Evaluation of the UNICEF Mine Risk Education Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007

The evaluation team visiting mine affected communities - note mine warning sign on the tree on the right of photo.

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Evaluation Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina:
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Executive Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is heavily contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). There are also significant problems with small arms and light weapons (SALW), both in terms of vast unused stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and explosives - some of which is in very poor condition - and also illegal weapons ownership by an estimated 16% of the total population.

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in 2002-2003 revealed that about 4% of the land area and over 1300 communities were affected by mines and UXO. Clearance has been coordinated by the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) and has made progress, but has only managed to address a small percentage of the contaminated land area so far. Since 1996 UNICEF has supported mine risk education (MRE) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The BHMAC, with support from UNICEF, has developed a sophisticated community-based mine risk analysis and mine action planning system. UNICEF has undertaken capacity building and provided funding and technical assistance to the BHMAC, local institutions and local and international non-governmental organisations.

Mine and UXO casualties in BiH have steadily decreased in the last ten years. All recent casualties are due to adult men intentionally entering mined areas due to economic necessity. There were no child casualties in 2006 or so far in 2007. It is reasonable to assume that good quality MRE will tend to reduce casualties.

The evaluation consisted of document analysis, field visits to affected communities and a feedback meeting with key stakeholders in Sarajevo.

Capacity building, planning and programme development have all been successfully addressed.

Several programmes by NGOs supported by UNICEF have brought high quality MRE to some communities but have not been able to progress from pilot programmes to sustainable large scale actions.

A key achievement has been the incorporation of MRE and small arms and light weapons (SALW) risk education into the school curriculum by all 13 Ministries of Education and teaching materials have been developed - though some work remains to consolidate this. UNICEF worked with a local NGO training teachers on how to integrate MRE in everyday class activities.

Analysis of the programme and strategy documents revealed areas which had not been effectively addressed - in particular the inclusion of local communities as protagonists in MRE was weak, as was the use of civil protection and other staff at municipal level. The dominant model for MRE has become *de facto* one of “service delivery” by professionals to the community. Standards and procedures have been developed by BHMAC to strictly regulate MRE activities. This is a significant achievement but may need revision to fully support community level action.

On the basis of the low casualty rate, the limited group of risk taking males, and the established capacity there is no longer a good case for continuing previous support to MRE in BiH. However a number of specific actions are recommended including supporting volunteers in local communities and municipal level officials to make MRE efficient and sustainable. Marking hazardous areas - an action already supported by UNICEF - and in particular maintaining the signs, is also identified as a key action - according to BHMAC records in the last two years 15% of casualties have occurred in known mined areas without signs.

Given the inclusion of SALW and landmine survivor assistance in the overall strategy, UNICEF is recommended to develop SALW risk reduction activities in close cooperation with the regional SALW centre, and to continue to develop the existing relationship with the Ministry of Health for LMVA.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Bosnia and Herzegovina - The war and the peace agreement

The 1990 parliamentary elections in Yugoslavia led to a national assembly dominated by three ethnically-based political parties, which had formed a loose coalition to take power from the communists. Croatia and Slovenia subsequently declared independence. A declaration of sovereignty by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in October 1991 was followed in 1992 by a referendum for independence which was boycotted by the great majority of Bosnian Serbs. With voter turnout of 67%, 99% of the votes cast were in favor[1]. Following a period of escalating tensions and military incidents, open warfare began in the capital city, Sarajevo, on April 6, 1992. There were no fewer than seven recognised armies and six further armed and paramilitary groups involved in the ensuing conflict.[2]

There was conflict between Croats and Bosniaks as well as between Serbs and each of these groups. By 1993, when an armed conflict erupted between the Sarajevo government and the ethnic Croat separatist area of Herzeg-Bosnia, about 70% of the country was controlled by Serbs.[3]

In March 1994, the signing of the Washington accords between the leaders of the republican government and Herzeg-Bosnia led to the creation of a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (often known as “The Federation”). The creation of this entity which reduced the extremely complex conflict with multiple players to a situation where the international community could see two opposing sides, the Federation forces on one side and the Serbian forces on the other. Together with international outrage at Serb war crimes and atrocities (most notably the genocidal killing of over 8,000 Bosniak males in Srebrenica in July 1995), international pressure eventually ended the war. The signing of the Dayton Agreement in Dayton, USA, by the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegović), Croatia (Franjo Tuđman), and Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milošević) finally brought a halt to the fighting, and established the complex structure of the present-day state. BiH is now comprised of two “entities” namely the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation has a Canton based structure (not unlike Germany’s “Länder”), the Republika Srpska (RS) has a unitary hierarchical structure. The three main ethnic groups (Bosniak Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs) have their representation guaranteed at most levels of government. In addition, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) still retains considerable powers (similar to a Governor) and one district, Brčko, is semi-autonomous and responds directly to the OHR. The High Representative is chosen by the Peace Implementation Council whose Steering Board members include six western powers as well as Russia, Japan, the European Union and Commission, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.[4]

Although the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina terminated 12 years ago, and there have been many steps since then to strengthen the peace building and reconciliation process, Bosnian society remains deeply divided and without a common political vision for the future. Frustration with politicians for the failure to address the need for economic development appears to be widespread.

Landmines and Small Arms in BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is heavily contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the 1992-1995 conflict. The military doctrine of the former Yugoslav national Army relied heavily on the use of mines as a deterrent against invasion. All soldiers were

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[1] Malcolm, Noel (1994). Bosnia A Short History. New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-5520-8.

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian_War Accessed 25 July 07

[3] Riedlmayer, Andras (1993). A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project.

[4] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_Peace_Implementation_Council

taught mine warfare doctrine and techniques (laying, recording and neutralizing)[5]. Yugoslavia had been a major producer of landmines and estimates of the number available for use at the start of the war range from 1 to 6 million - the lower figure is now considered correct. There were thus widespread knowledge of mines and their use and also large stockpiles of mines.

There are also significant problems with small arms and light weapons (SALW)in BiH, both in terms of vast unused stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and explosives - some of which is in very poor condition - and also illegal weapons ownership by an estimated 16% of the total population[6]. The UNDP SALW programme includes the destruction of explosive stockpiles even if this is technically not part of SALW reduction.

Impact of Landmines and ERW, SALW

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) conducted to international standards in 2002-2003 revealed that about 4% of the land area and over 1300 communities were affected by mines and UXO. The BiH Mine Action Plan 2007, using what officials said were more up to date figures, identified 18,600 mined areas covering 1,820 square kilometers. This is reported as representing only about 60 percent of all minefields, due to the unreliability of wartime records. BiH's Mid-Term Development Strategy 2004-2007 describes the country as among the seven most mine-impacted countries in the world and the most severely impacted in Europe. It states that 85 percent of communities affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are rural and that poverty and mine-contamination are directly correlated.[7]

Clearance has been coordinated by Mine Action Centres - first run by the UN, later by the two entities and currently at national level by the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC). Progress has been made but has only managed to address a small percentage of the contaminated land area so far. In 2006 total area cleared or eliminated from clearance by technical survey was about 7 sq km (0.3% of the total suspected area) with clearance work undertaken by 16 non-commercial organisations and commercial companies.

The rugged terrain with a lot of woodland makes the clearance task extremely difficult in places, though on more accessible farmland there is also use of machines for area reduction. Tripwire fragmentation and bounding mines are common in some areas and pose a lethal threat, the PROM-1[8] bounding mine is the dominant threat and causes the majority of current casualties.

Mine and UXO casualties in BiH have steadily decreased in the last ten years. All casualties are now apparently due to adult men intentionally entering mined areas due to economic necessity or economic choice. There were no child casualties in 2006 or so far in 2007. Using the LIS definition of "recent casualties" as those occurring in the last two years, BiH has had no recent casualties outside a single, well defined, high risk group. Casualties within this group have also fallen steadily in the last few years. At no time have children been more than 29% of the casualties (highest figure was in 2000).

National Structures for Mine Action and SALW Action

The Demining Commission under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication supervises the state-wide BiH Mine Action Centre and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues. The Commission has three members, representing the three ethnic groups in BiH. The Commission mobilizes funds for mine action in cooperation with the Board of Donors.

The BHMAC is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH's demining plan, including accreditation of all mine action organizations. It is supported by part-time UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF advisors. BHMAC operates from its headquarters through two mine action offices, formerly autonomous entity mine action centers, and eight regional offices. The two entity offices deal with regional offices on planning, survey and quality control/assurance. Quality assurance inspectors are based in the regional offices.

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[5] Landmine Monitor report for 1999, http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/bosnia.html Accessed 25 July 2007

[6] The UN Development Program (UNDP) 2004 Small Arms Survey.

[7] Information from Landmine Monitor 2007.

[8] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PROM-1

The Demining Law of 2002 created the present framework managing mine action in BiH. In 2005 the Demining Commission drafted, with UNDP support, a new law to update the management structure and allocation of responsibilities between the government, entity and state levels. The new law has not yet been implemented at the time of writing, November 2007.

The BHMAC has developed a sophisticated community-based mine risk analysis and mine action planning system which is used throughout the country - such a unified nation-wide approach is extremely rare in BiH. UNICEF was one of several donors contributing to this capacity development, and one of the two UN agencies acting as agents for the donors (the other being UNDP who have a large multi-donor multi-annual mine action programme).

In 2003, the Coordination Board for the Control of SALW (CB) was established in BiH on the basis of the provisions contained by the *United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* document from July 2001, and the Regional Plan for Implementation of Combat to SALW Proliferation developed by the Stability Pact for South East Europe in November 2001. The CB for SALW was informally operating for almost two years before the BiH Council of Ministers issued an official resolution to establish it.

The CB is composed of the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, the Tax Administration and entities ministries of interior. [9]

The evaluation team repeatedly heard reports that the CB had not met regularly.

Review timing

UNICEF decided on a review in mid 2007 to satisfy a number of requirements including the UNICEF mid Term Review and the need to develop the BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2009 to 2019. The decrease in casualties also suggests that a review is necessary in order to decide if there is further need for MRE or if resources should be directed elsewhere on the basis that the MRE work is now completed.

1.2 Terms of Reference

The evaluation - of which this report forms a part - is intended to provide an independent assessment of the UNICEF Mine Action Programme achievements and constraints and its overall contribution to Mine Action.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) included the following three key items:

1 An independent and impartial assessment of the status of the UNICEF mine action programme in the general context of MRE in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 The evaluation team should make strategic recommendations in support of the UNICEF Country Programme Mid Term Review (MTR) and provide clear recommendations for the end of the current programme cycle, until 2009.

3 The evaluation will also identify the needs and resources available in the country for the BiH Mine Action 2009 to 2019 strategy, with a focus on the comparative advantages and capacities of UNICEF.

[9] See disarmament2.un.org/cab/nationalreports/ 2006/bosnia%20&%20herzegovina.pdf

The ToR specify that the five standard evaluation criteria should be used: (a) relevance, (b) effectiveness, (c) efficiency, (d) impact, and (e) sustainability according to the IMAS 14.20.[10]

In accordance with the International Mine Action Standards as well as the BiH Standards for Mine Risk Education, the evaluation will cover issues of stakeholder involvement; coordination; integration with other mine action, humanitarian and development activities; community participation and empowerment; information management and exchange; appropriate targeting; communication and education methodologies and tools; and training needs.

The evaluation will present recommendations to UNICEF and other key programme stakeholders for future programme design, funding, implementation, and coordination.

Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will look in depth at the main components of the programme: Mine Action Policy Support, Community Mine Risk Management, and School-based Mine Risk Education.

The evaluation will look at the UNICEF contribution within the wider context of Mine Action in BiH, assess, and make recommendation in term of UNICEF strategic partnership and collaboration.

The evaluation will also review the Land Mine Victim Assistance component of the UNICEF project, which focuses on monitoring the implementation of the LMVA.

1.3 Methodology

The methodology used was:

1) Document review of an extensive list of documents, principally provided by UNICEF and the BHMAC. A list of major documents reviewed is included in Annex A to this report.

2) Field visits to meet:

(i) Municipal representatives in areas with mine affected communities,
(ii) Local people in affected communities who are acting as community representatives
(Focal Points) for mine action,
(iii) BHMAC regional staff,
(iv) NGOs active in MRE
Detailed interviews were conducted with each group. The experience of the evaluation team is that an interview time of at least one hour is needed if people are to start to share their experiences at more than a superficial level. The tradition of courtesy and hospitality in the Balkan countries leads to polite responses to questions at first, which yields rather little information of real value to the evaluation process. Only once the initial stage has passed is key information usually provided.
3) A meeting of key stakeholders was hosted by UNICEF in Sarajevo and the preliminary findings of the evaluation team were presented, using a powerpoint type slide show which is attached as Annex B to this report. Comments were invited and were noted by the team for inclusion in this final report.

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[10] Extract from IMAS 14.20 Evaluation of mine risk education programmes and projects**:**

a) is the project relevant - the extent to which the MRE project is suited to the particular needs, expectations and priorities of the target group, NMAA, implementing organisation and, where applicable the donor;

b) is the project effective - the extent to which the project achieves its objectives and goals;

c) is the project efficient - the extent to which the project outputs (qualitative and quantitative) are achieved in relation to the inputs, in particular resources and costs;

d)what is the impact - the benefits and costs of the MRE project, whether directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Political, socio-economic, environmental and cultural issues should be addressed; and

e) is the activity sustainable - the probability that the benefits achieved by the MRE project will continue after donor funding and/or specialist assistance (such as international technical advisors) has been withdrawn. Projects should be financially and technically sustainable.

UNICEF made simultaneous interpretation between Bosnian and English available for the meeting: the slides were presented in English and the discussion took place in local languages.

2 Mine Risk Education and SALW in BiH

2.1 The Mine Risk Education Strategy

In 2004, BHMAC, with support from UNICEF, drew up and published an MRE strategy.[11] The strategy includes four key assumptions:

1. Throughout the mid-term period (2005–2009), full capacities are necessary for the mine risk education implementation at all levels of society.
2. Capacity development at all society levels will result in more effective alternative solutions for assistance to local communities in order to involve them actively in the process of solving mine related problems.
3. The inclusion of accredited demining organizations is a precondition for the integration of mine risk education into humanitarian demining. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to additionally coordinate and train the available capacities.
4. Better links with local community will not be achieved without the inclusion of organizations supporting the development of civil society. It is therefore necessary to train them and coordinate their activities.

The strategy also sets out a number of Key Principles:

2.1. Relying upon local capacities
2.2. Integrated approach to mine action activities at the local community level
2.3. Coordination
2.4. Synchronization of activities with international conventions and standards

The strategic goals emphasise links to citizens' associations, formation of a network of local NGOs, the establishment of permanent and sustainable education capacities.

The strategy states "It is necessary to assess new potential participants in the mine risk education process, with especial attention to the civil society organizations that should have a significant role in the community based mine action, and capacities that ensure a certain degree of sustainability."

"By developing the network of local NGOs and other organizations by the end of 2007, the link will be maintained with local authorities, small organizations and individuals. By creating local capacities, the possibility of permanent education will be provided for the local communities' population."

The assessed resources for the mine risk education programs for the period 2005 - the end of 2008 amount to 4% of the total required resources for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the time of preparing the strategy there were 27 implementers of mine risk education activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.In conclusion, there are stable capacities for the mine risk education program.

2.2 UNICEF Programme - a brief summary of key actions

MRE in Schools

UNICEF first became involved in mine awareness in BiH in 1997. Collaborative work between UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC and the Ministries of Education in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)

[11] The strategy can be downloaded from the BHMAC website www.**bhmac**.org/en/filedownload.daenet?did=8

and the Republika Srpska (RS) resulted in the provision of mine awareness education as a part of the primary school curriculum throughout the country. In 1998, both Ministries of Education designated staff (two in the FBiH and one in the RS) to work full-time for mine awareness education.

Teacher training to support mine awareness in the school system started in 1997 in the FBiH and in the RS in 1998. In 2000, UNICEF continued to support the Ministries of Education in both entities by promoting mine awareness in football clubs and summer camps.

In 2001 and 2002, UNICEF continued the dissemination of mine awareness kits to schools.
In 2004, 335 school teachers were trained on mapping and problem solving in relation to addressing the problem of mines, 600 teachers from 20 primary schools received training on how to integrate MRE in their daily curriculum and 275 pupils involved in peer education.

In 2005, the MRE school curriculum was developed by the Entity Ministries of Education and Handicap International with UNICEF providing technical assistance and support for mobilisation of partners in this process. The training module for teachers was developed in 2006.

Through NGO Genesis, awareness and knowledge on landmines of MRE training module for students of the faculties of pedagogy was piloted and the Dean of the Faculty of Pedagogy of Bijeljina requested the faculty board for integration of MRE in five of the main subjects of the faculty curriculum. All the project activities also included an element of disability awareness with practical recommendations for teachers to work and socialise with people with disability.

Support for, and capacity building of, the BHMAC

In 2001, UNDP and the BHMAC requested UNICEF to provide technical assistance and support for MRE. In 2002, UNICEF commissioned a fact finding mission to identify key issues and to make recommendations on UNICEF's involvement in the BiH MRE programme. Based on the findings, in late 2002, UNICEF BiH recruited a professional MRE Technical Adviser with substantial professional experience to assist the BHMAC with the development of a policy framework for MRE in BiH and to strengthen the capacity of partner implementing NGOs in promoting mine-risk related behaviour changes.

The advisor started work in October 2002 and conducted an assessment and analysis in consultation with all relevant partners to determine the requirements and available resources in MRE and MVA in BiH. The Advisor, together with the BHMAC, then developed a consolidated MRE plan that also included coordination of MVA programmes. This consolidated BiH MRE plan provided the framework for both UNICEF's and the BHMAC's programmes.

In 2003 UNICEF's support for the Mine Action Centre through technical advice and chanelling of financial support from donors resulted in the adoption of a National MRE Plan, standards and accreditation of MRE agencies, and the development of an integrated information management system for MRE. A new approach to Mine Action planning supported by UNICEF, better integrated MRE with different elements of demining.

In 2005 the BHMAC developed a new planning system, the Community Integrated Mine Action Plan (CIMAP), with some technical and financial support from donors through UNICEF, which prioritises high Impact communities, rather than minefields, for mine action intervention. UNICEF especially focused on the improvement of MRE planning (proper needs assessment was often neglected by public awareness campaigns) and commissioned a training manual Mine Risk Education Planning for Mine-Affected Communities in BiH. During 2005, UNICEF and BHMAC initiated design of the quality assurance system for MRE. The task proved to be a lengthy process that had to be finalised in 2006,
In 2006 UNICEF worked with the BHMAC to develop a quality assurance system, including the adoption of standard operating procedures (SOPs), development of mine risk education (MRE) training, accreditation for the work of MRE organizations in BiH and the organization of supervision and evaluation of these processes. In 2006, UNICEF's assistance enabled the BHMAC to develop SOPs for MRE planning and for Integrated Mine Action Planning in affected communities.

Mine Risk management training

In 2004, the BHMAC held four courses on Mine Risk Management, each for 25 senior and middle managers from Civil Protection, the BHMAC, the Red Cross, international and local NGOs and the armies. In accordance with the BHMAC training plan, Civil Protection organised eight MRE trainings for mine action field personnel. In total, some 100 managers and middle managers, and 200 field personnel were given training on MRE.

Also in 2004, training for community representatives was designed and implemented resulting in the development of small mine risk reduction project by local authorities. The team then moved on to piloting a system of planning for MRE at community and municipality level that was intended to lead to the development of official procedures for planning.

Trainings on how to conduct simple information MRE campaigns and educational activities for vulnerable groups were provided to community representatives, and mine risk managers and instructors were trained to conduct MRE planning in affected communities, resulting in increased knowledge and skills of 250 community representatives and 145 mine risk managers and instructors on MRE.

Support to local and international NGOs

During school year 2002/2003, the Genesis project, a national NGO with UNICEF support, educated 13,000 children from 154 primary schools about mine risk through interactive puppet theatre and country-wide educational television programmes. Also in 2002, AMI /PRONI Youth volunteer groups were set up in four highly affected municipalities of North East BiH, reaching between 700 and 800 persons each month.

With UNICEF support, during 2004, 21,000 children from 209 primary schools were educated about the mine risk through interactive puppet theatre and country-wide education television programmes. The programme continued in 2005 with 5,500 children from 101 primary schools in 22 municipalities and 60 local communities receiving risk education through their participation in the MRE and SALW interactive puppet shows, which were synchronised with the BHMAC mine risk education policy. Around 20 students of all grades in each of 24 schools in highly landmine impacted communities, were engaged in interactive peer education workshops and their teachers.

13,000 children were provided with information on mines and mine risk in 2006. 120 teachers and 300 peer educators were trained on integrating landmine and SALW risk education into school curricula. UNICEF complimented an EC-funded school-based environmental project by assisting the NGO ‘Genesis’ in the development and implementation of a specific MRE component. More than 4,000 children and 40 school teachers increased their knowledge on environmental protection, including MRE, through participation in interactive puppet shows, peer education workshops and trainings for teachers. It was not possible to reach the target of 13,000 children due to decrease in funding.

UNICEF and SALW

The UN Development Program (UNDP) 2004 Small Arms Survey findings show that over 16% of the Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) population illegally possess weapons - over 495,000 people. So far over 50,000 SALW have been recovered from the civilian population since 1999. At this pace it will take another 80 years to fully recover all the illegal weapons in BiH.

UNICEF acknowledged the emerging issue of SALW from about 2004 onwards, and initiated SALW intervention and research. However, a proposed joint survey of SALW by UNDP and UNICEF was not realised. UNICEF undertook an intervention in support of illegal weapons collection where field personnel from an MRE NGO assisted local small arms owners to hand over their illegal weapons by acting as facilitators and intermediaries.

In schools, together with teachers, pupils and parents, UNICEF worked to recommended that weapons are kept safely, out of reach, and to teach children that they should not play with them. This is on going project, as is participatory action research on small arms in schools.

3 Analysis of UNICEF Mine Action Programme

3.1 Casualty rates in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mine and UXO casualties

Casualty rates (both death and injury) in BiH have steadily declined since the end of the war; data since 1998 are shown below.[12] In 2006 and so far in 2007 (up to the end of October) no child casualties have been reported. Child casualties prior to this decreased steadily for several years.



Analysis of accident reports by BHMAC staff for the evaluation team showed that of the 52 casualties reported so far in 2006 and 2007, 15 had been involved in accidents in unmarked areas, and for a further 13 it was not reported whether the area of the accident was marked or not. This potentially throws some doubt on the assertion that all the casualties knew they were in hazardous areas, and also raises questions about liability issues.

Analysis of casualty data shows that all the mine and UXO casualties in recent years (except for deminers at work) are adult males intentionally taking risks because of economic necessity, or possibly due to economic choice. It is widely acknowledged that further reducing the casualty rate in this group may prove to be difficult. Antonelli and co-workers at the Universities of Rome and Sarajevo[13] undertook detailed analysis of casualty data in BiH (including some sophisticated statistical analyses) and drew some interesting conclusions, including:

(i) Casualties are clustered. “81 % of the cases analysed were in fact concentrated in 6 districts, 2 in RS (Bjeljina and Doboj) and 4 in BIH (Posavski, Srednjebosanski, Tuzlanski and Zenicko-dobojski).”

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[12] Red Cross casualty data and recent data for 2006 and 2007 from BHMAC (with thanks to BHMAC staff).

[13] Mine Risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gender, Awareness and Territory, Antonelli. The original text was not made available to the evaluation team and could not be located through detailed searching on the Internet. The English translation by Castrucci does not include details of the co-workers.

(ii) The victims who knew of the danger and had received MRE – mainly men – continued to make frequent visits to the SHA zones. This means that:

• Some factor caused the future victim to intentionally enter the SHA;
• That the awareness of Mine Risk had no effect on the behaviour towards the danger areas."

Antonelli concludes: "What I found shocking was the finding in the study that two thirds of the people I had interviewed said that they would go back or were already going back to the areas where they had been injured."

Anlysis of Casualty data

Mine and UXO casualty rates are often considered as an indicator of the overall need for mine risk education, and as an indicator of the success of MRE. However, a "cause and effect" relationship of the number of casualties with MRE, marking, clearance and other activities has not been established in BiH or indeed in any other country. There is no evidence of a difference in the rate of reduction of casualties in communities with and without MRE. Other reports have claimed that emergency demining responses and marking are responsible for this reduction in BiH and elsewhere, indeed it is not uncommon for a significant fall in the number of casualties in one country to be simultaneously attributed to entirely different causes in different reports depending on the perspective of the author.

Some attempts have been made to identify the impact of MRE using "Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Beliefs" (KAPB) studies but without a clear results. The Red Cross - BiH and ICRC - published "Knowledge, Attitude, and Practises Survey (Mine Awareness)" in June 2003. The document lists the results of the interviews in BiH as raw data but does not explain the methodology in detail, nor does it present any analysis, so it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this study. Inspection of the data suggests that in 2003 there was widespread knowledge of the basic messages of MRE and that there was no clear difference between the answers of the groups with and without MRE.

It is widely accepted that the link between increased knowledge and behaviour change is not well understood; work done on this topic for HIV/AIDS risk awareness suggests that the linkage is established, but is far weaker than the linkage between education and knowledge and takes years to develop fully.[14] The international NGO Intersos neatly summed this up in their BiH study: "The subject of our analysis was not behaviour toward mine risk, but the attitude toward mine risk. As previously stated, there is no direct link between attitude and behaviour, however, attitude represents a realistic indicator of behaviour predispositions."

It is reasonable to assume that good quality MRE will contribute to reducing casualties. This is a useful outcome, and MRE does not have to be highly effective at an individual level in order to be useful. As a report for the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) notes: "research also shows that MRE interventions can be relatively ineffective in terms of numbers of people whose behaviour is modified, and yet still beneficial in comparison with other mine action interventions due to their comparatively low costs." [15] In this context, the proposed budget of 4% of total clearance costs dedicated to MRE in BiH appears to be a satisfactory choice.

MRE is a well documented subject and a lot of information is available on the internet[16] about the most effective ways to communicate the MRE messages about behaviour change (i.e. the way that leads to the best measurable transfer of knowledge) - for example it has been shown that posters are not very effective but inclusion in the school curriculum can be effective.

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[14] See unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001466/146621e.pdf

[15] Assessing the Compatibility of SALW Awareness and Mine Risk Education, SEESAC / UNDP, 2005 ISBN: 86-7728-008-1 This argument is developed at some length by the report's author, Keeley, in his PhD thesis "The Economics of Landmine Clearance" 2006, available from http://www.dissertation.de/

[16] UNICEF and the GICHD, and other sources, have information available.

SALW Casualty data

SALW casualty rates are more difficult to determine than mine and UXO casualty rates. Standards have been developed by the UNDP sponsored South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), of relevance here are Regional Micro-Disarmament Standard/Guideline (RMDS/G) 04.20 “SALW Accounting” [17] and RMDS/G 05.80 “SALW Survey.” [18] According to the UNDP Media Monitor Reporting and Impact Analysis, a total of 167 SALW related incidents occurred in BiH over the period January-July 2007, including 31 murders, 11 suicides, 26 armed assaults, and 25 armed robberies. The Mortality Index is 43% in the first seven months of 2007. However, despite the widespread weapons ownership, and the clear implication of illegal weapons in murder and suicide, it should be noted that both the homicide rate and the suicide rate of BiH are less than those of Switzerland and the suicide rate about half that of Slovenia[19].

It is suggested that incidents involving children are at the level of about one per month in BiH, but this could not be verified. Some incidents are known to be due to young children, under 8 years old, finding weapons at home and killing or injuring other children of similar age[20].

3.2 Analysis of UNICEF Mine Action and Small Arms Programme Plans

Log Frames

The Log Frames for the UNICEF MRE programme were reviewed in detail.

1. The Community Mine Risk Management (CMRM) Logframe

The 2005-2008 UNDAF Human Security Outcome was “Improved government and local community management of mine action, MRE and mine victim assistance, and SALW”

The 2005-2008 UNICEF Country Programme Outcome was “Communities in 154 most affected by landmines areas assess, develop and implement responses to risks associated with landmines, including MRE and MVA and SALW.”

The 2005-2008 UNICEF Output was “Local Governments in 100 communities highly impacted by landmines, in cooperation with NGOs, develop and have increased capacity to implement community action plans in mine action, integrating MRE and LMVA, and SALW risk Education.”

2. The Policy Logframe

The 2005 - 2008 the Human Security outcome was the same as CMRM

The 2005-2008 UNICEF Country Programme Outcome was “policy makers take responsibility and put into practice an effective policy framework integrating MRE and LMVA into mine action at national and local levels.

The 2005-2008 UNICEF Output was “BHMAC develops policy framework at national and local levels for MRE and MVA, including national standards and tools for its implementation.”

Analysis

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[17] http://www.seesac.org/resources/RMDS%2004.20%20SALW%20Accounting%20(Edition%204).pdf

[18] http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/demand/demand_pdf/2004_SEESAC_survey.pdf

[19] Data from “UNDP small arms control in BiH, SACBIH project impact report - PI/001” UNDP, Feb 2007. This report also states “…these weapons are very often used for committing suicide” presumably meaning a high proportion of the low number of suicides.

[20] Interview with Amna Berbic, UNDP Sarajevo, October 2007.

A number of areas were not implemented. Clearly, funding is not unlimited and choices have to be made. Implementing what could be called "classical" high quality MRE actions in the shorter term, most notably the Genesis puppet shows, have been far more evident.

The involvement of local people as MRE actors, the need to work at municipal and local level, and the development of local government (including local Civil Protection) as a key participant are consistent themes across all the Log Frames and also the MRE Strategy document. The importance of local people as actors in the process (and not passive recipients of MRE) is repeatedly mentioned, but the outcomes are very limited in this area. The only systematic involvement of local people and Municipality staff has been in (i) involvement in the CIMAP planning process where the local community is guided through a risk analysis by BHMAC staff and (ii) the training - but not always the subsequent follow-up - of municipality staff and Civil Protection staff in MRE. It is acknowledged that this type of long term sustainable approach is generally more difficult to implement than funding NGOs to do MRE projects. As is known, developing local skills can offer good long-term impact at low cost (good efficiency) but the current approach has proved unsustainable in BiH for two reasons.

First, the local NGO sector has not developed into being self-sustaining beyond a limited number of organisations - most importantly Genesis and Posavina Bez Mina. These organisations do appear to have been able to access funds from international donors and local governments to ensure their continuity, but at least one local MRE NGO has closed since the end of UNICEF funding. Some NGO demining agencies implement MRE as part of integrated mine action with demining funds - but again this is a service of delivering MRE messages and not creating local networks of people able to act as focal points.

Secondly, donors may not be interested in continuing the current level of support, making low cost local initiatives essential to any future MRE beyond that integrated with clearance work, in BiH.

The support for local communities to become involved in MRE was clearly written in to both strategy and policy, even though implementation was very weak.

Funding summary[21]

RECEIVED MRE FUNDS FOR THE PERIOD 2005-2007 * All amounts in USD		
Funds received by UNICEF Sarajevo		
Received in 2003	**Period covered by funds**	
810.188,00	2003 -2006	Funds received in 2003 and spent prior
144.048,23	2004-2006	to 2005 are not included
Received in 2004		
140.220,00	2005-2007	Funds received in 2004 and spent prior
192.440,00	2005-2006	to 2005 are not included
Received in 2005		
108.434,72	2005	
Received in 2006		
140.000,00	2006-2007	
Received in 2007		
272.919,10	2007-2010	
Funds received by UNICEF NYHQ		
2005	96.347,73	
2006	20.788,30	
2007	1.198,00	

[21] With thanks to UNICEF Sarajevo staff

3.3 Capacity building and support to policy development

A key goal of the UNICEF programme has been capacity building - see for example the 2004 UNICEF BiH Mine Action Programme General Report. This has been partly successful. The institutional support at national and entity level for planning and strategy development - principally through support to the BHMAC - has made a real contribution to the development of the organisation. Support to the various Ministries of Education assisted the implementation of the national MRE / SALW curriculum. However, as noted above, there has been little capacity building at the Municipal level and local community level.

Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)

With support from UNICEF, the BHMAC has drawn up SOPs for MRE - in itself a significant achievement. There is a clear need for SOPs and good regulation of MRE to ensure that the correct messages are transmitted in the correct way. However, the BiH SOPs are based on the approach used for SOPs for demining which has a number of important limitations which may impact negatively on MRE activities in BiH in the longer term.

Demining is a potentially dangerous activity and demining SOPs are based on ensuring the safety of deminers as well as quality management. This is not a suitable approach for MRE SOPs and has resulted in an unduly restrictive procedure. The SOPs do not envisage any participation of local people who want to be proactive and assist with MRE. MRE is regarded in the SOPs as a product to be delivered to local people by highly qualified professionals (minimum a university degree) working for accredited organisations - usually NGOs. There is no conceptual model in the SOPs permitting local people to teach each other or to work together, nor a model for such ideas as supporting local “Focal Point” people with a limited mandate such as checking that mine warning signs have not been tampered with and replacing them if they have, or acting as the contact person to report mines and UXO to the authorities.

Furthermore, there is no place identified in the SOPs for participation by Municipal MRE staff, nor for the active collaboration of Civil Protection staff at municipal or other levels. It is not realistic to expect all these staff to have university degrees. Similarly, there is no mention of the participation of the Ministries of Education in the SOPs.

It is unlikely that the strategic goals of local and municipal participation in MRE can be achieved without a major revision of the SOPs based on a different conceptual model which does not put restrictive control by BHMAC at the centre. BHMAC is tasked with accreditation and quality control - but this needs a different approach to that which has been proposed. This also raises a number of issues about who has authority to accredit whom - there is a clear need for a cooperative approach to MRE between BHMAC, Civil Protection and Municipalities which avoids conflicts over imposed ways of working.

Landmine Victim Assistance (LMVA)

LMVA is a difficult topic to address, there are serious ethical issues involved in decisions to offer or decline access to medical care and rehabilitation services. The boundaries of support can de difficult to define - resources may not be sufficient to support all people with disability, for example, in a post-war country like BiH. Advocacy may prove a more useful approach.

Areas which are easier to address are supporting training and finding work. UNICEF has supported landmine victims by working through the Ministry of Health. The evaluation team fully supports this approach - it supports local capacity building and a long-term national solution, and avoids duplication of programmes.

UNICEF has not focussed a large proportion of resources on LMVA compared with MRE, and there are clear reasons for this. However, with the decline in the number of casualties and MRE activities there may be a greater opportunity to further develop LMVA both through advocacy and direct support.

The evaluation team had limited time for both investigation and for reporting. Despite the inclusion of LMVA in the ToR the team took the decision to focus on MRE and not on LMVA during the evaluation.

3.4 The approach used in BiH

A detailed and rigorous study of Mine Risk Education for Mine-Affected Communities was funded by UNICEF and published in November 2005.[22] The research and proposed methodology is very thorough, but the application of this level of detail to all mine affected communities may not be justified. The GICHD guidebooks for MRE - a 600 page guide to implementing MRE in accordance with IMAS - state that there are five key questions to answer in planning MRE:

i. Who is at risk ?
ii. Where are they at risk (which region, or what type of land or area) ?
iii. What is the nature of the threat ?
iv. Why are they at risk - what is the reason for taking risks?
v. How can we best help?

The answers to the first four questions are already fully established in BiH.

The end result of the BHMAC process is high quality analysis and planning, but only for a relatively small percentage of the affected communities. With well over 1,000 affected communities identified in the LIS the resulting rate of planning suggests that it will be many years before all communities have a CIMAP plan developed - according to the BHMAC annual report for 2006 plans were developed for 25 communities, and of these 9 were implemented. The same report states that MRE plans were developed for 82 communities and for four municipalities (though it is not clear if this includes the CIMAP plans). With hundreds of communities affected the delay in developing plans is likely to be substantial for some communities. However, the delay in implementing the plans is going to be even longer, and at current rates could be measured in tens of years. It appears that there could be as many as 80 CIMAP plans already awaiting implementation and many of these will be out of date before implementation. The value of the MRE activities undertaken while writing the CIMAP plan is noted, however the frustration of communities who engage in a detailed planning process without any results should also be noted. The risk assessment and planning is intended to assist communities in identifying vulnerable groups and at risk activities, thus ensuring accurate information is shared, misconceptions are debunked, implementation should mainly focus on training of local focal points and urgent marking. The assessment and planning process should also provide an avenue to inform communities about the prioritisation process, roles and responsibilities of MAC, CP which is also intended to help in managing the risk.

Despite this very partial coverage, casualty rates are low and confined to a single high risk group. This strongly suggests that existing MRE activities are sufficient. It is even debatable if efforts should be targeted at the one high risk group. Antonelli noted from his detailed study, (see above) there is evidence that conventional MRE does not alter the behaviour of this group. Since the study was conducted in 2003 UNICEF has worked to develop a more sophisticated approach and has also focused on marking, as it appeared from the same study that marking was important, as a reminder for people overwhelmed by problems who unconsciously minimise the mine risk.

As all the MRE programmes in BiH, even the relatively large ones, have targeted only a part of the total at risk population it would have been possible to undertake comparative studies of either knowledge, attitudes and practices, or accident rates, in matched communities with and without MRE. This opportunity was not used - though the Red Cross KAP study mentioned above collected some data it was

[22] Mine Risk Education for Mine-Affected Communities - Guidelines for risk assessment and planning in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darvin Lisica and Suzana Srnic Vukovic, UNICEF / DFID, 2005

apparently not analysed. Since the BHMAC monitors where accidents happen, it would be feasible to undertake a retrospective study of the efficacy of MRE.

Providing a minimum level of MRE for all communities, beyond inclusion of MRE in the school curriculum, was planned to be developed by working at municipality level involving mine action coordinators and other CP units. Once a successful programme was implemented in a few communities it was intended that it would extended to further communities, though this had very limited success which has not been addressed. The replication in highly impacted communities where clearance work was done was foreseen to be funded by demining money and implemented in an integral manner with clearance, while, other communities should have been clustered and address through municipal level focus. This would also have allowed, for municipal authorities to take a more important part in implementation of marking and MRE. In the end the "reproducibility" of pilot programmes was a significant problem despite significant efforts which have been put into training a large number of Civil protection people. The overall structure has not been successfully established at municipal and local level to take this further, the SOPs do not foresee such people as key players in MRE and there appears to have been only limited cooperation between BHMAC and Civil Protection in establishing the required coordination of MRE activities.

It is worth repeating that the low casualty rate, and the zero child casualty rate, suggest that little or no further action is needed. It is often stated (the evaluation team heard this frequently) that continued action is needed to keep the accident rate low but the team has been unable to find evidence to support this assertion. The inclusion of MRE in the school curriculum would appear to be a useful, efficient and probably sufficient, response. Addressing the known high-risk group , or future members of this group who are still students, should be retained as an option if (i) novel approaches which lead to behaviour change can be identified and (ii) such approaches are cost effective.

Local participation in MRE

The importance of the local community is emphasised in a number of planning and strategy documents - notably the Bosnia and Herzegovina mine risk education strategy. On page 11 this states "By developing the network of local NGOs and other organisations by the end of 2007, the link will be maintained with local authorities, small organisations and individuals. By creating local capacities, the possibility of permanent education will be provided for the local communities' population." Similarly on page 15, "The affected local communities and other implementers of activities at the local level, such as citizens' associations, associations of returnees and local municipality authorities are a significant resource. Though they do not possess any financial power, they are directly affected by the mine risk and it is necessary to train them and inform them about their possible contribution to the implementation of the Strategy."

The evaluation team fully supports the stated strategy, but notes it has not been fully implemented.

Two of the most important reasons for the failure to implement local participation are the non-participatory model which has been promoted by BHMAC[23], and the difficulty that has been experienced in MRE (and other programmes) in moving from the pilot stage to a nation wide approach that can be successfully replicated at local level.

Local communities have received support in MRE by such programmes as the highly regarded "Genesis Project" local NGO, and a significant number of communities have participated in the BHMAC CIMAP planning process, which includes involving the community in analysing the risk due to mines and UXO and how to deal with it. This is a step in the right direction but falls far short of community led action. The evaluation team consider that "local community management of mine action" and "an effective policy framework integrating MRE and LMVA into mine action at […] local levels" were not effectively addressed and not achieved. The local dimension was notably weak (at both municipal and

[23] One regional BHMAC office visited by the evaluation team clearly stated that they regarded a local person replacing a mine warning sign that had been removed as "illegal" and an action that should be prohibited and the person prosecuted.

especially local community levels) and this led to a significant reduction in effectiveness, impact and efficiency.

There are a number of key reasons for involving local people in mine affected areas as active protagonists in MRE. Two of the most important are:

- The MRE is likely to be far more effective if local people are fully involved and feel "ownership" of the messages, rather than perceiving MRE as a message delivered by "outsiders." This is not exclusive to MRE but is generally true of development and behaviour change messages and the phenomenon is well documented. The idea of involving people in risk assessment and planning, providing training for them to ensure information sharing and warning of dangers with specific groups at specific time,(typically, hunters at the beginning of the season, forest fruit collectors in the right season, etc) is sound. However the structures were not successfully put in place to ensure that qualified, accredited staff were available at a local level to undertake this work on a large scale.

- In many countries, including BiH, it is the only cost-effective option and generally the only affordable option. Some local people care deeply about the mine problem in their community and are willing to volunteer their time to support MRE programmes. Given the large number of impacted communities in BiH (over 1,000) and the recognition of the desirability of frequent repetition of MRE messages, the cost and scale of an MRE operation based on professional staff repeatedly visiting each affected community is prohibitive. This is clearly seen in the programmes financed by UNICEF, which have provided intensive high quality MRE, but have reached only a very small proportion of the affected communities.

Local people acting as protagonists in this case could include local residents and also hunting associations, and similar formal and informal groups (e.g. groups of woodcutters who work together) who are at the most risk.

Landmine victims who live in the local area can also be an important local resource in peer-to-peer MRE, and the status of being a recognised resource for MRE may help some LMV in their social reinsertion process, and assist in overcoming the feelings of loss of purpose which some mine survivors have described.

Furthermore, structures already exist in BiH at Municipal level for Civil Protection and these municipal civil protection staff may be mandated to work with mine action as well in the new Demining Law which is currently under discussion.

The evaluation team also heard some enthusiastic responses in favour of more local involvement. For example, in one of the Municipal civil protection offices visited the staff were enthusiastic about being trained and working with the BHMAC to improve awareness and marking. They were able to map out a proposed training plan in some detail and to suggest ways to involve the community.

Marking and maintenance of marking

Marking hazardous areas with mine warning signs is widely recognised in BiH as an important part of MRE. In the research by Lisica and Srnic Vukovic (see Appendix A) it was regarded as the most important source of information about risk; 32% of respondents identified marking as their main information source. In interview, the Director of BHMAC also stated that signing was the most important preventive activity. UNICEF have been actively involved in supporting marking activities as part of MRE. The inclusion of marking within the remit of MRE is novel and very welcome, though the detailed coordination necessary between survey teams who locate the signs in the first place, and MRE staff was at times weak. The survey teams are integrated into mine clearance structures.

In the 2005 Logframe an output of "Landmine Risk reduced in high risk areas through urgent marking" with a Baseline of "BHMAC 2004 annual report - high risk partly due to lack of marking" is included.

Despite this clear recognition at all levels, many known and mapped SHAs in BiH are still not marked and the rate of marking means that completion is unlikely to be achieved soon - it could be more than a decade away. A further problem is the intentional removal of signs by men seeking to access SHAs for economic purposes, or to transit them on paths they had previously used. Reasons reported for removing signs reported to the evaluation team included: wanting to enter without alarming co-workers who were unaware of the hazard, and frustration at being barred from an area they did not consider hazardous or which had been informally demined. Credible reports suggest that local demining by former soldiers, and others, is not uncommon and is used to clear land and access routes. Reports by BHMAC staff that sometimes no mines are found during clearance of areas which were known to have formerly contained mines, support these reports.

While signs should be placed by qualified surveyors equipped with accurate maps and GPS, there appears to be no reason that local people could not be trained to check signs regularly while maintaining safe behaviour, and to replace any that are damaged or missing. Attitudes to this were mixed: local communities were enthusiastic, some Civil Protection staff were positive and BHMAC staff had mixed views about this approach.

The cost of an individual sign is not high, but given the number required the overall cost runs to tens of thousands of dollars. The evaluation team suggests that local production of signs by a workshop staffed by mine survivors would be a small MRE/LMVA project which could attract funding.

Insurance

One issue that was raised several times in interviews was a request for local people, Municipal workers and others who might be involved in MRE at a local level, was a request to be covered by insurance against the risk of a mine outside a marked area. It should be emphasised that at no time was this a request for insurance to enter known hazardous areas or to undertake hazardous activities. This is a reasonable request, and certainly not one that should be used as an argument against involving local people. Such insurance is not expensive as the risk is low. The evaluation team leader has this type of coverage worldwide for his work, for a modest annual premium.

Negotiating insurance cover and disability benefits on a national, entity or cantonal basis may take time, but this should not be used to block local MRE work.

School curriculum and linkage to SALW

The development of a national school curriculum for MRE and SALW risk education, accepted by all 13 ministries of education, has been a notable success, despite some shortcomings in the implementation. In particular, it was reported that evaluation of the programme and support for teachers have been weak. These issues are known to the relevant authorities and are reported as being widespread in the BiH education systems and not limited to MRE. One reason for the success is that the curriculum work was able to build on an existing knowledge base. A study by Prism Research in April 2001, in both high and low risk areas, found that child respondents generally possessed some knowledge about safe behaviours in unfamiliar areas where there may exist a danger posed by mines and UXO. This survey concluded that the main increase in knowledge from a mass media based MRE programme was by children in low risk areas. The survey data collected by the Red Cross in 2003 appear to support this view as does the PRONI review report from 2004. UNICEF commissioned Handicap International to do the preliminary assessment for the curriculum development, and supported the development of the strategy, then Handicap International did the curriculum development work with the Ministries of Education.

UNICEF has also funded the Genesis Project to work with the faculty of pedagogy training future teachers. At the end of the project the faculty said they would take over the training.

The current school curriculum integrates both MRE and SALW risk education, at the insistence of the MoE specialists who developed the curriculum. The linkage between MRE and SALW risk education is not entirely straightforward and has been the subject of several reports - including one for SEESAC

which the evaluation team recommends “Assessing the Compatibility of SALW Awareness and Mine Risk Education”[24] The GICHD have also worked in this area preparing a report “Identifying Synergies between Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons” (October 2006). SEESAC has taken a position against SALW risk education for children: “In SEE, however, there is currently little evidence of a direct impact of weapons on children and youth, therefore it is recommended that education and awareness programmes on small arms should focus on adults, particularly gun owners, rather than children. With regard to children, it is recommended that attempts to create a new issue of ‘small arms and children’ should be resisted; instead support should be given to existing programmes aimed at reducing violent behaviour such as education for peace, schools without violence and human rights education.” [25]

The curriculum appears to be a key action in potentially reducing SALW risk in the longer term by teaching safe attitudes and behaviour in school. It could provide a useful point for UNICEF to increase SALW activities, however as a first step discussion with SEESAC of their position against SALW for children and agreement on a common way forward would appear essential.

Although UNICEF did not support directly the development of the curriculum, which was done by HI, UNICEF supported Genesis to do MRE and SALW work through various projects. A large project, exclusively funded by UNICEF, was followed by two further ones, funded by the EC with UNICEF making a 10% contribution: one project was on environment and landmines (10%) and the other one on peaceful conflict resolution and small arms (10%). This year, 2007 UNICEF is supporting Participatory Action Research on Small Arms, the first phase was in 5 schools, the second phase, implementation, is in 3 of these 5 schools. UNICEF is also funding a MRE and Small arms and disability awareness project in 5 schools including teacher training and peer education.

A focus on more detailed and specially designed MRE for forestry and agriculture schools may be one of the few ways to address the high risk group of intentional risk takers. While it may be very difficult or impossible to influence the current adult male members of the risk taking group, addressing future woodcutters and farmers through such an intervention would be a logical approach to gradually changing attitudes and behaviour. This is mentioned in the BiH MRE strategy and i UNICEF has initiated discussion with the Genesis project to start this work in 2008.

3.5 Implementation constraints

Implementation problems have clearly been a serious constraint on the success of the project cycle. There is extensive research and policy development on mine action and MRE, especially at the BHMAC but also elsewhere in BiH. A great deal is known about the problem and has been known about the issues surrounding MRE in BiH for at least five years. While action is under way, as far as MRE through the CIMAP process is concerned, the implementation lags far behind the planning and there is a serious risk that planning will run so far ahead of implementation that it will be out of date before it is used. BHMAC are currently re-analysing their prioritisation data.

The view that MRE should (or even must) be accompanied by other mine action, predominantly clearance, has been consistently expressed in BiH for some time. A clear example is in the report of the assessment of the PRONI programme of intensive MRE in four communities. The report dates from 2004, the PRONI programme was described in Landmine Monitor Report (2002) as “the most effective mine risk education program in the Brčko district.” The assessment report states:

“However, the fact that virtually no actual mine clearance activities had been implemented for the duration of the project figured prominently in all conversations [with local people]. The phenomena that MRE work is often done in isolation from other forms of anti-mine action has already been observed in BiH, and it threatens to completely undermine the credibility of MRE and mine risk education work. It has been said and needs to be reemphasized that MRE should be done in conjunction with other forms

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[24] Assessing the Compatibility of SALW Awareness and Mine Risk Education, SEESAC / UNDP, 2005 ISBN: 86-7728-008-1

[25] SASP3 - SALW Awareness Support Pack available from http://www.seesac.org/

of demining activities." Later the same report notes: "The four target municipalities covered in this project have been exhausted as fertile ground for MRE work, and should again be considered only when, and if, actual mine clearance is scheduled to take place in these communities."

There are two key issues here:

1. If clearance is going to take at leat 30 years at the curent rate of progress, how is MRE to be addressed in the vast majority of communities that will not have any clearance activities in the next few years? Recommending that MRE should be linked to clearance is certainly a sound policy for highly impaced communities, but misses the point that MRE should probably also be addressed in communities where no clearance is likely to take place soon. BHMAC have failed to address this issue, and have focussed instead on very detailed and sophisticated planning for a limited numberof highly impacted communities and implementation for fewer.
2. The current situation is that there have been no recent casualties outside the high risk group. To elaborate the point further: Outside the one, known, high risk group there have been no casualties in communities with CIMAP or without CIMAP, no casualties in comunities where the local school teacher did not understand and implement the MRE curriculum correctly, as well as in those where it was well implemented and taught; no casualties in communities that have had no MRE (beyond the nationwide mass-media campaign) as well as those that are "saturated" by intensive actions like the PRONI work. Drawing any conclsions as to the effectiveness of MRE when there is a zero casualty rate outside the one high risk group is extremely difficult and would involve, for example, such work as detailed studies of matched communities and the risk taking behaviour of populations in them. Formalising the knowledge of local people through the CIMAP process may not alter risk taking behaviour by the high risk group, the link between knowledge and behaviour change is known to be weak. Conventionally, evaluation of MRE has answered the question "Were the activities planned and completed?" and not "Was risk taking behaviour changed by the MRE?"

The view that "effort is being focussed on generating strategic documents rather than coordination between key actors" was expressed at the meeting of key actors for feedback to the preliminary findings as was criticism of the failure to fully use information available from the Civil Protection services.

3.6 The Donor View

The evaluation team contacted a small number of donors in Sarajevo who had supported the UNICEF MRE programme in the past to hear their views on continuing funding this work.
All the donors contacted stated that they were unlikely to continue to support on a large scale. Small contributions from "the Ambassador's fund" or similar resources for suitable individual small projects would always remain a possibility.

Key reasons for the move away from supporting MRE included:

• The low casualty rate indicates that the "job is finished" and other priorities should be addressed.
• A perception that the root of the problem is economic and efforts should be re-directed to rebuilding the economy.
• In the case of the Netherlands a world-wide restructuring will lead to less involvement in BiH.
• The UK is strongly supporting the UNDP SALW programme and sees this as a higher priority.

The evaluation team is of the opinion that donors are more interested at present in SALW activities than MRE. The UNDP programme for SALW stockpile destruction has attracted 11 million dollars, and there is considerable support for a programme of weapons collection and disposal in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, SALW in SE Europe has a strong regional dimension which may also be attractive to donors.

3.7 UNICEF Positioning

Comparative advantage

The evaluation team also looked at the specific comparative advantages of UNICEF in MRE in BiH.

- •Experience and local knowledge - working since 1996 to suport MRE in BiH
- •Established relationships with others in the sector - NGOs, Red Cross, BHMAC, etc
- •Established reputation -the “UNICEF Brand” is recognised and associated with humanitarian work for children. In the complex political environment of BiH the neutrality of the UN institutions is an asset. The financial controls and confidence that they bring to donors add value.
- •Established links with donors (including UNICEF headquarters)
- •Ability to link MRE with other community based programmes.

This last point could potentially offer a route for further MRE work to address the issues of support for local communities taking local action in MRE.

The evaluation team consider that the most important resources for MRE in Bosnia and Herzegovina are local people -first people in local communities who are willing to volunteer time and effort to help reduce the risk to their community and secondly, people in municipalities who are interested and willing to engage with the problem but lack resources and training. These key assets are seriously under-utilised at present. They could also be key assets in the illegal weapons and unsafe practices parts of an SALW programme.

4 Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1 The UNICEF Mine Action programme

4.1.1 Relevance

The UNICEF programme was considered as highly relevant:

(i)The programme as described in the Logframes was relevant to the needs of stakeholders, and if implemented successfully would have met those needs.

(ii) The Strategy and Policy developed with the support of the programme were also highly relevant and set out a clear approach to MRE including support for action by local communities, MRE in schools, support to build national capacity through the BHMAC, and other key actions.

4.1.2 Effectiveness

The programme had mixed effectiveness.

(i) Some key actions were successfully implemented including: capacity building, MRE in the school curriculum, research into MRE planning and prioritisation, the development and use of NGO support for MRE including the Genesis puppet show and other activities.

(ii) Other key areas were not successful or were not adequately addressed, including: Support for local communities and municipalities, LMVA, SALW.

Key barriers to effectiveness included the weakness in implementation of MRE (compared to planning MRE), poor coordination between BHMAC which overall regulates and controls MRE and Civil Protection and municipal staff who are the key link at local and municipal level, and the difficulty in moving from a pilot scale trial of an MRE technique to large scale replication of the technique.

4.1.3 Efficiency

The programme had mixed efficiency

(i) Support to capacity building was generally efficient.
(ii) Support for developing strategy and planning appears to have been efficient.
(iii) The support for developing and implementing MRE in the school curriculum was not only efficient but has a very high leverage effect on resources.
(iv) The support for some of the direct MRE was less efficient - delivering MRE as a product on a pilot scale which is then never extended to a mass approach has limited efficiency.
One of the key limitations to efficiency was the "professionalisation" of MRE and the limited use of local volunteers and the existing civil protection staff at municipal level, as was envisaged in the planning.

4.1.4 Impact

It is very difficult to measure the true impact of MRE. Conventionally, the quantity and quality of outputs are used as a substitute for impact, but this is not entirely satisfactory. The programme had mixed impact overall.

(i) The impact of capacity building was good.
(ii) The impact of strategy development was poor as the strategy was not fully implemented. The evaluation team notes that it was partly implemented, and it allowed for general consensus on overall directions to take.
(iii) The impact of the CIMAP and MRE planning process supported by UNICEF was mixed: it was good where the plans were made and implemented, it was much lower (and possibly negative due to unfulfilled expectations) where plans were made but not implemented.

If MRE is to have further impact in BiH it must find ways to work with the repeat intentional risk takers as these are now the only casualty group. This focus has been repeatedly identified but not well addressed. However, it may well not be cost effective to work with this group investing substantial resources may not achieve any change in behaviour - interventions must be carefully planned and tested.

It is likely that MRE has contributed to the reduction in casualties due to mines and UXO in BiH. If this is the case then the overall impact is positive, but more limited than it might have been.

4.1.5 Sustainability

The sustainability is mixed.

(i) The capacity building and especially the planning skills that have been developed are sustainable.
(ii) On the other hand, the support to local NGOs has been generally unsustainable.
(iii) The policy of developing sustainable local capacity in MRE failed as it was not implemented, the sustainability remains uncertain and very heavily dependent on improved cooperation - and improved formal structures for cooperation - between BHMAC, Civil Protection and Municipal staff.

4.1.6 Overall Conclusions

1 - UNICEF has a number of clear reasons to be satisfied with the MRE programme in BiH. Overall it is clear that there have been some reall successes:

- the casualty rate is currently zero except for a small high risk group of intentional risk takers.
- local capacity has been built at BHMAC which is now capable of undertaking the task of MRE planning and monitoring, though there may still be some specific minor needs for ongoing support.

- inclusion of MRE in the school curriculum is agreed and being implemented nationwide, and can be expected to take care of long term MRE needs.
- a number of activities that are conventionally regarded as "good MRE" have been completed e.g. puppet shows, training local people, etc.
- the CIMAP process is inserting MRE into overall risk based demining process for a limited number of high impact communities.
- SOPs for MRE have been drafted, endorsed, and applied.
- a large number of local municipality people and municipal coordinators have had some MRE training.

2 - However some weaknesses were also identified:

- the community level is still weak in terms of local people as protagonists and not recipients of MRE. This is despite clear identification of the improtance and value of these local people as a key resource in the UNICEF strategy and in the BiH MRE strategy documents.
- there appears to be little clear vision and strategy at national level to deal with high risk group. Clearly focused research may be necessary to identify useful strategies for the high risk group, though cost-effectiveness criteria need to be rigorously applied to proposed actions with a group like this that may not respond.
- communities which lie outside the CIMAP process were intended to be principally addresed through municipal mine coordinators but this has not yet been put into practice for a number of reasons.
- a number of items in UNICEF strategic plan have not been fully addressed including SALW, and LMVA (though a useful start has been made on both, more remains to be done).
- the SOPs require modification to better include community action.

3 Key action needed is to develop a really effective community based MRE and SALW structure which is an essential resource for the mid to long term. This can only happen once BHMAC, Civil Protection and local municipalities start to work together in a more coordinated and cohesive manner. There appears to be little that UNICEF can effectively do beyond advocacy until some agreement is reached between BHMAC and CP, and also with the municipalities, and then the SOPs revised to take into account municipalities leading MRE work. If this is achieved, UNICEF may be able to assist local communities in finding effective ways to work within the structure. If agreement on the way forward is reached then UNICEF may be in a good position to link local MRE and SALW actions with other community based programmes.

4 SALW is an interesting avenue to explore further, especially at a regional level. It appears to be more interesting to some donors than further MRE is. There is a clear need to start three way negotiations between UNDP, SEESAC and UNICEF to discuss SEESAC's recommendation that no work on SALW with children should be done, and how UNDP and UNICEF can work together effectively and efficiently.

5 Given the important successes outlined above, there appears to be little left for UNICEF to do in terms of pure MRE. Support for some small trial programmes addressing the risk-taking group, supporting the ongoing school curriculum implementation, and limited ongoing support for BHMAC appear to be sufficient actions. To put it bluntly - two years without a child casualty despite the very high level of contamination in BiH can rightly be declared a real success and an opportunity for UNICEF to move on to other activities.

6 Both LMVA and SALW need an exploratory phase before larger scale action is developed. Both are relatively difficult and unknown areas of work compared to MRE and careful exploration of the way ahead is clearly both necessary and justified.

4.2 Recommendations

1. On the basis of the casualty data, the established capacity of BHMAC and Civil Protection, and the inclusion of MRE / SALW in the school curriculum, there is no case for continuing support to MRE in BiH beyond a limited number of specific actions:

1.1. Support to ensure the full and effective implementation of the existing MRE-SALW education within the school curriculum would be fully justified. Such support should be based on national or entity level actions and not on improving a few schools to a much higher standard than others.

1.2. Limited support to specifically address present, and especially future, members of the known high risk group might be useful, but should be at a modest level. As this group takes risks due to economic pressures a study of economic alternatives and how to implement them might be the most effective approach at present. Addressing the issue of members of this group deliberately removing warning signs may also be useful.

1.3. Support to improve and increase marking (signage) of known hazardous areas could be both effective and cost effective. Such support should be based on:

1.3.1. Working to establish and implement a strategy to involve local volunteers who are willing to check and maintain mine warning signs in their neighbourhood. This should be linked to other community support initiatives as closely as possible.

1.3.2. Providing signs by establishing local production, preferably also employing landmine survivors in a small workshop.

1.4. Support for developing implementing guidelines for training municipality level staff - usually but not always Civil Protection staff - in MRE and SALW risk education, and in community liaison techniques to enable them to support local volunteers. Such a system would have to be agreed by both BHMAC and Civil Protection, as well as the municipalities. This agreement may take a significant amount of time to realise, and UNICEF may need to undertake advocacy actions to engage all the parties in reaching and implementing such an agreement.

2. Collaboration with SEESAC and UNDP on SALW issues - and use of common standards, reports and other resources, is strongly recommended. Discussion with SEESAC of their recommendations to *not* undertake small arms risk education in schools is an essential precursor. If agreement can be reached then, in close collaboration with SEESAC, develop and implement a programme to

2.1. Make young people aware of the risks of SALW illegal ownership and promote safe practices with personal weapons whether legal or illegal. Continue and further develop the current innovative AR based project on SALW.

2.2. Consider working with the children of illegal weapons owners on a "child to adult" programme to promote disposal of weapons, or safe weapons handling and storage.

2.3. Develop SALW local contact points and community educators and work with municipal authorities on SALW issues. This should be undertaken in close linkage to 1.4 above if both are to be implemented.

3. Undertake further actions in LMVA.

3.1 Further develop the existing relationship with the Ministry of Health for LMVA as a way of supporting the development of sustainable responses to the needs of landmine survivors in BiH.

3.2 Undertake advocacy work in support of landmine survivors, and actions to assist the development of sustainable local organisations of survivors to undertake self-advocacy and other activities in support of professional and social reintegration.