death in Vietnam and was determined as follows: "The residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if the number of EO victims (including injured and fatalities) in a district has not been one of the top 10/top 20 causes of death in Vietnam in the last 10 years (2008 to 2017) more than 0/3/5 times." Only national statistics (instead of provincial statistics) up to 2017 could be made available and were used for the pre-test.

Summary of the results for option C1 (top 20 causes of death) and C2 (top 10 causes of death):

- <u>Cam Lô district has achieved a residual state if the top 10 causes of death and any</u> of the thresholds are applied. However, if the top 20 causes of death are taken into account, the district has not achieved a residual state with any of the thresholds and exceeds them in a total of 7 years (2008 – 2012, 2014 and 2015).
- <u>Hải Lăng district has achieved a residual state if the top 10 causes of death and any</u> of the thresholds are applied. However, if the top 20 causes of death are taken into account, the district has only achieved a residual state if a threshold of 5 times is applied and it exceeds the other thresholds of 0 and 3 times in a total of 5 years (2008 2011 and 2017).

It should be remembered that the statistical data of causes of death also includes deaths caused by voluntary risk taken (e.g. traffic accidents or self-harm). However, it is not possible in all cases to clearly identify whether a risk has been taken voluntarily or not. For the purpose of the pre-test and to counterbalance a possible adulteration of the result due to the inclusion of voluntary risks, injuries caused by EO were also considered as fatalities.

In general, and with regard to formal procedures, all three options of indicator 1 proved to be feasible as an indicator to evaluate the tolerable level of risk. Options C1 and C2 are the most challenging with regards to data collection and consistency, as statistics of causes of death were only available at national level. To apply options A and B, enough data was available in Quang Tri, but in other provinces, without a functioning and well-established mine action centre, it could be a challenge to collect the required data.

Option A is the most conservative approach, followed by options B and C. Options A and B only consider and compare the trend of EO victims within a province/district, while option C puts the number of EO victims in a broader context and compares the risk of being killed by explosive ordnance with other health risks. On testing options A and B, Cam Lộ district did not achieve a residual state regardless of the proposed thresholds applied. Hải Lăng however, achieved a residual state if the most tolerant of the proposed thresholds (5 times) was applied. Both districts can be considered as having achieved a residual state, if the EO victims are compared with the top 10 national causes of death, but not if the comparison includes the top 20 causes of death. The raw data for indicator 1, options A to C2, are included in this report in annex A. Stakeholders should discuss and decide whether a more conservative or tolerant option and threshold should be used in further testing.

INDICATORS 2, 3 AND 4

Indicators 2, 3 and 4 focus on the psychological and socio-economic effect of EO-contaminated areas. They are summarised in one sub-chapter because relevant data has been gathered in one field survey, using one questionnaire (see annex C). Indicator 2 measures the risk perception of the affected population (if they feel that their well-being has been compromised due to a potential or real presence of EO), indicator 3 affected people's land use (despite potential or real EO contamination and their risk perception) and indicator 4 measures whether the affected population benefitted from former RE activities.

For the purpose of this pre-test, baseline data (people's risk perception and land use before any survey and clearance activities had taken place) and up-to-date data (people's risk perception and land use after a certain amount of survey and clearance activities had taken place) was collected in four villages, in two communes in Cam Lộ, by interviewing roughly 200 households. This accounts for approximately 29% of all households and 7.5% of the total population of the four villages. The purpose of having baseline and up-to-date data was to test the effectiveness of the proposed indicators and to evaluate whether they help to identify a change in people's behaviour before and after (some) proactive clearance activities have been undertaken. For the pilot and possible implementation of the LTRM framework in other provinces, only up-to-data data reflecting the actual situation would need to be collected.

It was also planned that baseline and up-to-date data for Hải Lăng district would be collected, but due to misunderstandings with regard to the data to be gathered, the available data set is not complete and has therefore not been used for data evaluation and modelling, in order to avoid any potentially incorrect conclusions.

In Cam Lộ district the cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) has been completed and a lot of clearance activities have already been undertaken. In Hải Lăng, the CMRS is still ongoing and only some clearance activities have been carried out so far. The following maps of the four communes in Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts that were chosen for the pre-test, show already cleared areas and remaining CHAs. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the data collected in Hải Lăng during the pre-test was not reliable and not used for this report.





Illustration 4: The surveyed communes Cam Chính and Cam Tuyền in Cam Lộ district: CMRS and most of the clearance completed.



Illustration 5: The communes Hải Thọ and Hải Dương in Hải Lăng district which were also partly used for the pre-test: CMRS ongoing and some clearance activities undertaken.

INDICATOR 2, DEFINITION AND SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

The definition for indicator 2 (affected people's risk perception) was determined as follows: "A residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if not more than 40, 50, 60% (threshold) of the affected population feel that their well-being has been compromised by using the land that potentially contains EO."

Baseline data (people's risk perception before any survey and clearance activities had taken place):

• <u>Cam Lộ district has not yet achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are</u> <u>applied</u>, as 99.1% of all interviewed households stated that they felt their well-being was compromised by using the land that potentially contains EO.

Up-to-date data (people's risk perception after completed survey and almost completed clearance activities):

• <u>Cam Lô district has achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are applied</u> as only 1.9% of all interviewed households stated that they felt that their well-being was compromised and only 4.2% of all interviewed households said they were not sure if they felt their well-being was compromised in using the land that potentially contains EO.

INDICATOR 3, DEFINITION AND SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

The definition for indicator 3 (affected people's land use) was determined as follows: "A residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if at least 80, 70 or 60% of the affected population use land despite a potential EO threat."

Baseline data:

• <u>Cam Lộ district has achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are applied</u> as 92% of all interviewed households stated that they used the land despite a potential EO threat.

Up-to-date data:

• <u>Cam Lộ district has achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are applied</u> as 100% of all interviewed households stated that they used the land despite a potential EO threat.

INDICATOR 4, DEFINITION AND SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

The definition for indicator 4 (benefit from former RE activities) was determined as follows: "A residual state (tolerable level of risk) is achieved, if at least 80, 70 or 60% of the affected population have directly benefitted from RE activities."

Baseline data:

• <u>Cam Lộ district has achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are applied</u> as 81.6% of all interviewed households stated that they had benefitted from former RE sessions.

Up-to-date data:

• <u>Cam Lộ district has achieved a residual state if any of the thresholds are applied</u> as 96.7% of all interviewed households stated that they had benefitted from former RE sessions.

The raw data for the baseline and up-to-date survey data for indicators 2, 3 and 4 is included in this report in annex B. In addition to the data required to identify the tolerable level of risk (residual state), some additionally collected data was evaluated by using different filters. The results and relevant remarks for the baseline and up-to-date data are also presented in annex B.

In general, and with regard to formal procedures, all three indicators proved to be feasible for evaluating the tolerable level of risk as all the required data could be collected, although it should be noted that data collection involves time-consuming field survey. It can also be questioned and there should be further discussion on whether indicator 3 (land use) is a reasonable indicator, as baseline and up-to-date data show that more than 90% of the people use the land, regardless of a potential EO threat and whether they feel that their well-being is compromised. It is likely that this is also the case in other districts and provinces.

Indicators 2 and 3 turned out to be the most challenging and complex ones with regard to the understanding of what data should be collected, where and why. The aim of indicators 2 and 3 is to find out how the progress of proactive CMRS and clearance influences people's risk perception and land use. It was therefore decided to do the pre-test not only in a district where proactive survey and clearance had already been completed (Cam Lộ), but also in a district where proactive work had recently started and where only a small amount of work had been done so far (Hải Lăng). This concept was not sufficiently well understood which led to misunderstandings in the collection of data and is the reason why the data for Hải Lăng district has not been used for the evaluation, in order to avoid potential errors in the conclusions drawn. Further discussions and clarification amongst stakeholders are needed for the planned pilot.

INDICATOR 5

The stakeholders decided that the proposed indicator 5 (cost-benefit analysis) should not be considered for the pre-test in Quang Tri, as the book prices, as published by the provincial government, and market prices might differ considerably, and the land was being used regardless of potential or real contamination. Stakeholders did not feel confident in using this data, as it could lead to inaccurate results which does not reflect the reality. However, the principle of the indicator might still be valid in other locations and under other circumstances. Stakeholders should discuss the applicability of this indicator once again, in the context of the planned pilot in other provinces.

SUMMARY OF OVERALL EVALUATION RESULTS

Using different indicators to evaluate the tolerable level of risk allows for comprehensive decision-making of whether a district should be considered as having achieved a residual state (which implies a change from proactive survey and clearance to a reactive risk management approach) or not. The following table 3 summarises the evaluation results for the different indicators and options and shows how different thresholds influence the overall evaluation results.

	DESCRIPTION	THRESHOLD 1	THRESHOLD 2	THRESHOLD 3				
	A residual state is achieved, if	Cam Lộ district						
Indicator 1,	the percentage of EO victims (injuries and fatalities)/per population/per year in a district over the last 10 years does not	(0 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(3 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(5 times) Residual state not yet achieved				
option A	exceed the <u>lowest percentage</u> of EO victims in the whole province		Hải Lăng district					
	over the last 10 years (2009 - 2018) more than 0/3/5 times (see threshold 1 to 3).	(0 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(3 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(5 times) Residual state achieved				
	A residual state is achieved, if		Cam Lộ district					
Indicator 1,	the percentage of EO victims (injuries and fatalities)/per population/per year in a district over the last 10 years does not	(0 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(3 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(5 times) Residual state not yet achieved				
option B	exceed the <u>average percentage</u> of EQ victims in the whole	Hải Lăng district						
	province over the last 10 years (2009 - 2018) more than 0/3/5 times (see threshold 1 to 3).	(0 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(3 times) Residual state not yet achieved	(5 times) Residual state achieved				
		Cam Lộ district						
	A residual state is achieved, if the number of EO victims (injuries and fatalities) in a district has not been one of the top 10/top 20	(Top 20, 0 times) Residual state not achieved	(Top 20, 3 times) Residual state not achieved	(Top 20, 5 times) Residual state not achieved				
Indicator 1, option C1		(Top 10, 0 times) Residual state achieved	(Top 10, 3 times) Residual state achieved	(Top 10, 5 times) Residual state achieved				
(top 20) and C2 (top 10)	causes of death in Vietnam in the last 10 years (2008 - 2017) more	Hải Lăng district						
	than 0/3/5 times (see threshold 1 to 3).	(Top 20, 0 times) Residual state not achieved	(Top 20, 3 times) Residual state not achieved	(Top 20, 5 times) Residual state achieved				
		(Top 10, 0 times) Residual state achieved	(Top 10, 3 times) Residual state achieved	(Top 10, 5 times) Residual state achieved				

	DESCRIPTION	THRESHOLD 1	THRESHOLD 2	THRESHOLD 3				
Indicator 2	A residual state is achieved, if not more than 40, 50, 60% (see threshold 1 to 3) of the	Only data for Cam Lộ district was evaluated						
(up-to-date data)	affected population feel that their well-being is compromised by using the land that potentially contains EO.	(40%) Residual state is achieved	(50%) Residual state is achieved	(60%) Residual state is achieved				
Indicator 3	A residual state is achieved, if at least 80, 70, 60% (see threshold	Only data for Cam Lộ district was evaluated						
(up-to-date data)	1 to 3) of the affected population use land despite a potential EO threat.	(80%) Residual state is achieved	(70%) Residual state is achieved	(60%) Residual state is achieved				
Indicator 4	A residual state is achieved, if at least 80, 70, 60% (see threshold	Only data for Cam Lộ district was evaluated						
(up-to-date data)	1 to 3) of the affected population have directly benefitted from RE activities.	(80%) Residual state is achieved	(70%) Residual state is achieved	(60%) Residual state is achieved				

Table 3: Summary of evaluation results for Cam Lộ and Hải Lăng districts, using the four different indicators with different options and thresholds.

Table 4, below, simplifies the results and summarises the overall evaluation of results per district, indicator and threshold used. For indicator 1, option C2 is the most tolerant option to evaluate the tolerable risk, followed by option C1. The most stringent evaluation option for indicator 1 is option A. For all indicators and options used, threshold 1 signifies the most stringent, and threshold 3 the most tolerant method to identify the tolerable level of risk. The overview includes a proposal for an overall rating of the results and possible further actions. The rating used is conservative and proposes a change from proactive survey and clearance to a reactive risk management approach only if all indicators are "green". In all other cases, it is recommended that proactive activities continue, at least to a certain extent. The overview shows that the most tolerant option C2 for indicator 1 might be the most reasonable option for evaluating the residual state. All proactive survey and most of the clearance has been completed in Cam Lộ and this indicates that the district is "green". To consider the district as "orange" based on a conservative judgement of accident figures having dropped significantly over the last few years, might not be appropriate. However, this needs to be discussed further amongst stakeholders.

CAM LỘ DISTRICT													
		Threshold 1				Thres	hold 2		Threshold 3				
Indicator 1, option A	Ν	lo resid	ual sta	te	No residual state				No residual state				
Indicator 1, option B	No residual state				No residual state			No residual state					
Indicator 1, option C1 (top 20)	No residual state				No residual state			No residual state					
Indicator 1, option C2 (top 10)		Residu	al state		Residual state			Residual state					
Indicator 2		Residu	al state		Residual state			Residual state					
Indicator 3		Residu	al state		Residual state			Residual state					
Indicator 4		Residual state			Residual state				Residual state				
Overall rating (with option A – C2 for indicator 1)	A	В	C1	C2	A	В	C1	C2	A	В	C1	C2	

HẢI LĂNG DISTRICT													
		Threshold 1				Thres	hold 2		Threshold 3				
Indicator 1, option A	١	lo resic	dual sta	te	No residual state				Residual state				
Indicator 1, option B	١	No residual state			No residual state			Residual state					
Indicator 1, option C1 (top 20)	No residual state			No residual state			Residual state						
Indicator 1, option C2 (top 10)		Residu	ual state		Residual state			Residual state					
Indicator 2		Not ev	aluated	1	Not evaluated			Not evaluated					
Indicator 3		Not evaluated			Not evaluated			Not evaluated					
Indicator 4	Not evaluated			Not evaluated				Not evaluated					
Overall rating (with option A – C2 for indicator 1)	A	В	C1	C2	A	В	C1	C2	A	В	C1	C2	

COLOUR CODE FOR OVERALL RATING AND PROPOSED ACTION (PROPOSAL)									
All indicators green	1 indicator red	2 indicators red	3 indicators red	All indicators red					
No further proactive activities required, change to reactive risk management approach.	Analyse evaluation results in detail and focus on further proactive activities accordingly.	Analyse evaluation results in detail and focus on further proactive activities accordingly.	Analyse evaluation results in detail and focus on further proactive activities accordingly.	Further proactive activities required, reassess situation in 5 years.					

Table 4: Simplified overview of evaluation results per district, indicator/option and threshold including a proposal for an overall rating and related further actions.

SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Once a district/province has achieved a residual state, residual contamination should be managed based on intended land use. Whenever the residual EO contamination poses a threat to the planned land use, the specific location should be analysed in detail and risk mitigation measures should be considered. For this purpose, two different forms were proposed. Form B1 allows a general risk assessment to be carried out based on the likelihood of encountering different types of ammunition in a specific area. The result of this general risk assessment indicates whether the expected residual EO threat poses a relevant risk to the planned activities or not. Form B2 is based on the results of form B1 and analyses the EO risk of a specific site in detail by considering the characteristics of the planned land use and the ammunition that can be expected to be found.

For the purpose of the pre-test and in order to examine whether the instruments fulfil their function, six different future provincial development sites were chosen and the EO risk for the planned activities on these sites was analysed with the proposed forms B1 and B2.

In order to see how the result of the general risk assessment can be influenced, two different mapping methods and thresholds were tested on two of the six development sites. The illustrations on the next two pages illustrate the different mapping alternatives whilst the table on page 37 shows the differences in the assessment result.




Illustration 6: Grid-based likelihood maps for a future development project in Hải Thành (Hải Lăng district). Likelihood of aircraft bombs is shown in blue, EO > 60 mm in red and EO \leq 60 mm in purple. The first row shows the result if a 1 km grid box is applied, the second row if a 0.5 km grid box is used. The darkest shading indicates the highest likelihood, the lightest shading the lowest likelihood. The red squares mark the area considered for the risk assessment.



Illustration 7: Diameter-based likelihood maps for the same development project in Hai Thanh (Hai Lang district) based on a 1 km (image on the left) and a 500 m diameter (image on the right). The likelihood of encountering aircraft bombs, EO > 60 mm and EO \leq 60 mm is calculated by counting the findings in the relevant diameter.




Illustration 8: Grid-based likelihood maps for two nearby future development projects in Hải Dương (Hải Lăng district). The first row again shows the result if a 1 km grid box is applied, the second row if a 0.5 km grid box is used. The red squares mark the area considered for the risk assessment.



Illustration 9: Diameter-based likelihood maps for the same two nearby development projects in Håi Dương (Hải Lăng district) by using a 1 km (image on the left) and a 500 m threshold (image on the right).


The estimation of the likelihood of encountering residual contamination is based on the assumption that the CMRS is completed and that most of the CM have been cleared. Therefore, CM findings (to estimate the likelihood of encountering further CM) were only considered if they were recorded outside of known (cleared or uncleared) cluster strikes. The likelihood for other ammunition was estimated by counting all known EO findings within the relevant perimeter (diameter/grid box); this includes EO findings from EOD call-out and clearance tasks. To analyse possible residual contamination from aircraft bombs, the hits recorded in US bombing data were counted. Although it is known that this data is not accurate, it was assumed that this could give an initial idea of the likelihood of encountering aircraft bombs. The applied thresholds for a high/medium/low likelihood were shown on page 20. To simplify matters, these thresholds were maintained in the pre-test.

The following table shows the differences in the assessment results when using the two different mapping methods and diameter/grid box thresholds. However, the different results do not allow a clear general statement with regard to what method and threshold is more conservative or tolerant. Either the grid-based or the diameter-based method led to a more or less conservative result. With regard to the two different thresholds used, it seems that the smaller threshold (0.5 km grid box/ diameter) in general leads to a more tolerant but also more appropriate result.

PROJECT	MAPPING METHOD	THRESHOLD	LIKELIHOOD OF BOMBS	LIKELIHOOD OF > 60 MM	LIKELIHOOD OF ≤ 60 MM
	Diameter	1 km	low	medium	low
Development project in Hải	Diameter	0.5 km	low	low	low
Thành (Cultural House)	Grid box	1 km	low	low	low
	Grid box	0.5 km	low	low	low
	Diameter	1 km	low	high	high
Development project a) in	Diameter	0.5 km	medium	high	medium
Hải Dương (kindergarten)	Grid box	1 km	medium	high	high
	Grid box	0.5 km	low	medium	high
	Diameter	1 km	low	high	high
Development project b) in Hải	Diameter	0.5 km	low	high	high
Dương (primary school)	Grid box	1 km	medium	high	high
	Grid box	0.5 km	low	medium	high

Table 5: The table shows that the choice of either a diameter or a grid-based mapping method and the choice of different thresholds influence the result of the general risk assessment.

In addition to the different mapping methods and distance thresholds used, the pre-test in Quảng Trị also aimed to test the usefulness and usability of the specific forms with which a general and site-specific risk assessment of residual contamination can be made. In order to get a glimpse of the results achieved, the completed forms for development projects a) and b) in Hải Dương – the construction/extension of a kindergarten and a primary school – are presented and explained in the following pages; these provide a good example for the other assessed sites. The completed forms of all the assessed sites are attached in annex D. For the sake of convenience, only the forms with the diameter mapping method using a threshold of either 500 m or 1 km are included in the report.






Illustration 10: Diameter mapping for the general risk assessment (form B1, first page) with a 0.5 km (above) and a 1 km (below) threshold used for the development project in Hải Dương (kindergarten and primary school). The number of aircraft bomb hits and EO findings > 60 mm and \leq 60 mm results in a high/medium or low likelihood of encountering the relevant ammunition in the chosen diameter.

Aircraft bombs Med Lo Other ERW (> 60 mm) Other ERW (\$ 60 mm) Cluster munitions Cluster munitions Mines Confi	kelihood No human activity High 2 Aedium 2 Aedium 2 Low 3 Aedium 2 Aedium 2 Aedium 2 Com 1 Com 1		ace activity, mechanical 0 0	Surface activity, mechanical 0 0 1b	Intr	usive activ ≤ 30 cm 0 1b 1a	vity,	Intrusive activity, > 30 cm - 1 m 0 2b	Intrusive activit > 1 m 2c 1a 2b						
Aircraft bombs Med Co Other ERW (> 60 mm) Co Other ERW (> 60 mm) Co Cluster munitions Confi Mines Confi	Aedium C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C		0	0		1b			1a						
Other ERW (> 60 mm) Med Lo Other ERW (\$ 60 mm) Hij Cluster munitions Confil Mines Confil	Aedium O Low O High O Aedium O Low O nfirmed O							2b	2b						
Other ERW (s 60 mm) Cluster munitions Confri Mines Confri	High Addium 0 Low 0 onfirmed 0		0	1b		1a									
Cluster munitions Confii Mines Confi	Low Onfirmed O					2a		1a 2a	1a 2a						
Mines Confi	, in the second s		0	1a 1b		1a 2a		1a 2a	1a 2a						
0 No action required (la	Required action														
0 No action required (la	No action (residual risk).														
No action (residual risk).															
perimeter of the plann	ic assessment to identify the exact anned intrusive work ≤ 30 cm and to that depth (and / or propose n measures).	2b and pen	imeter of the planr conduct clearance etration depth of t	issessment to identify the ned intrusive work > 30 cr to the estimated maxim the expected ammunition er risk mitigation measure	n – 1 m um > 60 mm	2c	perimeter and condu	te-specific assessment t and depth of the planne ct clearance to that dep mitigation measures).	d intrusive work > 1r						
				-											
conduct clearance to t		pen	etration depth of t	the expected ammunition	> 60 mm				th (and / or propos						




Illustration 11: The general risk assessment (form B1, second page) using the 0.5 km (above) and 1 km (below) diameter. The result (framed in blue) doesn't change for the kindergarten and requires a site-specific risk assessment to identify areas where intrusive work is planned in order to mitigate the risk of encountering $EO > 60 \text{ mm} / \le 60 \text{ mm}$. The result for the primary school changes slightly when different diameters are applied. Both a medium and high likelihood of encountering EO > 60 mm leads to further action (site-specific assessment), therefore this difference is not relevant. However, the different result for the likelihood of aircraft bombs has an influence. If the likelihood is "low" (as is the case for the 1 km threshold) no action will be taken, if the likelihood is "medium" or "high" (500 m threshold) a site-specific risk assessment with the formulation of risk mitigation measures is required.

			Genera	l informat	ion								
District / Commune / Coordinates	Hải Lăng	н	ái Dương		107.33	7432 / 16.728176	Date o	f assessn	ment:	09 April 19			
	MAG			TFM, Hea									
Assessor company / Team / Name				irivi, nea				1	/ Marrine	-			
Project name / Planned activity	Building 6 cla Expected cor		ircraft hombs:	low likelit		Construction (intri			60 mm				
Result of general risk assessment	Required act	2	b for > 60 mm	(clearance	e down to 1m	/ max penetration m or other risk mi	depth or ot	her risk n		n measures)			
													structure was considerably
	C	History of the sit Information from		c t	contaminatio comb finds an mmediately	n from small arm re rare due to pre adjacent to the ki	s UXO throu vious cleara ndergarten	ghout th nce effo is a CHA,	he imme orts. , previou	diate vicinity. Some s	sporadic where f	bombing occu ade-out will ha	t widespread and consistent rred but over 50 years on an we significantly reduced the ot be discounted.
		Planned activitie steps and constr available)		16	One large bui oundations,	lding is planned, up to 1 m deep.					re heavy	machinery to t	transit the grass area and dig
						1	Detai Likelihood	led risk a	assessm	ent			
		Expected ERW category	Worst expe ammuniti	ion	Sensitivity	Expected condition	encounter	ring	Overall ating*	Expected dept	h	Work steps at risk	Expected worst cas
		category	type / eff	ect				1011					
		Other ERW ≤ 60 mm	40 mm /		х	×	x	Ion	x	0 – 30 cm			Explosion of an untampere 40 mm grenade on the sur
		Other ERW ≤ 60 mm Other ERW > 60 mm Possible measur Given the proxim	40 mm / 105 mm / Phospho es for risk mit	HE / pr tigation:		o the north, and i	x x uncleared to	the wes	X st) the ir	15 cm – 80 cm	ıld recon		Explosion of an untampere 40 mm grenade on the surf Unplanned explosion follov unsanctioned movement b workers. al survey (in line with curren the centre of the building
keholder discussion and decision:		Other ERW < 60 mm Other ERW > 60 mm Other ERW > 60 mm Country policy – contamination is Risk assessment depth of 1 m. Th conducted on a o Domestic EOD te the local populat All construction	40 mm / 105 mm / Phospho es for risk minity to several NPA) to a dep for und, furthe has awarded e recommence case by case b eams (MAG / 1 cion. workers shoul	HE / br tigation: I other CH oth of 30 c er battle a a "high" r dation is tr vasis. NPA / Pea Id have lir	As (cleared t cm, to assess rea clearance ating for UXC o sweep the ceTrees Viete nited workin	o the north, and it the presence of a e is conducted to D larger than 60 n exact location of it nam / Quảng Trị r	X x uncleared to ny shallowly make the ar nm. Since th the propose nilitary) are suspected U:	the wes y buried rea safe f e propos d founda on stand	x st) the ir small m for use. ised worl ations w dby and that on d	15 cm – 80 cm specting officer wou unitions in a surroun k is required to a dep ith a detector config coordinated by QTM liscovery, constructio	Ild recon iding are oth of 1 r ured to 1 IAC in th	ea of 100 m from m the detectors the required de e event that an	40 mm grenade on the sur Unplanned explosion follov unsanctioned movement b workers.

Illustration 12: Form B2 for the kindergarten based on the general risk assessment using a 1 km diameter. The first page contains general information and repeats the findings of the general risk assessment. The second page gives more specific information about the planned work and the worst expected ammunition in the categories that are likely to be encountered (in this case EO > 60 mm). The proposed risk mitigation measures include TS and potential follow-up clearance down to 30 cm, and a search down to 1 m in specified areas where deep intrusive work is planned. Page 3 offers space to support the provided information with pictures and relevant stakeholder discussions with regard to the planned risk mitigation measures.

		General in	nformation											
District / Commune / Coordinates	Hải Lăng	Hải Dương	107.3	35416	5/16.724	84	Da	te of asse	ssment:	09 Apri	19			
Assessor company / Team / Name	MAG	TF	M, Head Office				-	Her	ıry Marri	ner				
Project name / Planned activity	Building 8 classrooms			Con	struction	(intrusiv	re act	ivity > 1 m)					
	Expected contamination:	Aircraft bombs: m	edium likelihood / um likelihood of ≤ 60		and high	likelike		0						
Result of general risk assessment			nbs (clearance to sp						e (and / c	r other ris	k mitigation			
	Required action:	2b for > 60 mm (cl	earance down to 1 i earance down to 30							ion measu	ires)			
				The	primary :	school is	locat	ed on the e	dge of a l	puilt-up are	ea in Hải Lãng	g district. Durin	g the war the in	frastructure was considerat
		History of the si Information from	te / m NTS	con bor To t suc	tamination the finds a the north h close pr	n from s re rare d on the n oximity (mall : ue to nap yo	rms UXO 1 previous c ou can see indicate m	hroughou learance CHAs pre pre cluste	it the imme efforts. viously cleater munition	ediate vicinit red by MAG; contaminati	y. Some sporad these areas at on to the sout	lic bombing occu re now clear but h in the agricultu	ft widespread and consisten urred, but over 50 years on a the presence of cluster mur irral areas, where the lack of initions (if present at all).
		Planned activitie process steps an plans, if availabl	nd construction	Thr		te buildi	ngs ai	e planned						chinery to transit the grass a
									Detailed r	isk assessn	nent			
		Expected ERW category	Worst expected ammunition type / effect	Sei	nsitivity		ecteo dition	enco	hood of untering unition	Overall rating*	Expect	ed depth	Work steps at risk	Expected worst ca
		Aircraft bombs Other ERW	Mk82		×		x		x	x		m – 2 m		Unplanned explosion follo unsanctioned movement workers.
		≤ 60 mm Other ERW	40 mm / HE 105 mm / HE /		x			x x		x x		30 cm - 80 cm		Explosion of an untamper 40 mm grenade on the su Unplanned explosion follo unsanctioned movement
keholder discussion and decision:		country policy – contamination is The risk assessm rating, the recon case by case bas Domestic EOD te the local populat All construction	NPA) to a depth of 3 s found, further battl ent has awarded a " mmendation is to swe is. eams (MAG / NPA / P tion. workers should have	80 cm, le area 'mediu eep th Peace' e limit	to assess a clearanc um" rating ne exact lo Trees Viet ed workin	the pres e is cond for UXC cation c nam / Q g knowl	ience lucter) larg f the uàng edge	of any sha I to make t er than 60 proposed t Tri military of "suspect	lowly bui he area s mm (requ oundatio) are on s ed UXO"	ied small n afe for use iring cleara ns with a d tandby and so that on	nunitions in a ance up to a c etector confi d coordinatec discovery, co	i surrounding a depth of 1 m) b gured to a dep I by QTMAC in	area of 100 m fro out since aircraft th of 1 m. Cleara the event that a	al survey (in line with currer m the centre of the building bombs also have a "mediur nnce can then be conducted ny suspect items are discov II operations, avoid moving
		tampering with t	the object and call Q	ТМАС	for imme	diate as	sessn	ent and, if	required	, RSP and n	emoval.			
	urbance needed for ignition function anymore	Partially stil	rbance needed for Il functioning	ignit	ion			Likely st			for ignition			
	tion required) / 3 x red = red	Medium (action required) /	every other combi	inatic	on = yello	w (disc	uss ri	High sk accept	ability w	ith staker	-1-1			
ected condition Not likely to lihood verall rating: 3 x green = green (no ac											loider)			

Illustration 13: Form B2 for the primary school based on the general risk assessment using a 0.5 km diameter. In this example, the expected worst case for all three ammunition categories has to be evaluated. The proposed risk mitigation measures include TS as well as potential follow-up clearance down to 30 cm, and a search down to 1 m in specified areas where deep intrusive work is planned.

In general, both mapping methods (diameter and grid box) and distance thresholds used (0.5 km/1 km), as well as the forms themselves proved to be useful and easy to understand and complete. However, it is recommended that diameter mapping and a 0.5 km threshold be used as this leads to more accurate estimations of the likelihood of encountering a certain category of ammunition. The different thresholds used to distinguish the likelihood categories – low, medium and high (number of aircraft bomb hits and EO findings) – were not discussed before the pre-test, but the tested margin seemed to be useful and reasonable. With regard to the site-specific risk assessment, it should be noted that a professional risk evaluation can only be carried out if detailed information of planned activities (work steps) is available and a field visit to the specific site is undertaken. Stakeholders need to discuss and decide what mapping method and threshold should be used to further test the forms in the planned pilot.

This chapter evaluated the findings per indicator and gave an overview of the overall evaluation results in order to assess whether the proposed indicators work in principle, and if the pre-tested districts could already be considered as having achieved a residual state by using these indicators. Furthermore, the forms used for the general and site-specific risk assessments were tested, explained and discussed (forms B1 and B2). The following chapter summarises the key points that still need to be discussed in order to prepare a larger test (pilot) of the proposed indicators and tools.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER TESTS

The following paragraphs summarise the key issues emerging from the pre-test. These points need to be addressed and discussed amongst stakeholders before further testing and before a potential nationwide implementation of the LTRM framework can be considered.

GENERAL REMARKS

Understanding of the LTRM framework: the pre-test and especially the field survey to gather information for indicators 2, 3 and 4 showed that the LTRM concept and its purpose is not yet thoroughly understood by everyone. The aim of the framework is to find out to what extent proactive survey and clearance is needed until the risk posed by an EO threat drops below a tolerable level and a certain area (e.g. a district) can be declared as having achieved a residual state, which can be handled by reactive risk management (site-specific risk assessments based on location, land use and contamination type). This implies that it might not be necessary to clear all contamination proactively. The proposed indicators and thresholds make it possible to evaluate whether the residual state has been achieved at any time during ongoing proactive survey and clearance. The same extent of proactive activities might not be necessary in every area/district in order to achieve a residual state. It depends on people's perception, knowledge and approach to the risk.

Key discussions with stakeholders revealed objections from some that the LTRM framework was tested in one of the most heavily affected provinces in Vietnam and that it might lead to inaccurate conclusions if some districts in Quang Tri are declared as having achieved a residual state. However, it must be remembered that Quang Tri is also one of the most active provinces in mine action, in which proactive survey and clearance is advanced, and relevant, high quality data is available. Furthermore, the LTRM framework is still in the test phase and the results of the pre-test in Quang Tri have not yet lead to any final conclusions, but rather provide crucial insights for further discussions and the enhancement of the framework.

The advantage of the LTRM framework is its holistic approach and the use of different indicators, which makes it possible to consider the socio-economic, psychological and financial impacts of an EO threat. By using different indicators, the result of an evaluation will often produce a mixed outcome (some indicators "red", some indicators "green") and not lead to an immediate and complete change to reactive risk management. Mixed results will help to better understand the impact of an EO threat and implemented activities and hence allow for better allocation and prioritisation of further proactive measures.

It is therefore important and recommended that further testing of the framework includes districts where proactive activities are ongoing but have not yet been completed. This was also planned for the pre-test by applying the framework in Cam Lộ (proactive survey and clearance completed) and in Hải Lăng district (proactive survey and clearance ongoing). However, based on differing interpretations of the purpose of the LTRM framework, the collection of field data led to some misunderstandings and as a result, the data collected in Hải Lăng has not been used for this report, due to insufficient confidence about the accuracy of the data set. It has also been suggested that less contaminated districts/provinces be included in the further testing. This will allow better insights into how the intensity of contamination and the extent of completed proactive survey and clearance influence evaluation results.

Availability of data: to evaluate whether a district/province has achieved a residual state, the availability of data is crucial. The data required has been listed in table 2 on page 24 and 25 and includes information about the type and extent of the EO threat (SHA/CHA), people's perception of the risk, as well as accident/victim statistics and a recording of past proactive activities, including RE. Only if this data is available can the proposed indicators be used. This implies that an authority/institution at a certain level manages and coordinates mine action issues. In order to limit the effort needed for data collection, it is recommended that for further testing, districts/provinces are chosen where at least a part of the required data is already available.

Processes and protocols: it is also suggested that the establishment of processes and protocols is included with further testing of the LTRM framework, as it is important that roles and responsibilities are clarified. The LTRM concept includes basic ideas for processes and protocols (see page 23), but it must be understood that the responsibility for establishing the necessary regulatory framework is with the national authorities, in consultation with provincial authorities. The timely development and implementation of a regulatory framework is not only required to evaluate the tolerable risk/ residual state in further districts/provinces, but is also crucial for the implementation of general and site-specific risk assessments. Authorities and stakeholders at all levels need to know that a risk aspropriate, in order to enable the intended land use. This demands clear responsibilities, processes and procedures.

REMARKS INDICATOR 1 (DEATH PROBABILITY RATE)

The pre-test showed that some options of indicator 1 and proposed thresholds might be too stringent. Indicator options A and B led to the result that the tested district (Cam Lộ district) cannot be considered as having achieved a residual state (because indicator 1 is "red"), despite a high number of completed proactive clearance tasks and green indicators 2, 3 and 4. On the other hand, the indicator was "green" (with the most tolerant threshold) for Hải Lăng district where proactive clearance is still ongoing. This might not be an appropriate judgement as it would imply that more clearance is needed in a district where proactive clearance has actually been completed. Indicator options A and B demand a "zero/near zero tolerance" for EO victims, which might not be achieved even with completed proactive area clearance, as scattered UXO and the wrong way of handling of it may always lead to a certain number of victims.

It is therefore recommended that further testing works with indicator 1 option C2 which compares EO victims with the top 10 causes of death in Vietnam, or to review options A and B and thresholds used in order to make it more tolerant. For option C2, the most stringent threshold (explosive ordnance is not one of the top 10 causes of death in the last 10 years) should be used, and provincial statistics related to causes of death, instead of national statistics should be analysed, if available.

REMARKS INDICATOR 2 (PEOPLE'S RISK PERCEPTION/WELL-BEING COMPROMISED)

Indicator 2 is significant and should be used to evaluate the psychological effect of a potential EO threat. With the data collected in Cam Lộ, it was obvious that the extent of proactive survey and completed clearance influences people's risk perception and the effect on their well-being. However, the misunderstandings that arose during the collection of field data also showed that the questions used to gather the relevant information must be considered very carefully, translations must be accurate, survey teams need to understand the purpose of the survey in detail, and questions need to be asked orally in exactly the same way that they are phrased in written form.

For the further testing, it is recommended that this indicator is used with the most stringent threshold (not more than 40% of affected people feel that their well-being is compromised). The phrasing of the appropriate questions for collecting the required information needs to be given more attention and the survey has to be planned and carried out carefully. This requires sufficient preparation time and training for survey staff. In addition, it is suggested that guidelines for the definition of the expected sample size be established, for further field survey. For the pre-test (in Cam Lộ), the sample size was guided by the availability of resources and included 7.5% of the population of four villages, in two out of eight communes in the district. Compared with the district population, this accounts for approximately 0.45% and is not a representative sample size. A realistic sample size should consider both – statistical requirements and feasibility.

REMARKS INDICATOR 3 (LAND USE)

The pre-test has shown that over 90% of the affected population interviewed use land regardless of a potential EO threat, their well-being being compromised and regardless of proactive activities undertaken (including survey, clearance and RE). This percentage increases to 100% in Cam Lộ after clearance has been completed. The increase of 10% is not significant enough to make a difference with regards the proposed thresholds, and it should also be mentioned that the reasons for the 10% not using the land are mostly unrelated to a potential EO threat (see also explanations given in annex B, page 59). It is likely that the situation in other districts is similar, as it is generally acknowledged that people use contaminated land. Thus, indicator 3 is always "green" and does not allow for any conclusion as to whether an area/district can be considered as having achieved a residual state or not.

It is recommended that the indicator be tested in one or two more districts and/or provinces to confirm the result. If the outcome remains the same, the proposal is to skip this indicator as a way to evaluate the tolerable level of risk/residual state in Vietnam. However, the principle of the indicator might still be valid in other locations and under other circumstances.

REMARKS INDICATOR 4 (BENEFIT FROM FORMER RE ACTIVITIES)

The evaluation of the survey data showed that over 90% of the population interviewed benefitted from former RE, but this does not seem to influence land use and people's well-being being compromised (see also explanations given in annex B, page 59). Thus, it is questionable whether the indicator is useful for evaluating whether an area/district has achieved a residual state or not.

However, it is recommended that the indicator be used, as all people living in a contaminated area should have the possibility of benefitting from RE, at least and specifically until proactive clearance has been completed to some degree. Guidelines are needed for the expected sample size (see also recommendations in indicator 2, page 45). Furthermore, it is proposed that there should be an attempt to establish whether there is any correlation between accident figures and the benefit from former RE. If not, it is suggested that the most tolerant threshold (at least 60% of the affected population have benefitted from former RE activities) be used for further testing. If there is a correlation, a more stringent threshold should be applied. A more detailed assessment of a possible correlation between RE activities and people's behaviour and perception could also give important insights for future RE activities (e.g. focus on safe methods of cultivating land when it is contaminated).

REMARKS INDICATOR 5 (COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CLEARANCE COSTS AND LAND PRICES)

During the discussions and preparation of the pre-test (see also remarks page 17), stakeholders decided that this indicator should not be used for the pre-test in Quảng Trị. However, the principle of the indicator might still be valid in other locations and under other circumstances. As the indicators 1 to 4 consider either the socio-economic, psychological or physical impacts of (potential) EO threats, but none of the indicators include estimations of the precise financial impact of an EO threat, it is therefore recommended that stakeholders discuss the applicability of the indicator further, in the context of the planned pilot in other provinces.

GENERAL AND SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT (FORMS B1 AND B2)

The precondition for the performance of general and site-specific risk assessments as proposed, is the availability of data. This includes information with regard to the contamination in the surrounding areas of sites that are to be assessed, and availability of detailed information about the planned work/use of the potentially contaminated sites. The two main purposes of the proposed tools are, to be able to develop appropriate and tailored risk mitigation measures for sites on which intrusive work exceeds the standard clearance depth for cluster munitions, and to be able to handle potentially contaminated sites that have not been assessed/cleared in a systematic way during proactive clearance. This implies the existence of a database unit, in order to collect information about contamination and mine action activities, and which is able to model the required maps that allow the assessment of the likelihood of encountering a certain type of ammunition.

The pre-tested forms B1 and B2, mapping methods and thresholds proved to be useful, but in order to work with adequate and appropriate accuracy, the diameter mapping method and smaller threshold (500 m) is recommended for further testing. The proposed threshold for what should be considered as a high/medium/low likelihood of encountering a certain category of ammunition should still be discussed amongst stakeholders, but the tested threshold seemed to be appropriate.

It is also worth considering enhancing the mapping used, by adding a layer with information about known battlefields (information could possibly be requested from US databases). As an international expert had the lead in the pre-test of the forms in this instance, it is furthermore suggested that they be tested with mainly national staff during the next test phase.

CONCLUSION

The current report aims to summarise the long-term risk management (LTRM) framework, to reflect the work done and discussions held so far, as well as to give detailed information on the findings and implications of the completed pre-test in Quang Tri. This pre-test has been an important step in the assessment as to whether the proposed concept and tools are feasible and appropriate to be used in Vietnam. In general, this can be confirmed and the overall methodology to evaluate the tolerable risk/residual state, as well as tools to assess site-specific risks, have proven to be achievable. However, it is also obvious that more work and further testing are needed, in order to be able to make the final decisions with regard to the applicability of the LTRM framework to a set of comprehensive and differentiated data.

The results of the pre-test, in addition to explanations and recommendations given in this report, will help stakeholders decide what the most appropriate and adequate options and thresholds are for the further testing of the indicators: 1 (death probability rate), 2 (risk perception/impact on wellbeing) and 4 (benefit from previous risk education [RE] activities) to evaluate the tolerable level of risk. However, the pre-test also showed that the assessment of land use (indicator 3) might not be an appropriate method for Vietnam to evaluate whether an area/district can be considered as having achieved a residual state. Furthermore, stakeholders are encouraged to resume an initial testing of indicator 5 (cost-benefit analysis) as this would add an additional dimension to the evaluation methodology (financial impact of an explosive ordnance [EO] threat). The pre-test of the tools to evaluate site-specific EO risks (forms B1 and B2) impeding development and other projects, showed that the availability of data with regard to the contamination of the surroundings, and information with regard to the planned project is crucial for an effective risk assessment. This is also true for the evaluation of the tolerable risk associated with the proposed indicators. Only with the required data is it possible to assess whether a residual state has been achieved or not.

With regard to further testing, consideration should be given to choosing districts/provinces with different levels of contamination in order to test how this influences the evaluation results. Furthermore, the next phase of testing and finalising the methodology and tools requires more attention to processes and protocols. Roles, responsibilities and processes need to be clear and documented, once the LTRM framework is ready to be implemented.

Stakeholders' understanding of the LTRM framework was expected due to the discussions held throughout the development of the concept. But the pre-test showed that there are still different interpretations of the purpose and benefit of the LTRM framework. Stakeholders are therefore encouraged to discuss the insights presented in this report in detail, in order to achieve a common understanding and agreement of the way forward and the next steps to be addressed.

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
ANNEXES


Annex A) Raw data for indicator 1


Annex B) Raw data for indicators 2, 3 and 4

Annex C) Survey form used for indicators 2, 3 and 4

Annex D) Completed forms B1 and B2 for 6 future development sites







	EO victims per 100,000	4.65375 (Rank 15)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hypothetical EO victims per 100,000	4.5162 (Rank 15)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hypothetical EO victims per 100,000	8.16155 (Rank 14)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold									EO victims per 100,000	1.98439 (Rank 16)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hypothetical EO victims per 100,000	4.49883 (Rank 15)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hypothetical EO victims per 100,000	3.45793 (Rank 16)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold								
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	luảng Trị	28				EO victims Cam Lộ	2				EO victims Hải Lăng	7											EO victims Quảng Trị	12				EO victims Cam Lộ					EO victims Hải Lăng	3										
	Percentage	0.192452127	0.106035251	0.041886946	0.034570709	0.034478979	0.032617935	0.031365005	0.028214572	0.026581309	0.014435466	0.011495006	0.010344671	0.009463217		0.00448242	0.00193097	0.001861563	0.001294475	0.001239848	0.000661006		Percentage	0.191281605	0.104564173	0.042774235	0.034555889	0.033962021	0.032972719	0.030712501	0.02787813	0.026770426	0.014719511	0.011398459	0.010744707	0.009504402	0.00584153	0.004678613	0.001882581	0.00186115	0.001313337	0.001207875	0.000652719	
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	EO victims per 100,000	1.94625 (Rank 17)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hypothetical EO victims per 100,000	4.4287 (Rank 15)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hvpothetical EO victims per 100.000	0 (Rank beyond top 20)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold	-									EO victims per 100,000	1.12913 (Rank 19)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold		Hvnothetical FO victims ner 100 000	2 1066 (Bank 17)	B acult with too 20 threshold	Result with top 20 th eshold	Result With top to threshold	History EO sintime and 100 000		u (Kank beyong top 2U)	Result with top 20 threshold	Result with top 10 threshold								
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Cause of death or injury	Cardions cultar discassos		Neoplasms	Diabetes and kidney diseases	Resniratory infections and tuberculosis		Chronic respiratory diseases	Neurological disorders	Ilnintentional iniuries	Dimeting disperse		I ransport injuries	Uther non-communicable diseases	HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections	Self-harm and interpersonal violence	Maternal and neonatal disorders	Other infectious diseases	Enteric infections	Substance use disorders	Nerlected tronical diseases and malaria		okin and subcutaneous diseases	Nutritional deficiencies	Musculoskeletal disorders	20	Cause of death or injury	Cardiovascular diseases	Neoplasms	Disboton and bidmonialization	Chronic resultatory diseases	Destinatory infections and tuberculosis	Nexpiratory intections and tuber tuber		Unintentional injuries	Digestive diseases	Transport injuries	HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections	Other non-communicable diseases	Self-harm and interpersonal violence	Maternal and neonatal disorders	Other infectious diseases	Entorio infontione		Substance use disorders	Neglected tropical diseases and malaria	Skin and subcutaneous diseases	Nutritional deficiencies	Muraulactal disordare	Musculoskeletal disorders
Rank			2	ĉ	4	r I	5	9	7	. 0	0 0	ת :	TO	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	, C	9T	19	20		Rank	1	2	1 0	c 1	· u	nu	D I	~	8	6	10	11	12	13	14	1	CT .	16	17	18	19	1	70

ANNEX B) RAW DATA FOR INDICATORS 2, 3 AND 4

Overall baseline and up-to-date data for indicator 2 (risk perception), indicator 3 (land use) and indicator 4 (benefit from previous RE) on using different thresholds

Threshold 60% / 60% / 60%

Data set	Total interviewees	Feel tha comprom becaus	that their well-being is mised by using the land use of potential ERW	eing is the land ERW	Threshold: not more than	Use (despite potentia	Use the land (despite potential effect on well-being)	Threshold: at least	Former ben	Former beneficiary of RE	Threshold: at least
	(=households)	yes	not sure	ou		yes	ou		yes	ou	
:		221	2 0	0	/00/	205	205 18	C08/	182	41	/00/
Baseline	572	99.1%	0.9%	0%	00%	92%	8%	00%	81.6%	18.4%	00%
	V FC	4	6	201	/00.2	214	0	2007	207	7	/00/2
Jp-to-date	514	1.9%*	4.2%*	93.9%		100%	%0	20%	96.7%	3.3%	%/D0

Threshold 50% / 70% / 70%

Data set	Total interviewees	Feel that th compromise because o	nat their well-being is mised by using the land use of potential ERW	oeing is the land I ERW	Threshold: not more than	Use the land (despite potential effect on well-being)	Use the land :ntial effect on well-being)	Threshold: at least	Former beneficiary of RE	ciary of RE	Threshold: at least
	(=households)	yes	not sure	ou		yes	ou		yes	ou	
	CCC	221	2	0	E 00/	205	18	70012	182	41	/8UL
baseline	677	99.1%	0.9%	0%	%/DC	92%	8%		81.6%	18.4%	
	7 FC	4	6	201	F 00/	214 0	0	/00/2	207	2	7002
p-to-date	214	1.9%*	4.2%*	93.9%	%/nc	100%	%0	VU/2	96.7%	96.7% 3.3%	

Threshold 40% / 80% / 80%

Data set	Total interviewees	Feel that the compromised because of	Feel that their well-being is ompromised by using the land because of potential ERW	being is the land I ERW	Threshold: not more than	Use the land (despite potential effect on well-being)	e land ffect on well-being)	Threshold: at least	Former beneficiary of RE	ficiary of RE	Threshold: at least
	(=households)	yes	not sure	ou		yes	ou		yes	ou	
		221	2	0		205	18	000	182	41	
Baseline	273	99.1%	0.9%	%0	40%	92%	8%	8U%	81.6%	18.4%	80%
	7 FC	4	6	201		214	0	800	207	7	
p-to-date	214	1.9%*	4.2%*	93.9%	40%	100%	%0	80%	96.7%	96.7% 3.3%	80%

 * yes/not sure answers are added up for the overall result

ANNEX B) RAW DATA FOR INDICATORS 2, 3 AND 4

Raw <u>baseline and up-to-date data</u> for indicator 2 (risk perception), indicator 3 (land use) and indicator 4 (benefit from previous RE) in Cam Lộ: application of different filters, data analysis and interpretation

All interviewees (households interviewed)

Data set	Total interviewed		vell-being is compression of potent		Use th (despite potential e	e land ffect on well-being)	Former bene	eficiary of RE
Butubet	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
Develop	223	221	0	2	205	18	182	41
Baseline	223	99.1%	0%	0.9%	92%	8%	81.6%	18.4%
	214	4	9	201	214	0	207	7
Up-to-date	214	1.9%	4.2%	93.9%	100%	0%	96.7%	3.3%

Only women

Data set	Total interviewed		vell-being is compr l because of potent		Use th (despite potential e		Former bene	ficiary of RE
Butabet	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	92	92	0	0	82	10	69	23
Baseline	92	100%	0%	0%	89.1%	10.9%	75%	25%
	89	0	1	88	89	0	84	5
Up-to-date	89	0%	1.1%	98.9%	100%	0%	94.4%	5.6%

Only men separated

Data set	Total Data set interviewed		vell-being is compr l because of potent		Use th (despite potential e	e land ffect on well-being)	Former bene	eficiary of RE
but set	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	101	129	0	2	123	8	113	18
Baseline	131	98.5%	0%	1.5%	93.9%	6.1%	86.3%	13.7%
	125	4	8	113	125	0	123	2
Up-to-date	125	3.2%	6.4%	90.4%	100%	0%	98.4%	1.6%

Only 14 to 35 year-olds

Data set	Total interviewed		vell-being is compre l because of potent		Use th (despite potential e		Former bene	ficiary of RE
Data set	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	25	25	0	0	17	8	22	3
Baseline	25	100%	0%	0%	68%	32%	88%	12%
	22	0	2	20	22	0	22	0
Up-to-date	22	0%	9%	91%	100%	0%	100%	0%

Only 36 to 50 year-olds

Data set	Total interviewed		vell-being is compression of potent		Use th (despite potential e	e land ffect on well-being)	Former bene	eficiary of RE
Data set	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	60	60	0	0	54	6	46	14
Baseline	60	100%	0%	0%	90%	10%	76.7%	23.3%
	57	3	2	52	57	0	54	3
Up-to-date	57	5.3%	3.5%	91.2%	100%	0%	94.7%	5.3%

Only 51 to 89 year-olds

Data set	Total Data set interviewed		well-being is compr d because of potent		Use th (despite potential e		Former bene	eficiary of RE
Data set	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	120	136	0	2	134	4	121	17
Baseline	138	98.5%	0%	1.5%	97.1%	2.9%	87.7%	12.3%
	135	1	5	129	57	0	131	4
Up-to-date	135	0.7%	3.7%	95.6%	100%	0%	97%	3%

ANNEX B) RAW DATA FOR INDICATORS 2, 3 AND 4

Residents for more than 50 years only

Data set	Total interviewed		vell-being is compr l because of potent		Use th (despite potential e		Former bene	ficiary of RE
butta see	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	50	49	0	1	47	3	38	12
Baseline	50	98%	0%	2%	96%	4%	76%	24%
	0.9	0	4	94	98	0	97	1
Up-to-date	98	0%	4.1%	95.9%	100%	0%	99%	1%

Residents for 19 to 50 years only

Data set	Total Data set interviewed		vell-being is compresented because of potent		Use th (despite potential e	e land ffect on well-being)	Former bene	eficiary of RE
Dura Ser	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	154	153	0	1	143	11	128	26
Baseline	154	99.4%	0%	0.6%	92.9%	7.1%	83.1%	16.9%
	111	4	5	102	111	0	105	6
Up-to-date	111	3.6%	4.5%	91.9%	100%	0%	94.5%	5.5%

Residents for less than 19 years only

Data set	Total Data set interviewed		vell-being is compresented because of potent		Use th (despite potential e		Former bene	ficiary of RE
Butto Set	households	yes	not sure	no	yes	no	yes	no
	19	19	0	0	15	4	16	3
Baseline	19	100%	0%	0%	78.9%	21.1%	84.2%	15.8%
	F	0	0	5	5	0	5	0
Up-to-date	5	0%	0%	100%	100%	0%	100%	0%

Data interpretation

> Baseline data: before survey and clearance has been implemented.

> Up-to-date data: survey and most of clearance completed.

- Feel their well-being has been compromised: whatever filter is used, at least 98% of people feel <u>compromised</u> if the baseline data is considered. The small proportion of people not feeling affected are men who are more than 50 years-old. Considering the up-to-date data and whatever filter is used, over 90% of people <u>do not feel compromised</u>. The highest proportion of people still feeling affected or not being sure about feeling affected can be found amongst men and amongst the 36 to 50 year-olds.
- Use of land despite potential effect on well-being: whatever filter is used, more than 68% of people are using the land when considering the baseline data. The lowest proportion of land use can be found among people who have been residents for less than 19 years or who are 14 to 35 years-old. However, it should be noted that people who do not use the land give the reason that they don't own the land / don't need the land, and not that they're not using it because they are afraid of explosive ordnance. With regard to the up-to-date data, 100% of people use the land, regardless of the filter applied.
- *Beneficiary of former RE:* for the baseline data, the highest proportion of benefit from previous RE can be found amongst the 14 to 35 year-olds (88%). The lowest proportion of benefit from RE can be found amongst women (75%). For the up-to-date data, the highest proportion is recorded for the 14 to 35 year-olds (100%) and the lowest proportion for women (94.4%).
- Correlations:
 - No correlation can be found between benefit from former RE or feeling affected, and land use (as the absence of land use always means that people do not own or do not need the land but never that they're not using it because they feel affected).
 - No correlation can be found between benefit from former RE and feeling affected (more or less everyone feels affected regardless of any benefit from former RE).

ANNEX C) SURVEY FORM USED FOR INDICATORS 2, 3 AND 4

NPA VIETNAM

Post CMRS and clearance assessment form (PCCA)


Survey identification and	village information					
Survey ID		Survey date				
Surveyor		District				
Commune		Village				
No. of village residents		No. of village households				
Status of activities conducted						
NTS conducted TS conducted Clearance conducted	By Comple By Comple By Comple	eted Date Ongoing Not started				
Village (approx. size in Sq m)		CMRS CHA size in Sq m Clearance size in Sq m				
Name of person interviewed						
Gender	M F	Age				
What is your occupation or main income?		vernment employee 🔲 Private business dent				
How long have you been living / working here (year)?		No. of people in household				
1. Has your household benefit activities or not?	ted from risk education	Yes. How many times?:				
2. Do you think your land or th contains CM or other UXO?	e land that you are using	Yes No, I know it does not contain any CM or UXO Not sure				
2a. If yes, how do you know?		Physical evidence I have encountered Somebody else told me Not sure				
2b. If yes, is it a CM or another	type of UXO?	CM UXO Not sure				
2c. If yes, what happened to th	e item?	Reported Removed it myself No action taken				
2d. If you reported it, to whom	did you report it?	Local authority Specify: Hotline Number: MA operator Specify:				
2e. Has your land been cleared	of CM or UXO?	Yes, specify: No No Not sure				


ANNEX C) SURVEY FORM USED FOR INDICATORS 2, 3 AND 4

3. Do you think it is dangerous contains CM and / or UXO?	or not, to use land that	Dangerous Not dangerous Not sure		
4. Are you using or not using la UXO?	and that contains CM and / or	 Yes, I am using the lan No, I am not using the 		
4a. <u>If yes</u> : how do you use the l	and?	Residential Community/Public Infrastructure Services	 Agricultural/Pastoral Natural resources Access/Roads Other, specify: 	
4b. <u>If yes</u> : how do you work on	the land?	Manually	With machinery	
4c. <u>If no:</u> why don't you use the (Several answers possible)	e land?	 Because of ERW Doesn't own land 	 Land not needed Other, specify: 	
5. Do you feel afraid or not, to think contains CM or UXO?	use land you	🗌 Yes 🗌 No	D Not sure	
5.1 Do you feel afraid or not, to potential of it containing CM o	•	Yes No	D Not sure	
5a. <u>If yes:</u> which of the listed ac do you think are dangerous		 Walking Digging/Ploughing Raki Chopping wood Burning Using machinery Other, specify: 		
5b. <u>If yes:</u> would you use the la if you didn't feel afraid to u		Yes. Specify use: No		
6. How do you feel about the CMRS or clearance activities that have been conducted on your land or in your village?	 □ Satisfied □ Not satisfied 	If not satisfied please explain why?		
7. Are you confident that the land you are now using is safe to use?	🗌 Yes 🗌 No	If no, specify why:		

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 1) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 1 KM; FORM B1 (GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT)





TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 1) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 1 KM; FORM B1 (GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT)

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR

6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

Aircraft bombs: low likelihood / other ERW: low likelihood for > 60 mm, medium likelihood for < 60 mm Date of assessment: 20 March 2019 Henry Marriner Construction (intrusive activity > 1 – 1.5 m) 2a for \leq 60 mm (clearance down to 30 cm or other risk mitigation measures) 107.300205/16.714649 Form B2: Site-specific risk assessment: Cultural House in Hải Thành TFM, Head Office General information Hải Thành Communal Cultural House, 250 seats Diameter: 1 km Expected contamination: Required action: Hải Lăng MAG Site-specific residual contamination District / Commune / Coordinates Assessor company / Team / Name Result of general risk assessment Project name / Planned activity

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 1) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)

Planned activities (detailed formations if available) Planned activities (detailed foundations 1 - 1.5 m deep with fortified buried concrete struts. General foot traffic and vehicular motion is frequent on the adjacent road and immediate vicinity. Ground penetration is localised in the template of the cultural building plan with no intrusion into surrounding area. plans, if available) Expected ERW Worst expected and immediate vicinity. Ground penetration is localised in the template of the cultural building plan with no intrusion into surrounding area. Annotations. Expected ERW Worst expected and immediate vicinity is the use of heavy plant machinery to dig access steps and construction area. Cher ERW Vorte ERW Vorte expected erg Vorted ergo of an untanjoin area. Cher ERW 40 mm / HE Vorte ergo of an untampered and immediate of the inspecting officer would recommend technical survey (in line with current contry policy - NPA) to a depth of 30 cm to assess the area safe for use. Post to commencement of any work, and time allowing, the inspecting officer would recommend technical survey (in line with current contry policy - NPA) to a depth of 30 cm to assess the area safe for use.	History of the site / Information from NTS		US bombing (Previous surv historical finc	during the war as ey effort by NPA, Is and UXO-relate	well as heavy gr / Project Renew d incidents visibl	ound fightin to west of p e with roug	US bombing during the war as well as heavy ground fighting (with small arms contamination from both US and Vietname Previous survey effort by NPA / Project Renew to west of planned development site – visible on map as red area (CHA 05 historical finds and UXO-related incidents visible with roughly even distribution in the general vicinity of the building site.	ination from bot - visible on map a general vicinity	US bombing during the war as well as heavy ground fighting (with small arms contamination from both US and Vietnamese munitions). Previous survey effort by NPA / Project Renew to west of planned development site – visible on map as red area (CHA 0541). Other historical finds and UXO-related incidents visible with roughly even distribution in the general vicinity of the building site.
Detailed risk assessment Expected Expected Likelihood of Coverall Expected worst case category Worst expected Sensitivity Expected Use line Work Expected worst case Cther ERW 40 mm / HE X X X 0-30 cm Explosion of an untampered s 60 mm 40 mm / HE X X X 0-30 cm 40 mm grenade on the surface resister easures for risk mitigation: Explosion of an untampered Explosion of an untampered Explosion of an untampered root to commencement of any work, and time allowing, the inspecting officer would recommend technical survey (in line with current country policy – NPA) to a depth root assess the presence of shallowy buried small munitions in a surrounding area of 100 m from the centre of the building site. If contamination is found, further batt	nned activities (detaile cess steps and constru ns, if available)	ction	Planned activ foundations 1 road and imn surrounding a	rities now underw 1 - 1.5 m deep wit nediate vicinity. G area.	ay (see attached h fortified burie round penetrati	photograpl d concrete s on is localise	 most intrusive activity truts. General foot traffic a ed in the template of the ct 	is the use of hea and vehicular mo ultural building p	vy plant machinery to dig tion is frequent on the adjacent lan with no intrusion into
Supected ERW Worst expected ammunition Expected encountering sammunition Likelihood of ammunition Overall sammunition Work Expected worst case Other ERW 40 mm / HE Sensitivity condition ammunition ammunition 0-30 cm Explosion of an untampered steps at risk Explosion of an untampered for an untampered ammunition Other ERW 40 mm / HE X X X 0-30 cm 40 mm grenade on the surfic and on the surfic steps at risk Other ERW 40 mm / HE X X X 0-30 cm 40 mm grenade on the surfic and on the surfic and on the surfic and on the surfic and an untampered steps at risk Explosion of an untampered an untampered an untampered an untampered an untampered area steps at risk Explosion of an untampered an untamper					Detailed r	isk assessm	ient		
Other ERW 40 mm / HE X X X X 0 – 30 cm Explosion of an untampered \$ 60 mm 40 mm grenade on the surf. 0 – 30 cm 40 mm grenade on the surf. 40 mm grenade on the surf. ossible measures for risk mitigation: Prior to commencement of any work, and time allowing, the inspecting officer would recommend technical survey (in line with current country policy – NPA) to a depth cm to assess the presence of shallowly buried small munitions in a surrounding area of 100 m from the centre of the building site. If contamination is found, further batt area safe for use.		expected unition ' effect	Sensitivity	Expected condition	Likelihood of encountering ammunition	Overall rating*	Expected depth	Work steps at risk	Expected worst case
ossible measures for risk mitigation: Prior to commencement of any work, and time allowing, the inspecting officer would recommend technical survey (in line with current country policy – NPA) to a depth cm to assess the presence of shallowly buried small munitions in a surrounding area of 100 m from the centre of the building site. If contamination is found, further batt area clearance would be conducted to make the area safe for use.		m / HE	×	×	×	×	0 – 30 cm		Explosion of an untampered 40 mm grenade on the surface
	sible measures for risk rior to commencement m to assess the presenc ea clearance would be	t mitigatior of any wor to of shallor conducted	l: k, and time all wly buried sma to make the a	owing, the inspec Il munitions in a s rea safe for use.	ting officer woul urrounding area	d recommer of 100 m fr	nd technical survey (in line om the centre of the build	with current cou ing site. If contar	ntry policy – NPA) to a depth of 30 nination is found, further battle

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 1) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES


TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 1) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)


	Ittle disturbance needed for ignition Likely still functioning High its acceptability with stakeholder)
	Constitution Natable disturbance needed for ignition Some disturbance needed for ignition Little disturbance needed for ignition Expected condition Not likely to function anymore Demediation Little disturbance needed for ignition Extentior Not likely to function anymore Demediation Little disturbance needed for ignition Little disturbance needed for ignition Coreal rating: 3 x green = green for action required) / 3 x red = red (action nequired) / 3 x red = red (action nequired) / 2
and decision:	Notable disturbance needed for ignition Not likely to function anymore icen = green (no action required) / 3 x red = red (action action required) / 3 x red = red (action action required) / 3 x red = red (action action
Stakeholder discussion and decision:	Sensitivity Expected condition Likelihood attion * Overall rating: 3 x gree



ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR

6 FUTURÉ DEVELOPMENT SITES






ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 2) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 500 M;

68 | TOOLS AND PROTOCOLS FOR LTRM IN VIETNAM

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 2) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)





	History of the site / Information from NTS	discovered and UXO. Due to th marked on the cleared (to a d	adwineducin ou dremoved. Therr ne high populatic map, these have epth of 30 cm).	e was also heavy my these areas r been confirme	y ground figl ground figl nave been pl d to contair	us the war; through the cou hting resulting in widesprea rioritised by international N J UXO and only the one in g	rse of infrastruct ad contamination IGOs. Three area reen (encroachii	ria Lang town saw requent portioning thins by the OS during the war; through the course of infrastructure expansion many have been discovered and removed. There was also heavy ground fighting resulting in widespread contamination from cluster munitions and other UXO. Due to the high population, these areas have been prioritised by international NGOs. Three areas surrounding the proposed site are marked on the map, these have been confirmed to contain UXO and only the one in green (encroaching the 500 m radius) has been cleared (to a depth of 30 cm).
Planned activities (detailed pro steps and construction plans, if available)	Planned activities (detailed process steps and construction plans, if available)	un ii fo H	s still very much nd garden areas. 3 the 500 m radiu at the site will be is stage if larger l	in the early stag As a result, the and observing converted into building work w	ges – curren i inspecting f the current sports field ill be require	This proposal is still very much in the early stages – currently the area is made up of residential buildings (very small, one level, foundations) and garden areas. As a result, the inspecting team was unable to gain physical access to the exact proposed build instead circling the 500 m radius and observing the current level of infrastructure. With information available at this point it is understood that the site will be converted into sports fields – this will require ploughing and laying of turf, using light machineu unknown at this stage if larger building work will be required or indeed if it is planned.	esidential buildir vysical access to th information a ng and laying of	This proposal is still very much in the early stages – currently the area is made up of residential buildings (very small, one level, little to no foundations) and garden areas. As a result, the inspecting team was unable to gain physical access to the exact proposed building point, instead circling the 500 m radius and observing the current level of infrastructure. With information available at this point it is understood that the site will be converted into sports fields – this will require ploughing and laying of turf, using light machinery. It is unknown at this stage if larger building work will be required or indeed if it is planned.
				Detailed r	Detailed risk assessment	ient		
Expected ERW category	Worst expected ammunition type / effect	Sensitivity	Expected condition	Likelihood of encountering ammunition	Overall rating*	Expected depth	Work steps at risk	Expected worst case
Other ERW ≤ 60 mm	40 mm / HE	×	×	×	×	0 – 30 cm		Unplanned explosion on the surface during work.
Possible measures for risk mi We currently do not know th – data unavailable) to establi cluster munitions discovered.	Possible measures for risk mitigation: We currently do not know the size of the – data unavailable) to establish the exten cluster munitions discovered.	n: f the area require :xtent of contami.	ed for conversion nation (if any). F	to the sports gi ollowing TS, bat	round; regai tle area clea	rdless, the exact footprint s arance can be conducted to	hould undergo t a depth of 30 cr	Possible measures for risk mitigation: We currently do not know the size of the area required for conversion to the sports ground; regardless, the exact footprint should undergo technical survey (if it has not already – data unavailable) to establish the extent of contamination (if any). Following TS, battle area clearance can be conducted to a depth of 30 cm including 50 m fade-out for any cluster munitions discovered.
If building work PeaceTrees Viet All construction tampering with t	If building work is required, then a detector calibrated for a deeper search (up to 1 m) should be swept c PeaceTrees Vietnam / Quång Tri military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that a All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discover tampering with the object and call QTMAC for immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.	etector calibrated itary) are on stand ilmited working TMAC for immed	d for a deeper se dby and coordin: knowledge of "s liate assessment	arch (up to 1 m) ated by QTMAC uspected UXO" and, if required) should be : in the event so that on d , RSP and re	or calibrated for a deeper search (up to 1 m) should be swept over the foundation footprint. Domestic EOD teams (MA are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by the local population ted working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid C for immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.	footprint. Dome e discovered by t kers can cease al	If building work is required, then a detector calibrated for a deeper search (up to 1 m) should be swept over the foundation footprint. Domestic EOD teams (MAG / NPA / PeaceTrees Vietnam / Quång Tri military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by the local population. All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid moving or tampering with the object and call QTMAC for immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.
stakeholder disi	Stakeholder discussion and decision:	2						
Sensitivity	Notable	Notable disturbance needed for ignition	led for ignition	Some di	isturbance r	Some disturbance needed for ignition	Little	Little disturbance needed for ignition
Expected condition		Not likely to function anymore	more	Partially	Partially still functioning	oning	Likely	Likely still functioning
Likelihood				Medium	c		High	

ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 2) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)







TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 3) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 500 M;


TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 3) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)



History of the site / Information from NTS	te / n NTS	Some sporad contaminati green fill ind with roughly	dic bombing frc on from submu icates previous • even distribut	om US air Initions a Ily cleare ion in gel	assets (mir nd small ar d land by N neral vicinit	iimal) with ms ammun IAG operat y of the pla	Some sporadic bombing from US air assets (minimal) with heavy and intense ground fighting. Widespread and consistent UXO contamination from submunitions and small arms ammunition. Several confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) visible on map outli green fill indicates previously cleared land by MAG operators to a depth of 30 cm. Other historical finds and UXO-related incid- with roughly even distribution in general vicinity of the planned road expansion.	fighting. Widesp izardous areas (C her historical fin	Some sporadic bombing from US air assets (minimal) with heavy and intense ground fighting. Widespread and consistent UXO contamination from submunitions and small arms ammunition. Several confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) visible on map outlined in red; green fill indicates previously cleared land by MAG operators to a depth of 30 cm. Other historical finds and UXO-related incidents visible with roughly even distribution in general vicinity of the planned road expansion.
Planned activities (detailed pro steps and construction plans, if available)	Planned activities (detailed process steps and construction plans, if available)		vities have com ate, roadway is d tarmac and v o have a large b	imenced a compa videned i oreeze bl	but have b acted earth oadway to ock curb eit	een tempo path wide allow two- :her side to	rarily suspended for an unc enough for one-way flow o way traffic flow (pictures of prevent incursion by mud.	disclosed period of traffic with a g f both current st and other organi	Planned activities have commenced but have been temporarily suspended for an undisclosed period of time – reason for suspension unclear. In original state, roadway is a compacted earth path wide enough for one-way flow of traffic with a grass verge on either side. Modified road is a solid tarmac and widened roadway to allow two-way traffic flow (pictures of both current states attached). When completed, road will also have a large breeze block curb either side to prevent incursion by mud and other organic debris during the rainy season.
					Detailed r	Detailed risk assessment	rent		
Expected ERW category	Worst expected ammunition type / effect	Sensitivity	Expected condition		Likelihood of encountering ammunition	Overall rating*	Expected depth	Work steps at risk	Expected worst case
Other ERW ≤ 60 mm	40 mm / HE	×		×		×	0 – 30 cm		Unplanned explosion on the surface during work.
Other ERW > 60 mm	105 mm / HE / Phosphor	×		××		×	15 cm – 80 cm		Unplanned explosion following unsanctioned movement by workers.
ossible measur	Possible measures for risk mitigation:	Ë						-	
or this task the employed should puried ordnance	For this task the planned intrusive work will employed should be along the compacted e buried ordnance). Using a mobile detector,	ork will be alon acted earth sec tector, such as	ig the exact bo ction of the roa a scorpion cali	rder of th d (partia brated tc	ie road, no Ily complet a depth of	expected i ed area has 80 cm, wo	mpact to surrounding area s already been laid with tarr uld provide an accurate rea	(500 m border vi mac, thereby neg ad-out of any bur	For this task the planned intrusive work will be along the exact border of the road, no expected impact to surrounding area (500 m border visible on map). Risk mitigation employed should be along the compacted earth section of the road (partially completed area has already been laid with tarmac, thereby negating any surface influence on buried ordnance). Using a mobile detector, such as a scorpion calibrated to a depth of 80 cm, would provide an accurate read-out of any buried objects for later excavation and
investigation (as required) Domestic EOD teams (MA	i required). sams (MAG / NPA / F	eaceTrees Vie	tnam / Quảng ⁻	Irį milita	ry) are on st	tandby and	coordinated by QTMAC in	the event that a	investigation (as required). Domestic EOD teams (MAG / NPA / PeaceTrees Vietnam / Quảng Trị military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by
the local population. All construction work	the local population. All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discover commonion with the object and call OTMARC for immediate accommont and if continued PSD and common	e limited workir	ng knowledge o	of "suspe	cted UXO" : if romirod	so that on	discovery, construction wor	rkers can cease a	the local population. All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid moving or composition with the object and call OTMAC for immediate accomment and if continued and comment

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 3) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)


TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 3) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)





ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR

6 FUTURÉ DEVELOPMENT SITES





TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 4) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 500 M; FORM B1 (GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT)



		General information				
District / Commune / Coordinates	Hải Lăng	Hải Dương	107.335416 / 16.72484	Date of assessment:	essment:	09 April 19
Assessor company / Team / Name	MAG	TFM, Head Office	ice	ΗΨ	Henry Marriner	L.
Project name / Planned activity	Building 8 classrooms		Construction (intrusive activity > 1 m)	e activity > 1 n	(u	
	Expected contamination:	Aircraft bombs: medium likelihood / Other ERW: medium likelihood of $\le 60 \text{ mm}$	lood / of ≤ 60 mm and high likelihoo	d > 60 mm		
Result of general risk assessment	Required action:	 2c for aircraft bombs (clearance to specified depth for the intended land use (and / or other risk mitigation measures) 2b for > 60 mm (clearance down to 1 m / max penetration depth or other risk mitigation measures) 2a for < 60 mm (clearance down to 30 cm or other risk mitigation measures) 	e to specified depth for the int 'n to 1 m / max penetration de n to 30 cm or other risk mitigal	tended land u. pth or other r tion measures	se (and / or isk mitigatic 5)	other risk mitigatior on measures)
Site-specific residual contarnination			Diameter: 500			


History of the site /	_	The prir develop contam bomb fi	mary su ped and inatior inds ard	chool is d the are ו from sr e rare du	located ea was p nall arm ue to pro	The primary school is located on the edge of a built-up developed and the area was predominately woodland contamination from small arms UXO throughout the ir bomb finds are rare due to previous clearance efforts.	lge of a l ately wo ırougho∪ ≥arance €	ouilt-up arr odland anr it the imm efforts.	ea in Hái Láng district. Durin d rice paddy fields. Heavy gr ediate vicinity. Some sporac	The primary school is located on the edge of a built-up area in Hai Lang district. During the war the intrastructure was considerably less developed and the area was predominately woodland and rice paddy fields. Heavy ground fighting left widespread and consistent contamination from small arms UXO throughout the immediate vicinity. Some sporadic bombing occurred, but over 50 years on and bomb finds are rare due to previous clearance efforts.
	2	To the r such clc building	north c sse pro ʒs has r	on the m wimity co not requ	ap you o ould ind ired the	can see C licate mo i need foi	HAs prev re cluste	viously clea r munition al survey –	ared by MAG; these areas ar contamination to the south and subsequent confirmati	To the north on the map you can see CHAs previously cleared by MAG; these areas are now clear but the presence of cluster munitions in such close proximity could indicate more cluster munition contamination to the south in the agricultural areas, where the lack of buildings has not required the need for technical survey – and subsequent confirmation of cluster munitions (if present at all).
Planned activities (detailed process steps and construction plans, if available)	(detailed construction	Three s dig four	eparat ⁱ idatior	Three separate buildings are plar dig foundations, up to 1 m deep.	ıgs are β 1 m det	olanned t ep.	o accom	modate ei	ght classrooms. Work will re	Three separate buildings are planned to accommodate eight classrooms. Work will require heavy machinery to transit the grass area and dig foundations, up to 1 m deep.
							etailed n	Detailed risk assessment	nent	
Expected ERW category	Worst expected ammunition type / effect	Sensitivity	vity	Expé conc	Expected condition	Likelil encou amm	Likelihood of encountering ammunition	Overall rating*	Expected depth	Work Expected worst case steps at risk
Aircraft bombs	Mk82		X		×		×	×	0.5 m – 2 m	Unplanned explosion following unsanctioned movement by workers.
Other ERW ≤ 60 mm	40 mm / HE		×		×	×		×	0 – 30 cm	Explosion of an untampered 40 mm grenade on the surface.
Other ERW > 60 mm	105 mm / HE / Phosphor	×			×	×		×	15 cm – 80 cm	Unplanned explosion following unsanctioned movement by workers.
Possible measure Biven the proximi country policy – N	Possible measures for risk mitigation: Given the proximity to several other CHAs (country policy – NPA) to a depth of 30 cm,	HAs (cm, †	ared to	the nor	rth and i	uncleare any shall	d to the v owly bur	west) the ir ied small n	nspecting officer would reconnuiced reconnuiced in a surrounding a	cleared to the north and uncleared to the west) the inspecting officer would recommend technical survey (in line with current to assess the presence of any shallowly buried small munitions in a surrounding area of 100 m from the centre of the building site. If
contamination is f The risk assessme	contamination is found, further battle area clearance is conducted to make the area safe for use. The risk assessment has awarded a "medium" rating for UXO larger than 60 mm (requiring cleara	e area cle medium"	arance rating	e is cond for UXO	ucted tc larger t	o make th han 60 m	ie area si im (requi	afe for use iring cleara	ance up to a depth of 1 m) b	contamination is found, further battle area clearance is conducted to make the area safe for use. The risk assessment has awarded a "medium" rating for UXO larger than 60 mm (requiring clearance up to a depth of 1 m) but since aircraft bombs also have a "medium"
rating, the recomn case by case basis.	nendation is to swe	eep the e:	zact loc	cation of	f the pro	posed fc	undation	us with a d	etector configured to a dep	rating, the recommendation is to sweep the exact location of the proposed foundations with a detector configured to a depth of 1 m. Clearance can then be conducted on a case by case basis.
Domestic EOD tea	Domestic EOD teams (MAG / NPA / PeaceT		s Vietn	am / Qu	ıảng Trị	military)	are on s	tandby anc	d coordinated by QTMAC in	ees Vietnam / Quảng Trị military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by
the local population. All construction wor	tne local population. All construction workers should have limite	: limited v	vorking	t knowle	dge of "	'suspecte	"OXU p	so that on	discovery, construction wor	the local population. All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid moving or


TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 4) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 4) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)



TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 5) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 1 KM; FORM B1 (GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT)





TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 5) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 1 KM;

11 April 2019 Planting/Ploughing (intrusive activity > 30 cm - 1 m) Henry Marriner Date of assessment: O for aircraft bombs (site-specific assessment to clarify land use / work steps) 2a for ≤ 60 mm (clearance down to 30 cm or other risk mitigation measures) Aircraft bombs: medium likelihood Other ERW: low likelihood of \le 60 mm Form B2: Site-specific risk assessment: Perennial crop area, Hải Chánh/Hài Trường No coordinates provided Change purpose to perennial land in some locations in Hải Chánh, Hài Trường, Hải Phú and Hải Sơn communes TFM, Head Office General information Hải Chánh/Hài Trường Diameter: 1.5 km Expected contamination: Required action: Hải Lăng MAG Site-specific residual contamination District / Commune / Coordinates Assessor company / Team / Name Result of general risk assessment Project name / Planned activity


ANNEX D) COMPLETED FORMS B1 AND B2 FOR 6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SITES

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 5) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)


History of the site / Information from NTS	te / n NTS	Hài Tru UXO cc of EOD (but un UXO ur	r'ờng co ontamin) spot ta ncleared nder 60	Hài Trường commune is lo UXO contamination and, di of EOD spot tasks conducts (but uncleared) confirmed UXO under 60 mm calibre.	cated in ue to th∉ ed in the hazardo	the very su low amou area. US t us areas (C	outh of Hả unt of infra oombing w CHAs) seen	i Läng district along the F astructure built since the as also frequent in the an as red shaded areas. Thr i as red shaded areas. Th	luế border. Ground end of the war, the cea. To the north an see surveyed areas :	Hài Trường commune is located in the very south of Hài Lǎng district along the Huế border. Ground fighting during the war left sporadic UXO contamination and, due to the low amount of infrastructure built since the end of the war, there has been a relatively low number of EOD spot tasks conducted in the area. US bombing was also frequent in the area. To the north and south there are previously surveyed (but uncleared) confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) seen as red shaded areas. These surveyed areas support the "high" assessment for UXO under 60 mm calibre.
Planned activitie steps and constr available)	Planned activities (detailed process steps and construction plans, if available)		tention i sa has n ve activi	is to return t o buildings o ty would be	the blue- the infrastr the upro	shaded are ructure, wi ooting of la	ea to perer ith the exc irger trees	The intention is to return the blue-shaded area to perennial land with planting and ploughing to a depth between 30 cm – 1 r the area has no buildings or infrastructure, with the exception of a few dirt roads. Consequently, this assessment finds that th intrusive activity would be the uprooting of larger trees, although this activity has not yet been confirmed or even suggested.	nd ploughing to a d s. Consequently, thi is not yet been conf	The intention is to return the blue-shaded area to perennial land with planting and ploughing to a depth between 30 cm – 1 m. Currently, the area has no buildings or infrastructure, with the exception of a few dirt roads. Consequently, this assessment finds that the most intrusive activity would be the uprooting of larger trees, although this activity has not yet been confirmed or even suggested.
						Detailed	Detailed risk assessment	ssment		
Expected ERW category	Worst expected ammunition type / effect	Sensitivity	iivity	Expected condition		Likelihood of encountering ammunition	f B Overall rating*	Expected depth	Work steps at risk	Expected worst case
Aircraft bombs	MK82		×	×		×	×	0. 5 m – 2 m		Unplanned explosion following unsanctioned movement by workers.
Other ERW ≤ 60 mm	40 mm/HE		×		×	×	×	0 – 30 cm		Explosion of an untampered 40 mm grenade on the surface.
s bu mm Possible measur As seen in the sig The inspecting o munitions. If con	S b0 mm Possible measures for risk mitigation: As seen in the sight overview, there are The inspecting officer would recommentions. If contamination is found, fi	n: are sever hend tech	al uncle inical su battle an	ared CHAs ir irvey (in line ea clearance	the imn with cur e should	nediate vic rent count be conduc	cinity. Thei try policy - ted to ma	Soluminations. If contaminations is found, further battle area clearance should be conducted to make the area safe for use.	turther bombing ru	Soluminations. If contamination is found, further battle area clearance should be conducted to make the area safe for use.
Area is far too la	rge, and the likelihoc	od of airc	sraft bor	mbs is not pr	evalent (enough to	warrant w	vide-scale deep clearance	this would take a	Area is far too large, and the likelihood of aircraft bombs is not prevalent enough to warrant wide-scale deep clearance – this would take a very long time. Instead, local
authorities shoul buildin <u>es</u> .	authorities should be notified before any de buildin <u>es</u> .	e any dee	p work	(foundations	s etc.) are	e develope	ed. These s	should be checked first wi	ith deep search in tl	ep work (foundations etc.) are developed. These should be checked first with deep search in the immediate footprint of planned:
omestic EOD te	Domestic EOD teams (MAG / NPA / PeaceTr	^{>} eaceTre	es Vietn	am / Quảng	Trį milita	ary) are on	standby a	ind coordinated by QTM ^J	\C in the event that	ees Vietnam / Quảng Trị military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by
the local population. All construction wor ^l	tion. workers should have	ی limited	working	knowledge	of "suspé	ected UXO	" so that o	in discovery, constructior	ו workers can cease	the local population. All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid moving or
ampering with t	tampering with the object and call QTMAC f	TMAC for	r immec	or immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.	nent and	, if require	id, RSP and	d removal.		


TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 5) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 5) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)



TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 6) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 1 KM; FORM B1 (GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT)





TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 6) DIAMETER MAPPING METHOD, THRESHOLD 1 KM; FORM B1 (GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT)


TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 6) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)

		General	General information			
District / Commune / Coordinates	Hải Lăng	Hải Xuân		No coordinates available	Date of assessment:	01 April 2019
Assessor company / Team / Name	MAG		TFM, Head Office	ce	Henry Marriner	ler
Project name / Planned activity	Enlarge/redesign recreational area	l area		Planting / Ploughine	Planting / Ploughing (intrusive activity 30 cm - 1 m)	1 m)
	Expected contamination:	Aircraft bombs: I	ow likelihood/a	Aircraft bombs: low likelihood/other ERW: low likelihood of > 60 mm and high likelihood of \leq 60 mm	of > 60 mm and high likeliho	ood of ≤ 60 mm
Result of general risk assessment	Required action:	2a for ≤ 60 mm (clearance dowr	2a for \leq 60 mm (clearance down to 30 cm or other risk mitigation measures)	igation measures)	
Residual contamination in commune	Diameter 2 km					

History of the site / Information from NTS	e/ NTS	As with the re UXO. The are to be low afte surrounded b borders of the	As with the rest of Hải Lắng UXO. The area was also he to be low after many years , surrounded by previously cl borders of the CHAs in red.	district, this a avily bombed of clearance e eared confirm	ea saw larg throughout fforts by the ed hazardou	ith the rest of Hải Lăng district, this area saw large amounts of ground fighting leading to extensive contaminati . The area was also heavily bombed throughout the war, however, the presence of these air-dropped bombs is low after many years of clearance efforts by the military and several international NGOs. This particular site is unded by previously cleared confirmed hazardous areas. The cleared areas can be observed in green fill with t ars of the CHAs in red.	hting leading to esence of these rnational NGOs. eas can be obse	As with the rest of Håi Läng district, this area saw large amounts of ground fighting leading to extensive contamination with UXO. The area was also heavily bombed throughout the war, however, the presence of these air-dropped bombs is assessed to be low after many years of clearance efforts by the military and several international NGOs. This particular site is surrounded by previously cleared confirmed hazardous areas. The cleared areas can be observed in green fill with the original borders of the CHAs in red.
Planned activities (detailed pro steps and construction plans, if available)	Planned activities (detailed process steps and construction plans, if available)		Some information is missing regarding the exact proposal the majority of the work will be light, with a focus on presel light machinery and potentially the planting of new trees. Theavy machinery and foundations to a depth of $1.5 - 2$ m.	g regarding the be light, with (ally the plantin ations to a de	e exact prop a focus on p g of new tre pth of 1.5 –	osal of work to be comm reservation of the natura es. There may be a requ 2 m.	ienced in the are l area. Some plo lirement to build	Some information is missing regarding the exact proposal of work to be commenced in the area, however it is anticipated that the majority of the work will be light, with a focus on preservation of the natural area. Some ploughing can be expected using light machinery and potentially the planting of new trees. There may be a requirement to build in the area which would involve heavy machinery and foundations to a depth of $1.5 - 2 \mathrm{m}$.
				Detailec	Detailed risk assessment	ient		
Expected ERW category	Worst expected ammunition type / effect	Sensitivity	Expected condition	Likelihood of encountering ammunition	f B rating*	Expected depth	Work steps at risk	Expected worst case
Other ERW ≤ 60 mm	40 mm/HE	×	×	×	×	0 – 30 cm		Unplanned explosion on the surface during work.
Possible measure The presence of th out will have appli	Possible measures for risk mittigation: The presence of the 3 previously cleared CH. out will have applied a "50 m fade-out rule"	on: ared CHAs within out rule" meaning	and around the g there should b	e no UXO aroui	icantly have id the border	As within and around the area will significantly have reduced the likelihood of cluster munitions and other UXO. The wor meaning there should be no UXO around the borders and, given their proximity to one another, the chances of residual	luster munitions and the states of the state	Possible measures for risk mitigation: The presence of the 3 previously cleared CHAs within and around the area will significantly have reduced the likelihood of cluster munitions and other UXO. The work carried out will have applied a "50 m fade-out rule" meaning there should be no UXO around the borders and, given their proximity to one another, the chances of residual
entire proposed a should be conduct	containington is jow. The task finality finduces beginde to a bepind entire proposed area (blue shading on map) excluding any previously should be conducted to a depth of 30 cm within the proposed areas.	on map) excludin 0 cm within the p	g any previously proposed areas.	cleared areas (green shadin	is development task the re ig). If TS indicates consister	it UXO contamina	es dealance to a deput of 30 cm. Given me size of this development task the recommended action would be technical survey of the excluding any previously cleared areas (green shading). If TS indicates consistent UXO contamination, then battle area clearance thin the proposed areas.
If building work is PeaceTrees Vietna All construction w tampering with th	If building work is required, then a detector calibrated for a deeper search (up to 1 m) should be swept or PeaceTrees Vietnam / Quång Tri military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that a All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discove tampering with the object and call QTMAC for immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.	letector calibrate itary) are on stan e limited working XTMAC for immec	d for a deeper s dby and coordir g knowledge of " diate assessmen	earch (up to 1 r lated by QTMA suspected UXO t and, if require	n) should be C in the even " so that on (d, RSP and re	If building work is required, then a detector calibrated for a deeper search (up to 1 m) should be swept over the foundation footprint. Domestic EOD teams (MA PeaceTrees Vietnam / Quång Tri military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by the local population All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid tampering with the object and call QTMAC for immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.	footprint. Domes e discovered by tl rkers can cease al	If building work is required, then a detector calibrated for a deeper search (up to 1 m) should be swept over the foundation footprint. Domestic EOD teams (MAG / NPA / PeaceTrees Vietnam / Quàng Trị military) are on standby and coordinated by QTMAC in the event that any suspect items are discovered by the local population. All construction workers should have limited working knowledge of "suspected UXO" so that on discovery, construction workers can cease all operations, avoid moving or tampering with the object and call QTMAC for immediate assessment and, if required, RSP and removal.

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 6) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)

TEST DEVELOPMENT SITE 6) FORM B2 (SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT)





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