

Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership

Azerbaijan

Geneva, March 2012

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), an international expert organisation legally based in Switzerland as a non-profit foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards. In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan, coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

This report was written by Charles Downs, independent consultant.

© Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

The designation employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the GICHD concerning the legal status of any country, territory or armed groups, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Centre International de Déminage Humanitaire | Genève

7 bis, av. de la Paix | P.O. Box 1300 | 1211 Geneva 1 | Switzerland | t. + 41 (0)22 906 16 60
f. + 41 (0)22 906 16 90 | info@gichd.org | www.gichd.org

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ANA	Azerbaijan National Army	SCRRA	State Committee for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of War-Affected Areas
ANAMA	Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action	SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
AP	Anti-personnel mine	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
ARRA	Azerbaijan Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency	TA	Technical Advisor
AT	Anti-tank mine	TSQAD	Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division
BP	British Petroleum	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
Dayag-RA	Dayag – Relief Azerbaijan	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
DMC	Department for Mine Clearance	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War		
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining		
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross		
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons		
IED	Improvised Explosive Device		
IEFP	International Eurasia Press Fund		
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards		
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action		
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey		
MAC	Mine Action Centre		
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan		
MAG	Mines Advisory Group		
MDD	Mine Detection Dogs		
MDM	Mechanical Demining Machines		
MoE	Ministry of Education		
MRE	Mine Risk Education		
MVA	Mine Victim Assistance		
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency		
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation		
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority		
PfP	NATO Partnership for Peace		
QA	Quality Assurance		
QA/QC	Quality assurance / quality control		
SAC	Survey Action Center		

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME	3
Strategy	4
Mine Risk Education	5
Mine Victim Assistance	5
Stockpile destruction	6
Ottawa Convention Advocacy	6
Resource Mobilisation	6
Gender	7
HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT	8
International Technical Cooperation	10
Estimating the Scale of the Landmine/ERW Problem	13
Mine Risk Education	13
Mine Victim Assistance	14
CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME	15
General assessment	15
National programme management	16
Organisational capacities	16
Technical capacities	17
Strategic Planning	18
Organisational sustainability	19
Financial sustainability	19
Extending technical cooperation to other national mine action programmes	19
Mine Risk Education	20
Mine Victim Assistance	20
TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP	22
Essential mine action programme capacities	24
LESSONS LEARNT	31
"Transition" concept	31
From "exceptions" to "institutions"	31
Transition process	31
Content: what to transition	32
Post-transition development	32
Don't punish success, support it!	33
RELEVANT TABLES	34
BIBLIOGRAPHY	41
ANNEXES	43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Azerbaijan's mine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem is the result of both an internal war between Azerbaijan and Armenian separatists—which saw landmines laid by both sides throughout the duration of the conflict between 1992 and 1994—and Russia's hasty and careless efforts to destroy larger ammunition stores, which left live rockets and shells strewn over large areas of southern Azerbaijan.

To address its contamination problem, Azerbaijan created the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) in 1998. The ANAMA was charged with coordinating activities in the areas of demining, mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance. Having limited operational capacity, ANAMA signed an agreement with UNDP, creating the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme in 1999, which included a UNDP-managed trust fund to channel international financial contributions and the provision of technical assistance through UNOPS. With an eye on developing Azerbaijan's national operational capacity, much of UNOPS' contracting focused on hiring organisations like the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) and other private groups to help train national staff in demining and EOD, and UNICEF and the ICRC to integrate MRE into curricula of schools in mine/ERW affected districts and to train teachers to carry out MRE.

Azerbaijan adopted its first national strategy in 2001, which mandated ANAMA to manage most mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal outside technical support. The programme was formally nationalised in 2004, with the departure of the last Chief Technical Advisor, who at that point was the only remaining long term advisor. In fact, since the programme was nationally owned in the first place, there was never a question of whether the programme would transition from the UN to national ownership. For this reason, the programme had mainly focused on gaining knowledge in mine action—a new field in Azerbaijan—and allocating resources to jumpstart the process, but did not foresee an extended UN presence within the national agency. ANAMA, therefore, sought to increase its national capacity and management control, while also welcoming support, but not authority, by the UN and other partners.

Through full nationalisation, ANAMA began to develop new methods and procedures that were better adapted to the national situation. In addition, after nationalisation, a number of donors and the national government began to entrust ANAMA with more resources. With greater responsibility for their own programme and its results, the management and staff paid more attention to being efficient and effective, with a great measure of success.

Azerbaijan illustrates that transition often refers to shifting the balance between foreign and national staff in decision-making at all levels, rather than fully shifting from a UN-led programme to a nationally-owned one. The Azerbaijan case illustrates that the government itself initiated and had ultimate authority and ownership of the mine action programme from the beginning, even if external funding and operational support played a major role. ANAMA, then, demonstrates that national mine action programmes should aim to be fully nationalised while also benefiting from continuing partnership with the UN and others.

INTRODUCTION

Azerbaijan is located in the Caucasus region of southeast Europe, and shares borders with Russia, Iran, Turkey, Georgia and Armenia (Map 1). The total population in 2011 was over nine million people. Slightly more than 50 per cent live in urban areas, half of whom live in the capital city of Baku.

Azerbaijan is a middle income country with an average GDP of just over USD 10,000. While agriculture remains an important source of employment, the single largest contributor to national income is the petroleum sector. With the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan petroleum pipeline in 2005, the economy has been fuelled by construction and other projects financed from petroleum proceeds. Nonetheless, average salaries remain low by European standards, with low incomes particularly common among internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the areas affected by landmines and conflict.

The mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination problem is a direct result of the break-up of the Soviet Union, which included Azerbaijan's declaration of independence in October 1991. Two main factors, explained below, are the cause of the current problems.

In 1988, Armenian separatists in the Azerbaijan districts of Nagorno-Karabakh declared their independence from Azerbaijan. Separatists and Armenian forces, with Russian support, fought a war with Azerbaijan from 1992 until a ceasefire was signed in 1994. However, the parties have not signed a peace agreement and violations of the ceasefire at the line of control are frequent. The separatist forces occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, displacing an estimated 1.5 million people (nearly 20 per cent of the population) in the process. Some territory was recovered by Azerbaijan in 1993-94.

The armies of both sides were trained by the Soviets as regards use of landmines, so sometimes laid pattern minefields. However, many of the fighters were irregular forces who followed more random approaches to landmine use. Most of the population centres, water, power and road infrastructure, as well as some agricultural land in the areas that exchanged hands were affected by mines and ERW.

Azerbaijan was an important element in the southern defence structure of the Soviet Union, ready for possible NATO assaults from Turkey or through Iran. Many Soviet Army bases and training ranges were located in Azerbaijan, together with one of the Soviet Union's largest arms stockpiles. When the Soviet Army withdrew from Azerbaijan in 1991, efforts to destroy larger ammunition stores left live rockets and shells strewn over large areas. Smaller quantities of munitions were buried near many bases.

The first General Survey, conducted in 2001 in the 11 most affected districts, identified

64 affected settlements and 60 square kilometres of contamination. The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) conducted in 2002-2003 identified 480 mine-affected communities in 18 out of 68 districts nationwide, with a total of 970 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 514,000 people. Nearly two-thirds of the SHAs were affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) alone, with 163 SHAs over an area of 44 square kilometres contaminated by the explosive dispersal of UXO from the Saloglu arms storage site. As many as 210 low impact communities with 307 SHAs had only UXO hazards creating one or zero blockages to livelihoods assets (eg crop land). More than half of mine-affected communities are in Fizuli district, while more than half of the UXO-affected communities are in Aghstafa district.

The landmine/ERW situation in the currently occupied territories is unknown, although estimates suggest that it could be roughly comparable to the extent of problem in the accessible areas. The extent of the use of mines around the current Azerbaijan National Army bases (away from the frontline) and on the borders with Russia, Iran, Georgia and Turkey is unknown, although some border minefields are reported to have been removed by the military.

A total of 2,882 landmine victims are registered in the IMSMA database, as a result of all data collected since the first International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) efforts in 1996. Of those, 2,372 are clearly identified by sex, date of birth, date of incident and type of injury and the other 510 are classified as “other”. Nearly all are victims of mines laid during the recent conflict. The LIS identified 51 victims during the two years prior to the survey, of whom 98 per cent were men. The number of victims has fallen from roughly five a month in 2005 to about one every two months in 2010 and 2011 (Table 1). The vast majority of victims are men between the ages of 18 and 40, often involved in mine accidents while on military duty.

Demining (clearance and survey) has shown that, while landmines are widespread, mined areas are not generally dense. Compared to other conflicts, anti-tank (AT) mines are relatively more common than AP (anti-personnel) mines. The most widespread hazard is UXO on the many battle areas and old ammunition stores.

OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

Presidential Decree 854 of 18 July 1998 created the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), which reports to the Deputy Prime Minister as head of the State Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. The Government of Azerbaijan and UNDP established the internationally supported national mine action programme on 2 April 1999.

ANAMA was created with the responsibility to coordinate action in areas of demining, mine risk education, and victim assistance. The agreement included the creation of a UNDP-managed trust fund to channel international and government financial contributions and provision of technical assistance through UNOPS. As of 2011, the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme was comprised of three main organisations plus other actors and activities, as they have developed from the early years of the national mine action programme (Chart 1):

Chart 1 Key Features of the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme	
Strategic purpose	Support recovery and rehabilitation of areas and population affected by conflict with Armenia
NMAA/MAC	ANAMA
National demining operators	ANAMA Relief Azerbaijan (RA-Dayag) International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF)
International demining operators	None
National MRE operators	ANAMA RA-Dayag IEFP Ministry of Education Community risk education committees
National MVA operators	Ministry of Health Ministry of Labour and Social Protection ANAMA (vocational training and micro credit)
Core funding channels	Government of Azerbaijan UNDP Trust Fund Bilateral donor cooperation
Largest funders (over USD 1 million cumulative)	Government of Azerbaijan USA European Commission NATO UNDP

By the end of 2010, ANAMA had eliminated nearly 50 per cent of the 306 square kilometres of SHAs identified during the 2006 review with local authorities, with 155 square kilometres remaining. The national programme has been releasing land through clearance and survey at an annual rate of about 30 square kilometres since 2008 (Table 2).

Prior to the establishment of ANAMA, the Azerbaijan National Army (ANA) conducted mine clearance in the former conflict areas under their control. This clearance reportedly focused on defensive minefields surrounding their own bases as well as on major roads and some other areas. While ANA provided no minefield maps to ANAMA, it reportedly cleared over 19,000 AT and 22,000 AP mines from 15 minefields between 1994 and 1997. Establishment of ANAMA reflected the Government agreement with the international community that humanitarian mine action should be managed by a civilian agency.

STRATEGY

ANAMA's core goal is to achieve an Azerbaijan where all people live free from the threat of landmines and ERW. Its attention focuses on making it safe for IDP resettlement and removing hazardous obstacles to development projects. It has a twofold strategy:

- (a) to ensure safety and remove hazards from the currently accessible areas affected by the conflict
- (b) to expand, in order to identify and resolve the problem of landmines and ERW when the currently occupied territories become accessible.

Broad priorities for ANAMA and the national programme were established from the beginning as:

- To clear areas of life-threatening dangers
- To support the resettlement of IDPs through clearance of houses and infrastructure required to support communities
- To clear construction sites as requested by aid and development agencies
- To support food security through clearance of agricultural and grazing land

Operational criteria for prioritisation/selection of tasks since 2001 include:

- The area must be secure and free of fighting
- The task must conform to national priorities
- Refugees or IDPs are returning into the area
- Reconstruction tasks have to be planned, funded and ready to commence under the national reconstruction programme
- Local authorities and communities must have been consulted
- The population must derive immediate humanitarian, economic or social benefits after the operation

MINE RISK EDUCATION

The ICRC, through its work with Azerbaijani IDPs, which began in 1996, was actively involved in mine risk education (MRE). It carried out the following:

- developed a database of mine victims
- carried out mine awareness sessions in IDP communities
- trained health and education personnel working there

ANAMA, with the support of UNICEF, took over responsibility for MRE from ICRC at the beginning of 2000. Key ICRC national staff were transferred to ANAMA, as was the victim database. UNICEF worked with ANAMA from 2000-2004, with community outreach MRE through volunteer teacher, health workers and others. Since 2004, as the result of an agreement between ANAMA, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education, MRE has been integrated in schools as a classroom subject in mine-affected areas. ANAMA continues to successfully promote community MRE committees working with local authorities to spread MRE materials and monitor local accidents.

MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Even though a Mine Victim Assistance Strategy was adopted in 2004, it is more accurate to say that there is a range of mine victim assistance (MVA) efforts rather than a coherent MVA programme. Azerbaijan has legislation that guarantees war victims and persons with disabilities the right to:

- medical treatment
- other social support
- pensions

These laws predate the mine action programme, and were reinforced by the 2009 ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. The rights and protections under these laws extend to mine victims.

ANAMA established the Mine Victim Assistance Working Group in 2003 to bring together local and international NGOs, government agencies and UN organisations working on the issue. In 2004, ANAMA conducted a Mine Victim Assistance Needs Assessment, the results of which continue to guide the work of all major MVA actors. Most victims received emergency medical and prosthetics support. Many survey respondents, however, identified the lack of support in the areas of social and economic reintegration as a problem.

ANAMA's role in mine victim assistance primarily is to ensure that:

(a) the appropriate range of support is provided to victims, leading to increased focus on economic and occupation reintegration

(b) victims and their families are aware of their rights and of the assistance available

In addition, ANAMA supports pilot vocational training and micro-credit projects for mine victims and their families.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Although Azerbaijan has not committed itself to the destruction of its own stockpiles of primarily Soviet era mines, the issue of destruction of abandoned soviet munitions stocks is a concern which ANAMA has successfully responded to with the support of NATO/NAMSA. As a result of the success of the Saloglu project (see section 5 below), the government has tasked ANAMA (rather than the Ministry of Defence) with a clean-up of the other ex-Soviet munitions storage areas.

OTTAWA CONVENTION ADVOCACY

Azerbaijan is not a signatory of the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention. It has indicated that it will not be able to sign the Convention as long as the conflict with Armenia continues, but that it does not foresee any obstacle to sign once that conflict has been resolved. Therefore mine action is an internal safety and development issue rather than a treaty obligation. ANAMA attends the regular working groups and annual meetings of the Ottawa Convention as an observer. It has voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly Resolution against landmines since 2005 and has provided voluntary Article 7 reports since 2008. These reports describe the known problem and progress made, but they are incomplete as regards the existence of stockpiles and mined areas under the control of the military.

While ANAMA does not have a role in advocacy of the Ottawa Convention, it has an active public relations role to make known the dangers and damage caused by landmines and ERW to the people and development of Azerbaijan. Since the geographic extent of the problem is not nationwide, ANAMA has had to work proactively to ensure that government officials and the public as a whole are aware that Azerbaijan has this problem. It issues a monthly internet newsletter and press releases to maintain awareness of the problem and the programme actions. It also issues specific press releases whenever there is a mine accident or important mine action event. The news items are usually picked up by the local media.

Finally, the “Mine Danger” textbook developed by ANAMA and approved by the Ministry of Education in its regular curriculum contains a section on the APMBC and notes that high-ranking government officials have repeatedly stated that “the Republic of Azerbaijan will discuss the Treaty and adopt the decision to join it as soon as our lands are liberated from occupation.”

RESOURCE MOBILISATION

ANAMA took the lead in resource mobilisation from UNDP in 2003. ANAMA found that

some donors (eg USA) preferred to contribute to it directly, and their contribution increased significantly when ANAMA assumed responsibility. Other donors prefer to contribute through UNDP, and ANAMA values the trust fund management role which UNDP provides, which will become much more important at such time that ANAMA has access to work in the currently occupied districts. Azerbaijan is now the largest single contributor to the national mine action programme as well as to the UNDP Trust Fund in support of the national programme.

The number of donors has grown from three donors at the beginning of the programme to a cumulative total of 17 (Table 3). Principal partners each contributing more than USD 1,000,000 are US Dept of State, European Commission, NATO/NAMSA and UNDP.

GENDER

The UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action were issued after the programme had been nationalised. There are no women deminers. In 2000, MAG and ANAMA started to develop a women's demining section, and interviewed some candidates, but finally decided not to proceed with it. Relief Azerbaijan employed some women as translators during the period of training with MAG. The LIS survey teams were comprised of both men and women, and the community interview process ensured that both men and women were consulted. Some of the vocational training and micro-credit programmes focus on women particularly as indirect victims. ANAMA headquarters staff is 30 per cent women, including the heads of two departments. The majority of trained MRE facilitators (teachers) are women. ANAMA maintains and reports mine victim data on a sex and age disaggregated basis.

HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

In 1996, the Government, in coordination with the World Bank and UNDP, created the Azerbaijan Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (ARRA) to oversee reconstruction of the areas that had been occupied by the Armenian forces and then recovered by Azerbaijan. During preparatory planning for rehabilitation and return of IDPs to the war-affected areas, the Government recognised the need for a programme to remove mines/ERW and that such efforts would need international support. As ARRA began its work it encountered landmine obstacles to reconstruction and IDP return that confirmed the need for a demining programme. This founding link of mine action to reconstruction, IDP return and development has been maintained ever since.

After Presidential Decree 854 established the National Demining Agency (soon ANAMA), Government and UNDP began the negotiation of project AZE/98/003/07 to establish a joint “national mine action programme”, to provide technical assistance to the new agency and to establish a trust fund to receive financial contributions to support the national programme. The project document (prodoc) was signed on 2 April 1999. The parties recognised the need for international training and material assistance to develop the capacity to fulfil the role of ANAMA, with the prodoc stating that “Once fully trained and equipped, ANAMA will assume the pivotal role in the field of all mine action activities in Azerbaijan.”

ANAMA was to be a mine action coordination body, without its own operational capacity. Clearance was to be conducted by national and international NGOs established and accredited for this purpose. ANAMA was to report to the State Commission on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of War-Affected Areas (SCRRRA), and the Director of ANAMA to be appointed by the Chairman of the SCRRRA (Deputy Prime Minister), with the agreement of the President and in consultation with UNDP.

From the beginning of the national mine action programme, UNDP was the principal UN partner of the government. UNDP provided the framework for technical and financial support following the establishment of the national mine action programme. UNDP cooperation with ANAMA has continued without interruption, and is now under its fourth prodoc.

Initial technical assistance to ANAMA was shaped by the period when it began. ANAMA was developed during a period of great a debate in the international mine action community concerning:

- standards (IMAS)
- database system (IMSMA)
- structure of NMAA and MAC
- survey (LIS)

- MAC coordination model (not operations - contracting)
- prioritisation (impact)
- management development (senior and middle management training)

At the time ANAMA was established, nearly all MACs had been setup and managed by the UN, typically as part of a peacekeeping mission, including those in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia and Mozambique. Even those which had been handed over to the national government often still received multiple international advisors who were directly involved in day-to-day management of the programme. This meant that nearly all experienced potential international advisors understood their role as that of managing the programme, with particular attention to field operations.

A new consensus following the 1997 Department of Humanitarian Affairs study on the “development of indigenous mine action capacities” highlighted the importance of an organisational separation between the programme management capacities of the national institution and the operational capacities of its field partners¹. This was reflected in the early decision to establish a national NGO to manage deminers rather than have them directly recruited into a division of ANAMA.

While UNDP assistance did not begin with a fully detailed overall capacity development strategy, there was a clear understanding in the mine action community as to what capabilities a national authority and mine action centre should have. The UNDP prodoc included the development of a mine action plan, comprising six components:

- a national demining agency capable of planning, managing and coordinating mine action, undertake resource mobilisation activities, and support in its capacity development
- mine surveys, marking, documentation and creation of a national mines database
- coordinated mine action planning, prioritisation and awareness programmes
- training, quality management, mine/UXO clearance in support of reconstruction programmes
- victim support activities
- public relations and advocacy for support of a ban on use of landmines

ANAMA’s original Strategic Plan, adopted in October 2001, focused on development of an independent national capacity capable of working with minimal external technical advisors by 2003. Its specific goals addressed the need for capacity in six core areas:

¹¹ Eaton, *et al*

- (a) overall management
- (b) demining (clearance and survey)
- (c) MRE
- (d) information management
- (e) training and quality management
- (f) resource mobilisation

Quantitative aspects of the Strategic Plan were revised in November 2003 to consider results of the LIS. Priorities included:

- supporting mechanical demining
- strengthening strategic planning, management, coordination and control of operational activities
- revising standard operating procedures in accordance with national experience and standards

The 2002-2003 Work Plan further emphasised that “The nationalisation of the Program will remain a main goal to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for outside technical support.”

INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The first ANAMA staff were recruited in May 1999 and the first international advisors arrived in mid-summer. By March 2000, ANAMA had:

- developed a national mine action plan
- initiated a national mine database
- constructed administrative buildings
- selected training areas
- begun to purchase equipment

The UNDP-Government project signed on 2 April 1999 named UNOPS as the cooperating agency for the recruitment of international advisors and procurement of demining services. Early efforts of the Chief Technical Advisor and the Regional Advisor focused on

- (a) setting up a regional base in Fizuli district, the highly impacted district where operations were to begin
- (b) procurement of equipment for the yet to be created operational demining teams
- (c) writing National Mine Action Standards derived from the International Mine Action Standards and National SOPs derived from experience in other countries

- (d) selecting a national NGO (Relief Azerbaijan) to manage the training of the demining teams

Following the existing model, the technical advisors supplied by UNOPS were in operations, information management, and programme management; ANAMA proved strong in all these areas. UNOPS provided four full time advisors: Chief Technical Advisor, Regional Operations Advisor, Quality Assurance (QA) Advisor and Information Systems Advisor. The QA advisor was mobilised as a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) and the information systems advisor was provided on an in-kind basis by the Government of Switzerland, which had supported development of special information management software for mine action.

ANAMA received 12 long term advisors through UNOPS over the following five years, with an equal or greater number of other international advisors supplied by contractors and other donors. UNICEF supported the development of MRE materials and outreach training. Each advisory role was important in setting up ANAMA, and each was phased out as it became less necessary. The Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) position was maintained longest and was finally phased out in 2004.

UNOPS contracted with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to train deminers, section leaders and site supervisors and develop the capacity of the national NGO to manage the demining teams. MAG began working on this in March 2000 and deployed the first four sections (27 deminers in total) by June. By the beginning of 2001, MAG trained four national section leaders from the deminers, but insisted that it needed to maintain more experienced international staff as site supervisors. This was an issue of concern to the new National Director when he arrived in April 2001, since it implied postponing nationalisation of the programme. MAG concluded its UNOPS contract at the end of 2001 without having trained supervisors.

UNOPS contracted Minetech in 2000 to bring a mine detecting dog (MDD) capacity to the programme to work in coordination with the NGO deminers. ANAMA decided that it wanted to incorporate such capacity in its toolbox. However, Minetech had not been contracted to train handlers and departed with its dogs at the end of the contract. The US Department of State then agreed to provide MDD assistance and contracted Ronco to bring dogs and trainers to Azerbaijan, giving ANAMA an MDD capacity which it has maintained and expanded since 2002.

Over the years ANAMA received technical assistance in several areas essential to develop the identified required capacities (Chart 2).

Chart 2	
Technical Cooperation Partners and Subject Matter	
Partner	Subject Matter of Cooperation

UNDP	General partner, management support, TAs, trust fund management, senior and middle management training support, exchange of experience with other programmes, development of regional centre
UNOPS	Cooperating agency for technical advisors, contracting with service providers, contracting ANAMA to provide its own staff
UNICEF	MRE
UNMAS	UN assessment mission, LIS Quality Assurance Monitor
GICHD	IMSMA, technical advice regarding legislation, dogs, machines
US Dept of State	Financial support, MDD training
US DoD, EUCOM	Equipment, training for EOD, demining, munitions storage disposal
MAG	Training of manual demining NGOs, contracted by UNOPS
World Bank	Loan funds for construction of ANAMA HQ and vehicle procurement
Switzerland	Advisors for IMSMA, financial support
Minetech	MDD capacity, contracted by UNOPS
Ronco	MDD and handler training, contracted by US DoS
Armor Group	MDM support
SAC	Landmine Impact Survey
ICRC	Initial support regarding MRE and MVA
BACTEC	Survey
Cranfield University	Senior and middle management training
James Madison University	Senior management training

The two demining NGOs provide management and support for the manual demining teams, which operate within a framework established by ANAMA. ANAMA assigns the 38-person demining team their areas of operation and tasks. They have the same ANAMA-provided training, same SOPs, same salary scales, uniforms and work rules, and even the same menus for meals.

Relief Azerbaijan began with 27 deminers in 2000 and increased to the originally planned 38 in 2002. IEPF, which initially conducted surveys, started with 38 deminers in 2002. ANAMA staff were trained by a US Department of Defense mission as deminers, emergency response, UXO and technical survey in 2002, and were conducting clearance by 2003. In 2004, the three organisations together had 107 deminers and 15 mine detecting dogs (MDD). By 2011, this had increased to 114 deminers and 36 MDD.

In 2003, ANAMA decided that it required mechanical demining machine capacity (MDM), and arranged with the US Department of State and the European Commission to test a few machines. The machines selected were then purchased with bilateral assistance.

ESTIMATING THE SCALE OF THE LANDMINE/ERW PROBLEM

The need for good survey data to understand the extent of the landmine/ERW problem was recognised in the World Bank project formulation reports. In 1998, BACTEC International undertook a Level 1 Survey in Fizuli and Agdam districts. The team surveyed 260 of the 700 square kilometres potentially mined in the Fizuli district, and marked 3.2 square kilometres. In addition, 17 sites in Agdam were surveyed. The landmine problem in Fizuli was concentrated around 16 villages, as well as roads, irrigation channels and power lines.

ANAMA recognised early the importance of good information regarding the extent of contamination. The 2001 General Survey identified a total of 60 square kilometres of contamination affecting 64 communities in 11 districts on the line of control. SAC conducted a LIS in 18 districts from September 2002 to June 2003, with IEPF as its operational partner. This resulted in an increase in the estimated hazardous area to 736 square kilometres.

These surveys provided the information upon which the national programme was built. The LIS expanded ANAMA's perspective on the mine/ERW contamination problem in terms of the number of districts affected and the extent of explosive ordnance left behind at ex-Soviet military bases. This provided the basis for the expansion of the demining programme and development of a special cleanup project for the Saloglu arms depot which began with NATO support in 2005.

ANAMA decided that it needed to improve database information as the programme progressed. In 2006, it conducted a review with the local authorities starting from the LIS results, which reduced the estimate of SHAs to 306 square kilometres, a reduction of 60 per cent (Table 4). Experience gained by then led ANAMA to conclude that only about ten per cent of the remaining area would actually require clearance, while the rest would be cancelled through survey on a case by case basis. ANAMA initiated a resurvey process in 2008. Continuing survey and clearance reduced the overall SHA to 184 square kilometres as of the end of 2009, comprising 280 SHAs, of which 89 were believed to be mined areas and 191 with only UXO.

MINE RISK EDUCATION

MRE was supported by UNICEF from 2000 until 2007. During the first years, the MRE programme expanded through:

- group training sessions
- community billboards
- voluntary training of teachers and health workers

LIS found that the most common MRE outreach known to community members were village posters/signs. An evaluation of the programme conducted in 2002 was quite

positive, but questioned the focus on school age children, since the majority of mine victims were working age men.

In 2004, following a change of personnel, the Ministry of Education (MoE), signed a memorandum of understanding with UNICEF and ANAMA, to incorporate MRE into the regular course curriculum for schools in the affected districts. Once the agreement was signed, the parties implemented it very effectively. ANAMA/UNICEF developed materials to MoE pedagogic standards, UNICEF printed textbooks, the MoE directed its teachers as to how to incorporate MRE into their weekly lesson plans and ANAMA trained 2,355 teachers in the subject matter (Table 5). ANAMA's work with the MoE continues strongly at the time of this study in 2011.

MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2000, Azerbaijan had two principal prosthetics hospitals, both in Baku, one of which was run in cooperation with the ICRC. The latter hospital closed at the end of 2001. ICRC has continued to provide technical support to government-run rehabilitation centres.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

When the Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme was established, there was a need for capacity development in all areas. The original need for capacity development was resolved during the first five years of the programme. Various external evaluations have commended the quality of work carried out by ANAMA and its national NGO partners. These include external evaluations for UNICEF, the World Bank and UNDP:

- Evaluation of the UNICEF-ANAMA MRE programme in 2002 recognised that the effort had produced a “good national capacity.” In 2004, the MRE programme transitioned to full national responsibility as the Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for implementation and monitoring of MRE in the school curriculum, and district authorities coordinated volunteer community-based MRE committees.
- The “outcome evaluation” of UNDP assistance to ANAMA in 2004 concluded that the joint UNDP-Government “Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme has proved to be a success. (...) ANAMA has provided evidence that effective institutional capacity building is possible.”
- The World Bank assessment in 2005 concluded that ANAMA has become “an efficiently structured and well-functioning organisation operating in accordance with international standards for demining activities.”
- The 2008 “outcome evaluation” of UNDP support to mine action since 1999 concluded: “The mine action programme is highly integrated with all aspects being coordinated by ANAMA. The ‘hard issues’ of mine clearance and unexploded ordnance disposal (EOD) are well managed and targeted. The ‘soft issues’ of mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance area also well managed.”
- UNDP 2009 study of “feasibility of ANAMA establishing an International Centre for Mine Action” concluded that ANAMA “has grown into a mature, well-managed and technically competent mine action organization.” ANAMA “has a well-resourced and international standard training capability” and “has played a key role in developing the mine action capacity of several neighbouring countries.”
- GICHD 2009 evaluation of EC funded mine action in the Caucasus and Central Asia concluded that: “Azerbaijan has a well established mine action sector. The Azerbaijan National Mine Action Authority (ANAMA) is responsible for planning, coordinating, managing and monitoring of mine action countrywide. While it was not possible to assess ANAMA in detail, the evaluation team had the impression that

it has a sound structure and is very active, not just in its duties in Azerbaijan, but also in regional or international mine action events...Capacity building has been successful.”

NATIONAL PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national programme management was created with the programme. The first national director of ANAMA had an often difficult relationship with the early international advisors, caused in part by differing perceptions of their respective roles, including the sense that the advisors were interfering in his management responsibilities. The issue came to the attention of the senior most government officials and the current national director was appointed in April 2001. An experienced and well-respected manager from the state construction sector, he entered with a mandate to resolve the problems and nationalise the programme. He has decisively developed the organisation and is well-respected both inside of it and out. While the initial seeds for the national capacity were planted in 2000, it was only with the arrival of the second national director that ANAMA began to be guided by a clear capacity development strategy.

Most of the middle and senior managers have participated in one or more of the international manager training courses provided at Cranfield University (UK), James Madison University (USA) or Amman University (Jordan). They speak highly of the courses and of the value created by the fact that their colleagues have had similar training, giving them a shared understanding from which to approach organisational issues.

ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITIES

The specific structure of the national demining centre was new and the initial organisational chart was taken from the experience of other countries. The original organisational structure was staffed more like a project than an on-going government office, with a total of 18 national staff from all levels (see Annex C). Once the centre was established with general management, finance, support and information management, national management determined there was a need for specialised subunits to strengthen certain functions. That resulted in the current organisational structure:

- Departments: Operations, MRE, Information, Planning and Development, Finance and Support Services
- Division: Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division (TSQAD)
- Offices: Information Technology, Public Relations, Executive Secretariat

Staff are distributed among headquarters and field offices:

- Head office – Baku
- Regional office – Fizuli, from first year
- Regional training centre – Goygol
- Three operational centres – Terter, Agjabedi and Aghstafa districts
- Field operations in seven districts

TECHNICAL CAPACITIES

While the specific core technical capacities were new for Azerbaijan, ANAMA had the advantage of catching up with known practice elsewhere. Therefore, the standards, methods and training for manual clearance, MDD, MDM and IMSMA were all initially imported through advisors. Once this had been done and practical experience was gained, ANAMA’s expansion was based on national decisions and training.

Technical advisors and trainers helped establish the standards, operational procedures, information management system and strategic planning that were standard for mine action programmes at the time that ANAMA was developing. With the relatively high level of education that was common throughout the Soviet Union, and the opportunity of an important new challenge, national staff responded quickly to the new approach. As the programme moved toward full nationalisation and staff gained more experience, the SOPs were adapted to national systems and procedures, a process which was led by the national staff. Further development of appropriate SOPs has taken place since, specifically for land release and ammunition stores clearance.

IEPF and RA continue to focus primarily on minefield clearance (and MRE), while ANAMA focuses on battle area clearance, UXO destruction and emergency response to spot tasks, as well as MDD and MDM support to the manual demining teams of all three organisations. At the end of 2010, ANAMA had a total of 404 employees: 253 operational staff and 151 administrative support staff. IEPF and RA each had 38 deminers and a combined total of 137 staff (Chart 3).

Chart 3 Mine Action Programme Operational Capacity, 2011	
Manual clearance capacity	116 deminers, 3 organisations
Technical survey capacity	20 surveyors
Explosive Ordnance Disposal capacity	79 specialists
Emergency response team	18 deminers
Training, survey and quality assurance division	20 instructors/inspectors
Mine detecting dog capacity	32 dogs, 42 dog handlers
Mechanical demining machines	6 (Bozena-4, Bozena-5, MV-4 and EOD-BOT)
MDM personnel	18 operators and support
Support personnel	228 (logistics, inventory, procurement, maintenance)
Total personnel	541

The various land release efforts have considerably lessened the extent of landmine impact in the accessible regions, compared to the situation at the time of the Landmine Impact Survey. This leapt forward with the 2006 review with local authorities of the LIS-identified SHAs (Table 6), and has continued with average annual release of 30 square kilometres since 2008.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The current national socio-economic development plan 2009-2013 follows the previous national plan in identifying ANAMA as responsible for:

- Reducing the number of deaths and injuries from mine incidents
- Promoting the return of IDPs
- Facilitating rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure; and
- Supporting food security

The mine action strategy for 2009-2013 seeks to:

- reduce and clear accessible suspected hazardous areas
- develop and expand operational capacity
- support intensified and extended MRE and VA programmes

In the long term, ANAMA plans to further increase and reinforce its operational and management capacity to enable it to address the mine and ERW threat from the occupied areas once they are returned to Azerbaijan.

Ever since the first national strategy, adopted in 2001, ANAMA has had a dual perspective on the national programme: resolving the landmine and ERW problems of the currently accessible territories and eventually assessing and resolving the landmine and ERW problems of the occupied territories. ANAMA has a plan for clearance of the currently occupied territories once they are returned. On the basis of preliminary estimations, they expect to establish seven bases, with a total of 700 deminers, 100 dogs and 26 machines, to work over a decade to ensure that the areas are free from the threat of mines (Tables 7 and 8). ANAMA therefore seeks to maintain capacity until the other territories become accessible, and then expand, rather than plan for programme conclusion.

There are an estimated three to five years of demining remaining in the currently accessible areas, as well as response to spot tasks, to provide continuing value and experience. One reason that ANAMA has entered into contracts and cooperation agreements with other countries is to ensure that its full structure remains professionally engaged and developing until the return of the occupied territories.

ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

ANAMA and the national mine action programme have been organisationally sustainable for several years. They value interaction with other programmes – and would like more such interaction. The National Director and staff currently manage the programme and adapt its structure and operations to changing circumstances according to their own criteria.

FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

Financial sustainability is assured by the high level of government contribution to the programme budget – which increased steadily from ten per cent to over 75 per cent of the annual budget (Table 9). This contribution is supported by the inclusion of ANAMA since 2006 in the multiyear National Socio-economic Development Plan and its explicit inclusion in the annual state budget.

EXTENDING TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO OTHER NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES

ANAMA has signed several memoranda of cooperation and agreements, including with the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, Croatia MAC, Turkey Ministry of Defence Industry, Government of Georgia MAC, and the Afghanistan DMC.

The strength of ANAMA is evidenced by its ability to provide support directly to foreign clients and partners, including the national programmes of Afghanistan, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Vietnam. These cooperation efforts build on ANAMA's own experience in mine action – the first and still most experienced national programme within the region – together with the language facility provided by Azeri (very similar to Turkish) and Russian as working languages. ANAMA has also conducted training through translators in Arabic, Farsi, Dari, and Georgian. Major projects include:

- Georgia – In 2009 ANAMA submitted a proposal in a NATO/NAMSA competitive tender process to provide operational and capacity development training to help establish the new Georgia National Army entity responsible for mine action. In spite of not being a NATO member, ANAMA won the contract. ANAMA supplied its own equipment for the training, while procurement was underway for the Georgian teams. Training has since been conducted in Georgia and Azerbaijan, with nine two-week sessions covering a range of core topics
- Turkey – ANAMA has conducted two projects with Turkey. In the first project, funded by the Government of Turkey, ANAMA provided demining training to NOKTA Ltd. For the second project, ANAMA has joined with a successful Turkish consortium to provide training and quality assurance of Turkish deminers clearing the mined area at a border crossing with Syria

- Afghanistan – the Government of Azerbaijan provided non-military assistance to the Government of Afghanistan on a bilateral basis and included ANAMA in the formulation team. ANAMA’s counterpart for this assistance is the government body Department for Mine Clearance (DMC), the local counterpart for eventual handover of the Afghanistan national programme. ANAMA has hosted DMC staff for several trainings, supported adaptation, translation and printing of the MRE text book from Azeri to Dari and Pashto, and has discussed other specific topics of cooperation. Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) also visited ANAMA and has been pleased with the results of the ANAMA-DMC cooperation. ANAMA and MACCA have very good relations and experience with the exchange. MACCA appreciates the support of ANAMA to DMC on government issues. ANAMA also has assisted DMC to prepare to take over responsibilities from MACCA

MINE RISK EDUCATION

MRE continues to be provided in several distinct manners for different populations:

- Incorporated by the MoE in the regular curriculum for schools in war-affected districts. MoE supervises MRE instruction in over 1000 schools as part of teachers’ normal workload, reaching a wide population
- Deminers provide MRE to local communities whenever work is interrupted by weather
- ANAMA issues press releases and related cautionary messages whenever there is a mine accident
- Community MRE Committees monitor accidents and keep interested actors informed

MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Mine Victim Assistance is coordinated by the ANAMA Information Department, within the framework of the 2004 Mine Victim Assistance Strategy, based on the 2004 Mine Victim Needs Assessment. ANAMA tries to ensure that mine victims are aware of their rights to treatment and support under national laws and to coordinate economic reintegration projects targeting mine victims. Specific projects have included:

- “Community-based small business trainings and micro-credit fund for Azerbaijan mine survivors.” The second phase began in 2010 and will directly benefit 73 mine survivor participants, similar to the number of participants in the first phase
- “Medical examination and treatment procedures in Sanatorium” provided 110 mine victims with full medical services during a three week stay at a Caspian Sea sanatorium
- Wheelchair distribution
- Training/employment in carpet weaving and tailoring

Mine Risk Education

MRE experts have long recognised the importance of working with schools. An important achievement of the UNICEF-supported programme from 2000-2002 was the training by 15 UNICEF-qualified “master teachers” of 1,043 teachers and 508 health workers to educate children and clients about MRE. The teachers and health workers were volunteers, and while the results were positive they were superficial. UNICEF and ANAMA tried unsuccessfully to get the programme adopted into the curriculum of the Ministry of Education.

In 2004, with a change in personnel in the Ministry of Education, agreement was reached and a memorandum of understanding was signed by the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and ANAMA to integrate MRE into the curriculum of schools in the mine-affected areas. A joint pedagogic committee developed the materials to provide appropriate content and approved text books. The Ministry included “mine risk education” as a one semester subject, with an appropriate teaching plan. UNICEF paid for printing of materials and, between 2004 and 2009, ANAMA conducted teacher training for all schools covered by the agreement (Table 5). The teachers cover the material as part of their regular teaching schedule.

The value of the teacher time involved is estimated to be equivalent to an annual financial contribution of roughly USD 400,000, while being more effectively institutionalised than ANAMA could ever do on its own. The programme appears to be quite effective - since 2010, there have been no accidents involving school age children living in the affected districts and no fatalities since 2005.

TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

In many of the countries with mine action programmes at the time ANAMA was created, the state structure had collapsed or been severely weakened. However, this was not the case in Azerbaijan. Government offices needed to be re-established in the accessible areas affected by the conflict, but national institutions and structures had continued to function.

There was never a question of transitioning a programme from the UN to national ownership, since the programme was nationally owned in the first place. The Azeri perspective focused on the need to import knowledge related to the new field of mine action, and resources to jumpstart the process, but did not foresee an extended UN presence within the national agency. It was an issue of practical capacity and management control, while welcoming continued support by the UN and other partners.

ANAMA had multiple UN advisors, both resident and visiting, and these advisors played a strong role in the establishment and management of ANAMA during its early years. International advisors were key in obtaining some necessary knowledge, but national staff found that working with them was not always easy. Their role was viewed locally as generally positive on the technical side while sometimes clumsy and inappropriate as management and in personal behaviour.

Those who worked directly with UN advisors provide a positive assessment of most of them, but it is often balanced by critical comments. Each advisor seemed concerned with different problems and had their own solutions, so continuity of advice and development was lacking. As ANAMA matured, ANAMA staff sometimes had more experience than some UN advisors. The cost of the advisors, which seemed high, exacerbated tensions. The monthly salary of one advisor was the same as the combined monthly salaries of one entire NGO demining team. The experience with international advisors left behind particularly negative memories in those few cases where the personal behaviour of the advisor was seen as disrespectful or otherwise inappropriate. There is no true privacy in such situations, so any inappropriate behaviour becomes widely known, reducing the credibility and effectiveness of the advisor concerned.

International advisors (both individuals and contractor staff) rarely spoke Russian or Azeri and had to do some or all of their work with national staff through translators. Interestingly, this produced a core of ANAMA staff who were college educated in law, business or other subjects, and able to interact effectively between advisors and other national staff. Over time several of these individuals took on key roles in senior and middle management and ANAMA HQ functions, particularly in the Operations Department.

The successful “mine action transition” in Azerbaijan tells a story of how specific technical and management capacities developed. It also shows how all positions and the effective institutionalisation of mine action was nationalised, thanks to a strong manager who lead qualified and motivated staff with government and international financial and political support.

The decision to move ahead decisively with nationalisation came with the arrival of the new National Director in April 2001. He had been requested to come to ANAMA for two years to “straighten it out.” From the very beginning, he charged the national staff to become ready to fully manage the programme, since the “advisors will not always be here.”

Among his early actions was the establishment of a national training and monitoring team. Quality assurance and training had, until then, only been done by international advisors, but from then on it was to be done by nationals with the support of advisors. Similarly, he met with the acting CTA and UNDP to affirm this intent and clarify their respective roles and authorities to ensure the cooperation would lead to full nationalisation within a reasonable period of time. The new CTA, who arrived in August 2001, fully supported this.

The first national strategy, adopted in October 2001, set the goal for ANAMA to manage most mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal outside technical support. The programme was formally nationalised in 2004, with the departure of the last CTA, who at that point was the only remaining long term advisor. The target in the national strategy proved to be realistic, even though the process took a little longer than planned to complete.

ANAMA self assessment in late 2002: “The aim of the agency for consolidation of nationalisation and expansion of capacity has been mainly achieved. (...) ANAMA has established a functional headquarters staffed with qualified nationals, a regional office and a training facility that meet international standards. Currently two national NGOs and two international organisations are working under the framework of ANAMA. The UNDP is assisting ANAMA with resource mobilisation and provides technical support to the Project. At the same time the Agency is developing bilateral relations with the donor community.”

The CTA who arrived in mid-2001 was the first mine action CTA anywhere to be selected from a mine-affected country. His background in mine action from the perspective of a national NGO provided a practical perspective that shared the goal to move ahead with nationalisation. He encouraged gathering experience from other programmes and encouraged national staff to express their opinions on how work could be improved.

The National Director and the CTA worked together well, and ANAMA staff remember this period as a very productive one, when they began having more training and exchange with other programmes. In 2003 they completed a review of SOPs against

actual practice to nationalise the SOPs and reinforce knowledge about them. When questions arose about alternatives, they tried them out and reported back to the technical working group for a decision. Both the director and the CTA recognised the value of work in the field. They acted to overcome the existing gaps between headquarters and the field and between ANAMA and the NGOs, and insisted that all are important parts of a unified programme where success depends on the work of each one.

ESSENTIAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME CAPACITIES

What are the essential capacities required of a typical mine action programme? Based on accumulated experience of existing mine action programmes, they can be summarised as follows (Chart 4):

Chart 4

Essential capacities of a mine action programme
<p>Organisational capacities of the MAC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overall management - Operational management (planning, tasking, monitoring, quality management) - Information management - Administrative management -
<p>Operational capacities of the national programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Demining assets (manual, MDD, MDM) - Field presence - Mine risk education - Mine victim assistance
<p>Authority and responsibility</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National demining law - National institutional and budget integration to provide appropriate sustainable authority
<p>Interaction with and provision of support to clients (eg government departments and private companies whose work programmes are constrained by explosives contamination)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public access to information on known contamination, suspected areas and demining conducted - Survey teams made available to check specific areas of concern and estimate costs of action

The establishment of the training and monitoring team in 2001 was an important step in:

- nationalising the technical and management capacity
- providing ANAMA with its own resource to refresh
- renewing and developing national technical capacity

With ten years of experience, the Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division has delivered a wide range of training courses to cover ANAMA needs (Chart 5).

Chart 5 Training courses provided by ANAMA TSQA Division
Basic Demining
Technical Survey
Team Leader
EOD/BAC
Site Supervisor
Integration for Joint Operations with MDDs
Integration for Joint Operations with MDMs
Instructor
Middle and Field Management
Battle Area Clearance
General Survey
Information Management
Site Paramedic
First Aid
Emergency Trauma
QA/QC
House/Wall Clearance
Railway Clearance
IED Recognition
HMA Familiarisation
Storage and Transportation of Explosives
MRE Instructor

Capacity development in the specific areas typical of a mine action programme was sufficient to develop the capacity of the national programme. Key steps in the development and nationalisation of specific capacities of the national mine action programme included (Chart 6):

Chart 6 Key Steps in the development of the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hazard area information collection: general survey, LIS, review, technical survey, resurvey - Database installation and training - Demining teams trained and established - NGOs selected and prepared to administer and support demining team - Fizuli regional office and operational base opened - Training, monitoring and QA team established - National site supervisors assumed responsibility - Management training courses: senior and middle management - MDD teams trained with national handlers

- MDM machines selected and national operators trained
- Mine Victim Needs Assessment of 2004
- MRE in school curriculum agreed with Ministry of Education in 2004
- ANAMA included in national socio-economic development plan from 2006
- ANAMA included in annual national budget from 2006, with national contribution steadily increasing to 75 per cent of total ANAMA costs
- Successful implementation of high profile projects: Saloglu, BTC pipeline, Zobjug settlement
- Direct support to other national mine action programmes
- Demining law to regulate future expanded programme (pending approval)

The revision of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) required that ANAMA staff accumulate experience to be able to review and improve them. Original SOPs prepared in 2000 were transplanted from another UN programme to Azerbaijan; they were not adapted to the situation or practice of Azerbaijan. Eventually, after accumulating more experience, the 2003 review was undertaken by the team of site supervisors, with short term advisory support, resulting in a set of SOPs that were much more relevant to Azerbaijan.

ANAMA gained confidence in its own abilities and developed a very positive profile with key national and international partners through its successful completion of several high profile projects. These included:

- (a) clearance of the abandoned Saloglu ammunition storage area
- (b) ensuring a safe route for the BTC petroleum pipeline
- (c) providing a suitable site for the large Zobjug IDP resettlement project

High Profile Project #1: Saloglu ammunitions storage area

The Soviet Union's largest ammunition storage area in the South Caucasus was located near the town of Saloglu in Aghstafa district. An area made up of 138 bunkers had been developed since the 1930s. As Soviet troops withdrew from Azerbaijan, they sought to destroy the bunkers and munitions with a series of explosions in August 1991. This produced a dense presence of UXO over the 5.6 km² storage area, and scattered UXO over an area of 44 km². In the years that followed, the explosive debris resulted in 152 UXO accidents, of which 32 were fatal. The problem was identified by the general survey of 2001 and highlighted by the Landmine Impact Survey of 2002-2003.

In late 2001 the Government of Azerbaijan appealed to NATO for support in clearance of the Saloglu site within the Partnership for Peace programme. NATO/NAMSA initially considered providing support to the Azerbaijan National Army (ANA) to conduct the work. After review of ANA and ANAMA capacity and procedures, NATO/NAMSA decided to support ANAMA to conduct the clearance. From late 2005 to mid-2011, through three project phases (surface, subsurface and deep clearance), ANAMA removed and destroyed all munitions within the 5.6

km² core area and many scattered UXO in the wider area. A total of over 640,000 UXO were removed and destroyed at Saloglu, constituting 95 per cent of all UXO destroyed in the entire region.

High Profile Project #2: BTC pipeline

Construction of the BP Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline to carry petroleum overland from the Caspian Sea for ship-loading on the Mediterranean was perhaps the single most important investment in the region during the first decade of the new century. The pipeline route had been chosen without much attention to the potential hazard represented by passing within 250 metres of the Saloglu ammunition storage site, although the Army had been requested to clear any hazards that might exist along the pipeline route. As the contractor approached the area they discovered that there were indeed UXO in the immediate path of construction.

BP was dissatisfied with the lack of thoroughness of the previously conducted clearance work and the government asked ANAMA to handle it. ANAMA set up a special team to work with the BTC contractor on the 22 km hazardous stretch. It removed 121 UXO from a 60 metre wide corridor and the pipeline construction proceeded without delay. This project strengthened the reputation of ANAMA as a capable professional organisation that could be relied upon to resolve landmine/ERW obstacles to development.

High Profile Project #3: Zobjug IDP resettlement clearance and land release innovations

Faced with demand for more rapid demining of land for critical IDP resettlement projects, ANAMA was an early experimenter in what has come to be known as “land release”. In 2004 the president announced that all IDPs who wanted to return to villages in the liberated territories would be housed within three years. ANAMA was able to guide the Social Fund for IDPs to build in areas free of suspected hazard. But it was impossible to find a hazard-free site large enough for one group of 2,104 families from several villages in Fizuli district. Existing methods were not able to clear and handover the land for construction within the deadline.

ANAMA developed a more deliberate land release approach (the term was not yet in general use), permitting it to assess the suspected hazard levels of different areas, based on existing information, and apply different methods accordingly. This resulted in reducing the time and cost for carefully processing the entire area to about one-third of what it would otherwise have been. A total of 19 km² were released through survey and clearance, and the IDPs were able to move in on time. The SOP for this new land release approach was adopted in 2007 and has increased the level of productivity of the programme as a whole.

Responding to issues often faced by mature programmes:

The full nationalisation of a mine action programme is sometimes thought of as appropriate only when the national landmine/ERW problem has been largely resolved, in which case identifying and responding to the “residual problem” takes on particular importance. The transition in the case of Azerbaijan came much earlier, and the experience suggests that this could be possible with many programmes.

ANAMA has responded successfully to a set of issues often faced by mature programmes looking to the future, including (Chart 7):

Chart 7

Issues regularly faced by mature mine action programmes

- The development of high-level capacities for planning, management and coordination
- Sustaining the programme, including local ownership and financing capacity (external resource mobilisation and national financing)
- Good governance of the programme, including accountability, transparency, equal opportunities and responsiveness
- Planning for handling of residual capacity
- Arranging for long term management of dataset, so that future planning projects will know what areas were suspect and what areas were demined
- Remaining well integrated in the international mine action community network
- Linking mine action and development
-

ANAMA has developed specific units for planning and resource mobilisation and they have proven successful. Long term sustainability of the programme is ensured not just by its good reputation, but specifically by its incorporation into the national socio-economic plan and national budget.

ANAMA has sought to ensure its accountability to stakeholders, and transparency in its action, through regular reporting (monthly, quarterly, each semester, annually) to all concerned, together with annual audits of all its funding, and a separate audit of funds received through UNDP. Furthermore, all salary and other payments to staff are made through electronic banking, which provides a clear record of transfers and minimises doubts that are often created in a system based on cash payments.

ANAMA recognises that spot contamination that was not previously known will continue to appear for many decades. When it occurs now, the police are instructed to secure the immediate area and they can rely on a prompt response from small ANAMA emergency response teams. ANAMA sees no reason to change this approach while it is still operating at full capacity. This relates to a somewhat unusual aspect of the ANAMA situation, driven by a second type of “residual contamination” in currently occupied areas. ANAMA would like to maintain its full current capacity while waiting for the

opportunity to expand when those areas are returned. Therefore, ANAMA wants to keep existing work and even seeks new work to allow it to maintain its structure. This is an unusual “transition” issue, with which current ANAMA management is dealing.

The national mine action database will remain an important planning and environmental hazard dataset far into the future. It contains critically important information about what areas were suspected of being hazardous, which were demined, and how they were treated (through clearance or survey). This information will be as important for future construction and development planning as good data on soil types, seismic risks, flood plains, industrial contamination and other environmental hazards. It is important that the database be housed in an appropriate institution and relies on accessible software. Since ANAMA will be around for many more years, it is not urgent to resolve this issue now, but it would be useful to discuss it with the appropriate national partner institution.

ANAMA has not required technical support for many years, but it benefits from technical exchange with other programmes when opportunities arise. Ironically, ANAMA’s successful ownership and management of the national programme may have removed it somewhat from the discussions within the international mine action community, which are often mediated through chief technical advisors, who, along with technical advisors, help maintain a flow of information about developments of interest to the mine action community. Without their presence, it becomes more important that ANAMA actively pursues the contacts to remain integrated into those discussions. This is not just a matter of updating email lists, but of proactively engaging in the relevant discussions and visiting other programmes to share innovative experience.

Learning about and trying new approaches will help ANAMA to be ready to be more effective when the currently occupied territories become accessible. If both ANAMA and the relevant international organisations (particularly the GICHD and UNDP, but also UNICEF, UNMAS and others) recognise this, they can be more proactive to ensure that ANAMA staff are aware of and participate in the range of international mine action opportunities. ANAMA would benefit from programme visits to observe and explore the relevance of practical systems and approaches, such as for example (Chart 8):

Chart 8**Topics for learning from other programmes, for potential future development**

- Cluster munitions clearance
- Use of rats for demining
- Ground penetrating radar – road verification
- Ground penetrating radar – other purposes
- Mountainside clearance
- Post-clearance impact assessment

- Lessons from evaluations
- Land release experience

ANAMA's work has been closely linked with development since it was initially created to support the reconstruction effort in the war-affected regions. Since 2006, it is directly referenced in the national socio-economic development plan for support to development actions. Its national budget allocations provides coverage for priority development programmes, and it can be called upon by public and private entities to provide support outside that framework, upon approval of an appropriate project including relevant costs.

A national demining law was drafted by the advisors in 2002 but never submitted for approval. ANAMA did not believe that approval of the law was important at that time. ANAMA is now interested in having a national law approved, in anticipation of increased activity with additional actors, when the currently occupied territories become accessible. Issues which until now have been dealt with internally or through direct coordination between ANAMA and the two national NGOs may benefit from an explicit legal framework in the future, when the national programme expands and new partners join. This includes such questions as ANAMA authority within the programme, organisational accreditation, labour conditions, etc. The law currently awaiting approval would also formalise the position of ANAMA as part of the state structure, with attendant civil service security for its staff.

ANAMA has the appropriate types of capacities for its work today. If it had greater demining assets, it could further reduce existing SHAs through survey (enabling cancelled areas to be put back into use) and conclude more rapidly the clearance and handover of confirmed hazardous areas. ANAMA does not currently consider there to be a need to establish a residual response capacity since it foresees more than another decade of mine action programme activity. None of this appears to represent a bottleneck in the ability of any other parties to proceed with their projects.

The primary future development of national capacity will be quantitative expansion. This will occur at the time when resolution of the current conflict permits mine action activities in the currently occupied territories. Until that time, ANAMA will seek to continue activities at the present scale and maintain capabilities ready for rapid expansion when the time comes to do so. This is also an appropriate period to explore and test additional technologies and methods which may provide useful additions to its operational toolkit.

LESSONS LEARNT

Several important lessons can be drawn from the Azerbaijan experience, lessons which are relevant for other national programme managers and for international organisations working in mine action. They are discussed below in four broad topics: concept, process, content and post-transition issues.

“TRANSITION” CONCEPT

The transition debate in mine action reflects primarily the experience of UN-managed programmes. It does not capture well the situation of the majority of national mine action programmes which are usually supported by UNDP. Formally, UNDP-supported programmes are by definition nationally owned from their origin, although the strength of such ownership varies widely, and typically the programmes have not been nationalised from the beginning. Rather, technical advisors assist in establishing new functions and often play roles which go beyond the bounds of merely advisory. Azerbaijan illustrates the more frequent situation where the transition refers to shifting the balance between foreign and national staff in decision-making at all levels. Furthermore, it shows that, rather than seeking to “conclude UN-support”, the goal should be to have a fully nationalised programme which benefits from continuing partnership with the UN and others.

FROM “EXCEPTIONS” TO “INSTITUTIONS”

An important part of the transition is to establish the mine action role and functions within national institutions. UN-managed programmes in all countries are “exceptions”. They are externally managed and cannot be part of the national institutional structure. It is because of their exceptional nature that they pay particularly close attention to coordination meetings and working groups – they are not part of the normal division of labour and need to encourage other institutions to act outside of their normal role. No matter how well-intentioned and competent their staff may be, agreements they make are inherently temporary.

TRANSITION PROCESS

ANAMA’s experience suggests that in most cases the transition process should not be complicated nor too drawn out. It required three basic elements:

- a decision as to what should be developed as the capacities of the programme
- a government decision to nationalise the programme, with a reasonable timeframe in which to gain experience under supervision and then assume responsibility
- a strong national manager who understood the process

Capacities developed at different rates and together they required about three years. The process benefited from a chief technical advisor, who supported the institutional development goals and process.

ANAMA benefited from several conditions that may not always exist in other countries. First, the state structure had not collapsed. Second, the Azeri population generally, and ANAMA staff in particular, have a relatively high level of general and professional education. Third, ANAMA was created with a mandate to support safe return and development initiatives, and it depended directly on the inter-sectoral commission established to oversee reconstruction and development in the war-affected region chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. Fourth, the salary scale applied in ANAMA and to the demining organisations was relatively attractive without drastically distorting the national norm. Fifth, government funding is essential for sustainability and it began to grow significantly with nationalisation.

ANAMA staff see a difference between being a relatively autonomous, but temporary, UN-based structure and being part of the government, dealing with institutions and local culture. Clearer awareness of this difference might have changed some of the early assistance to ANAMA, eased some of the tensions that arose and facilitated the transition.

CONTENT: WHAT TO TRANSITION

At the beginning there is sometimes confusion between “national capacity” and “clearance capacity.” In Azerbaijan, determining what capacities to develop and nationalise benefited from the advantage of catching up with older mine action programmes, with the important addition that all capacities developed were to be nationalised. Therefore, operational capacities included manual demining, EOD, mine detecting dogs, demining machinery, technical and non-technical survey. Operational management capacities included team leaders, site supervision, quality assurance, and training. Other key capacities included information management, base and support management, public and donor relations, and planning.

Tensions developed in a couple of cases when one of the parties involved seemed to resist the change in its role (eg, site supervision and resource mobilisation). Through deliberate effort to resolve whether the difference was a matter of principle or readiness, and to keep clear the respective roles, the crises were overcome and further cooperation improved. Support to capacity development and nationalisation should be the rule in TORs and supervision of mine action technical advisors and contractors.

POST-TRANSITION DEVELOPMENT

The experience of Azerbaijan demonstrates the increased ability of the national programme to improve once fully nationalised. Full nationalisation enabled ANAMA to

develop new methods and procedures that were better adapted to the national situation as well as to explore new opportunities for work and exchange with other programmes. Some important donors and the national government proved willing to entrust ANAMA with greater resources after it was fully nationalised. With greater responsibility for their own programme and its results, the management and staff addressed greater attention to be more efficient and effective. Some innovations may parallel developments in other countries (eg, land release at Zobjug), and can contribute to international advance in the matter.

DON'T PUNISH SUCCESS, SUPPORT IT!

The transition debate seems to suggest that once it has been completed there should be no need for further UN support. This suggestion is particularly clear when the process is discussed as an “exit strategy.” The Azerbaijan case shows the continuing importance of support and cooperation with the “post-transition” national programme. External funding continues to be important as will technical assistance in new areas and periodic external evaluation of specific issues or the programme as a whole. What becomes more important is to ensure the national programme remains integrated into the international mine action network after the departure of the Chief Technical Advisor.

Both the national programme and the international organisations should act to ensure that networking remains strong. Since most organisations cooperate on the basis of a project/programme framework, it may be useful to maintain such a framework even with small amounts of funding in order to keep formal and informal channels of reporting and interaction active.

RELEVANT TABLES



Year	Male		Female		Children		Total	
Status	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
As of December 2004	289	1,652	8	34	44	204	341	1,890
During 2005	7	23	1	4	2	22	10	49
During 2006	2	15	0	0	0	0	2	15
During 2007	6	14	0	0	0	0	6	14
During 2008	0	9	0	1	0	1	0	11
During 2009	4	16	0	0	0	2	4	18
During 2010	1	4	0	0	0	0	1	4
During 2011 (through Sept)	3	2	0	1	1	0	4	3
Total (through Sept 2011)	312	1,735	9	40	47	229	368	2,004

Source: ANAMA, October 2011

Year	Mined area clearance (km ²)	BAC (km ²)	Area reduced or cancelled (km ²)	Total area released (km ²)
2000	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.11
2001	0.47	0.23	0.09	0.79
2002	0.63	0.37	0.09	1.09
2003	1.37	3.40	0.17	4.94
2004	1.69	4.50	0.39	6.58
2005	1.85	3.00	2.36	7.21
2006	2.06	5.46	12.53	20.06
2007	2.12	4.11	12.22	18.30
2008	1.46	3.11	25.70	30.27
2009	1.67	10.21	19.71	31.59
2010	1.26	6.18	22.28	29.72
Total	14.66	40.6	95.54	150.66

Source: ANAMA Annual Reports

Donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total USD
UNDP	167,849	232,177	420,000	265,410	155,000	180,000	145,000	120,000	125,000	350,000	300,000	282,167	2,742,603
Azerbaijan	124,111	603,537	242,000	258,760	203,417	255,000	749,561	1,241,379	2,235,296	6,312,500	8,086,793	8,997,993	29,310,347
USA			1,698,039	1,040,633	1,125,000	1,275,461	1,803,979	2,326,840	2,200,000	1,633,113	483,000	1,503,148	15,089,213
US-EUCOM					234,000								234,000
EC				1,200,000	350,000	1,000,000		1,180,000					3,730,000
Japan		486,724		78,807		70,000							635,531
UK-DFID				200,000	250,000	75,000				271,490			796,490
ITF							104,490	384,102	146,919			15,274	650,785
Italy					400,000	240,000							640,000
UNICEF						70,000	88,250	20,060	35,000				213,310
Norway		112,140											112,140
Canada		65,000											65,000
NATO PfP							227,880	538,805	139,841	123,648	1,393,208	985,760	3,409,142
Rotary Club of Baku									13770				13,770
Saudi Arabia								50,000					50,000
Sweden									47,522	23,858			71,380
WWM Foundation									102,310	177,122			279,432
Total	167,849	1,499,578	2,360,039	3,043,610	2,717,417	3,165,461	3,119,160	5,861,186	5,045,658	8,891,731	10,263,001	11,784,342	58,043,143

Source: ANAMA Annual Report 2011

**Table 4 – Results of 2006 review in the 11 mine/UXO affected regions of Azerbaijan
(conducted jointly by ANAMA and local executive authorities)**

Region	Total contaminated area (sq m)	Mined areas		Battle areas and areas contaminated by UXOs (sq m)
		Areas to be reduced/cancelled (sq m) (constitutes about 90%)	Areas to be cleared (constitutes about 10%) (sq m)	
Fizuli	47,379,000.00	42,638,760.00	4,737,640.00	2,600.00
Tertter	63,964,000.00	57,477,060.00	6,386,340.00	100,600.00
Agstafa	10,550,000.00	6,427,156.50	714,128.50	3,408,715.00
Agdam	18,835,550.00	16,887,941.10	1,876,437.90	71,171.00
Gazakh	24,904,554.00	19,531,848.60	2,170,205.40	3,202,500.00
Gedabey	68,501,790.00	60,362,316.00	6,706,924.00	1,432,550.00
Goranboy	12,720,000.00	9,677,731.50	1,075,303.50	1,966,965.00
Khanlar	16,785,480.00	10,601,262.00	1,177,918.00	5,006,300.00
Khodjavend	26,145,040.00	23,530,536.00	2,614,504.00	0.00
Tovuz	11,476,535.00	10,328,755.50	1,147,639.50	140.00
Agjabedi	4,660,000.00	4,160,871.00	462,319.00	36,810.00
TOTAL	305,921,949	261,624,238	29,069,360	15,228,351

Source: ANAMA

Table 5 – MRE programme targeted schools and number of teachers trained during 2004-2009 school years

No	Districts	Total number of schools	Targeted schools in 2004/2005	Number of teachers	Targeted schools in 2005/2006	Number of teachers	Targeted schools in 2006/2007	Number of teachers	Targeted schools in 2007/2008	Number of teachers	Targeted schools in 2008/2009	Number of teachers	Total number of targeted schools	Total number of teacher participated in the training	Total number of students by districts	Total number of targeted students	Distributed materials		
																	Manuals for teachers	Textbooks for students	Training posters (4 types)
1	Aghdam	144	40	81	78	126	15	30	0	0	11	30	144	267	23341	4680	387	5879	1364
2	Aghjabedy	62	19	47	0	0	16	30	15	30	11	22	61	129	23536	4108	313	5485	860
3	Aghstafa	39	18	37	20	40	11	15	0	0	0	0	49	92	14270	3561	183	4200	664
4	Beylagan	53	18	36	0	0	0	0	15	30	18	41	51	107	17262	3162	380	6196	600
5	Dashkesan	49	24	39	13	22	0	0	14	26	0	0	51	87	5561	790	200	1952	734
6	Fizuli	80	39	84	8	16	0	0	0	0	5	15	52	115	14874	2137	287	3912	773
7	Qazakh	47	26	49	15	30	6	15	0	0	0	0	47	94	15850	3054	164	3898	608
8	Gadabey	85	24	47	36	61	0	0	27	54	0	0	87	162	15401	2944	271	3594	1253
9	Goranboy	81	18	34	0	0	0	0	13	26	46	89	77	149	19100	3583	128	2750	618
10	Goygol	49	21	39	0	0	10	20	19	38	0	0	50	97	10311	1911	159	2550	676
11	Tartar	48	20	40	0	0	23	45	10	20	0	0	53	105	12659	2476	195	3174	720
12	Tovuz	85	25	51	20	40	27	45	14	26	0	0	86	162	29714	6210	352	6791	1368
13	Xodjavand	20	11	23	8	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	34	2205	206	82	686	263
14	Nakhchivan AR 7 border districts with Armenia	228	0	0	50	102	0	0	0	0	177	381	227	483	63569	10420	550	7520	680
15	Lachin	149	0	0	74	142	0	0	0	0	0	0	74	142	14886	1232	150	1282	994
16	Kalbadjar	114	0	0	47	88	0	0	0	0	0	0	47	88	10879	797	94	1050	697
17	Jabrail	60	0	0	7	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	13	9274	101	16	112	244
18	Shusha	24	0	0	3	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	9	2811	58	12	70	84
Total:		1417	303	607	379	700	108	200	127	250	268	578	1185	2335	305503	51430	3923	61101	13200

Source: ANAMA

Table 6 – Review progress in relation to LIS-identified impacted communities										
District	High impact		Medium impact		Low impact		None impacted		Total	
	LIS	Review	LIS	Review	LIS	Review	LIS	Review	LIS	Review
Aghdam	0	1	6	2	19	5	0	11	25	19
Aghjabedi	0	1	1	0	21	1	0	11	22	13
Aghstafa	2	2	2	8	16	35	0	22	20	67
Baku city		0		2		0		0		2
Beylagan	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	2	6	3
Fizuli	4	3	35	10	135	11	0	15	174	39
Ganja City	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	2	3
Gazakh	1	0	6	1	18	8	0	12	25	21
Gedabey	1	0	16	0	68	13	0	29	85	42
Geranboy	1	0	8	3	10	6	0	9	19	18
Goygol(Khanlar)	0	0	4	1	16	5	0	14	20	20
Hajigabul	0		0		1		0		1	
Imishly	0		0		1		0		1	
Jalilabad	0		1		2		0		3	
Khojavend	0	1	0	1	11	0	0	0	11	2
Lenkeran	0		1		5		0		6	
Naftalan City	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	1
Samukh		0		1		2		6		9
Sumgayit city		0		0		1		0		1
Tertter	1	0	9	2	13	1	0	13	23	16
Tovuz	1	0	13	1	20	11	0	15	34	27
Total:	11	8	102	33	367	102	0	160	480	303
Note: The two surveys involved differing methodologies, but both sought to include all mine/ERW affected communities and 2006 review started from results of 2002-2003 LIS.										
Source: ANAMA										

Capacity	2009	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year
	Existing capacity	Capacity	Capacity	Capacity	Capacity
Mine Clearance & Technical survey	3 clearance teams; 4 technical survey teams (170 staff)	6 clearance teams; 6 technical survey teams (293 staff)	9 clearance teams; 9 technical survey teams (416 staff)	12 clearance teams; 12 technical survey teams (539 staff)	15 clearance teams; 15 technical survey teams (700 staff)
UXO Clearance	70 staff	70 staff	70 staff	70 staff	70 staff
Emergency Response Team	18 staff	18 staff	18 staff	18 staff	18 staff
MDD Section	33 MDD	53 MDD	70 MDD	87 MDD	100 MDD
MDM Section	6 machines	11 machines	16 machines	21 machines	26 machines
Management Support	ANAMA HQ 2 Regional Bases 3 Operational Centres	ANAMA HQ 3 Regional Bases 4 Operational Centres	ANAMA HQ 4 Regional Bases 4 Operational Centres	ANAMA HQ 6 Regional Bases 4 Operational Centres	ANAMA HQ 7 Regional Bases 4 Operational Centres

	Regions	Total area of region, mln.sqm.	Suspected contaminated area (mln.sqm)		Time-frames		Average demining rate, in mln sqm. per year **	1 sqm. cost (in USD)	Average demining cost (in mln.USD) ***	
			Total	Priority *	Total	Priority			Total	Priority
1	Agdam	1 094,0	70	10	14 years	3 years	25-30	1,00 -1,30	437,0	86,2
2	Fizuli	1 386,0	40	10						
3	Jebayil	1 050,0	40	5						
4	Gubadli	802,0	50	10						
5	Zangilan	707,0	25	5						
6	Lachin	1 835,0	55	10						
7	Kelbadjar	1 936,0	100	20						
Total:		9 509,0	380,0	75,0	14 years	3 years			437,0	86,2

Note: *Priority areas include roads, places of settlement, communication lines, water canals, electricity lines, etc
 ** This is to be done by rapid and effective capacity increase up to 740 manual deminers, 120 mine detection dogs and 26 machines for mechanical clearance, 7 regional bases
 *** The demining cost includes capacity development expenses

Table 9 – Summary of national and international financial contributions to ANAMA			
Year	National (USD)	International (USD)	Total (USD)
2010	8,997,993	2,786,349	11,784,342
2009	8,086,793	2,176,208	10,263,001
2008	6,132,500	2,7594,231	8,891,731
2007	2,235,296	2,810,362	5,045,658
2006	1,241,379	4,619,807	5,861,186
2005	749,961	2,369,199	3,119,160
2004	255,000	2,910,461	3,165,461
2003	203,417	2,514,000	2,717,417
2002	258,760	2,784,850	3,043,610
2001	242,000	2,118,039	2,360,039
2000	603,537	896,041	1,499,578
1999	124,111	167,849	291,960
Total	29,310,347	28,732,796	58,043,143

Source: ANAMA Annual Report 2011

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aliyev, Aziz, "Azerbaijan Mine Action Program: The Information Leverage," *Journal of Mine Action*, 7.2, August 2003.

ANAMA, Annual Reports and Work Plans, 2000-2011.

ANAMA, Azerbaijan Mine Action Strategy, 2009-2013.

Aqa, Sayed and Strebels, Josef, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan," *Journal of Mine Action*, 6:1, April 2002.

Baric Consultants, "Evaluation of the UNDP Mine Action Programme in Azerbaijan," April 2004

Baric Consultants, "Outcome evaluation of UNDP Support to 'Strengthening and further expansion of the mine action capacity in Azerbaijan' Project," December 2008.

Downs, Charles, "Mine Action Services for Development: Azerbaijan Case," March 2009.

Eaton, Robert, Chris Horwood and Norah Niland, "Study Report: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities," DHA 1997.

GICHD, Evaluation of EC funded mine action in the Caucasus and Central Asia, July 2009.

GICHD, Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation, GICHD, 2004.

ICBL, "Azerbaijan", Landmine Monitor Annual Reports, 1999-2011.

Levinger, Beryl and Jean McLeod, "Hello, I must be going: Ensuring quality services and sustainable benefits through well-designed exit strategies," EDC, October 2002.

Nelke, Christina, "An external review of the UNICEF-ANAMA Mine Risk Education project in Azerbaijan," 1 October 2002.

Powell, Bruce, "Report on the Feasibility of ANAMA establishing an International Centre for Mine Action in Goygol, Azerbaijan," 13 August 2009.

UNDP Project Document, AZE/98/003: Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme, period 1999-2001.

UNOPS Cooperating Agency Agreement, Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme, period 1999-2001.

UNDP project document, AZE/05/xxx: Strengthening and Further Expansion of the Mine Action Capacity in Azerbaijan, period 2005-2008.

UNDP Project document, AZE/09/xxx: Further strengthening and expansion of mine action capacity in Azerbaijan, period 2009-2011.

World Bank, Implementation Completion Report 34626, Azerbaijan Pilot Reconstruction Project,

2006.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

Persons Interviewed

ANAMA

- Nazim Ismayilov, National Director
- Sabir Safarov, Manager of Financial Department
- Fikret Aliyev, Operations Department
- Samir Poladov, Head of Operations Department
- Adil Aslanov, Operations Department
- Musa Jalalov, Head of MRE Section
- Murad Rahimov, Head of Information Department
- Shamir Yagizarov, Information Department
- Sabina Sarkarova, Planning and Public Relations
- Elnur Gasimov, Training and Quality Assurance Division

IEPF

- Umud Mirzoyev, Chairman
- Nick Nwolisa, Head of Programme Development and International Relations

Relief Azerbaijan – Dayag

- Shahin Ibrahimov, Director

Ministry of Education

- Agababa Ibrahimov, Head of Education Department


UNDP

- Nato Alhazishvili, Deputy Resident Representative
- Shamil Rzayev, Senior Advisor and Programme Officer

ANNEX 2

Institutional Structure of ANAMA in Original UNDP-Government Prodoc

Initial staffing proposal (see table below) included 18 staff for ANAMA. The proposed structure did not allow for level or type of staffing appropriate for a government institution with these responsibilities. Rather, it was a team division of labour for an intense but limited-time project.



Functions	Functions	Functions
Planning/prioritisation/coordination - develop NMAP Contracting Clearance, survey, marking Operations Training Victim Support Quality Assurance	Survey data processing Mine Awareness Mine Information System Advocacy & PR Resource Mobilisation	Financial Management Procurement Personnel Administration Logistic Support

Staffing Table: National Staff

Director	1
Secretary	1
Translator	1
Operations Manager	1
Operations Officer	1
QA/standards Officer	1
Operations Assistant	1
Mine Awareness Officer	1
Information Manager	1
Computer Technician	1
Database TGIS specialist	1
Finance/Administration Manager	1
Accountant	1
Clerk (Procurement, Administration)	1
Driver	3
Cleaner	1
TOTAL	18

ANNEX 3

ANAMA Organisational Chart

